The Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms
Used in the English Translation
of
Master Peter Lombard’s
and of
St. Bonaventure’s Commentaria
on the same
by Br. Alexis Bugnolo,
Editor & Publisher
© 2006
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English Term Used |
Latin Term |
Rational for use of English Term |
How to Render Specific Forms of the Latin term(s) or specific Latin idiomatic usages of the term |
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A |
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abstraction, in the abstract, abstract (ed), withdrawn
to remove, to withdraw, to abstract |
abstractio, in abstracto abstractus, -a, -um
abstrahere |
Abstraction is a technical term of Medieval Logic for that form of expression which is composed in abstract terms, as in the saying: « Deity is superior to humanity » and « Generation presupposes existence ». It is opposed to Concretion (q. v.)
In its root meaning abstraho, -ere means “to draw away”, “to withdraw” “to remove”, “to abstract”. The sense must be rendered according to the context, “to abstract” in reference to logical acts, “to withdraw” or “to remove” or “to draw away” in reference to the alteration of meaning, signification, of propositions, or in other general senses.
Likewise abstractus, -a,-um is rendered variously as “abstract”, “abstracted”, “withdrawn”, “removed” etc., according to context: e.g. use “abstracted” rather than “abstract”, when the noun modified is followed by a prepositional phrase such as « from its general sense » [de sensu generali].
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in abstracto: in the abstract — when referring to the general manner of formulating a verbal or logical statement; in an abstract (statement) — when it refers to the use in an actual statement.
in abstractione: in abstraction
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judgment, |
arbitrium |
The Latin term arbitrium means that act whereby a thing is chosen, judged or decided. As such it can be rendered as choice, judgment or decision. Though, Neil Lewis in his article on Grosseteste, says:
“Like most medieval thinkers Grosseteste typically uses the term ‘free decision’ (Liberum arbitrium) rather than ‘free will’ (libera voluntas). This notion involves a duality, the term ‘free’ pointing to the will and ‘decision’ to some kind of rational judgment,”
the proper distinction appears in this, that arbitrium refers to the act whereby a thing is chosen, judged or decided, in deed, where as choice, judgment and decision, per se, are acts of the intellect distinguishing in an intellectual act between two or more beings or acts. Thus arbitrium is properly a genus of act in the power of acting, which is properly the will.
In addition, in English there is a long tradition of rendering liberum arbitrium as “free will” rather than as “free judgment”, “free decision” or “free choice”. This is seemingly because in Latin libera voluntas signifies in the real order (“a free will”) rather than in the genus of qualities of power (“free will”).
This tradition in English has its roots seemingly in Medieval Scholasticism, as is evidenced by what St. Bonaventure writes in Sent, Bk. I, d. 11, dubium 4, p. 218
The Seraphic Doctor also uses the term liberum arbitium in Sent. Bk. I, d. 17, p. II. a. sole, q. 3, in reply to nn 1 and 2, p. 315, as a supposit for a free will (libera voluntas). This is seemingly because, being an active power, any genus of its acts is the same according to substance with the power itself.
Finally, that arbitrium pertains to the will, rather than the intellect, is taught by St. Augustine himself, as the Quaracchi Editors themselves note in Sent. Bk. II, d. 42, a. sole, q. 2, p. 748, footnote 8, where having cited Augustine’s de Libero arbitrio they write:
Thus to walk along in the tradition of Latin and English Scholasticism, liberum arbitrium will be rendered as “free will”; and to distinguish this from libera voluntas, the latter will always be rendered with a definite or indefinite article (“a free will”, “the free wills”, etc.)
By itself the term arbitrium will be rendered according to context, as either “judgment” or “decision”; “choice” being omitted because of its unduly generic signification in modern English.
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liberum arbitrium: free will
libertas arbitrii: the freedom of judgment, the freedom of decision (according to context) |
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assignation, impression; to assign, to impress |
assignatio, assignare |
The Latin term assignare can be rendered into English either in respect to a formative act or a logical act: It thus has two senses:
1) “to impress” something upon something else: e.g. « On the second impression of the image » [De secunda assignatione imaginis]. This sense is taken from the literal sense of the Latin verb, which means “to set a seal upon”.
In this manner it is be used to refer to the divinely determined location of the image, which is the thing created on account of the likeness with which God ordained it to be and have.
