S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PROEMIUM IN LIBRUM PRIMUM
SENTENTIARUM

FOREWORD TO THE FIRST BOOK
OF THE SENTENCES

QUAESTIONES PROEMII

 

Quaestio III.

QUESTIONS ON THE FOREWORD

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 12-14.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 12-14.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO III.

 

Utrum hic liber sive theologia sit contemplationis gratia, an ut boni fiamus, sive utrum sit scientia speculativa, an practica.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether this book or theology is for the sake of contemplation, or that we become good, or whether it is a speculative or practical science?

Tertio quaeritur1 de causa finali. Et cum dictum sit, quod liber iste est ad revelandum abscondita, quaeritur, utrum opus hoc sit contemplationis gratia, vel ut boni fiamus. Et quod sit, ut boni fiamus, videtur sic.

Thirdly there is asked1 concerning the final cause. And since it has been said, that this book is for revealing things hidden away, it is asked, whether this work is for the sake of contemplation, and/or that we become good. And that it is, that we become good, it seems thus.

1. Omnis doctrina, quae est de his, sine quorum cognitione non contingit recte vivere, est, ut boni fiamus; sed iste liber est ad cognitionem verae2 fidei, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo nec recte vivere, ut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo:3 ergo iste liber est, ut boni fiamus.

1. Every doctrine, which concerns these things, without the cognition of which one does not happened to live uprightly, is (for this), that we become good; but this book of his is for the cognition of the true2 faith, without which it is impossible to please God and live uprightly, as is said in the eleventh (chapter) to the Hebrews:3 therefore that book of his is (for this), that we become good.

2. Item, omnis doctrina, quae convenit cum virtute in obiecto, est, ut boni fiamus; haec per se manifesta est; sed haec doctrina convenit cum fide in obiecto, quia est de credibili, de quo etiam est fides sive in quo; ergo etc.

2. Likewise, every doctrine, which convenes with virtue in object, is (for this), that we become good; this is self-manifest [per se manifesta]; but this doctrine convenes with faith in object, because it concerns the credible, of which also, or in which, is faith; ergo etc..

3. Item, doctrina particularis conveit cum totali in fine; sed finis totalis Scripturae sacrae non est tantum, ut fiamus boni, sed etiam ut fiamus beati; et beatitudo est optimum: ergo finis istius scientiae est, ut boni fiamus.

3. Likewise, a particular doctrine convenes with the whole in (its) end; but the end of the whole of Scripture is not only, that we become good, but also that we become blessed; and beatitude is the best: therefore the end of that science of his is (this), that we become good.

CONTRA: 1. Magister dicit in littera,4 quod finis sive intentio sua « est theologicarum inquisitionum abdita pandere », sed hoc pertinet ad eum, cuius finis est speculatio: ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Master (Peter) says in (his) text,4 that his end or intention « is to lay open those things withdrawn from theological inquiries » but this pertains to him, whose end is speculation: ergo etc..

2. Item, scientia quae est, ut boni fiamus, pertinet ad mores; sed cum theologia sit de fide5 et moribus, liber autem iste de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores: ergo opus hoc non est, ut boni fiamus.

2. Likewise, the science which is, that we become good, pertains to morals; but although theology concerns faith5 and morals, that book of his, however, (concerns) these things which look towards faith, not these which look towards morals: therefore this work is not, that we become good.

3. Item, omnis scientia, quae est, ut boni fiamus, est practica; sed omnis talis est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro;6 sed haec non est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, sed a Deo: ergo est contemplationis gratia, non ut boni fiamus.

3. Likewise, every science, which is, that we become good, is practical; but every such (science) concerns these things which are by our work;6 but this does not concern these things which are by our work, but by God: therefore it is for the sake of contemplation, not that we become good.

