S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

Divisio libri Sententiarum
et disputatio circa frui et uti.

The Division of the Book of Sentences
and The Disputation about to enjoy and to use

ARTICULUS I.

 

QUAESTIO 1.

ARTICLE I

 

QUESTION 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 29-32.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 29-32.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Veteris ac novae Legis continentiam etc.

While considering the contents of the Old and New Law etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In parte ista incipit tractatus libri, qui dividitur in quatuor libros partiales. Prima pars habet duas partes. In prima parte venatur Magister materiam huius libri et per consequens aliorum. In secunda exsequitur divisionem suam, quae incipit ibi distinctione secunda:1 Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide etc.

In this part of his, he begins the text [tractatus] of the Book, which is divided into four partial books. The first part has two parts. In the first part Master (Peter) hunts the matter of this book and consequently of the others. In the second he seeks out his division, which he begins there in the second distinction:1 And thus in this manner the true and pious faith etc..

Item prima pars, in qua venatur materiam habet duas2 partes. In prima parte venatur materiam per divisiones, et ideo primo ponit divisionem, per quam distinguuntur tres libri a quarto, scilicet per res et signa. Secundo3 ponit divisionem, per quam distinguitur primus liber a tribus aliis, quae est per frui et uti, ibi: Id ergo in rebus considerandum.4

Likewise the first part, in which he hunts the matter (of the book), has two2 parts. In the first part he hunts the matter through divisions, and for that reason he first posits a division, through which the three books are distinguished from the fourth, that is through things and signs. Second3 he posits a division, through which the first book is distinguished from the other three, which is through enjoying and using, there (where he says): Among things, therefore, it must be considered.4

Item, prima pars habet tres particulas. In prima proponit divisionem et auctoritate Augustini confirmat eam, quae est, quod tota doctrina theologica est de rebus, vel de signis, id est, subiectum commune theologiae in haec duo dividitur. In secunda membra divisionis explanat, ibi: Proprie autem hic res appellantur, ostendens, quid sit res et quid signum secundum membra praedictae divisionis. In tertia vero particula divisionem ad propositum applicat, ibi: Cumque his intenderit theologorum speculatio, dicens, quod de rebus et signis sit5 dicturus, primo tamen de rebus.

Likewise, the first part has three subparts. In the first he proposes a division and confirms it by the authority of (St.) Augustine, which is, that the whole doctrine of theology concerns things, and/or signs, that is, the common subject of theology is divided into these two. In the second he explains the members of the division, there (where he says): But here (those) are properly named things, showing, what a thing is and what a sign according to the members of the aforesaid division. But in the third subpart he applies the division to the proposed (subject), there (where he says): And since . . . the speculation of theologians is intent upon these, saying, that he is going to speak of things and signs5, first, however, of things.

Item, pars illa, in qua ponit divisionem per frui et uti, per quam primus liber distinguitur ab aliis tribus, habet duas partes. In prima ponit divisionem et explanat ipsam.6 In secunda quae dicta sunt epilogat, ibi: Omnium igitur, quae dicta sunt etc. Prima igitur pars habet tres partes: in prima ponit divisionem in res, quibus fruendum, et res quibus utendum: in secunda ad maiorem evidentiam assignat quasdam definitiones, ibi: Frui autem est amore inhaerere etc. In tertia vero proponit et determinat quasdam dubitationes, ibi: Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur etc.

Likewise, that part, in which he posits a division through enjoying and using, through which the first book is distinguished from the other three, has two parts. In the first he posits the division and explains it.6 In the second he says in addition [epilogat] what they are, there (where he says): Of all the things, therefore, which have been said etc.. Therefore the first part has three parts: in the first he posits a division among the things, which one is to enjoy, and the things which one (is) to use; in the second he assigns certain definitions for greater clarity [evidentiam], there (where he says): Moreover to enjoy is to cleave to any thing by love etc.. But in the third he proposes and determines certain doubts [dubitationes], there (where he says): Moreover since men, who enjoy and use etc..

