S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Albano & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PROŚMIUM IN LIBRUM PRIMUM
SENTENTIARUM

FOREWORD TO THE FIRST BOOK
OF THE SENTENCES

QUAESTIONES PROŚMII

 

Quaestio I.

QUESTIONS ON THE FOREWORD

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pag. 6-9.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 6-9.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIONES PROŚMII

 

QUESTIONS ON THE FOREWORD

 

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae primo tacta sunt,1 quatuor possunt quaeri iuxta quatuor praedicta.

For an understanding of those things which were first touched upon,1 four (things) can be asked in accord with the four aforesaid (conditions).

Primo,2 quae sit huius libri materia vel subiectum.

First,2 what is the matter and/or subject of this Book.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Quae sit materia quodve subiectum huius libri vel theologiae.

QUESTION 1

 

What is the matter or subject of this Book and/or of theology?

ET3 QUOD Deus sit subiectum, videtur.

AND3 IT SEEMS that God is the subject:

1. Illud enim subiectum est in scientia, de quo et de cuius proprietatibus est scientia tota;4 sed de Deo et eius operibus, utpote creatione et reparatione, est totus iste liber; ergo etc.

1. For in a science, that is the subject, concerning which and concerning the properties of which the whole science is;4 but that whole Book of his concerns God and His works, inasmuch as (it concerns) the Creation and the Reparation; ergo etc..

2. Item, videtur quod subiectum istius libri sint res et signa.  Illud enim est subiectum in scientia, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur illa scientia, quia « scientiae secantur in res »,5 hoc est, dividuntur secundum divisionem subiectorum; sed hoc est res et signum, sicut manifestum est; ergo etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that the subject of that Book of his is things and signs.  For in a science that is the subject, according to the division of which that science is divided, because « sciences are cut into things »,5 that is, they are divided according to the division of their subjects; but this (subject) is thing and sign, as has been manifested; ergo etc..

3. Item, videtur quod credibile sit subiectum huius libri.  Illud enim est subiectum in libro, circa quod versatur auctoris intentio et tractatus; sed credibile est huiusmodi.  Unde Magister dicit in Prologo quod propositum suum est, « fidem nostram clypeis Davidicae turris munire », hoc est, ad probandum fidem rationes adducere, non, in quam, fidem-habitum, sed creditum:6 ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that the credible is the subject of this Book.  For in a book that is the subject, about which the intention and treatment of the author turns; but the credible is of this kind.  Whence Master (Peter) says in his Prologue that his proposal is, « to wall our faith with the round-shields of the Tower of David », that is, to adduce reasons to prove faith, not, I say, the faith-habit, but (the faith) as believed.6

SED CONTRA:  1. Subiectum in scientia debet complecti omne, quod determinatur in illa; sed in hoc libro non tantum determinatur de Deo, sed etiam de creaturis:  ergo Deus non est subiectum totius istius7 libri generaliter, sed solum primi libri.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. The subject in a science ought to embrace everything, which is determined in it; but in this Book there is determined not only (the things) concerning God, but also (those) concerning creatures:  therefore God is not the whole subject of that7 Book of his, but only of the First Book.

2. Item, aliter ostenditur illud idem sic.  Licet tres causae coincidant in unam, tamen materia non coincidit simul cum fine;8 quia materia dicit quid incompletum, finis autem dicit totius operis complementum; sed Deus est finis totius istius operis, quia finis totius theologiae:  ergo non est subiectum vel materia.

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown in another way thus.  Though three causes coincide in one, nevertheless matter does not coincide at the same time with its end;8 because “matter” means “something incomplete”, but “end” means the “complement of the work”; but God is the end of that whole work, because (He is) the end of the whole of theology:  therefore He is not its subject and/or matter.

3. Item, quod res et signa non sint subiectum,9 videtur.  Omnis enim scientia est de rebus vel de signis:  ergo si res et signa sunt subiectum huius libri, liber iste est generalis ad omnes.  Quodsi10 specialis scientia et doctrina traditur in hoc libro, patet quod res et signa non debent assignari in eo pro subiecto.

3. Likewise, it seems that things and signs are not the subject.9  For every science concerns things and/or signs:  therefore if things and signs are the subject of this Book, that Book is general for all.  And if10 a special science and doctrine is handed down in this Book, it is clear that things and signs ought not to be assigned in it for its subject.

4. Item, constat quod alia est scientia de rebus et alia de signis, ut patet; differt enim sermocinalis scientiae a naturali; ergo scientia tradita in hoc libro aut11 non est unius generis, aut non est simul de rebus et de signis; sed est unius generis:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that one is the science of things and another that of signs, as it clear; for conversational science differs from natural science; therefore the science handed down in this Book either11 is not of one genus, or is not at the same time of things and of signs; but it is of one genus:  ergo etc..

5. Item, quod credibile non sit subiectum, videtur, quia scientia et virtus12 sunt diversi habitus:  ergo habent diversa obiecta; ergo cum credibile, in quantum huiusmodi, si obiectum virtutis, non erit obiectum scientiae in quantum huiusmodi:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that the credible is not the subject, because science and virtue12 are diverse habits:  therefore they have diverse objects; therefore since the credible, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind [in quantum huiusmodi], if it be the object of a virtue, will not be the object of the science, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind:  ergo etc..

