S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PROŒMIUM IN LIBRUM PRIMUM
SENTENTIARUM

FOREWORD TO THE FIRST BOOK
OF THE SENTENCES

QUAESTIONES PROŒMII

Quaestio II.

QUESTIONS ON THE FOREWORD

Question 2 

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pag. 9-12.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 9-12.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Quae causa formalis quive modus procedendi sit in his libris Sententiarum.

QUESTION 2

 

What is the formal cause or manner of proceeding in these Books of Sentences?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR1 de causa formali sive modo agendi. Et dictum est, quod est perscrutatorius et inquisitivus secretorum.

SECONDLY THERE IS ASKED1 concerning the formal cause or the manner of treatment [modo agendi]. And it has been said, that (the manner of treatment) is one thoroughly scrutatory and inquisitive of secrets.

SED CONTRA:  1. Isaiae quadragesimo:2  Deus dat secretorum scrutatores quasi non sint.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. In the fortieth (chapter) of Isaiah (there is written):2 God causes the scrutinizers of secrets (to be) as if they were not.

2. Item, Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto:3  Perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria.

2. Likewise, in the twenty-fifth (chapter) of Proverbs (there is said):3  The thorough scrutinizer of (His) majesty will be oppressed by (His) glory.

3. Item, Ecclesiatici tertio:4  Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris.  Ergo, si ea quae Magister perscrutatur, sunt secreta, . . .

3. Likewise, in the third (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus (there is written):4 Lest you think of things higher than yourself, and scrutinize things stronger than yourself.  Therefore, if those things which Master (Peter) thoroughly scrutinizes, are secrets, . . .

1 Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omissis verbis Secundo quaeritur, Vat. deinde addit huius libri. — Et dictum est, scilicet in Prooemio; perscrutatorius, id est rationativus sive rationalis, quod vocabulum S. Bonav. sumsit ex loco Iob, in principio Prooemii posito.  Constat, quod, suppositis fidei principiis, per usum rationis formatur scientia theologica, cuius obiectum, ut supra q. 1. S. Doctor exposuit, est credibile, prout transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additionem rationis.
2 Vers. 23.
3 Vers. 27; Vulgata legit:  Qui scrutator est maiestatis etc.
4 Vers. 22.

1 Contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, having omitted Secondly there is asked [Secundo quaeritur], the Vatican text then adds, of this Book. — And it has been said [huius libri.  —  Et dictum est], that is, in the Foreword; thoroughly scrutatory [perscrutatorius], that is reasoning [rationativus] or rational, which word St. Bonaventure takes from the passage in Job, quoted at the beginning of the Foreword.  It is established, that, with the principles of the faith supposed, through the use of reason theological science is formed, whose object, as above in q. 1, the Seraphic Doctor has expounded, is the credible, in so far as it passes over into the reckoning of the intelligible, and this through the addition of reason.
2 Verse 23.
3 Verse 27; the Vulgate reads:  He who is a scrutinizer of (His) majesty etc. [Qui scrutator est maiestatis etc.]
4 Verse 22.

 

p. 10

 

sunt magna, sunt alta et fortia, male Magister procedit.

are great, are high and strong, (then) Master (Peter) proceeds badly.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur sic:  modus procedendi in parte scientiae debet esse uniformis modo totalis scientiae;1 sed modus procedendi in sacra Scriptura est typicus et per modum narrationis, non inquisitionis:  cum ergo liber iste pertineat ad sacram Scripturam, non debet procedere inquirendo.

4. Likewise, it is shown thus by reason:  the manner of proceeding in a part of a science ought to be uniform with the manner of the whole science:1 but the manner of proceeding in Sacred Scripture is typical [typicus] and through a manner of narration, not of inquisition:  therefore since that Book of his pertains to Sacred Scripture, it ought not proceed by inquiring.

5. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens materiae, de qua est; unde in principio veteris Ethicae2 dicitur:  « Sermones inquirendi sunt secundum materiam »; sed materia huius doctrinae est credibile; sed credibile est supra rationem:  ergo modus procedendi per rationes non convenit huic doctrinae.

5. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be convenient to the matter, which it concerns; whence in the beginning of the old Ethics2 there is said:  « The subject of a conversation [sermones] must be inquired into according to (its) matter »; but the matter of this doctrine is the credible; but the credible is above reason:  therefore the manner of proceeding through reasons is not convenient for this doctrine.

6. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens fini, ad quem ordinatur scientia; sed haec scientia, ut dicit Magister in littera,3 ordinatur ad fidei promotionem; sed rationes fidem non promovent, sed evacuant; unde Gregorius:4  « Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum »; ergo talis modus contrariatur fini, ergo non est conveniens. Unde et Ambrosius:5  « Tolle, inquit, argumenta, cum de fide agitur. Piscatoribus creditur, non dialecticis ». Vanus ergo et inutilis videtur hic modus.

6. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be convenient to the end, towards which the science is ordered; but this science, as Master (Peter) says in the text3 is ordained to the promotion of the faith; but reasons do not promote the faith, but empty it; whence (St.) Gregory:4  « The faith, for which human reason offers experiment, has not merit »; therefore such a manner is contrary to the end, therefore it is not convenient. Whence even (St.) Ambrose says:5 « Take away the arguments, when one is dealing with the Faith.  It was believed by fishermen, not dialecticians ».  Therefore this manner seems vain and useless.

SED CONTRA:  1. Primae Petri tertio:6  Parati, omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide et spe.  Cum ergo multi sint, qui fidem nostram impugnant, non tantum rationem de ea poscunt; utile et congruum videtur per rationes eam astruere et modo inquisitivo et ratiocinando procedere:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. In the third (chapter) of First Peter:6  (Be) prepared, to render to everyone requesting a reason concerning that faith and hope which is in you.  Therefore since there are many, who impugn our Faith, they not only request a reason concerning it; it seems useful and congruous to build it up [eam astruere] through reasons and to proceed by an inquisitive manner and by reasoning [ratiocinando]:  ergo etc..

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore in libro de Trinitate:7  « Credo sine dubio, ad quorumlibet explanationem, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, sed etiam necessaria argumenta non deesse, licet contingat nostram industriam latere ».  Ergo cum fides nostra credat necessaria, et illa habeant rationes latentes, et talia indigeant perscrutatione, ut enodentur;8 patet quod modus perscrutatorius maxime convenit huic scientiae.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor in (his) book On the Trinity:7  « I believe without doubt, that for the explanation of anything, what is necessary is that there be not only probable, but also that there be not lacking necessary arguments, though it may happen that our effort [industriam] be hidden.  Therefore since our Faith believes necessaries, those also have hidden reasons, and such need a thorough scrutinization, to be unknotted [enodentur];8 it is clear that a thoroughly scrutatory manner is most convenient to this science.

3. Item, non est peioris conditionis veritas fidei nostrae quam aliae veritates; sed in aliis veritatibus ita est, quod omnis, quae potest per rationem impugnari, potest et debet per rationem defendi:  ergo pari ratione et veritas fidei nostrae.

3. Likewise, the truth of our Faith is not of a worse condition than other truths; but in the other truths it is thus, that everyone, which can be impugned through reason, can be and ought to be defended through reason:  therefore by an equal reason also the truth of our Faith.

4. Item, non est modo fides nostra peioris conditionis quam in principio; sed in principio, quando impugnabatur per falsa miracula magorum, defendebatur per vera Sanctorum:  ergo cum modo impugnetur per falsa argumenta haereticorum, debet defendi per vera argumenta doctorum.

4. Likewise, our Faith is now not of a worse condition than in the beginning; but in the beginning, when it used to be impugned through the false miracles of the magicians, it used to be defended through the true ones of the Saints:  therefore when it is now impugned through the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended through the true arguments of teachers.

CONCLUSIO.

Modus procedendi perscrutatorius sive ratiocinativus convenit huic doctrinae, cum valeat ad confundendum adversarios fidei, ad fovendum infirmos in fide, ad delectandum perfectos.