1 Vat. proprio marte omittit Tertio quaeritur.
2 Ita plures codd. ut A I K T X etc. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet nostrae; praeferimus lectionem codd., utpote quae est S. Doctori familiarior et planius exprimit praerequisitum ad recte vivendum.
3 Vers. 6.
4 In Prolog. vide infra.
5 Substituimus particulam et pro non de. Dubium quidem non leve hac in re ingerebatur nobis eo, quod, cum Scholasticorum tempore theologia communiter dicta contineretur compendiose in libro Sententiarum, sicuti de isto libro statim subiicitur, quod sit de his quae spectant ad fidem, non de his quae spectant ad mores, ita etiam de theologia dicendum sit, quod sit de fide, non de moribus. Sed consentientibus omnibus mss. ed ed. 1, lectionem Vat. mutavimus; qua mutatione supposita, theologia largiori sensu accipienda est, quatenus diversas complectitur disciplinas. — Mox plures codd. inter quod et cod. T cum ed. 1 post iste addunt est.
6 Duabus his propositionibus consimiles habet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 2: Quoniam praesens tractatio (Ethicae) non est speculationis causa, quemadmodum aliae; non enim fit, ut cognoscamus, quid sit virtus, sed ut boni efficiamur. Et II. Metaph. text. 3. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Speculativae etenim (scientiae) finis veritas, practicae autem opus. — Secundum huius argumenti propositionem cod. K ita exhibet: et omnis scientia practica est de his quae sunt ab opere nostro, non a Deo: sed ista scientia non est etc.

1 The Vatican text omits Thirdly it is asked for its own reasons.
2 Thus very many of the codices as A I K T X etc. together with edition 1 against the Vatican text, which has our; we prefer the reading of the codices, as it is more familiar to the style of the Seraphic Doctor and expresses more plainly the prerequisite for upright living.
3 Verse 6.
4 In the Prologue, v. infra.
5 We have substituted the particle and in place of not. Indeed doubt has not lightly entered into our own mind in this regard, because, since the time of the Scholastics theology, commonly speaking, is contained in an compendious manner in the Book of Sentences, as if it were immediately the subject of this book, which concerns these things which look to faith, not these which look to morals, so that even of theology must be said, that it concerns faith, not morals. But with the consent of all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have changed the reading of the Vatican text; having supposed which change, theology must be accepted in the broader sense, to the extent that it comprises diverse disciplines. — Next very many of the codices, among whom are even codex T together with edition 1, adds concerns [est] after that book of his.
6 Aristotle has things similar to these two propositions in Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 2: Since the present treatise (the Ethics) is not for the sake of speculation, to the measure that it (belongs) to another; for it has not come into being, that we may cognize, what is virtue, but that we may be made good. And in the Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 3 ( the Shorter Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1): For speculative (science's) end is also truth, but practical's work. — Following to the proposition of this argument, codex K has: and every practical science concerns these things which are from our work, not from God: but that science of his does not etc..

p. 13

CONCLUSIO.

 

Scientia theologica est habitus affectivus et medius inter speculativum et practicum, et pro fine habet tum contemplationem, tum ut boni fiamus, et quidem principalius, ut boni fiamus.

CONCLUSION

 

Theological science is an affective habit and the mean between the speculative and practical, and for (its) end it has both contemplation, and that we become good, and indeed more principally, that we become good.

RESPONDEO: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum est, quod perfectibile a scientia est intellectus noster.1 Hunc autem contingit considerare tripliciter, scilicet in se, vel prout extenditur ad affectum, vel prout extenditur ad opus. Extenditur autem intellectus per modum dictantis et regulantis. Secundum hunc triplicem statum, quia2 errare potest, habet triplicem habitum directivum. Nam si consideremus intellectum in se, sic est proprie speculativus et perficitur ab habitu, qui est contemplationis gratia, qui3 dicitur scientia speculativa. Si autem consideremus ipsum ut natum extendi ad opus, sic perficitur ab habitu, qui est, ut boni fiamus; et hic est scientia practica sive moralis. Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus4 extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativum et practicum, qui complectitur utrumque; et hic habitus dicitur sapientia, quae simul dicit cognitionem et affectum: Sapientia enim doctrinae est secundum nomen eius, Ecclesiastici sexto.5 Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen, ut boni fiamus.

I RESPOND: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that our intellect is a thing perfectible by science.1 But one happens to consider this in a threefold manner, that is in itself, and/or as far as it is extended to affection, and/or as far as it is extended to work. But the intellect is extended through a manner of dictating and regulating. According to this threefold state, because2 it can err, it has a threefold directive habit. For if we were to consider the intellect in itself, it is thus properly speculative and is perfected by a habit, which is for the sake of contemplation, which3 is called speculative science. But if we were to consider it as born to be extended to work, it is thus perfected by a habit, which is, that we become good; and this is practical science or moral (science). But if we were to consider (it) in a middle manner as born4 to be extended to affection, it is thus perfected by a middle habit, between the purely speculative and practical, which comprises both; and this habit is called wisdom, which he calls simultaneously cognition and affection: For wisdom is of doctrine according to its name, in the sixth (chapter) of Ecclesiaticus.5 Whence this (habit) is for the sake of contemplation, and that we become good, however principally, that we become good.