6. Item, sicut consideratio huius libri versatur . . .

6. Likewise, as the consideration of this Book revolves . . .

1 Hoc est:  quae in Prośmio generaliter de quatuor causis libri sententiarum dicta sunt.  Nunc quatuor quaestiones speciales de eisdem causis proponuntur.
2 Codd. F bb cum ed. 1 addunt hic quaeritur.
3 Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam Et.  Mox post verbum videtur cod. M adiungit Probo.
4 Vide Aristot., I Poster. c. 7. et 8.  —  Mox sequimur codd. et ed. 1 ponendo et pro de ac dein utpote loco ut puta.  Codd. F et S operationibus pro operibus.
5 Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (in ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot c. 8), ubi sic habetur:  Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res.  Cum quibus verbis concordant antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. ac recentiorem cod. cc, qui habet ut res pro in res.  Paulo ante Vat. post scientia addit ab aliis; sed mendose (agitur siquidem de divisione scientiae in se, uti ex subnexis colligitur) et praeter fidem mss. ac ed. 1.  Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, refragantibus tamen antiquiores mss. et ed. 1, ante dividuntur repetit particulam quia, sed male, eo quod proxime subnexa non sint nisi explicatio verborum secantur in res.  Paulo post sub demonstrativo hoc intellige tale subiectum, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur theologia.  Substituimus ex codd. A G H I M Y etc. et ed. 1. hoc pro haec, licet multi codd. cum Vat. habeant haec, quia in eorum lectione syllogismus perturbaretur.
6 Sensus est:  non, inquam, fidem in quantum est habitus a Deo in animam infusus, sed in quantum est ipsum creditum, scil. veritates revelatae; sive aliis verbis, si recte tamen intelligantur:  non fidem subiective, sed obiective sumtam.  —  Vat. sed fide creditum; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 legunt:  fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum creditum ; omnes vero codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.
7 Vat. cum cod. recentiori cc huius contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.
8 Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (ed Paris. Firmin-Didot. c. 7.), ubi sic legitur:  Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque.
9 Cod. V materia seu subiectum.  Mox post vel restituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 omissam particulam de.
10 Lectio Vat., quae est et multorum codd., explicatur per sequentem cod. L:  Sed constat quod specialis; codd. A C F R aa Sed specialis; cod. G Sed si specialis.  Mox codd. S U ff post patet adiiciunt igitur.  Deinde fide mss. et ed. 1 posuimus debent pro habent.
11 Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc vitiose et contra antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 particulam aut transponit post ergo.  Mox cod. V verbo generis adiungit determinati.
12 Mendum Vat. veritas loco virtus et paulo infra veritatis pro virtutis castigavimus auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.

1 That is:  what is generally said in the Foreword concerning the four causes of the Book of the Sentences.  Now four special questions concerning the same causes are proposed.
2 Codices F and bb with edition 1 add here there is asked [quaeritur].
3 We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the conjunction And [Et].  Codex M reads And I prove, it seems, etc [Et . . . probo videtur].
4 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 7 and 8.  —  Then we follow the codices and edition 1 by placing and [et] for of and then inasmuch as (it concerns) [utpote] in place of as for example [ut puta].  Codices F and S have operations [operationibus] for works [operibus].
5 Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. III, text. 38 (in the Parisian edition of Firmin-Didot ch. 8), where it is had thus:  Therefore science and sense is cut into things.  With which words the more ancient codices and edition 1 are concordant, contrary to the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc, which has as things [ut res] in place of into things [in res].  A little before this the Vatican text adds from others [ab aliis] after science [scientia]; but faultily (if it indeed deals with the division of a science in itself, as is gathered from the points that follow) and unsupported by the manuscripts and edition 1.  Then the Vatican text with codex cc, in opposition however to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, repeats the conjunction because [quia] after are divided [dividuntur], but badly, for the reason that the points that follow most closely are not but an explanation of the words are cut into things [secantur in res].  A little after this by the demonstrative this [hoc] understand “such a subject, according to the division of which theology is divided”.  We have substituted from codices A G H I M Y etc. and edition 1. this [hoc] in place of this [haec], though many codices together with the Vatican manuscript have the latter, because in their reading the syllogism is confused.
6 The sense is:  not, I say, faith inasmuch as it is a habit infused into the soul by God, but inasmuch as it is the very thing believed, namely revealed truths; or in other words, if however they are rightly understood:  faith taken not subjectively, but objectively.  —  The Vatican text has but believed by faith [sed fide creditur]; editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 read:  faith believed according to habit, but according to what is believed [fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum crediturm]; but all codices with edition 1 exhibit our text.
7 The Vatican text with the more recent codex cc has of this [huius] in contradiction to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
8 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text. 70. (in the Parisian edition of Firmin-Didot. ch. 7), where it read thus:  Moreover the three (causes) come upon one, for the most part.

9 Codex V has matter or subject [materia seu subiectum].  Then after and/or [vel] we have restored from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 the omitted word concerns [de].
10 The reading of the Vatican text, which is also that of many codices, is explained by the following codex L:  But it is established that a special [Sed constat quod specialis]; codices A C F R and aa have But a special [Sed specialis]; codex G has But if a special [Sed si specialis].  Then codices S U and ff add therefore [igitur] after it is clear [patet]. Next trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have put ought not [debent] in place of do not have [habent].
11 The Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc wrongly and against the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 transposes the conjunction either [aut] after therefore [ergo].  Then codex V adjoins determined [determinati] to the word of a kind [generis].
12 The mistake of the Vatican text of having truth [veritas] in place of virtue [virtus] and a little below this of truth [veritatis] for of virtue [virtutis] we have corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1. [Trans. note:  St. Bonaventure will use inasmuch as (it is) of this kind [in quantum huiusmodi], as St. Thomas Aquinas uses qua; thus the credible of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks just below this, is the credible qua credible; and the science, science qua science.]

 

p. 7

 

circa fidem, ita etiam1 circa spem et caritatem:  ergo si sperandum vel diligendum sive diligible non est subiectum huius libri, pari ratione nec credibile est subiectum in eo.

around faith, so also1 around hope and charity:  therefore if (what is) to be hoped for and/or loved or (what is) lovable is not the subject of this Book, for equal reason neither is the credible the subject in it.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Deus est subiectum theologiae radicale, Christus est subiectum integrale, res et signa sunt subiectum universale sive etiam credibile, prout transit in rationem intelligibilis.