CONCLUSION

The thoroughly scrutatory or ratiocinative manner of proceeding is convenient to this doctrine, since it prevails to confound the adversaries of the Faith, to warm the infirm in faith, (and) to delight the perfect.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod modus perscrutatorius convenit huic doctrinae sive libro. Cum enim finis imponat necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus:9  « Serra est dentata, quia est ad secandum »; sic iste liber, quia est ad promotionem fidei, habet modum inquisitivum. Modus enim ratiocinativus sive inquisitivus valet ad fidei promotionem, et hoc tripliciter secun- / -dum . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the thoroughly scrutatory manner is convenient for this doctrine or Book. For since the end imposes a necessity for those thing which are for the end; because, as the Philosopher says:9  « A saw is toothed, because it is for cutting »; so this Book of his, because it is for the promotion of the Faith, has an inquisitive manner (of proceeding).  For the ratiocinative or inquisitive manner prevails for the promotion of the Faith, and this in a threefold manner according / to . . .

1 Cod. R propositionem maiorem sic exhibet:  modus procedendi in scientia debet convenire scientiae.
2 Nullius mss. auctoritate ponit Vat. primo Ethicorum. Lectio mss. confirmatur codice lat. 6569 Bibliothecae Regalis Parisiensis, qui continet Aristotelis Ethicam in duas partes distributam. Prima pars comprehendit primum Ethicorum librum estque translationis graeco-latinae, uti ex verbo proheresis, quod iam in principio occurrit, colligitur. Haec pars intitulatur Ethica nova. Secunda pars complectitur secundum et tertium Ethicorum librum et vocatur Ethica vetus. Vide Jourdain:  Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, pag. 179, ubi et de hac Ethica veteri adiungitur:  Non videtur mihi, quod haec translatio sit aetatis multum antiquioris. Ibidem citatur alia graeco-latina translatio Ethicorum, quae in operibus S. Thomae sub nomine Translatio vetus invenitur, in eaque (II. c. 2.) locus a S. Bonaventura allegatus sic exhibetur:  Sermones sunt expetendi secundum materiam. Similis locus habetur quidem I. Ethic. c. 3, qui tamen etiam in cit. antiqua translatione aliis verbis exhibetur:  Dicetur autem utique sufficienter, si secundum subiectam materiam manifestetur. — Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1 pro sed credibile non ita bene et credibile, quia est minor subsumta. In hac propositione forsan respicitur illud Dionysii de Div. Nom. c. 1:  Eius quidem (Divinitatis) scientia et contemplatio omnibus invia est.
3 Infra in Prologo.
4 Homil. 26. in Evang.
5 Quoad hunc textum Ambrosii notamus, quod ipse tam in mss. quam in Vat. exhibetur sub nomine Hieronymi, at falso; non enim in operibus S. Hieronymi habetur, sed in Ambrosii libro I, de Fide c. 13. n. 84. his verbis proferetur:  Aufer argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur. . . non creditur philosophis, creditur piscatoribus; non creditur dialecticis, creditur publicanis. — In quo textu Vat., non consentientibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, ante piscatoribus ponit pastoribus et.
6 Vers. 15, ubi Vulgata legit:  Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe. — Mox lectionem Vat. utique pro non tantum, in quae et constructio propositionis perturbatur et sensus ipsius non integre redditur, emendamus ex fere omnibus mss. (aliqui ut H ff falso habent non tantum) et ed. 1. Cod. B vero bene explicans aliorum codd. lectionem ponit et non tantum. Mox cod. R non ita bene eos instruere loco eam astruere; et immediate post ex codd. A F G H I R S T etc. cum ed. 1 inquisitivo pro inquisitorio substituimus.
7 Libr. I. c. 4. — Vat., reluctantibus mss. et ed. 1, circa initium huius textus mittit relativum quae et verbum est, quibus omissis sensus omnino perturbatur.
8 Plures codd. ut M P Z cum ed. 1 enucleentur.
9 Aristot., II. Phys. in fine, text. 92, ubi legitur:  Haec autem (divisio sive sectio) non erit, nisi serra habeat dentes tales. Et I. de Partib. animal. c. 5:  Non enim sectio serrae gratia facta est, sed serra sectionis gratia.