Et in prima particula primo ponit divisionem secundum auctoritatem Augustini, secundo exemplificat, ibi: Illae, quibus fruendum etc.7

And in the first subpart he first posits a division according to the authority of (St.) Augustine, secondly he exemplifies it, there (where he says): Those which one is to enjoy etc..7

Frui autem est amore inhaerere. Haec secunda8 particula illius partis, in qua ponit divisionem in qua distinguitur primus liber ab aliis tribus, quae est de quibusdam notificationibus, quatuor habet particulas. Primo enim ponit notificationes frui et uti; secundo applicat eas ad propositum, scilicet ad res, quibus fruendum est9 et utendum, ibi: Res igitur quibus fruendum; tertio comparat ad alias assignationes, ibi: Notandum vero, quod idem Augustinus; quarto, quia videntur10 sibi contradicere, movet et determinat quandam dubitationem, ibi: Et attende quod videtur Augustinus dicere etc.

To enjoy is to cleave . . . by love. This second8 subpart of that part, in which he posits a division in which the first book is distinguished from the other three, which concerns certain observations [notificationes], has four subparts. For he first posits observations regarding to enjoy and to use; second he applies these to the proposed (subject), that is to the things, which one is to enjoy9 and use, there (where he says): The things therefore which one is to use; third he compares it to other acceptations [assignationes], there (where he says): But it must be noted, that the same (St.) Augustine; fourth, because (these things) seem10 to contradict themselves, he puts forward [movet] and determines a certain doubt, there (where he says): And attend that (St.) Augustine seems to say etc.

Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur et utuntur. Haec tertia pars, in qua movet et tractat dubitationes quasdam, habet tres partes secundum tres dubitationes, quarum11 prima est, utrum homo homine debeat frui, secunda, utrum Deus homine fruatur, vel utatur, et hanc movet ibi: Sed cum Deus diligat etc.; tertia quaestio12 est, utrum virtutibus sit fruendum, vel utendum, ibi: Hic considerandum est, utrum virtutibus etc. Et in qualibet istarum trium partium primo movet quaestionem, secundo motam determinat, tertio determinationem per auctoritatem confirmat. Et particulae in suis locis sunt manifestae.

Moreover since men, who enjoy and use. this third part, in which he puts forward and treats of certain doubts, has three pars according to the three doubts, of which11 the first is, whether man [homo] ought to enjoy man, the second, whether God enjoys man, or uses (him), and this he puts forward there: But since God loves etc.; the third question12 is, whether one is to enjoy virtues, or use (them), there (where he says): Here it must be considered, whether one is to enjoy the virtues etc.. And in any of these three parts of his he first puts forward the question, second, he determines the (question) put forward, third, he confirms the determination through authority. And the subparts have been made manifest in their own place.

1 Vat., post suam addendo et hoc, transponit verba dist. 2 ante relativum quae; sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
2 Vat. paulo infra, contradicentibus mss et ed. 1, tertium membrum subdivisionis adiungendo ponit hic tres loco duas; sed falso, uti ex dicendis patebit. Error editorum Vat. fore inde provenit, quod ipsi putarent, per verba immediate sequentia In prima parte significari primam partem subdivisionis, cum tamen revera per illa nihil aliud significetur nisi prima pars principalis, i. e. tota prima distinctio.
3 Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 substituimus Secundo pro In secunda, postulante hac in super contextu, cum Secundo referatur ad primo paulo superius positum.
4 Nullo adstipulante mss. nec favente ed. 1, Vat. adiungit hic In tertia determinat dubitationes quasdam ex praemissis ortas, ibi: Cum autem homines, qui fruuntur sed falso, cum haec pars sit tertia particula subdivisionis partis primae, sicuti infra expresse habetur.
5 Contra anitquiores codd. et ed. 1 minus bene Vat. fuerit. Mox codd. C S cc Iterum pro Item.
6 Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus et explanat ipsam et mox ex fere omnibus codd. cum ed. 1 post Prima addidimus igitur, pro quo codd. P et Q habet iterum.
7 Ita mss. cum ed. 1; in Vat. autem subdivisio, quae incipit a verbis Et in prima particula usque to Frui autem, deest.
8 Vat. hic interserens verbum est, ob variatam constructionem in fine propositionis ante quatuor praefixam habet particulam et; insuper in media propositione post divisionem pro in qua ponit quam, sed contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1.
9 Fide mss. et ed. 1 addimus est.
10 Ita plurimi codd. ut A C F G I K R T V X W Z etc. et ed. 1 necnon textus Magistri Sentent. contra VAt., quae habet videtur, et aliquos codd. ut H L O S, qui legunt videtur.
11 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus quarum, sicuti et paulo infra post fruatur substituimus vel pro et.
12 Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. quaestio.