CONCLUSION

 

God is the radical subject of theology, Christ is the integral subject, things and signs are the universal subject or even the credible one, insofar as it passes into the reckoning of the intelligible.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod subiectum in aliqua scientia vel doctrina tripliciter potest accipi.  Uno modo dicitur subiectum in scientia,2 ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad principium radicale; alio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum integrale; tertio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the “subject” in any science and/or doctrine can be interpreted in a threefold manner.  In one manner a “subject” in a science is said (to be that),2 to which all things are reduced as to their radical principle; in another manner, (that) to which all things are reduced as to their integral whole; in a third manner, (that) to which all things are reduced as to their universal whole.

Exemplum huius manifeste patet in grammatica.  Nam subiectum primo modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad principium elementare3 vel radicale, est littera, quam ideo vocat Priscianus4 elementum, quia est minimum, in quo stat resolutio grammatici.  Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum integrale, est oratio congrua et perfecta.  Subiectum vero, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale, est vox litterata, articulata5 ordinabilis ad significandum aliquid in se vel in alio.

An example of this is manifestly clear in grammar.  For in the first manner the subject, to which all things are reduced as to their elementary or radical principle,3 is the letter, which for that reason Priscian4 calls (it) the element, because it is the smallest thing, upon which the resolution of grammatical (structure) depends [in quo ... stat].  The subject (in grammar), to which all things are reduced as to their integral whole, is congruous and perfect speaking.  But the subject (in grammar), to which all things are reduced as to their universal whole, is the voice literate, articulate5 and able to be ordained to signify anything in itself and/or in another.

Per hunc modum est distinguere in quadrivialibus.  Nam subiectum in geometria, ad quod omnia resolvuntur6 ut ad principium, est punctus.  Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum integrum, est corpus, quod continet in se omne genus dimensionis.  Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum universale, est quantitas continua, immobilis.

It is through this manner that one distinguishes among (the sciences) of quadrivium.  For the subject in geometry, to which all things are resolved6 as to their principle, is the point.  The subject, to which all things are reduced as to their integral whole, is the body, which contains in itself every genus of dimension.  The subject, to which all things are reduced as to their universal whole, is continuous, immovable quantity.

Per hunc modum et in hoc libro est assignare subiectum secundum triplicem differentiam.

It is also through this manner that one assigns, in this Book, a subject according to a threefold difference.

Nam subiectum, ad quod omnia7 reducuntur ut ad principium, est ipse Deus.

For the subject, to which all things7 are reduced as to their principle, is God Himself.

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur, quae determinantur in hoc libro, ut ad totum integrum, est Christus, prout comprehendit naturam divinam et humanum sive creatum et increatum,8 de quibus sunt duo primi libri; et caput et membra, de quibus sunt duo sequentes.  Et accipio large9 totum integrum, quod multa complectitur non solum per compositionem, sed per unionem et per ordinem.

Also the subject, to which all things, which are determined in this Book, are reduced as to their entire whole, is Christ, insofar He comprehends the Divine Nature and the human or the created and the uncreated,8 of which are the first two Books; and as Head and members, of which are the two following.  And I interpret broadly9 “the entire whole”, as that which embraces many things not only through composition, but through union and through order.

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale, possumus nominare per circumlocutionem10 sive sub disiunctione; et sic est res vel signum; et vocatur hic signum Sacramentum.  Possumus et unico vocabulo nominare; et sic est credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem modo, proprie loquendo, est11 subiectum in hoc libro.

We can also name the subject, to which all things are reduced as to their universal whole, through a circumlocution10 or under a disjunction; and in this manner (the subject of the whole work) is the thing and/or the sign (of theology); and this sign is called the Sacrament.  We can also name it with one word; and thus it is the credible, however insofar as the credible does pass into the reason in a (certain) manner, properly speaking, it is11 the subject in this Book.

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, et Deum esse subiectum et res et signa, et credibile, diversimode, sicut dictum est.

Therefore (these) proving reasons must be conceded, and that God, and things and signs, and the credible, in diverse ways [diversimode], are the subject, as has been said.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod non tantum de Deo12 agitur in hoc libro; dicendum,

1. Therefore that it is objected unto the contrary, that not only is God12 dealt with in this book; it must be said . . .