Talis est cognitio tradita in hoc libro. Nam cognito haec iuvat fidem, et fides sic est in intellectu, ut, quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum.6 Et hoc patet. Nam haec cognitio, quod Christus pro nobis mortuus est, et consimiles, nisi sit homo peccator et durus, movet ad amorem; non sic ista: quod diameter est asymeter costae.7

Such is the cognition handed down in this book. For this cognition helps faith, and faith is so in the intellect, that, as much as it concerns it own reckoning, it has been born to move the affection.6 And this is clear. For this cognition, that Christ died on our behalf, and the like, unless a man be a sinner and hard (of heart), moves towards love; not so those things: that the diameter is the asymmeter of the side.7

Concendendum ergo, quod est, ut boni fiamus.

Therefore it must be conceded, that it is (for this), that we become good.

1. Quod obiicitur, quod8 est ad pandendum abscondita; dicendum, quod ibi non est status, quia illa revelatio ordinat ad affectum.

1. Because it is objected, that8 it is for laying open things hidden away; it must be said, that that [ibi] is not a state, because that revelation orders towards affection.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod non est de moribus nec de his quae sunt ab opere nostro; iam patet responsio ad illud,9 quia ipse loquitur de illa quae proprie est, ut boni fiamus, ut de practica.

2. 3. Because it is objected, that it does not concern morals nor these things which are by our work; the reply to that is already clear,9 because this is said of that which is properly, that we become good, as (is) practical (science).

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I. Haec questio communiter sic proponitur: utrum theologia sit speculativa, an practica? Attamen, stricte loquendo, inter hunc et illum loquendi modum est differentia. Nam proprie practica est notitia, quae per se est ordinabilis ad operationem; et in hoc sensu S. Doctor negat, theologiam esse practicam (ad 2. et 3.). Sed ut boni fiamus per directionem ad finem ultimum sive per inflammationem affectus, hoc inter speculativas scientias proprissime convenit theologiae.

I. This question is commonly proposed thus: whether theology is practical or speculative? But strictly speaking, however, there is a difference between this and that manner of speaking. For properly practical is the knowledge [notitia], which is per se ordainable to operation; and in this sense the Seraphic Doctor denies, that theology is practical (reply to n. 2 and 3). But that we become good through direction to the last end or through an enkindling of the affection, among the speculative sciences this most properly belongs to theology.

II. In corp. tangitur quaestio inter scholasticos agitata, utrum theologia sit sapientiae, quod communiter affirmatur, cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. a. 1. m. 1. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 1. q. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 6. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. ad 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5. ad 3. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. Prolog. p. 2. q. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. A. 6. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. in fine.

II. In the body there is touched upon the question debated among the scholastics, whether theology is wisdom, which is commonly affirmed, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I., a. 1, m. 1. — (Bl.) John Duns Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 3. — St. Thomas., Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., a. 1, q. 3; Summa., I., q. 1, a. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 4, ad 1. — Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 5, ad 3. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., p. 2, q. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 6. q. 2. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1. in fine.

III. In ipsa solutione quaestionis cum Seraphico Doctore et re et modo loquendi conveniunt Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., Thom. de Argentine. S. Thom. in Commentar. in Sent. loco infra cit. simpliciter dicit: Ergo (scientia sacra) non est practica, sed speculativa; in Summa vero: Comprehendit sub se utrumque, magis vero est speculativa quam practica. Haec ultima solutio parum distat a doctrina Seraphici, quod patet sic.

III. in this solution of the question both in matter and in manner of speaking Alexander of Hales, Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Giles the Roman and Thomas of Argentina agree with the Seraphic Doctor. St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences, in the passage cited below, says simply: Therefore (sacred science) is not practical, but speculative; but in the Summa (says) : It comprehends beneath itself both, but it is more speculative than practical. This last solution is not far from the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor, which is thus clear.