1 The Vatican text, by adding and this after his division, transposes the words in the second distinction before the relative which, but against the manuscripts and edition 1.
2 The Vatican text a little below, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, by adjoining a third member of the subdivision, places three here in place of two; but falsely, as will be clear from what is to be said. The error of the editors of the Vatican text arose from this, that they thought, that by the words immediately following In the first part there was signified the first part of the subdivision, when, however, really there was by these nothing else to be signified except the first principal part, i. e. the whole first distinction.
3 On the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have substituted Second in place of In the second, as demanded in the above context, since Second refers to and for that reason he first [Trans.: the initial capitals, not present in the original note seemingly by typographic lapse, are here restored in both the Latin and English text of the same].
4 With no manuscripts supporting and without edition 1 favoring it, the Vatican text adjoins " In the third he determines certain doubts risen from the aforesaid things, there (where he says): Moreover since all men, who enjoy" but falsely, since this part is the third subpart of the subdivision of the first part, as is had expressly below.
5 Against the more ancient codices and edition 1, and less well, the Vatican text has was going to speak. Next codices C S and cc have Again in place of Likewise.
6 Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied and he explains it and next from nearly all the codices together with edition 1 we have added Therefore at the first part has three parts:, whereas codices P and Q have Again.
7 Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1; But in the Vatican text the subdivision, which begins from the words And in the first subpart up to But to enjoy, is lacking.
8 The Vatican text, inserting the word is here, because of the varied construction at the end of the proposition, has prefixed before has four the word and (it); moreover in the middle of the proposition after a division has through which in place of in which, but the manuscripts and edition 1 contradict this.
9 Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added one is [est].
10 Thus very many of the manuscripts, as A C F G I K R T V X W Z etc. and edition 1, and also the text of Master Peter, against the Vatican text, which has (this) would seem . . . itself, and some of the codices as H L O S, which read (this) seems . . . itself.
11 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied of which, just as also a little below, before uses, we have substituted and/or [ve] for and.
12 Not trusting in the manuscripts or edition 1, the Vatican text omits question.

p. 30

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad evidentiam definitionum et aliorum, quae Magister ponit de his verbis frui et uti, sex quaeruntur in parte ista, quorum tria pertinent ad uti, tria ad frui.

For the greater clarity of the definitions and other things, which Master (Peter) posits by these words to enjoy and to use, six things are asked in this part, three of which pertain to using, three to enjoying.

De uti tria quaeruntur.

Concerning to use three things are asked.

Primo quaeritur, quid sit uti per essentiam.
Secundo, utrum omni creato contingat uti.
Tertio, turum solo bono creato sit utendum.

First there is asked, what is it to use, essentially?
Second, whether one happens to use every created thing?
Third, whether one is to use only a created good.

De frui similiter quaeruntur tria.

Concerning to enjoy three things are similarly asked.

Primo, quid sit frui per essentiam.
Secundo, utrum bono increato fruendum sit.
Tertio, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo bono increato.

First, what is it to enjoy, essentially?
Second, whether one is to enjoy the uncreated Good.
Third, whether one is to enjoy only the uncreated Good Itself.

ARTICULUS I.

Quid sit uti et de utibili.

ARTICLE I

What is it "to use"? and On the usable

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum uti sit actus voluntatis, an rationis,
vel omnis potentiae.

QUESTION 1

Whether "to use" is an act of the will, or of the reason,
and/or of every power.