1 In Vat. et recentiori cod. cc non bene deest etiam, quod tamen in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Mox cod. F sicut pro si.  Deinde fide omnium codd. et ed. 1 expunximus sperabile vel, quod Vat. praemitti verbo diligibile.
2 Cod. U hic satis bene addit illud.  Mox, postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed 1, substituimus alio pro secundo.
3 Vat. primum elementale. Auctoritate codd. ee ff et ed. 1 in textum recepimus principium, utpote quod praecedentibus et subsequentibus magis correspondere videtur; multi codd. propter abbreviationem ambigui sunt; omnes tamen cum ed. 1 legunt elementare.
4 Libr. I Grammat. c. 2 (de Littera).  —  Non multo post cod. X grammaticae pro grammatici.
5 Explicationem horum verborum accipe a Prisciano, I. Grammat. c. 1:  Articulata est, quae coarctata, hoc est, copulata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius, qui loquitur, profertur . . . Litterata est, quae scribi potest.  —  Unus alterve cod. ut aa haec duo adiectiva coniungit per particulam et.
6 Codd. H I K reducuntur.  Mox post principium codd. P Q X ff addunt, ut et supra in textu additum est, radicale.  Paulo post codd. H Q integrale pro integrum.
7 Cod. D hic addit, sicuti et paulo post in textu reperitur, quae determinantur in hoc libro; codd. vero D K post principium adiiciunt radicale vel initiale et cod. ff tantum radicale, quae adiectiva cum praecendentibus correspondent textumque distinctiorem reddunt. Paulo post codd. K Q integrale loco integrum.
8 Lectio Vat. sive creatam et increatam, quae nimis arcta videtur, castigatur auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.
9 Consulto dicit large, quia totum integrum in sensu stricto dicit compositum ex partibus; sed dua naturae in Christo faciunt totum integrum secundum Scholasticos per unionem hypostaticam, non per strictam compositionem.  —  Vat. praemittit particulam hic et mox post sed addit etiam, quod hic et alibi saepius omnes mss. omittunt, licet minus congrue.
10 Contra auctoritatem codd. et ed. 1 loco per circumlocutionem Vat. ponit dupla nominatione, fortasse propter maiorem oppositionem cum verbis paulo post sequentibus unico vocabulo.
11 Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic Vat. credibile, quod certe in textu subintelligendum est. Mox codd. P Q cum edd. 4 et 5 post diversimode satis bene addunt tamen.
12 Vat. quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro; mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. in eo conveniunt, quod omittant per totum; codd. vero R T ee ff et ed. 1, transpositis verbis et addendo tantum, suppeditant lectionem, quam in textum recepimus, quae et in se clarior est et ad amussim correspondet propositioni minori supra in obiectione positae.  Mox post tamen ex codd. T et ee supplevimus de Deo, quae verba certe subaudienda sunt. Dein cod. F post substantiam addit et operationem.  Plures codd. ex repetitione vocis substantiam decepti propositionem mutile exhibent.  Cod. K vero totam responsionem magis succincte ita proponit:  Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non complectitur omnia, quae hic considerantur, dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus non sit subiectum in hac scientia, sed tantum (sic primitus, postea correctum in tamen) sequitur, quod non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium. Mentem suam S. Doctor hac de re in Breviloq. b. I. c. 1. ita aperit:  Cum s. Scriptura sive theologia sit scientia dans sufficientem notitiam de primo principio secundum statum viae ... et Deus non tantum sit rerum primum principium et exemplar effectivum in creatione, sed etiam refectivum in redemptione et perfectivum in retributione; ideo non tantum agit de Deo creatore, sed etiam de creatione (ita codd. contra edd., quae habent creatore) et creatura.

1 In the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc also [etiam] is lacking, which is had, however, in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.  Then codex F has as [sicut] in place of if [si].  Next trusting in all the codices and edition 1 we have expunged believable and/or [sperabile vel], which the Vatican text prefaces with the word lovable [diligibile].
2 Codex U well enough adds here that [illud].  Then, applying nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted another [alio] in place of a second [secundo].
3 The Vatican text has prime elemental and/or radical [primum etc.] for elementary and/or radical principle [primcipium etc.].  On the authority of codices ee ff and edition 1 we have received into the text principle [principium], in that it seems to correspond more to the preceding and subsequent (sentences); many codices on account of abbreviation are ambiguous (here); all however together with edition 1 read elementary [elementare].

4 Grammar, Bk. I, ch. 2 (On the Letter).  —  Not much after this codex X has of grammar [grammaticae] for of grammatical (structure) [grammatici].
5 The explanation of these words comes from Priscian, Grammar, Bk. I, ch. 1:  That has been articulated, which has been compressed, that is, joined together with another sense of the mind of him, who is speaking, mentioning . . . That is literate [litterata], which can be written.  —  One or the other codex like aa conjoins these two adjectives by the conjunction and [et].

6 Codices H I and K have are reduced [reducuntur].  Then after principle [principium], codices P Q X and ff add, as has also been added above in the text, radical [radicale]. A little after this codices H and Q have integral [integrale] for entire [integrum].
7 Here codex D adds, as is also a little afterwards repeated in the text, which are determined in this Book [quae determinantur in hoc libro]; but codices D and K add radical and/or initial [radicale vel initiale] after principle [principium] and codex ff adds radical [radicale] only, which adjectives correspond with the preceding ones and render the text more distinct.  A little after this codices K and Q have integral [integrale] in place of entire [integrum].
8 The reading of the Vatican text or created and uncreated [sive creatum et increatum], which seems exceedingly brief, is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1.
9 He says broadly [large] deliberately, because he says that the entire whole [totum integrum] in the strict sense has been composed out of parts; but the two natures in Christ make an entire whole according to the Scholastics through the hypostatic union, not through strict composition.  —  The Vatican text prefaces this with the adverb here [hic] and then adds also [etiam] after but [sed], which here and elsewhere all the manuscripts often omit, though less fittingly.
10 Against the authority of the codices and edition 1 in place of through a circumlocution [per circumlocutionem] the Vatican text puts by a twofold naming [dupla nominatione], perhaps on account of the greater opposition with the words which follow a little after this:  with one word [unico vocabulo].
11 Against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 the Vatican text here repeats credible [credibile], which certainly must be understood (as being) implicitly in the text. Then codices P and Q together with editions 4 and 5 add well enough however [tamen] after in diverse manners [diversimode].
12 The Vatican text has that what concerns God is not dealt with entirely in this Book [quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro]; the manuscripts together with edition 1 agree against the Vatican text in this, that they omit entirely [per totum]; but codices R T ee ff and edition 1, with transposed words and by adding only [tantum], supply the reading, which we have received into the text, which is also in itself clearer and corresponds to the structure [ad amussim] of the minor proposition placed above in the objections.  Then (on the next page) after however [tamen] we have supplied God . .. with [de Deo] from codices T and ee, which words certainly have to be understood. Next codex F adds and operation [et operationem] after substance [substantiam].  Very many codices, deceived from the repetition of substance [substantaim] exhibit a mutilated proposition.  But codex K proposes the whole response more succinctly in this manner:  Therefore that it is objected in the Contrary, that God does not embrace all things, which are considered here, it must be said, that from this it does not follow, that God is not the subject in this science, but it only (thus the reading of the primitive text, afterwards corrected to however) follows, that He is not the subject as the whole, but as the principle. [Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non complectitur omnia, quae hic considerantur, dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus non sit subiectum in hac scientia, sed tantum (sic primitus, postea correctum in tamen) sequitur, quod non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium].  The Seraphic Doctor explains his mind on this matter in the Breviloquium, Bk. I, ch. 1, in this manner:  Since Sacred Scripture or theology is a science giving sufficient knowledge [notitiam] of the First Principle according to the state of the way(farer) . . . and since God is not only the First Principle of things and the effective Exemplar in creation, but also the refective One in redemption and the perfective One in retribution; for that reason not only does it deal with God the Creator, but also with the creation (thus the codices against the editions, which have creator) and the creature.