1 Codex R. exhibits the major in this manner:  the manner of proceeding in science ought to be convenient to the science.
2 On the basis of the authority of none of the manuscripts, the Vatican text reads of the first Ethics. The reading of the manuscripts is confirmed by codex lat. 6569 in the Royal Library of Paris, which contains Aristotle's Ethics arranged in two parts. The first part comprehends the first book of the Ethics and belongs to the Greco-Latin translation, as is gathered from the word proheresis, which found even at the beginning. This part is entitled New Ethics. The second part comprises the second and third book of the Ethics and is called the Old Ethics. See Jourdain's Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, p. 179, where concerning this Old Ethics there is added:  It does not seem to me, that this translation is much older in age. In the same work there is cited another Greco-Latin translation of the Ethics, which is found in the works of St. Thomas under the name Old Translation, and in that (II. c. 2) the passage alleged by St. Bonaventure is exhibited thus:  The subjects of conversations [sermones] are to be sought out according to (their) matter. Indeed a similar passage is found in the Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 3, which is however even in the ancient translation exhibited in other words:  But it is said in a sufficient manner at any rate, if it is manifested according to the subject matter. — Then the Vatican text, breaking with the manuscripts and edition 1, has in place of but the credible, the not so well and the credible, because it is the minor supposition. In this proposition there is perhaps referred to that passage from Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 1:  Indeed the science and contemplation of His (Divinity) is impassible to all things.
3 Cf. the Prologue.
4 Homil. 26. in Evang.
5 In regard to this text of (St.) Ambrose we note, that it is exhibited both in the manuscripts and in the Vatican text under the name of (St.) Jerome, but falsely; for it is not found in the works of St. Jerome, but in (St.) Ambrose's book, On the Faith, Bk. 1, ch. 13, n. 84 these words are cited:  Bear off arguments, where faith is sought . . . it is not believed by philosophers, it is believed by fishermen; it is not believed by dialecticians, it is believed by publicans. — In which text, the Vatican text, not agreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, places shepherds and before fishermen.
6 Verse 15, where the Vulgate reads:  Always prepared for the satisfaction of everyone requesting (from) you a reason concerning that hope which is in you. — Then the reading of the Vatican text, having at any rate in place of not only, in which both the construction of the proposition is perturbed and its sense is not rendered integrally, we have emended from nearly all the manuscripts (some as H and FF have falsely not only) and from edition 1. But codex B, well explaining the reading of the other codices, has and not only. Then codex R has not so well instructing them in place of building towards it; and immediately afterwards from codices A F G H I R S T etc. together with edition 1 we have substituted inquisitive in place of inquisitory.
7 Book I, ch. 4. — The Vatican text, with the manuscripts and edition 1 disagreeing, introduces the relative which and the word is around the beginning of this quote, which having been omitted entirely altered the sense (of the text).
8 Very many codices, as M P and Z together with edition 1 have be thoroughly explained [enucleentur].
9 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II in fine, text 92, where there is read:  But this (dividing or cutting) will not be, unless the saw have such teeth. And On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 5:  For the cutting has been made for the sake of the saw, but the saw for sake of cutting.

 

p. 11

 

secun- / -dum tria genera hominum.  Quidam enim sunt fidei adversarii, quidam sunt in fide infirmi, quidam vero perfecti.

according / to the three genera of men.  For certain ones are adversaries of the Faith, certain ones are infirm in faith, but certain ones (have been) perfected.

Modus inquisitivus valet primo ad confundendum adversarios.  Unde Augustinus primo de Trinitate:1 « Adversus garrulos ratiocinatores elatiores quam capaciores rationibus catholicis et similitudinibus congruis ad defensionem et assertionem fidei est utendum ».  Secundo valet ad fovendum infirmos.  Sicut enim Deus caritatem infirmorum fovet per beneficia temporalia, sic fidem infirmorum fovet2 per argumenta probabilia.  Si enim infirmi viderent, rationes ad fidei probabilitatem deficere et ad oppositum abundare, nullus persisteret.  Tertio valet ad delectandum perfectos.  Miro enim modo anima delectatur in intelligendo quod perfecta fide credit.  Unde Bernardus:3 « Nihil libentius intelligimus, quam quod iam fide credimus ».