CIRCA PRIMUM1 de uti, quid sit per essentiam, utrum sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, sic proceditur. Quod sit actus voluntatis ostenditur sic.

ABOUT THE FIRST (question)1 concerning to use, what is it essentially, whether it is an act of the will, or of the reason? it is advanced in this manner. That it is an act of the will is shown thus:

1. Ab actu utendi denominatur unusquisque bonus;2 sed nullus dicitur bonus nisi ab actu voluntatis: ergo actus utendi pertinet ad voluntatem.

1. By an act of using every single good thing is denominated;2 but none is called good except by an act of the will:  therefore the act of using pertains to the will.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate:3 « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis » : ergo uti est actus voluntatis.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity:3 « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will » :  therefore to use is an act of the will.

3. Item, hoc videtur per divisionem ipsius uti contra alia, quia decimo de Trinitate4 dividit Augustinus haec tria, ingenium, doctrinam et usum, et dicit, quod ingenium respicit, quid homo possit, doctrina, quid homo sciat, usus, quid5 velit: ergo usus est actus voluntatis.

3. Likewise, this seems through a division of to use itself against the others, because in the tenth (book) On the Trinity4 (St.) Augustine divides these three, ingenuity, doctrine and use, and says, that ingenuity respects, what a man can (do), doctrine, what a man knows [sciat], use, what5 he wants:  therefore use is an act of the will.

4. Item, « Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;6 sed uti et abuti sunt opposita, ergo cum abuti sit solius voluntatis, quia eius solius est peccare: ergo et uti similiter erit actus solius voluntatis.

4. Likewise, « There are naturally bound to be opposites about the same thing »;6 but to use and to abuse are opposites, therefore since to abuse belongs to the will alone, because to it alone does "to sin" belong: therefore also will to use be an act of the will alone.

CONTRA: 1. Usus sive assuefactio est via in habitum acquirendum;7 sed omnis potentia nata est acquirere habitum: ergo uti videtur esse omnis potentiae.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Use or being accustomed [assuefactio] is a way to acquire a habit;7 but every power is naturally bound to acquire a habit: therefore to use seems to belong to every power.

2. Item, omnis potentia mediante operatione sua ordinatur in finem;8 sed eo dicitur aliquid utibile sive uti, quo in finem est ordinabile; sed ordinari in finem mediante propria operatione est omnis potentiae: ergo et uti similiter.

2. Likewise, every power by means of its operation is ordained unto an end;8 but for this reason it is said that anything (is) usable or that one uses it, because it is ordainable unto an end; but to be ordained unto an end by means of its own operation belongs to every power: therefore also to use similarly.

3. Item, sicut Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera,9 uti est id quod in usum venerit referrre etc. Sed eius est referre, cuius est conferre; sed conferre est solius rationis, ergo et referre: ergo et uti a definitione.

3. Likewise, as (St.) Augustine says and as is had in the text (of Master Peter),9 to use is that which comes to be referred unto use etc.. But to refer belongs to that, to which to confer belongs; but to confer belongs to the reason alone, therefore also to refer: therefore also to use by definition.

4. Item, ars utitur suis intrumentis;10 sed ars est in potentia rationali sive cognitiva, cum sit scientia: ergo cum habitus et actus sint eiusdem potentiae, si ars est in potentia rationali, et usus similiter erit in eadem.

4. Likewise, art uses its own instruments;10 but art is in the rational or cognitive power, since it is knowledge [scientia]: therefore since habit and act belong to the same power, if art is in the rational power, use will also similarly be in the same.

CONCLUSIO.

 

"Uti" quinque modis potest intelligi: si sumitur communissime et communiter, est actus omnis potentiae; si sumiter proprie, magis proprie et propriissime, est actus voluntatis.

CONCLUSION

 

"To use” can be understood in five manners: if it is taken in its most common and common sense, it is an act of every power; if it is taken in its proper, more proper, and most proper sense, it is an act of the will.

RESPONDEO:11 Dicendum, quod uti quinque modis accipitur, et secundum hoc diversificatur secundum rem et secundum definitionem.