2) “to assign” something to something else, e.g. « In St. Augustine’s theology, the image of God is assigned to the soul according to the reckoning of its three powers » [In theologia S. Augustino imago Dei assignatur animae ratione potentiarum trium.]
In this manner it is used in regard to the rational determination by some human author of the locus of the image of the Trinity in a created thing.
Conclusion: Since both St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure consider the first sense on account of the second, the former manner of translating this term ( impression, to impress ) will be used throughout in titles of discussions; whereas the latter manner ( assignation, to assign ) will be employed in particular references to these discussions, wherein one speaks of how human authors use terms. All the derivatives of these two verbs are to be used for all the derivatives of the Latin verb, respectively. |
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B |
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C |
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casuale |
Casuale is a technical term of Medieval Latin grammar for those words which follow a preposition, which, with the preposition, form the phrase which it introduces: e.g. in the sentence, « God The Father works through God the Son » [Deus Pater operator per Deum Filium], “through God the Son” [per Deum Filium] is a prepositional phrase, begun by the preposition “through” [per], in which phrase Deum Filium is the casuale of the phrase, that is, that word or name which is in the case [casus, -us] introduced by the preposition.
In Latin casuale is the neuter singular of the adjective casualis, -e, because it is understood that it stands for the name [nomen] or phrase [verbum] which follows the preposition.
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cum suo casuali: with what accompanies it in its phrase |
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to cognize, cognition, cognizable, etc. |
cognoscere, cognition, cognoscibilis etc. |
The Latin verb cognoscere and its derivatives, which is very often translated into English by “to know”, has the specific meaning among Scholastics of « to know in that manner in which a knower knows not through another but by means of its own power to know ».
It is therefore a form of knowing distinct from scientific knowledge [scire, scientia], general knowledge [noscere, notitia],and thought [cogitare, cogitatio]; capable of being had by non-intellective powers, such as the senses [cf. St. Bonaventure’s, Itinerarium mentis in Deum] and which does not preclude these other forms of knowing, so long as they originate through the power of the knower knowing the object known; though presupposing the presence of the object known to the knowing power, but not its being comprehended.
Since cognoscere has many equivalent cognates in English, to retain the standard usage of the Latin term(s), even the rarer forms of these such as cognizable, cognizability, cognizant, cognizance, cognizing, cognition, cognitive etc. must be employed. Only rarely, outside of the context of manners of knowing, that is in passing remarks or idiomatic expressions, such as “to know” a person [conoscere personam] can it be rendered as “to know”, “to recognize.” The English forms which use an -s- for the -z- are not to be employed.
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cognoscere: to cognize
cognoscibilis: cognizable
cognoscibilitas: cognizability
cognoscens. cognizant
cognitivus, -a. –um: cognitive
cognitio: (the) cognition
ad cognoscendum: to cognize
ratio cognoscendi: the reckoning of cognizing or, the reason for cognizing
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concretion, in the concrete, concrete |
concretio, in concreto, concretus, -a, -um |
Concretion is a technical term of Medieval Logic, in which a proposition is composed from concrete terms, as in the saying: « God generates a Son » or « Paul is a man from London » . It is opposed to Abstraction (q.v.).
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in concreto: in the concrete — when it refers to the general manner of formulating a verbal or logical statement; in a concrete (statement) — when it refers to the use in an actual statement.
in concretione: in concretion
concretus, -a, -um: concrete — in all senses; however rarely as co-created. |
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D |
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to define, to delimit |
definire |
The Latin verb definire in nearly all its forms is to be rendered in English normally by its cognate “to define”.
However, in the sense that a thing is defined by a place or in a place, the sense of the Latin de- -finire, is that a thing bounds another, by confining it by boundaries, and thus in this usage definire in all its forms an derivatives is to be rendered by the English “to delimit” in all its forms and derivatives, even those which are not normally found.
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definitive: definitively or in regard to dimensions and places delimitively |
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discretion |
discretio |
Discretion in the common sense, has the same sense in Latin and English.
However the Latin discretio, has another sense, that is, “a division made by means of a dividing line” [discrimen].
In technical Scholastic terms, this second sense of discretion is distinguished from a separation and a distinction.