The inquisitive manner prevails first to confound adversaries.  Whence (St.) Augustine (says) in the first (book) On the Trinity:1 « Against the garrulous ratiocinators, more elated than capable, one must use catholic reasons and congruous similitudes for the defense and assertion of the faith ».  Secondly it prevails to warm the infirm. For as God warms the charity of the infirm through temporal benefactions [beneficia], so does it warm2 the faith of the infirm through probable arguments.  For if the infirm saw, that the reasons for the faith were lacking probability and (those) for the opposite abounded, no one would persist (in the Faith).  Thirdly it prevails to delight the perfect.  For in a wonderful manner the soul delights in understanding what it believes with a perfect faith.  Whence (St.) Bernard (says):3 « We understand nothing more freely, than what we already believe by faith. ».

1. 2. 3. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates intelliguntur de perscrutatione curiosa, non de perscruatione studiosa.  Nam ipse Dominus dixit Iudaeis, Ioannis quinto:4 Scrutamini scripturas etc..

1. 2. 3. Therefore because it is objected unto the contrary, it must be said, that all those authorities are understood concerning a curious, thorough scrutinization, not concerning a studious, thorough scrutinization.  For the Lord Himself said to the Jews, in the fifth (chapter of the Gospel) of St. John:4 Scrutinize the Scriptures etc..

4. Quod obiicitur, quod iste5 modus non competit sacrae Scripturae; dicendum ad hoc, quod liber iste ad sacram Scripturam reducitur per modum cuiusdam subalternationis, non partis principalis; similiter et libri doctorum, qui sunt ad fidei defensionem.  Quod patet sic:  quia non quaelibet determinatio trahens in partem facit subalternationem scientiae, sed determinatio quodam modo distrahens.6  Nam scientia de linea recta non dicitur subalternari geometriae, sed scientia de linea visuali, quoniam haec determinatio quodam modo trahit ad alia principia.  Quoniam igitur sacra Scriptura est de credibili ut credibili,7 hic est de credibili ut facto intelligibili, et haec determinatio distrahit — « nam quod credimus debemus auctoritati, et quod intelligimus, rationi »8 — hinc est, quod sicut alius modus certitudinis est in scientia superiori et inferiori, ita alius modus certitudinis est in sacra Scriptura et alius in hoc libro, et ideo alius modus procedendi.  Et sicut scientia subalternata, ubi deficit, redit ad certitudinem scientiae subalternantis, quae maior est; sic etiam, cum Magistro deficit certitudo rationis, recurrit ad auctoritatis certitudinem9 sacrae Scripturae, quae excedit omnem certitudinem rationis.

4. Because it is objected, that this5 manner of his is not suited [competit] to Sacred Scripture; it must be said that in this regard, that his Book is reduced to Sacred Scripture through the manner of a certain subalternation, not of the principal part; similarly also the books of the doctors (of theology), which are for the defense of the Faith.  Which is thus clear:  because not every determination drawing unto one side [trahens in partem] causes a subalternation of a science, but (only) a determination drawing apart [distrahens] in a certain manner.6  For the science of the straight line is not said to be subalternated to geometry, but the science of the visual line (is), since this determination in a certain manner draws towards other principles.  Therefore since Sacred Scripture concerns the credible as credible,7 this concerns the credible as made intelligible, and this determination draws apart — « for what we believe, we ought to from authority, and what we understand, from reason »8 — hence it is, that as there is one [alius] manner of certitude in superior and inferior science, so there is another [alius] manner of the certitude in Sacred Scripture and another in this Book, and for that reason (there is) another manner of proceeding. And just as a subalternated science, where it is deficient, returns to the certitude of the subalternating science, which is greater; so also, when there is lacking to Master (Peter) the certitude of reason, he has recourse to the certitude9 of Sacred Scripture, which exceeds every certitude of reason.

5. Quod tu obiicis, quod10 debet convenire materiae; dicendum, quod convenit. Et quod obiicitur,* quod credibile est supra rationem; verum est, supra rationem quantum ad scientiam acquisitam,11 sed non supra rationem elevatam per fidem et per donum scientiae et intellectus.  Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum; scientia et intellectus elevant ad ea quae credita sunt intelligendum.