I RESPOND:11 It must be said, that “to use” is accepted in five manners, and according to this it is diversified according to thing and according to definition.

Accipitur enim usus sive uti communissime, secundum quod dividitur contra otium vel otiositatem, pro naturali operatione debita cuilibet rei, sive / ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur . . .

For use or "to use" is accepted in the most common sense [communissime], according to which it is divided against leisure [otium] or leisure-time [otiositatem], in place of the natural operation due any thing, or / toward that which any single thing [unaquaeque res] is ordained . . .

1 Consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus verba Circa primum et mox mutavimus aut in an, quod et grammatice melius est.
2 Forsitan respicitur illud Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 3. in fine: Qui enim bene his (voluptatibus et doloribus) utetur, bonus; qui male, erit malus.
3 Cap. 11. n. 17; vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3 in initio.
4 Ibidem, paulo ante; et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25.
5 Cod. X hic iterum addit homo.
6 Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis circa finem; Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria.
7 Idem B. Albert., S. I. tr. 2. q. 8. m. 1. his verbis exprimit: Secundo dicitur uti rei exercitium ad inducendum habitum, secundum quod dicit Victorinus in Rhetoricis suis (seu Comment. in Rhetor. Circeronis, I. c. 1-4. 25. et II. c. 59.), quod natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem. — Vide et Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1.
8 Vide Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16. (Ed. Paris. VIII. c. 8. ). — Mox codd. C F G H K L O R S U cc et ed. 1 utile pro utibile; cod. Z utile sive utibile quo etc.
9 Hic c. 2. — Faventibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, pro Vat. ergo referre et per consequens uti; praeferimus tamen lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 tanquam distinctiorem.
10 Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Circa finem argumenti mendum Vat. ponentis sic pro si castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1. — Mox Vat. post usus addit sive uti; quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
11 Plures codd. ut A I T etc. Solutio pro Respondeo.

1 With the consent of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have restored the words About the first (question) and next we have changed or [aut] into or [an], which is also better grammatically [in Latin]. [Trans. Here the first refers to the items enumerated in the Treatment of Questions.]
2 This perhaps refers to that passage of Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 3 at the end: For he who uses these (pleasures and sorrows) well, (is) good; he who (does so) evilly, will be evil.
3 Chapter 11, n. 17: see above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 at the beginning.
4 Ibid., a little before; and in On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 25.
5 Codex X again adds here a man.
6 Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Opposites", near the end: But it is clear, that around either the same species or genus there are naturally bound to be contraries. [Trans.: there are naturally bound to be, translates nata sunt fieri, which is lit. they are born to become, i.e., by their nature they necessarily come into being.]
7 The same Bl. (now St.) Albert, Summa., I tr. 2, q. 8, m. 1, expresses this with these words: Secondly to use is said (to be) the exercise of a thing to induce a habit, according to which Victorinus says in his Rhetorics (or Commentary on the Rhetorics of Cicero, I. chs. 1-4, 25 and II, ch. 59), that nature makes one able [habilem], art powerful, use facile. — See Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 1.
8 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 16, (Parisian edition, Bk. VIII, ch. 8). — Next codices C F G H K L O R S U and cc and edition 1 have utile in place of usable; codex Z has utile or usable which etc.
9 Here in ch. 2. — Favoring the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, we have substituted in the text (of Master Peter) for below. In the conclusion of this argument, the Vatican text has therefore to refer and consequently to use; we have preferred, however, the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 as more distinct.
10 Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 53 (ch. 3). — Near the end of the argument the mistake of the Vatican text, of placing so [sic] for if [si], is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. — Next the Vatican text adds or "to use" after use; which is lacking in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
11 Very many of the codices, as A I T etc. have The Solution: in place of I respond:.

p. 31

ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur, et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus:1 « Cuius usus bonus etc. ».

toward that which any single thing [unaquaeque res] is ordained, and according to this the Philosopher says:1 « The use of which is good etc. ».