A distinction, from the Latin distinguere, to mark off, is any difference that does not suppose a division, nor a disparity. A discretion is a difference which supposes a division, but not necessarily a disparity. A separation is a difference which supposes a division and some disparity, at least in quality.
Thus properly speaking the Divine Persons are distinct, not discrete nor separated; men are distinct and discrete and separate persons; and the members of the human body are distinct and discrete, but not separate according to their existence (Cf. especially Sent. Bk. I, d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, Scholium I, 1).
In this regard it is useful to review what St. Bonaventure says regarding separation, discretion and distinction, in Sent. Bk. I, d. 24, notes on the text of Master Peter:
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E |
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‘to be’, ‘being’; a being, being; of being, to be, of the act of being
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esse, ens, essendi |
The Latin verb sum means “I am”. Its present infinite is esse (“to be”), its present participle in medieval Latin is ens, entis (“being”). However, whereas In Latin the present infinite is also the gerund; in English the gerund is also the present participle. Finally, in Latin the gerundive is essendus, -a, -um.
When the verb sum or any of its forms are used without reference to the category of being, ideally or really, they will be rendered into English with their normal equivalents without any special notation.
The ontological signification of esse and ens.
However, in medieval Scholastic philosophy the very act by which a thing exists, its ‘to be’, is rendered esse, and the general notion whereby a thing is what it is, is likewise its esse; but a individual thing which is, a being, is an ens; and yet, this present participle is also used as a supposit for the notion: being.
Thus in respect to the terminology, there is an inherent equivocation in both languages; and in addition in medieval Scholasticism there is a further inherent equivocation regarding the terms for being.
To make it quite clear to the reader, and to leave it to scholars to determine more exactly the meaning of the texts in Latin, the following method is employed throughout, to render these two Latin terms, in each of their senses into English, in an unequivocal manner:
For clarity sake the real thing, which is always signified in Latin through the word ens, in the singular or plural, will be rendered in English as, « a/the being », without quotes of any kind, in the singular with an article, or in the plural as « beings »; the act whereby a thing exists, its ‘to be’, will be rendered in English as « ‘to be’ », within single quotes; the general notion of being, when represented in Latin by esse, wherein it is used as a gerund, will be rendered in English as « ‘being’ », within single quotation marks, with or without the article, and rarely in the plural (cf. Sent. I, d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, 4. arg. ad opp. and ad 4.); and the general notion of being, when represented in Latin by ens, in the neuter single, will be rendered in English as « being » without any article, and always in the singular.
However, it must be noted that there is not always intended a notional distinction in the English translation by the diverse terms ‘to be’ and ‘being’, for some stylistic requirements of the English translation may at times require switching between these, as is done with other infinitives, used as gerunds.
The gerundive essendi, which in Latin always is used in these texts for the act whereby a thing exists will be rendered « of being », « for being » or « to be » according to the grammatical context.
Finally, since it is the custom of this translation to indicate words used as terms, within double quotes; and since to do this, with the above English terms would make it difficult to discern ‘being’ or ‘to be’, when bracketed additionally with double quotes, when esse or ens are used in this manner they will not normally, be rendered into English, but will appear in the English text in their Latin forms, without quotes, but underlined, as is the custom in English for quoting Latin words. |
ratio essendi: reason to be, or reckoning of being
ratio entis: reckoning of a being, or reason for the being, or reckoning of being (in the general sense of being)
esse primum: the first act of being
esse secundum: the second act of being
bene esse: well-being
quid entis: something of a being (a circumlocution generally used for substance)
non esse: ‘not being’ (in the sense of non-existing)
non-esse: ‘not-being’ (in the sense of the general notion of what is privative of being: the hyphenation of the Quaracchi Edition is to be retained) or ‘not-to-be’ (in the sense of not existing)
non ens: a non-being or one not being (in the sense of a being which is not)
non-ens: a non-being (in the general notional sense: the hyphenation of the Quaracchi edition is to be retained)
in essendo: in being
privation essendi: a privation of the act of being
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F |
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to set (oneself) off from (ones) surroundings; to set (oneself) off in (a) place. |
facere distantiam, (sive circumstantiam sive in loco) |
The Latin idiom facere distantiam expresses a view of measuring very different from that which is commonly used today. Literally, the Latin idiom says that something causes distance, or according to the root of distantia, causes a standing away or apart. The idiom therefore means to say that something causes the surroundings to stand at a distance, that is, is a cause of such that the surroundings can be measured as distant or as standing separately.