5. Because you object, that10 it ought to be convenient to the matter; it must be said, that it is convenient. And because it is objected, that the credible is above reason; (it must be said that) it is true, that (it is) above reason as much as regards acquired science,11 but (it is) not above reason elevated through faith and through the gift of knowledge [scientiae] and understanding.  For faith elevates one to assent (to what is to be believed); (the gifts of) knowledge and understanding elevate one to understand what has been believed.

6. Quod obiicitur, quod12 non convenit fini, quia evacuat meritum; dicendum, quod, quando assentitur propter se rationi, tunc aufertur locus fidei, quia in anima hominis dominatur violentia rationis.  Sed quando fides non assentit propter rationem, sed propter amorem eius cui assentit, desiderat habere rationes; tunc non evacuat ratio humana meritum, sed auget solatium.  Et primo modo intelligit13 Hieronymus, quod non sunt inducenda argumenta dialectica, quibus homo principaliter innitatur, quia innitendum est auctoritati principalius quam rationi.

Because it is objected, that it12 is not convenient to the end, because it empties merit; it must be said, that, when it is assented to on account of reason itself, then it bears off a place for faith, because in the soul of a man the violence of reason dominates.  But when faith does not assent on account of reason, but on account of love of Him to whom it assents, it desires to have reasons; it then does not empty human reason of merits, but augments consolation [solatium].  And in the first manner13 (St.) Jerome understands, that dialectical arguments must not be introduced, by which a man would be principally supported, because one must be more principally supported by authority than by reason.

1 Cap. 2, ubi dicitur:  Istis garrulis ratiocinatoribus, elatioribus quam capacioribus atque ideo morbo periculosiore laborantibus, sic fortasse serviemus, ut inveniant aliquid, unde dubitare non possint. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 in hoc textu post ratiocinatoribus addit magis.
2 Cod. K hic addit quis, sed non bene, ut videtur.
3 Libr. V. de Consid. c. 3. in fine:  Nil autem malumus scire, quam quae fide iam scimus.
4 Vers. 39.
5 Substituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 iste pro ille.
6 Id est, quae rem ad alium conceptum vel ad alia principia specialia trahit.
7 Ita antiquiores mss. (quorum aliqui ut A F G P Q ee cum ed. 1 ante credibili repetunt praepositionem de) contra Vat., quae habet credibile. — Mox per demonstrativum hic intelligitur liber Sententiarum. Cod. B addit vero, cod. O habet haec autem scientia loco hic. Dein cod. F pro facto ponit ratione.
8 August. de Utilit. credendi c. 11. n. 25:  Quod intelligimus igitur debemus rationi, quod credimus auctoritati. In quo textu plures codd. ut F G H T etc. cum Vat. debetur pro debemus.
9 Vat. cum recentiori cod. dd, omittendo certitudinem, legit auctoritates; codd. B L N O T ee lectionem Vat. servantes addunt et ad certitudinem; codd. autem C D F M P Q U W X Z aa bb exhibent lectionem in textum receptam, quam praeferimus eo, quod in ipsa duae species certitudinis, scilicet auctoritatis et rationis, distinctiori modo exhibentur.
10 Supple:  modus, quod Vat. sola addit. — Cod. R obiicitur loco tu obiicis.
11 Hoc est, habitam investigatione naturalis rationis et modo naturali, qui secundum Scholasticos a via sensus et experientiae incipit. Huic scientiae opponitur scientia infusa, sub qua continetur cognitio fidei, utpote quae tam respectu obiecti cogniti, quam respectu modi cognoscendi homini immediate a Deo praestatur. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic addit per rationem evidentem, quam additionem tamen nimis arctam iudicamus; certum siquidem est quod ratio, nisi elevetur per donum fidei, ad stricte credibilium cognitionem ne quidem probabilem pertingere non possit. Melius cod. K pro ad scientiam acquisitam ponit ratio in se consideratur. Mox plurimi codd. A B C D F G I L M P Q S T V X Y ee sapientiae loco scientiae, quod tamen ex subnexis improbatur.
12 Supple:  modus iste. — Mox ad idem subiectum propositionis servandum fide multorum mss. A F G I K R S T etc. et ed. 1 praeferimus evacuat passivo evacuatur, quod habet Vat.
13 Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, removimus additionem Vat. Gregorius similiter et, quae additio, sicuti iacet, omissa scil. qualibet interpunctione, erronea est, quia quae sequuntur non respiciunt verba Gregorii, sed solummodo Hieronymi. Cod. D post intelligit adiungit particulam et.