Secundo modo dicitur communiter; et sic usus dividitur contra dissuetudinem. Et hoc modo definitur a Victorino:2 « Usus est actus frequenter elicitus a potentia », et hoc modo potest dici, quod est actus omnis potentiae nec addit super actum nisi frequentiam.

In the second manner it is said in its common sense [communiter]; and so use is divided against disuse [dissuetudinem]. And in this manner it is defined by Victorinus:2 « Use is an act frequently elicited by a power », and in this manner it can be said, that it is an act of every power and that it does not add (anything) upon the act except frequency.

Tertio modo accipitur uti proprie; et sic dividitur contra habitus memoriae et intelligentiae, scilicet3 contra ingenium et doctrinam. Et sic definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis», et sic dicit actum voluntatis proprie.

In the third manner “to use” is accepted properly; and so it is divided against the habit of memory and intelligence, that is3 against ingenuity and doctrine. And thus it is divided by (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity: « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will », and so he calls it an act of the will in the proper sense.

Quarto modo accipitur magis proprie; et sic dividitur contra actum quietativum, scilicet contra frui. Et sic definitur ab Augustino:4 « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis propter aliud », et sic est actus voluntatis ut ad aliud relatae.

In the fourth manner it is accepted in its more proper sense [magis proprie]; and so it is divided against the quietative act, that is against to enjoy. And so it is defined by (St.) Augustine:4 « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will for the sake of another », and so it is an act of the will while (the will is) related to another.

Quinto accipitur propriisime; et sic dividitur contra actum inordinatum, scilicet contra abuti. Et sic definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana:5 « Uti est id quod in usum venerit referre ad id, quo fruendum est », et sic uti dicit actum voluntatis relatum et ordinatum in finem.

In the fifth it is accepted in its most proper sense [propriisime]; and so it is divided against the inordinate act, that is against to abuse. And thus it is defined by (St.) Augustine in On Christian Doctrine:5 « To use is to refer that which comes to be used for that, which one is to enjoy », and thus "to use" means an act of the will related and ordained unto an end.

Ratio ergo diversarum notificationum est multiplex acceptio eius quod est uti; et ratio multiplicis acceptionis est oppositio eius ad diversa.

Therefore the reason for the diverse observations is the multiple acceptation of what it is to use; and the reason for the multiple acceptation is its opposition to diverse things.

Si ergo quaeratur, cuius potentiae est6 actus; dicendum, quod communissime et communiter loquendo, est actus omnis potentiae; et sic non loquitur Augustinus; proprie vero, magis proprie et propriisime actus est ipsius voluntatis.

If therefore it is asked, to which power does6 the act belong; it must be said, that in the most common sense and commonly speaking, it is an act of every power; and (St.) Augustine does not speak in this manner; but properly, in a more proper sense and in the most proper sense it is an act of the will itself.

1. Et sic patet primo obiectum in contrarium, scilicet quod7 sit omnis potentiae.

1. And so (that which is) first objected in the contrary is clear, that is, that (to use)7 belongs to every power.

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod omnis potentia refertur in finem per actum suum; dicendum, quod illa potentia dicitur uti suo actu, quae est domina sui actus; et talis potentiae est referre suum actum, non tantum referri. Et quoniam sola voluntas est domina sui actus et sola est se ipsam movens, ideo ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti. Aliis autem potentiis contingit uti materialiter et passive, quia habent referri, et non referre. Et hinc est, quod ab Augustino dicitur:8 « Uti est assumere aliquid in faculatem voluntatis »; facultas enim dicitur eius dominium, quo faciliter potest in actum suum tanquam illius princeps.