1 Hoc est, intellectus est subiectum aptum perfici a scientia. — Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1. ponendo perfectibilis transponit verba a scientia post noster.
2 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, transponendo quia cum praefixa praticula et, in principio huius propositionis aliqualiter respectum considerationis immutat. — Mox cod. X perfectum pro directivum, et plures codd. ut C F G L R S etc corrupte ductivum.
3 Vat. minus bene quae. Simile recurrit in sequenti propositione, in qua Vat. habet haec pro hic; utrobique tamen contra maiorem partem mss. ut A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff et ed. 1.
4 Codd. K et Z, sicuti in praecedentibus, consideremus ut natum. — Mox ex mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3, 6 castigavimus mendum Vat. legentis effectum pro affectum.
5 Vers. 23, ubi Vulgata transponit est post nomen. — Sensus est: sapientia secundum etymologiam tempore S. Doctoris communiter receptam idem est ac sapida scientia, sive scientia, quae dat saporem. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 1; S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Paulo supra ante simul Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 quia loco quae. — In principio sequentis propositionis sub demonstrativo hic subaudi habitus; ed. 1 habet haec, quod refertur ad sapientia. — Mox cod. K cum ed. 1 satis bene principalius loco principaliter.
6 Codd. I et T et fides licet sit in intellectu, tamen quantum est de sui ratione, nata est movere affectum; lectio non spernenda. — Mox cod. X pro Et hoc ponit Quod sic. Dein ex fere omnibus mss. ed ed. 1 hic restituimus particulam quod, quae deest in Vat., sed modo loquendi Scholasticorum magis congruit; e contra paulo infra post amorem expunximus fide mss. et ed. 1 in Vat. addita verba et devotionem.
7 Id est, diameter quadrati est incommensurabilis lateri, quae sententia occurit in IV. Phys. Aristot., ubi iuxta antiquam versionem impressam Venetiis 1489 studio Bernardino de Tridino, textu 120 (ed. Paris c. 12) sic legitur: Quoniam neque quod non est, erit in tempore, ut quaecumque non contingunt aliter esse, sicut diametrum esse lateri symetrum. Et ibidem iuxta translationem arobico-latinam: Ilud quod impossiblie est, ut sit aliter, ut diametrum esse symetrum constae (thn diametron einai th pleura summetron). Pro quo textu in Vat. habetur circulus vincit diametrum, sed obstant codd. et ed. 1.
8 Subaudi hic et in principio sequentis responsionis: liber iste, vel, scientia praesentis libri.
9 Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd., perturbata propositionis constructione, habet duo ultima pro illud. Immediate post plures codd. ut C G H L O Q etc. minus bene quod loco quia. — Mox post illa supple cum Vat. scientia.

1 That is, the intellect is an apt subject to be perfected by science. — The Vatican text, breaking with the manuscripts and edition 1, has perfectible [perfectibilis] in place of a thing perfectible [perfectibile].
2 The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, by replacing because with the prefixed particle and at the beginning of this proposition, alters in some respect the point of the statement. — Next codex X has perfect in place of directive, and very many of the codices as C F G L R S etc. have the corrupted reading ductive [ductivum].
3 The Vatican text has less well which. The same recurs in the following proposition, in which the Vatican text has this [haec] in place of this [hic]. Both ways, however, are contrary to the greater part of the manuscripts as A C F G H K M P Q S T U W Z cc ee ff and ed. 1.
4 Codices K and Z, as in the preceding, have we were to consider it as born. Next from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6 we have corrected the mistake in the reading of the Vatican text which has effect [effectum] in place of affection [affectum]..
5 Verse 23, where the Vulgate transposes est after nomen [trans.: this has reference to only the Latin syntax; its refers to wisdom.] — The sense is: wisdom is, according to received etymology at the time of the Seraphic Doctor, the same thing as tasty knowledge [sapida scientia], which gives a taste. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I., q. 1, m. 1; St. Bonaventure, Commentary, Bk. III. d. 35, q. 1. — A little above this, before simultaneously, the Vatican text against nearly all the codices and edition one has because in place of which. In the beginning of the following proposition for the demonstrative this understand habit; edition 1 has this, which refers to wisdom. Next codex K with edition 1 has more principally in place of principally well enough.
6 Codices I and T have and faith though it is in the intellect, however as much as concerns its own reckoning, has been born to move the affection; a reading which is not to be spurned. — Next codex X puts Which thus in place of And this. Then from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have here restored the particle that, which was lacking in the Vatican text, but is more agreeable to the manner of speaking of the Scholastics; and conversely a little after love we have expunged on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 the words added in the Vatican text, and devotion.
7 That is, the diameter of the square is incommensurable with the side, which sentence occurs in the fourth book of Aristotle's Physics, where according to the ancient version printed at Venice in 1489, edited by Bernardino of Tridino, text. 120 (ch. 12 in the Parisian edition) there is read: And because that which is not, will not be in time, whatever they are, they do not happen to be otherwise, such as "a diameter is symmetrical to the side". And the same according to the Arabic-Latin translation: That which is impossible, to be otherwise, as "a diameter is symmetrical to a side." (thn diametron einai th pleura summetron). For which text there is had in the Vatican text a circle conquers a diameter, but the codices and edition 1 oppose this.
8 Understand here in the beginning of the following response: that book of his, and/or the science of the present book.
9 The Vatican text against the manuscripts and the six first editions, having perturbed the construction of the proposition, has the two last in place of that. Immediately afterwards very many of the codices as C G H L O Q etc. have less well that in place of because. — Next after that supply with the Vatican text science.