This concept of a cause of measure, is formal, that is it is according to the reckoning of distance, measured from two termini, the thing and the surroundings, but speaks of this distance only in reference to the surroundings.
In English today, though we speak of distance to places as so many feet, miles, kilometers, etc. from here, we do not speak of things causing others to be distant, but of things being distant from other things. Therefore it seems more clear today to express a logical equivalent of this idiom, rather than the metaphor it employs, and thus to translate it as: to set (oneself) off from (ones) surroundings, or to set (oneself) off in (a) place, since by being set off from one’s surroundings, or by being set off according to place, a thing becomes a terminus from which the distance to its surroundings can be measured. “Being set off from” retains the notion of distantia, while the active form of the verb, to set off, retains the active sense of facere. Cf. Master Peter Lombard’s Book of Sentences, Bk. I, d. 37, p. II, throughout. |
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H |
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I |
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intellect, understanding, to understand, intelligence, understanding |
intellectus, intelligere, intelligentia |
The Latin term intellectus can be two different words, a supine of the verb intelligere, “to understand”: intellectus, -us; and the adjective, meaning “understood”: intellectus, -a, -um. The adjective is easily translated, and will not be discussed here.
The supine has two different senses in English.
1) « the intellect »: the intellectual faculty of a rational being. The supine should be rendered by « intellect » only when there is an explicit reference to the intellectual faculty of a rational being.
2) « understanding »: an act of the intellect, or that which results from this act, namely the comprehension of an intelligible being. In the former sense it can be rendered as « understanding » or as « (act of) understanding » with or without an article; in the latter sense, that of the consequence of the act of the intellect, it is rendered always as « understanding ».
However, the Latin verb intelligere is often used in the infinitive form for the act of the intellectual faculty; thus it is it is rendered as « understanding », or « (act of) understanding ».
And the Latin noun intelligentia is used in a twofold sense: for the intellectual faculty, « the intelligence », and for the consequence of an act of this faculty, when reckoned as something had, rather than a having, that is as knowledge; and thus is rendered as « understanding »
It is not always easy to understand the precise sense in which the supine is being used; whether as regards the faculty, or an act of the faculty or the result of an act of the faculty.
A good example of this ambiguity in the use of the supine is found in St. Bonaventure’s Commentary on Book I, d. 28. (q.v.) In question 3, St. Bonaventure speaks of intellectu apprehendente, and he explains this further in Dubium 1 of the same Distinction. In that Dubium, it is not until the fourth paragraph of the Response, wherein St. Bonaventure writes: « Secundum hunc triplicem intellectum de comparatione Patris et Ingeniti » etc.. that it becomes clear that he is speaking not of the faculty, nor of its act, but of the consequence of an act of this faculty, namely an “understanding” of the terms in question.
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intellectus termini: the understanding of a term
intellectu: frequently as by understanding, in the sense of a supine.
ad intelligentiam: for an understanding.
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intention |
intentio |
The Latin term intentio has two senses, based on its classical meaning of a “stretching out or towards”, or the “straining or stretching” of the mind.
It has two technical senses which will both be rendered by its English cognate « intention »
1) the Logical: in this sense, intention is a technical term of Medieval Logic for the meaning of any term.
2) the Intellectual: in this sense, intention is a proposal of the mind to undertake or posit some act.
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interemption |
interemptio, interimere |
Interemptio is a technical term of Medieval Logic for that form of rebuttal which disproves the major and minor of the opposing argument: the use of the Latin term is taken from St. Severinus Boethius’ translation of the term in Aristotle’s Elenchae. The Quaracchi Editors give this definition of Interemption, tom. I, p. 87, footnote 4:
Conclusion: This term must be retained to reflect the Scholastic categories of argumentation. And therefore will be rendered by its English cognate « interemption ». |
interimendo: by interemption — when referring to this form of rebuttal; by denying — when followed by a term for an argument or some part of an argument, as is interimendo conclusionem: by denying the conclusion.
N.B.: in some uses interimere in any form of the verb, may retain its normal, non technical use, even speaking about forms or argument or classification; in such instances it is to be rendered as to take away (by negating) or to deny.