2. Because it is objected secondly, that every power is referred unto an end through its own act; it must be said, that that power is said to use its own act, which is lord of its own act; and to such a power belongs to refer its own act, not only to be referred (by its own act). And since the will alone is lord of its own act and it alone is moving itself, for that reason it is that alone, to which it belongs to use actively. But it happens that it uses the other powers materially and passively, because they have to be referred, and do not have to refer. And this is, what is said by (St.) Augustine:8 « To use is to assume something into the faculty of the will »; for a faculty is said (to be) the dominion of that, by which it is able easily to act on its own [in actum suum] as (the latter's) prince.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationis est referre; dicendum, quod dupliciter est referre, scilicet per collationem et illationem, sicut praemissae referuntur ad conclusionem; et hoc est rationis, et hoc non est uti. Et est referre per9 inclinationem et ordinationem ad aliud; et hoc est proprie voluntatis, quia potest aliquid assumere quiescendo ibi, vel aliud intendendo; et hoc est referre,10 per quod definitur uti etc.

3. To that which is objected, that “to refer” belongs to reason; it must be said, that “to refer” is twofold, that is through collation and illation, just as premises are referred to a conclusion; and this belongs to reason, and this is not “to use”. And (this) is “to refer” through9 inclination and ordination to another; and this properly belongs to the will, because it can assume anything by resting there, and/or by intending it; and this is the "to refer",10 through which "to use" is defined etc..

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de arte, dicendum, quod ars dicit quod est operationis, et quod est speculationis. Secundum quod dicit11 quod est speculationis, non habet uti, et sic est rationis; secundum vero quod dicit quod est operationis, sic extenditur ad voluntatem et eam regulat in utendo.

4. To that which is objected concerning art, it must be said, that art means what belongs to operation, and what belongs to speculation. According to which it means11 what belongs to speculation, it does not have to use, and thus belongs to reason; but according to which it means what belongs to operation, thus it is extended to the will and regulates it in using.

1 Sententia: Cuius bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est, verbotenus legitur apud Boethium, de Differentiis topicis, libr. II. circa medium, in quo libro auctor proponit locorum topicorum divisiones, quae ex una parte, duce Aristotele, a Themistio, et ex altera parte a Cicerone exhibentur, earumque differentias indicat.
2 Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor. ( † inter 370-382), qui praeter opuscula theologica contra Arianos varios confecit libros philosophicos et rhetoricos; sic transtulit Porphyrii librum de Praedicabilibus in linguam latinam (cfr. Boeth., Dialogus I. in Porphyrium) scripsitque commentarium in Rhetorica et Topica Ciceronis (cfr. Boeth. Comment. in Topica Ciceronis; et ed. Operum Cicernois per Orelli, ubi Victorini Comment. in Rhetor. invenitur). Licet definitio usus, de quo hic agitur, explicite non inveniatur in praenotatis Victorini operibus, colligi tamen posse videtur ex supra (argum. 1 ad opp.) allatis eius verbis una cum hac exercitationis definitione, quam in Comment. super I. Rhetor. Ciceronis, c. 2. proponit: Exercitatio est suscepti operis continuatio. Cfr. et ibid. c. 25., ubi de definitione habitus agitur, in qua ponitur usus sive exercitatio.
3 Perturbatam lectionem Vat. et pro scilicet emendavimus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. Vide etiam supra fundam. 3, sicuti et de sequenti definitione ab Augustino data cfr. fundam. 2.
4 Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 3. in princ. — In fine propositionis Vat. male et contra mss. et ed. 1 relative pro relatae.
5 Vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2, in quo textu codd. A F G H I K S X Y etc. sibi non constantes habent venit pro venerit.
6 Codd. S Y Z satis bene sit. Mox Vat., reluctatntibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, post quod addit duobus primis modis est actus omnis potentiae, tribus vero ultimis est actus ipsius voluntatis; sed superflue, quia verbis immediate sequentibus idem dicitur. Dein multi codd. ut C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. cum edd. 2 et 3 post communissime, omissis verbis et communiter, transponunt ea post Augustinus simulque omittunt et propriisime, sic legendo: Communiter vero et proprie actus est ipsius voluntatis; quae lectio praecedentibus manifeste contradicit. Codd. D P Q T post propriisime addunt loquendo, id est tribus ultimis modis.
7 Supple cum cod. bb uti; Vat. autem praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit uti communissime sumtum, qua additione non quidem falsus, sed alius sensus obtinetur; in lectione siquidem mss. a S. Doctore hic non datur explicita responsio ad primo obiectum, sed breviter repetitur ipsa obiectio; e contra est in lectione Vat.
8 Postulante maiore parte codd. F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1, posuimus modum passivum pro activo Augustinus dicit.
9 Cod. D secundum.
10 Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc addit quo vel, quod tamen abest ab antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
11 Ed. 1 hic et paulo infra illud loco quod dicit.