 

p. 8

 

quod, quamvis non agatur de Deo quantum ad substantiam tantum, agitur tamen de Deo quantum ad substantiam, vel quantum ad opera eius; et ideo non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium.

that, although God is not dealt with only as much as regards His substance, however God is dealt with as much as regards His substance, and/or as much as regards His works; and for that reason He is not the subject as the whole, but as the principle.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod materia non coincidit in unum cum fine; dicendum, quod materia tripliciter dicitur:  scilicet materia ex qua, materia in qua et materia circa quam; et haec ultima materia magis1 dicitur obiectum quam materia.  Quando ergo dicitur, quod materia non coincidit cum fine, verum est de materia ex qua, quae proprie est materia,2 sed non de materia circa quam, quae proprie est obiectum; nam idem potest esse obiectum habitus et finis; et tali modo accipitur materia in scientia pro obiecto virtutis3 cognoscentis.

2. That it is objected, that matter does not coincide in one with its end; it must be said, that matter is spoken of in a threefold manner:  namely “matter out of which” [materia ex qua], “matter in which” [materia in qua] and “matter about which” [materia circa quam]; and this last “matter” is called the “object” rather1 than the “matter”.  Therefore when it is said, that matter does not coincide with its end, it is true of “matter out of which”, which properly is the matter2 but (it is) not (true) of the “matter about which”, which properly is the object; for the same thing can be object, habit and end; and in such a manner “matter” is interpreted in science as the object of the virtue3 of the one cognizing it.

3. 4. Quod obiicitur de rebus et signis, quod sunt subiecta omnium scientiarum; dicendum, quod res et signum4 possunt accipi in sua generalitate; et sic non pertinent ad scientiam specialem nec ad librum nec ad eandem scientiam.  Possunt iterum accipi secundum quod induunt rationem credibilis, et sic, quemadmodum una est virtus5 et unus est habitus de omnibus credibilibus, sive sint res sive sint signa, ut fides, sic una est scientia specialis de omnibus, in quantum induunt hanc rationem,6 sive sint res sive signa.

3. 4. That there is an objection concerning things and signs, because they are the subjects of all sciences; it must be said, that thing and sign4 can be interpreted in their generality; and so they do not pertain to a special science nor to the Book nor to the same science.  Again they can be interpreted according to which they put on a reckoning of the credible, and so, in accord with the manner that there is one virtue5 and one habit concerning all credibles, whether they be things or signs, as is faith, so there is one special science concerning all things, inasmuch as they put on that reckoning,6 whether they be things or signs.

Aliter potest dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de rebus et signis, aut absolute, aut in relatione ad fruitionem sive ad illud, quo fruendum est.  Primo quidem modo spectant ad speciales scientias et diversas; secundo modo ad unam scientiam sive doctrinam.  Unde quemadmodum de omnibus entibus, in quantum reducuntur ad unum primum ens, est una scientia et7 unus liber, sic de omnibus rebus et signis, in quantum reducuntur ad unum, quod est alpha et omega, est una scientia.

In another manner it can be said, that there is a twofold manner of speaking [dupliciter est loqui] concerning things and signs, either absolutely, or in relation to enjoyment or to that, by which a thing is to be enjoyed.  Indeed in the first manner they look towards the special and diverse sciences; in the second manner towards one science or doctrine.  Whence in accord with the manner which concerns all beings, inasmuch as they are reduced to one Prime Being, there is one science and7 one Book, so concerning all things and signs, inasmuch as they are reduced to one thing, which is their alpha and omega, there is one science.

5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod credibile est obiectum virtutis8 etc.; dicendum, quod alio modo est credibile obiectum virtutis, alio modo scientiae.  Credibile enim, secundum quod habet in se rationem primae veritatis, cui fides assentit propter se et super omnia, pertinet ad habitum fidei; secundum quod super rationem veritatis addit rationem auctoritatis, pertinet ad doctrinam sacrae Scripturae, de qua dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram,9 quod « maior est eius auctoritatis quam humani ingenii perspicacitas »; sed secundum quod supra rationem veritatis et auctoritatis addit rationem probabilitatis, pertinet ad considerationem praesentis libri, in quo ponuntur rationes probantes fidem nostram.  Et sic patet, quomodo differenter est fides de credibili, et libri de canone sacrae Scripturae, et praesens scriptura.  Et ideo non valet illa10 obiectio, quoniam iste liber non est sic ad defensionem spei et caritatis, sicut fidei; et ideo non est simile.

5. 6. That it is objected, that the credible is the object of virtue8 etc.; it must be said, that in one manner the credible is the object of virtue, in another (an object) of science.  For the credible, according to which it has in itself a reckoning of prime truth, to which faith assents on account of itself and above all things, pertains to the habit of faith; according to which it adds above the reckoning of truth, the reckoning of authority, it pertains to the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, of which Augustine says (in his) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,9 that « greater perspicacity belongs to its authority than to human ingenuity »; but according to which it adds above the reckoning of truth and authority, a reckoning of probability, it pertains to the consideration of the present Book, in which there are posited reasons to prove our faith.  And so it is clear, how different faith is from the credible, and books from the canon of Sacred Scripture, even the present writing.  And for that reason that10 objection is not valid, since that Book is not so much for the defense of hope and charity, as it is of the Faith; and for that reason it is not similar.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Supponit Doctor Seraphicus in his quaestionibus prośmialibus et alibi passim, quod theologia sit vera scientia; immo in Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. dicit:  Ipsa sola est scientiae perfecta.  Quo sensu hoc dicatur, explicatur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et ibid. q. 4.  —  Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) cum Nominalibus negat, theologiam in viatoribus esse proprie scientiam; S. Thomas (S. I. q. 1. a. 2.) vero hoc affirmat.