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L |
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to/of a place, placed, in a place |
localis, locatum, in loco |
This Latin adjective localis –e, has the meaning of “local”, “of a place”; thus in constructions when combined with forms of the verb “to be” [esse], it has the sense of “belonging to a place” [esse locale; est localis].
It is in this sense that it seems best to render the adjective in regard to things being in a place; because in English to say that something is local, does not signify that it is in a place, per se, but rather that it pertains to a place or is native to a place; whereas to say “it belongs to a place” is to say both that it is “circumscribable to or by a place”; which is the sense esse locale has according to the Quaracchi Editors in Bonaventure’s Commentaria, Bk. I, d. 37, p. II, a. 1. q. 1, p. 652, footnote 2; and to say that it is under the laws of a place, that is governed by the conditions of a place, as St. Bonaventure says esse locale means loc. cit., p. 653, in the body of the Response.
Thus to distinguish the differing terms: esse locale, locatum, in loco, in English these are to be rendered respectively, with or without demonstrative adjectives, as « to belong to a place », « the one placed », and « in a place ».
Derivatives of localis, such as localitas, locabilitas, illocalitas are to be translated similarly according to the standard rules of derivation, and so respectively be rendered, as « quality of belonging to a place », « ability to belong to a place », « quality of not belonging to a place ». |
est localis: belongs to a place locatum: the one placed (when used as a substantive) |
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N |
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O |
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to order, to ordain;
ordered, ordained, ordinate |
ordinare,
ordinatus |
The Latin verb ordinare means “to order”, “to put in order”.
Consequently its perfect passive participle or adjective ordinatus means properly “that which has been ordered” that is “placed in order”; and because in English we can also say that something has been “ordained” to another, that is “ordered” to it, the Latin participle can also be rendered in this manner, and the verb likewise, that is as “to ordain”.
But since what has been ordered to another, is no longer out of an order, nor disordered, it is consequently, both in Latin and English, something “ordinate”. St. Bonaventure himself uses these allied senses of the term in Sent. Bk. I, d. 43, dubium 7, p. 778, where he speaks first of God’s ordained power [potential rdinate], and then contradistinguishes its manner of acting against what is done inordinately [inordinate]:
Hence according to context, ordinatus must be rendered as “ordained” or “ordinate”; for clarity sake it will not normally be rendered “ordered”, since in English this can be confounded with “ordered” [mandatum], that is “commanded”.
It thus will be rendered “ordained” when it refers to the application of one thing to another; and “ordinate” when refers to the consequent quality of that which has been thus ordained (cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, dubium 2, p. 1318: « and in a similar manner does (St.) Bernard accept (it), when he says, that virtue is an ordinate affection [et similiter accipit Bernardus, cum dicit, quod virtus est affectio ordinata.] ».
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ordinate: ordinately or in an ordinate manner (when used in reference to the quality of the manner in which a thing is done or is); in an ordered manner (when referring to the order in which things are placed).
ordinate ad finem: in a manner ordained to (an/the) end; (similarly with other nouns other than finem). |
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P |
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by means of presence, the quality of being present, of presence or according to presence |
praesentialiter, praesentialitas, praesentialis |
This adverb, praesentialiter, derived from the Latin adjective, praesentialis, -e, meaning of or belong to a presence, has the peculiar meaning of in a manner of being present to. This same adjective is the root of the archaic English cognate presentiality, which is the quality of being present. Since the concept is not easily conveyed except with an awkward circumlocution, the cognates presentially, presentiality, and presential will be rendered more directly according to their logical equivalents, respectively, as by means of presence, the quality of being present, and of presence or according to presence (regarding the specific context, these will have definite or indefinite articles and implied possessive adjectives, as in the phrases: by means of His presence, the quality of their being present, according to His presence.
In English we commonly say presently, but this is more often understood of time, than of place, and so presently will not be employed to avoid confounding these terms.
Nota bene: when praesentialiter is followed by other adverbs, such as essentialiter or potentialiter these are similar translated in the same way, as part of the same construction, as in the phrase: God is everywhere in all creatures by means of His Essence, presence, and power [Deus ubique in omni creatura essentialiter, praesentialiter, potentialiter est.]: Master Peter Lombard, First Book of Sentences, D. XXXVII, ch. 1, at the end.