1 The sentence: Of which (the use) is good, is also itself good, is found in (St. Severinus) Boethius, On Different Topics, Bk. II, about the middle, in which book the author proposes the divisions of the places of the topics, which are arranged on one side, by Themistius, following Aristotle, and on the other by Cicero, and indicates their differences.
2 Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetorics (&crux; between 370-382), who besides his lesser theological works against the Arians, composed various philosophical and rhetorical books; thus he translated Porphyry’s book On Predicaments into Latin (cf. Boethius, Against Porphyry, Dialogue I) and he wrote a commentary on the Rhetorics and Topics of Cicero (cf. Boethius, Commentary on the Topics of Cicero; and the edition of the Works of Cicero, by Orelli, where Victorinus' Commentary on the Rhetorics is found). Though the definition of use, which is dealt with here, is not explicitly found in the aforenoted works of Victorinus, however it seems that it can be gathered from the above (in the argument in reply to obj. 1) mentioned words of his under the definition of exercise [exercitationis], which he proposes in the Commentary on the Rhetorics of Cicero, ch. 2: Exercise is the continuation of a work undertaken. Cf. also ibid., ch. 25, where the definition of habit is dealt with, in which use is employed for exercise.
3 The confused reading of the Vatican text, which has and [et] in place of that is [scilicet], we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and six of the first editions. See also above in n. 3, and likewise for the definition given by (St.) Augustine which follows, cf. n. 2.
4 See the text of Master (Peter) here at the beginning of ch. 3. — At the end of the proposition the Vatican text, badly and against the manuscripts and edition 1, has in a relative manner [relative] for related [relatae].
5 See above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2, in which codices A F G H I K S X Y etc., disagreeing with themselves, have comes [venit] in place of comes [venerit].
6 Codices S Y and Z has the subjunctive sit instead of the indicative. Next the Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, adds after that the phrase: in the first two manners it is an act of every power, but in the last three it is an act of the will itself; but superfluously, because by the immediately following words the same is said. Then many codices, as C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. together with editions 2 and 3, by omitting the words and commonly after in the most common sense, transpose them after (St.) Augustine, and at the same time omit and in the most proper sense, by reading: But commonly and properly it is an act of the will itself; which reading manifestly contradicts the preceding. Codices D P Q and T, after in the most proper sense, add speaking . . . .in the most proper sense, that is in the last three manners.
7 Supply with codex bb to use; But the Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, adds here to use, taken in the most common sense, by which addition it obtains another, but not false, sense; indeed in the text of the manuscripts there is given, by the Seraphic Doctor, no explicit response to the first objection, but the objection is only briefly repeated; on the other hand in the Vatican text there is.
8 As demanded by the majority of the codices F G H I R S T etc. and edition 1, we have replaced the active voice, (St.) Augustine says with the passive.
9 Codex D has according to.
10 The Vatican text, together with the more recent codex cc, adds by which . . . is also, which however is absent from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
11 Edition 1, here and a little below, has to that in place of to which it means.

p. 32

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

In hac quaestione antiqui scholastici satis consentiunt. Scot., I. Sent. d. 1. q. 3 et 5. in fine. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 1. — B. Albert. M., hjic a. 13. 16. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1, qui doctrinam S. Bonavent. breviter repetit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 1. principalis q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 8. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

In this question the ancient scholastics sufficiently agree. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, q. 3 and 5, in fine. — St Thomas, here at q. 1; Summa., I. II., q. 16, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here at a. 13, 16, and 17. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 1, who briefly repeats the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. — Richard of Middleton, here at a. 1. a. 1. — Giles. R., here at a. 1, principally q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa. a. 8. q. 1. — Durandus, here at q. 3. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here at q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here at q. 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.