I. The Seraphic Doctor supposes in these questions on the foreword and elsewhere passim, that theology is a true science; nay rather in the Breviloquium, part I, ch. 1, he says:  It alone is the perfect science.  In what sense this is said, is explained in Sent., Bk. III, d. 23, a. 1, q.1, at n. 4, and ibid. , q. 4.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Prolog., q. 4) together with the Nominalists denies, that theology in wayfarers is properly a science; but St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 1, a. 2) affirms it.

II. Non quaeritur hic de subiecto, in quo est scientia, quod est intellectus, sed de subiecto, de quo est scientia et circa quod immediate versatur.  Dicitur subiectum, quia de illo ea praedicantur, de quibus agitur in illa scientia.  Licet ab auctoribus non raro hi termini:  subiectum, obiectum et materia circa quam, confundantur, tamen in sensu stricto obiectum scientiae est id quod scitur, subiectum vero eius est id de quo conclusiones praedicantur.  S. Doctor accipit hic subiectum in sensu stricto.

II. There is no question here of the subject, in which the science is, which is the intellect, but concerning the subject from which science is and about which it immediately revolves.  It is called a subject, because the things, which are dealt with in that science, are predicated of it.  Though these terms:  subject, object and matter about which, are not rarely confounded by authors, nevertheless, in the strict sense the object of a science is that thing which is known, but its subject is that thing of which (its) conclusions are predicated.  The Seraphic Doctor interprets “subject” here in the strict sense.

III. Circa distinctionem, quam habet in solutione ad 2, hoc notandum.  Materia in qua vocatur subiectum sive corporale sive spirituale, in quo recipitur aliquod accidens:  sic intellectus dici potest materia, in qua recipitur scientia.  Materia ex qua dicitur ea pars compositi, quae cum forma facit compositum.  Materia circa quam dicitur in scientia ipsum subiectum, circa . . .

III. About the distinction, which he has made in the solution to n. 2, this must be noted.  “Matter in which” is called the “subject”, either corporal or spiritual, in which some accident is received:  so the intellect can be said to be the “matter”, in which science is received.  “Matter from which” is said to be that part of the thing composed, which together with the form makes the composite.  “Matter about which” is said in science to be the subject itself, about . . .

1 Cod. N addit proprie.
2 Cod. aa adiungit et similiter de materia in qua, quae lectio in textum recipienda videretur, si sufficienti numero codicum fulciretur; certe tamen ipsa subintelligenda est.
3 Falsa lectio Vat. veritatis loco virtutis emendatur ex mss. et sex primis edd.
4 Cod. aa satis bene signa.  Mox codd. A T Y etc. ante librum non repetunt particulam ad, cod. I ponit vel librum, cod. X nec ad librum unum.
5 Vat., quae falso ponit veritas, corrigitur ex mss. et sex primis edd.
6 Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc superflue hic addit scilicet credibilis, quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
7 Ex codd. A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. cum ed. 1 posuimus et loco aut.  Deinde codd. I et T post liber bene addunt scilicet metaphysica.  Mox, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. habet ordinantur pro reducuntur; cod. vero bb reducuntur vel ordinantur.
8 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 in hac propositione bis habet mendose veritatis loco virtutis.
9 Libr. II. c. 5:  Maior est quippe Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas.  —  Dein Vat. praeter fidem codd. voci secundum praemitti sed; ed. 1 addit vero.
10 Magis placeret, si pro illa haberetur alia.  Vat. autem absque ulla mss. auctoritate post obiectio adiungit de sperabili vel diligibili.  Circa finem propositionis codd. inter se non conveniunt; Vat. cum cod. cc pro et ideo habet unde; multi codd. ut A C F G S V W X bb etc. nullam coniunctivam particulam ponunt; cod. D nec pro et ideo non; codd. autem B D K Q R exhibent lectionem nostram et ideo; codd. I T ideo.

1 Codex N adds properly [proprie].
2 Codex aa adjoins and similarly concerning matter in which [et similiter de materia in qua], which reading seems must be received into the text, if it is supported by a sufficient number of codices; nevertheless it certainly must be understood as implicit.
3 The false reading of the Vatican text, which has of truth [veritatis] in place of of virtue [virtutis], is emended from the manuscripts and from the six first editions.
4 Codex as has signs [signa] well enough.  Then codices A T Y etc. do not repeat the preposition to [ad] before Book [librum], codex I puts and/or the Book [vel librum], codex X has nor to a book [ad librum unum].
5 The Vatican text, which falsely puts truth [veritas], is corrected from the manuscripts and the six first editions.
6 The Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc adds superfluously here namely the credible [scilicet credibilis], which is lacking in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
7 From codices A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. together with edition 1, we have put and [et] in place of or [aut].  Then codices I and T after book [liber] do well to add namely metaphysics [scilicet metaphysica].  Next, opposing nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text has are ordered [ordinantur] in place of are reduced [reducuntur]; but codex bb has are reduced and/or ordered [reducuntur vel ordinantur].
8 The Vatican text, against the manuscripts and edition 1, twice in this proposition has faultily of the truth [veritatis] in place of of virtue [virtutis].
9 Book II, ch. 5:  Indeed greater is the authority of this Scripture than the capacity of all human ingenuity. — Then the Vatican text, not trusting in the codices prefaces but [sed] to the word according; edition 1 adds but [vero].
10 It would be more pleasing, if it had the other [alia] in place of that [illa].  Moreover the Vatican text without any authority from the manuscripts adjoins concerning the hopeable and/or lovable [de serpabili vel diligibili] after objection [obiectio].  Near the end of the proposition the codices do not agree among themselves; the Vatican text with codex cc has whence [unde] for and for that reason [et ideo]; many codices such as A C F G S V W X bb etc place no conjunction at this point; codex D has neither [nec] for and for that reason . . . not [et ideo non]; but codices B D K Q R exhibit our reading and for that reason [et ideo]; codices I and T have instead for that reason [ideo].