Similarly: when praesentialitas is used in conjunction with terms connoting temporal relations it will be translated as « being present », as in the sentence: « since the same thing is now truly cognized under a reckoning of being future [ratione futuritionis], now under a reckoning of being past [ratione praeteritionis], now under a reckoning of being present [ratione praesentialitatis] »: St. Bonanventure, Sent., Bk. I, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, 4 arg. ad opp..
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through the prior; through the posterior
through (a consideration of what is) prior; through (a consideation of what is) posterior |
per prius, per posterius |
The pithy Latin phrase, per prius, composed from the preposition per (“through”) and the neuter form of the adjective prius (“before”) is used when speaking of anything under the consideration or according to a reckoning of a before vis-à-vis an after.
In some usages it is used simply, in the sense of “through a before”, “through (something) prior”, etc..
However, sometimes its use in the Commentaria of St. Bonaventure is idiomatic, and must therefore be rendered according to its exact logical sense, rather than a more directly verbal equivalent, since in English there is none.
Therefore, this phrase will always be translated thus:
through (a consideration of what is) prior
which English translation must include all the words, even those within parentheses as well as the parentheses. Here the parentheses, which are used generally throughout the English Translation of both Lombard and Bonaventure, to signify words which must be added to clarify the context or which are implicit in the context, are used to notify the reader that the sense of this Latin phrase is much more than its verbal equivalent, and yet at the same time to indicate that the English translation here is taking a liberty which it does not normally do, by rendering this prepositional Latin phrase with a more complex syntactical structure.
The sense in which this Latin phrase is understood by St. Bonaventure is most manifest in Sent., Bk. I, d. 29, dubium 4, at the end, where he says:
For by saying “according to diverse comparisons”, he shows that per prius is said according to the reckoning or consideration of a before vis-à-vis an after.
Similarly, the equivalent expression per posterius is to be rendered,
through (a consideration of what is) posterior
Note: In philosophical texts these two phrases are often understood as “in a prior sense” and “in a posterior sense”; however, this manner of translation is apt to induce the reader to understand that it is only in the sense of the words which follow and not according to an objective reckoning, that that which is said is said. Hence, this manner of rendering the two phrases will not be employed.
See the right column, for how to render each phrase with quam. Also note, that after prius or posterius, there can be any number of comparative adjectives in the neuter singular, all of which would likewise join the construction; e.g. through a consideration of what is prior, more noble, and more unchanging [per prius, nobilius, et immobilius.]
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per prius . . . quam . . .: through (a consideration of what is) prior . . . rather than . . .. or through (a consideration of what is) prior to . . . |
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principle, beginning |
principium |
The Latin principium means both “beginning” and “principle”.
The manner in which this term is rendered into English will follow the rationale taught by St. Bonaventure in Sent., Bk. I, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1:
Hence, when the Latin principium is used
1) in reference to an origin, it will be rendered in English as principle, since every origin of something is its principle, but not necessarily its beginning.
2) in reference to that which has nothing before it, it will be rendered as a beginning, since everything which has nothing before it is a beginning, but not necessarily a principle. Yet, St. Bonaventure argues ibid. ad 4, that a Divine Person can be said to be the “beginning” of another, inasmuch as He is a co-equal. And so when principium means the negation of something anterior and something greater in goodness, it is to be rendered as beginning, since a “principle”, contrariwise, can be both anterior and greater.
Accordingly, in reference to God, it is said that in the order of existence God is the beginning of creatures, and in the order of essence their principle, since existing has a point in time of initiation, but the essential cause of essences and their being caused in the essential order are atemporal.
Likewise it is more common to say that the Father is the principle of the Son and Holy Spirit, than Their beginning, since the latter might imply to some that They are not eternal. Similarly, if God be said to be the beginning of creatures, this might lead some to think that God, as a beginning, is part of creation. |
in principio: in the beginning — when used in reference to time
principaliter: principally, or in a principle manner |
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Q |
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R |
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reason, reckoning |
ratio |
This one Latin term is rendered by two similar English terms: reason and reckoning.
The Latin term ratio is derived from the Latin deponent verb reor, reri, ratus (to think or judge): ratus, -a, -um, is defined by Cassel’s as determined or settled; and the phrase ratum facere as to ratify, confirm or make valid. And hence a ratio is a reckoning, an account, a calculation, a consideration. It thus has the sense of an “explanation”, as one says in English, “how do you reckon, he did that?”, as in the sense of “to render account of”. And hence ratio takes on the meaning of a reason, cause, motive or explanation by which a thing is understood or under which aspect it is recognized as having a certain formality.