1 Chapter 2, where there is said: Those garrulous ratiocinators, more elated than capable and for that reason suffering with a more dangerous disease, let us serve so that they may perhaps find something, whence they cannot not doubt. — In this quote, the Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 adds rather before more elated.
2 Here codex K adds who, but not well, as is seen. [Trans. note:  Here contrary to the custom that will prevail in the Quaracchi Edition for citations from the Fathers of the Church, the original text lacks the quotations marks, « », which have been added for the sake of a conformity of style to both the English and Latin texts above.]
3 On Considerations, Bk. V, ch. 3 in fine:  But we prefer to know nothing, which we know already by faith.
4 Verse 39.
5 We have substituted from the more ancient manuscripts and from edition 1 this . . . of his [iste] in place of that [ille].
6 That is, which draws a thing towards another concept and/or to other special principles.
7 Thus the more ancient manuscripts (some of which, as A F G P Q and ee together with edition 1 repeat concerning [de] before credible) against the Vatican text, which has credible [credibile]. Next by the demonstrative this there is understood the Book of Sentences. Codex B adds but before this [trans.:  according to the English syntax], and codex O has but this science in place of this. Then codex F puts an intelligible reason in place of made intelligible.
8 (St.) Augustine, On the Utility of Believing, ch. 11, n. 25:  That which we therefore understand, we ought to by reason, what we believe, by authority. In which text very many of the codices as F G H T etc. together with the Vatican text have ought to be in place of we ought to.
9 The Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc, by omitting the certitude of, reads authorities ; codices B L N O T and ee following the Vatican reading add and to certitude; but codices C D F M P Q U W X Z aa and bb exhibit the reading received in the text, which we prefer for the reason that in it the two species of certitude, namely of authority and of reason, are exhibited in a more distinct manner.
10 Supply the manner, which only the Vatican texts adds. — Codex R has it is objected in place of you object.
11 That is, a habit (acquired) by the investigation of natural reason and in a natural manner, which according to the Scholastics begins from the way of sense and experience. To this science is opposed scientia infusa, under which is contained the cognition of faith, inasmuch as it, both in respect of the object cognized, and in respect of the manner of cognizing, is offered immediately by God to man. Cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 35, a. 2. — Here the Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 adds through evident reason, which addition, however, we judge to be exceedingly strict; (this is) certain even if it is that reason, unless it be elevated by the gift of faith, cannot stretch to the cognition of credibles, strictly speaking, nor indeed to the probable (cognition of them). This is better had in codex K which places reason is considered in itself in place of regards acquired science. Next very many of the codices A B C D F G I L M P Q S T V X Y and ee have of wisdom in place of of knowledge, which however is disproved from what follows.
12 Supply:  his manner. — Next to keep the same subject in the proposition, we have, on the testimony of manuscripts A F G I K R S T etc. and edition 1, preferred empties to the passive is emptied, which the Vatican text has.
13 Favoring the manuscripts and edition 1, we have removed the addition made by the Vatican text, similarly (St.) Gregory and, which addition, as is stated, having omitted punctuation, is erroneous, because what follows does not refer to the words of (St.) Gregory, but only of (St.) Jerome, Codex D adds the particle also [et] before understands.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic videtur mendum in exemplo editionis criticalis adhibito a me, ad finem lineae secundae sub hoc numero:  obi-citur pro obii- citur.]