 

p. 9

 

quod versatur scientia.  Haec ultima sub diverso respectu potest esse tum obiectum habitus tum finis, ut patet in virtutibus theologicis:  v. g. fidei obiectum et finis est prima Veritas; creditur enim summum verum propter summum verum.  Cfr. Alexander Hal. Sum. p. I . q. 1. m. 3.

which the science revolves.  This last under diverse respects can be both the object of the habit and the end, as is clear among the theological virtues:  e. g. the object and end of faith is Prime Truth; for the Most High True One is believed on account of being the Most High True One.  Cf.  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 1, m. 3.

IV. In solutione ad 3. tangitur quaestio de unitate scientiae theologicae.  Hanc Nominales ex suis falsis principiis impugnant; sed eam adstruunt S. Bonaventura, Breviloq. p. 1. c. 1.  Alexander Halensis, p. I. q. 1. m. 3. ad 4. et 5.  —  Scotus, I. Report. Prolog. quaestiunc. 2.  —  S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 2; Sum. I q. 1. a. 3.  —  B. Albertus M., Sum. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3.  —  Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 2.  —  Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. part. 1. principalis 2. q. 3.  —  Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 6. q. 3.  —  Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4.

IV. In the solution to 3. the question of the unity of the science of theology is touched upon. This the Nominalists impugn from their false principles; but they build next to it, as St. Bonaventure says in Breviloquium., p. 1, c. 1; and Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 1, m. 3, at nn 4 and 5.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio, Bk. I, Prologue, quaestiunc. 2.  —  St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, Prologue, q. 1, a. 2; Summa., Bk. I, q. 1, a. 3.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, Summa., p. I, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 2; Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 3.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, Prologue. a. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, Prologue, part. 1, principle 2, q. 3.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 6, q. 3.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prologue, q. 4.

V. In solutione principalis quaestionis antiqui scholastici valde saltem verbis dissentiunt.  Nonnulli affirmant, Deum esse quidem subiectum theologiae, non autem sub ratione Deitatis, sed sub aliqua limitatione, v. g. quatenus est restaurator et glorificator (ita Aegidius R.) vel quatenus est perfectissimus (Dionys. Carth.).  Haec vero limitatio ex parte subiecti non videtur probabilis.  — Alexander Ha.  ponit tria subiecta secundum tria, quae sunt in quolibet ente completo, scil. secundum substantiam, virtutem (potentiam) et operationem:  primo modo subiectum est Deus, secundo modo est Christus, qui est virtus Patris, tertio modo sunt opera restaurationis facta per Christum.  — Scoto attribuitur sententiae, Deum sub ratione entis infiniti esse subiectum theologiae; attamen cum ipse (I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. n. 9.) dicat:  Deum sub ratione entis infiniti aut necessarii non legitime poni obiectum theologiae, sententia eius a Frassenio (Scotus academicus, tom. I. disp. prooem. a. 2. q. 5.) et a Lycheto (ad loc. cit.) ita explicatur, ut in substantia cum S. Thoma conveniat, qui (S. I. q. 1. a. 7.) unum assignat subiectum, scil. Deum sub ratione Deitatis.  Differentia tamen inter utrumque consistit in hoc, quod Scotus putat, hoc subiectum Deus intelligi materialiter, uti res et causa omnium veritatum, quas virtualiter in se continet; S. Thomas vero intelligit Deum in ratione formali, id est, ut scibilis vel revelabilis, non autem in se et subiective.  De hac differentia cfr. Caietanus in Comment. et Macedo (Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti, Coll. 2 diff. 4. sect 4.).

V. In the solution of the principal question the ancient scholastics dissented strongly at least in words.  Not a few affirm, that God indeed is the subject of theology, not however under the reckoning of Deity, but under some limitation, e. g. to the extent that He is the restorer and glorifier (thus Giles the Roman) and/or to the extend He is the most perfect (Bl. Dionysius the Carthusian).  But this limitation on the part of the subject does not seem probable.  — Alexander of Hales posits three subjects according to the three things, which are in any complete being [ente completo], namely according to substance, virtue (potency) and operation:  in the first manner the subject is God, in the second manner it is Christ, who is the virtue of the Father, in the third manner they are the works of restoration wrought through Christ.  — To Scotus is attributed the opinion, that God under the reckoning of an infinite being [entis infiniti] is the subject of theology; but nevertheless since he himself says (Sent., Bk. 1, Prolog., q. 3, n. 9.):  “That God under the reckoning of an infinite or necessary being [entis] is not legitimately posited as the object of theology,” his opinion is thus explained by Frassen (Scotus academicus, tom. I, disp. prośm., a. 2, q. 5.) and by Lychetus (on the same loc. cit.), that it agrees in substance with St. Thomas, who (Summa, I., q. 1, a. 7.) assigns one subject, namely God under the reckoning of Deity.  However the difference between both consists in this, that Scotus thinks, that this subject God is understood materially, as a thing and the cause of truths, which He contains virtually in Himself; but St. Thomas understands God in formal reckoning, that is as knowable and/or revealable, but not in Himself and subjectively.  On this difference cf. Cajetan in his Commentary and Macedo (Collationes doctrinae S.Thomae et Scoti, Coll. 2, diff. 4, sect 4.).

Sententia nunc communior accuratius distinguit in qualibet scientia tria obiecta:  obiectum materiale (quod in theologia est omne a Deo revelatum) et duplex obiectum formale.  Horum alterum se tenet ex parte subiecti, de quo est scientia, et est res ipsa, quae primo cognoscitur; hoc vocatur obiectum formale quod; alterum se tenet ex parte potentiae ut ratio, sub qua intelligimus, et vocatur obiectum formale quo.  Hac ultima ratione illae scientiae, quae idem obiectum materiale habent, proprie distinguntur et specificantur.