In Scholastic philosophy and theology ratio takes on specific technical usages:
1) the reason: considered as an intellective power or act, whereby the mind gives an explanation of something. This usage is nearly always confined to discussions of theories of knowledge or the powers of the soul, and rendering ratio as the reason should only be done when the context explicitly requires this attribution.
2) reckoning: by far the most common translation to be employed for the term ratio, when it is used to show the explanation or cause for the attribution of another term, especially when followed by a genitive term, such as a gerundive, as in the phrases a reckoning of understanding [ratio intelligendi], a reckoning of cognizing [ratio cognoscendi], or in phrases in which it is followed by a noun, in the genitive case, a reckoning of similitude [ratio simlitudinis].
Note: that when the phrase is used in a general sense, without reference to some previously mentioned ratio, then it is to be rendered into English with the indefinite article a, as here above. But when it refers to some specific previous mentioned ratio, or, to an ideal standard, then it is to be rendered with the definite article the. When to use one or the other article must be determined by the entire sense of the context and argument, often by that of the entire Question or Article in which it is used, and the final determination must be based on a philosophical and theological consideration of its use, rather than on a merely linguistic one.
3) reason: considered as the motive or cause of something or of some attribution. Since ratio as all –io derivative nouns in Latin is normally considered an action, but is properly passive in sense, it can have the sense of reckoning (passive) or of the reason (active) for which or by which something is done or attributed. When it has this sense (which can often occur in the same phrases of the same passage where it has the sense of reckoning), it is rendered as reason, as for example when followed by gerundive in the genitive: « the reason for understanding [ratio intelligendi]», « the reason for speaking [ratio loquendi] », « the reason for cognizing [ratio cognoscendi] »; and when followed by nouns in the genitive, as in « one reason for the similitude » [una ratio similitudinis] etc..
These English translations of the second and third sense of ratio are confirmed by what the Quaracchi Editors say in Sent. Bk. I, d. 35, Scholium, II, second paragraph, regarding the two sense of ratio cognoscendi:
For that disposition by which it is equipped for understanding is its “reason for understanding”, and that according to which the object is cognized is the “reckoning of understanding”.
Conclusion: Translators without a background in Scholastic philosophy should seek and take counsel on how to render this term in every instance it appears; in nearly all cases, the final decision will be made by an Editor. However, the idiomatic usages, as cited in the column right of this one, can be always rendered thus when they are used idiomatically, and not in reference to a specific instance of ratio which precedes.
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Other idiomatic usages are:
eadem ratione: for the same reason — when used to introduce another an argument based on the same explanation or cause: but not when referring to a specific, preceding use of ratio
pari ratione: for an equal reason — when used to introduce an argument based on an equivalent explanation or cause: but not when referring to a specific, preceding use of ratio |
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respect, looking-back |
respectus |
The Latin respectus means “a looking-back”; that is a “regard”, or backward glance. The Latin word has two senses, and has two grammatical structures for its use.
In some senses, it refers to an active relation, and is to be rendered as “looking-back”, as in the phrase: « It is in the Son’s looking-back to the Father that there is found the whole reckoning of His Name [In Filii respectu ad Patrem invenitur tota ratio sui nominis] » In others senses it has a passive sense, as in the phrase: « In respect of which reckoning is He said to be a “son”? [In respectu qualis rationis dicatur filius].».
Here there must be distinguished the two different grammatical structures which follows the Latin term respectus:
1) « in respect of » [v. g. in respectu illius]: when followed by a genitive, the precise signification is that of a relation emanating from a principle, as in the phrase: « In respect of a beginning the Father is said to be the Author of the Divine Nature [In respectu principii Pater dicitur auctorem divinae naturae] ».
2) « in respect to » [v. g. in respectu ad illum]: when followed by the preposition to [ad], the precise signification is that of a relation extended toward a terminus, as in the phrase: « In respect to the Father the Second Person of the Most Blessed Trinity is said to be the Son [In respectu ad Patrem secunda persona sanctae Trinitatis dicitur Filius] ». |