 

 

p. 12

 

SCHOLION

SCHOLIUM

I. In solut. ad 4. S. Doctor tangit aliam quaestionem, utrum scil. theologia sit scientia subalternata, de qua scholae Scoti et D. Thomae dissentiunt, quatenus eius subalternatio intelligitur respectu theologiae beatorum. Scotus enim negativam sententiam tenet, sumendo subalternationem in sensu stricto cum omnibus conditionibus, quas requirit Aristoteles (I. Poster. c. 10); S. Thom. vero (S. I. q. 1. a. 2) subalternationem aliquam admittit. Seraphicus autem hic loquitur tantum de subalternatione relate ad s. Scripturam et in hac solutione omnino concordat cum S. Thomas (S. I. q. 1. a. 2), Scoto (hic Prolog. q. 4. et 5.) aliisque doctoribus. — De subalternatione respectu theologiae beatorum cfr. Scotus., I. Report. Prolog. q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 4; I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. 5. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 4. a. 2. cum Comment. Caietani. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4 ad ult. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. et 5. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. Prolog. p. 1. princ. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. A 7. a. 4. et seqq. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7. et 8.

I. In the solution to n. 4 the Seraphic Doctor touches another question, namely whether theology is a subalternate science, concerning which the school of Scotus and the divine Thomas disagree, to the extent that its subalternation is understood in respect of the theology of the blessed. For (Bl. John Duns) Scotus holds a negative opinion, taking subalternation in the strict sense with all the conditions, which Aristotle requires (I. Posterior Analytics, ch. 10); but St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 1, a. 2) admits some subalternation. Moreover, here the Seraphic (Doctor) speaks only of subalternation related to Sacred Scripture and in this solution he entirely agrees with St. Thomas (ibid.), with Bl. John Duns Scotus (here in the Prologue, q. 4. and 5) and with other doctors. — On subalternation in respect of the theology of the blessed, cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus., Reportatio, Bk. I, Prolog., q. 3, a. 3, quaestiunc. 4; Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 4 and 5. — St. Thomas, Summa., I., q. 4, a. 2 together with Cajetan's commentary. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 4 to the end. — Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1, and 5. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., p. 1, princ. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a 7, q. 4 ff.. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I., Prolog., q. 7, et 8.

II. Cum dicitur in solut. ad 6.:  Quando assentitur propter se rationi; sensus est:  quando homo non habet voluntatem aliquid credendi nisi propter rationem convincentem. Cfr. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. et 5. — Notabilis est forma locutionis:  « In anima hominis dominatur violentia rationis ». Ratio enim humana, quae se intra suos limites angustos claudendo influxum primae veritatis reiicit legitimoque suo Domino obsequium denegat, iusto iudicio condemnatur, ut sub iugo erroris servire debeat.

II. When it is said in solution to n. 6:  When it is assented to on account of reason itself; the sense is:  when a man does not have the will to believe anything except on account of a convincing reason. Cf. Sent., (Bk. I,) d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, at nn. 2 and 5. — The form of expression is notable:  « In the soul of man the violence of reason dominates ». For human reason which by closing itself within its own narrow limits rejects the influx of prime truth and denies its obsequium to its own legitimate Lord, is condemned by a just judgment, to duly serve under the yoke of error.

III. In solutione ipsius quaestionis omnes doctores satis consentiunt, et plurima hic dicta confirmantur Conc. Vaticano cap. IV. de fide cath. — Bonav. Breviloq. Prooem.; comment. in Evang. S. Ioannis, Prolog. n. 10. (in I. tom. Suppl. Bonelli). — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 4. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. in fine; II. Sent. d. 1. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 1. a 8. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 1. q. 5; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 14. q. 2; a. 8. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. — Gabr. Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 7.

III. In the solution to the same question all the Doctors are in sufficient agreement, and very many of the things said here are confirmed by the Vatican Council, On the Catholic Faith, ch. IV. — St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium., Foreword; Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, Prologue, n. 10. (in the first volume of Supplementary Writings, by Bonelli). — Alexander Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 3. in fine; Bk. II, d. 1, q. 4. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1, a. 5; Summa. I., q. 1, a 8. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, Summa., p. I., tr. 1, q. 5; Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 7. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 14, q. 2 and a. 8, q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 3. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog. q. 1. — Gabriel Biel, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog. q. 7.

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