 

p. 14

 

1. Uterque admittit praeter scientiam speculativam et practicam tertium membrum, quod simul utrumque continet. Licet Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) de hac divisione male sentiat, tamen fere ab omibus et rationabiliter admitttur et bene defenditur ab Aegid. Rom. loc. cit. Ita habitus theologicae scientiae, cum sit superiorir ordinis, quia fundatur in principiis fidei, quae imperatur a voluntatre et involvit inclinationem in Deum, videre esse eminenter speculativus et aliquo modo practius; habet enim virtutem et intellectum illuminandi et affectum inflammandi. Unde saltem in sense largo haec scientia potest appellari practica, licet ex parte obiecti non immediate dirigat operationem, quia ex parte finis de sui ratione inclinat ad amorem Dei. Pro explicatione servire potest III. Sent., d. 23. a. 1. a. 2. in corp.

1. Each admits besides speculative and practical science a third member, which simultaneously contains both. Though (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Prolog. q. 4) thinks badly of this division, it is however admitted by nearly all and that reasonably and it is well defended by Giles the Roman, loc. cit.. Thus the habit of theological science, since it belongs to a superior order, because it is founded on the principles of (the virtue of) faith, which is commanded by the will and involves an inclination into God, seems to be eminently speculative and in a certain manner practical; for it has virtue for both illuminating the intellect and inflaming the affection. Whence at least in the broad sense this science can be named practical, though on the part of the object it does not immediately direct operation, because on the part of the end from its own reason it inclines to the love of God. For an explanation one can use (what is said in the Commentary), Bk. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, in the body of the reply.

2. Si S. Thomas dicit, quod theologia sit magis speculativa quam practica, hoc verum est, si consideratur ex parte obiecti; et hanc rationem etiam S. Bonaventura satis innuit, cum in solut. ad 2. et 3. neget, quod haec scientia sit practica in sensu stricto. Si vero Seraphicus affirmat, quod sit « principaliter, ut boni fiamus », hoc iterum verissimum est, si spectatur eius finis, qui certe magis est, ut boni fiamus, quam ut tantum divina speculemur.

2. If St. Thomas says, that theology is more speculative than practical, this is true, if it is considered on the part of the object; and St. Bonaventure has sufficiently inclined to this reason, since in the solution to n. 2 and 3 he denies, that this science is practical in the strict sense. But if the Seraphic Doctor affirms, that it is « principally, that we become good », this is again most true, if one looks at its end, which it is certainly greater, (namely) that we become good, than that we only gaze upon divine things.

3. S. Bonaventura hic theologiam expresse non nominat scientiam affectivam; tamen tertium membrum divisionis, quod speculativum et practicum in se complectitur, non inepte cum B. Alberto aliisque antiquis hoc vocabulo distingui potest, attendendo finem principalem, qui est caritas in affectu. Nam a fine principali aliqua res nomen bene sortiri potest. — De duplici genere cognitionis, scil. speculationis et devotionis, cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.

3. St. Bonaventure here expressly does not name theology an affective science; however the third member of the division, that it comprises the speculative and practical in itself, cannot, together with Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great and the other ancient authors, be inaptly distinguished by this word, when attending to the principal end, which is charity in the affection. For from the principal end anything can be well named. — Of the twofold genus of cognition, namely, speculation and devotion, cf. the Commentary, Bk. III., d. 35, q. 1.

IV. De tota questione: Alex. Hal., S. P. I. q. 1, m. 1 et 2. — Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 1. a. 3. m. 3; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. Prolog. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., Prolog. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 8. q. 3. et seqq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. prolog. q. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6. — Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 12.

IV. On this whole question: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I. q. 1, m. 1 et 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 4. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 1, a. 3; Summa. , I., q. 1, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albert., Summa., p. I, tr. 1, a. 3, m. 3; Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 4. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, Prolog., q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 8. q. 3 ff.. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. I, prolog., q. 2. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 6. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. I, Prolog., q. 12.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.