The now more common and more accurate opinion distinguishes in any science three objects:  the material object (which in theology is everything revealed by God) and the twofold formal object.  The first of these is held on the part of the subject, concerning which the science is, and it is the thing itself, which is first cognized [cognoscitur]; this is called the obiectum formale quod; the other is held on the part of potency as the reckoning, under which we understand it, and it is called the obiectum formale quo.  By this last reckoning, those sciences, which have the same material object, are properly distinguished and specified.

Uti ex textu patet, S. Bonaventura aliter et tripliciter distinguit subiectum theologiae et secundum hanc distinctionem convenienter triplex subiectum theologiae assignat; sic diversas theologorum sententias nititur conciliare.  Et notandum, quod totum integrale est compositum ex partibus, quae cum aliis constituunt totum, unde vocantur partes integrales.  Totum universale vero est quodlibet superius substantiale sumtum ad suum inferius in linea praedicamentalis, ut animal ad hominem et homo ad Socratem.  Ita Petrus Hispanus, Bonaventurae coaevus, in sua Summula super librum Topicorum, de locis concomitantibus.  Nec sententia Seraphici contradicit S. Thomae, quo unum tantum assignat subiectum, cum hic subiectum praecise sumat ut subiectum formale quod.  Non tamen negat S. Thomas, quod sub diversis respectibus etiam alia subiecta theologiae rationabiliter assignari possint; immo hoc in utroque loco infra citato sufficienter innuit.  Ipse autem S. Bonaventura dicit in corpore quaestionis, et Deum esse subiectum, et Christum, et res et signa et credibile, tamen diversimode.  Unde sibi constans in 1. conclusione ipse cum S. Thomas dicit, Deum esse subiectum theologiae; sed hoc aliter explicat, scil. ut subiectum radicale, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad principium.  Hoc Trigosus intelligit de subiecto formali adaequato et sic Seraphicum omnino ad sententiam S. Thomae trahit.  Ex contextu tamen patet, intelligendum esse potius de subiecto materiali, quatenus Deus est principium, a quo omnia derivantur sive, ut dicit in Breviloquio p. I. c. 1:  Subiectum, ut a quo omnia, est Deus.  In 2. conclus. sub alio respectu ponit Christum ut subiectum materiale adaequatum, per quod et de quo propinque omnia sciantur.  In 3. conclus. ponit duplex subiectum, nempe res et signa sed sub ratione credibilis, et ipsum credibile, quatenus veritates revelatae per rationes fiunt intelligibiles et probabiles.  In hac ultima conclusione vocabula totum universale significant subiectum formale et attributionis.  Trigosus, Sum. S. Bonav. q. 1. a. 2. dub. 2; Hauzeur, Collatio totius theologiae, tom. I. q. 1.

As from the text it is clear, St. Bonaventure distinguishes in another and threefold manner the subject of theology and according to this distinction he fittingly [convenienter] assigns a threefold subject of theology; thus he strives to reconcile the diverse opinions of theologians. And it must be noted, that the entire whole [totum integrale] has been composed from parts, which together with other things constitute the whole, whence the are called “integral parts”. But universal whole [totum universale] is any superior substantial taken according to its own inferior in the line of a predicament, as animal is to man and man to Socrates. Thus Peter the Spaniard, a contemporary of St. Bonaventure, in his Summula super librum Topicorum, “On concomitant places”.  Nor does the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor contradict that of St. Thomas, by which only one thing is assigned as the subject, since here subject is taken precisely as the subiectum formale quod.  However St. Thomas does not deny, that under diverse respects even other things can be reasonably assigned as subjects of theology; nay rather this in both places cited below he sufficiently hints at.  Moreover St. Bonaventure himself says in the body of the question, both that God and Christ, and thing and sign, and the credible are the subject, however in diverse manners.  Whence he himself establishing in conclusion 1, says together with St. Thomas, that God is the subject of theology; but he explains this in another manner, namely that He is the radical subject, to which all things are reduced as to their principle.  This Trigosus understands of the adequate formal subject and thus draws the Seraphic Doctor entirely towards the opinion of St. Thomas.  From the context it is clear however, that it must be understood rather of the material subject, to the extent that God is the principle, from which all things are derived or, as he says in the Breviloquium, p. I, c. 1:  The subject, from which all things are, is God.   In conclusion 2, under another respect he posits Christ as the adequate material subject, through which and concerning which nearly all things are known.   In conclusion 3, he posits a twofold subject, in fact [nempe] things and signs but under a reckoning of the credible, and God Himself as credible, to the extent that revealed truths becomes intelligible and probable through reasons.  In this last conclusion the phrase “universal whole” signifies the subiectum formale et attributionis.  Trigosus, Sum. S. Bonav. q. 1, a. 2, dub. 2; Hauze ur, Collatio totius theologiae, tom. I, q. 1..

VI. Auctores antiqui de hac quaestione tractantes:  Breviloq. p. I . c. 1.  —  Alexander Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 3.  —  Scotus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3; I. Report. Prolog. q. 1.  —  S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 4; Sum. I. q. 1. a. 7.  —  B. Albertus M., Sum. p. 1. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 1; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2.  —  Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 3.  —  Richardus a Mediavilla, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6.  —  Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. p. 1, princip. q. 1.  —  Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 19. a. 1.  —  Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5.  —  Gabriel Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 9.

VI. The ancient authors treating of this question:  Breviloquium. p. I . c. 1.  —  Alexander Hales, Sum.. p. I. q. 1. m. 3.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. 1, Prolog., q. 3; Report., Bk. 1, Prolog, q. 1.  —  St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I., q. 1, a. 7.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, Summa., p. 1, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 1; Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., a. 3.  —  Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 6.  —  Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., p. 1, princip. q. 1.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 19. q. 1.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 5.  —  Gabriel Biel, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 9.

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