S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis 

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

BOOK I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICULUS I.

QUAESTIO 2.

ARTICLE I

QUESTION 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 32-33.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum omni creato utendum sit.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether one is to use every created thing

SECUNDO, VISO quid sit uti per essentiam, quaeritur de utibili, utrum scilicet omni creato sit utendum. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

SECOND, HAVING SEEN what essentially "to use" is, (the second question) is asked concerning the usable, that is, whether one is to use every created thing. And that (this is) so, seems in this manner.

1. Proverbiorum decimo sexto:1 Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus: ergo omnia sunt ordinabilia in Deum: sed omne ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare; sed ordinando ad Deum ordinabile recte utimur: ergo si omnia contingit ordinare, omnibus est utendum.

1. In the sixteenth (chapter) of Proverbs:1 All things [universa] for His own sake hath God worked: therefore all things [omnia] are ordainable unto God: but it is fitting that one ordain every ordainable unto God; but by ordaining the ordainable towards God we use (it) in a upright manner: therefore, if it is fitting that one ordain all things [omnia], one is to use all things.

2. Item, ens et bonum convertuntur, sicut vult Dionysius;2 sed omnia sunt entia: ergo omnia sunt bona. Sed omne bonum diligendum: ergo omne creatum est diligendum; sed non est diligendum propter se: ergo propter aliud; sed hoc est uti: ergo uti contingit omni creato.

2. Likewise, being [ens] and the good are convertible [convertuntur], as Dionysius maintains [vult];2 but all things are beings: therefore all are good. But every good (is) to be loved: therefore every created (thing) is to be loved; but it is not to be loved for its own sake: therefore for the sake of another; but this is (what it means) “to use”: therefore it is fitting that one use every created (thing).

3. Item, omni virtute contingit recte uti:3 ergo opus omnis virtus est rectus usus; sed usus alicuius virtutis est respectu mali poenae, ut patientiae, alicuius respectu mali culpae, ut poenitentiae: ergo malis omnibus, scilicet culpae et ponae, contingit recte uti: ergo multo fortius bonis: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it happens that one uses every virtue in an upright manner:3 therefore the work of every virtue is an upright use; but the use of any virtue, in respect of the evil of punishment, is as patience, of any (virtue), in respect of the evil of fault, as penance [poenitentiam]: therefore it is fitting that one use all evils, that is, of fault and punishment, in an upright manner: therefore much more strongly (all) goods: ergo etc.

4. Item, « Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem »;4 sed omnibus contingit abuti: ergo omnibus contingit recte uti: ergo utendum est omni creato.

4. Likewise, « Opposites are naturally bound to be about the same thing »;4 but it happens that one abuses all things: therefore it happens that one uses all things in an upright manner: therefore one is to use every created (thing).

CONTRA: 1. Caritas est, per quam recte utimur, quia omnia ordinantur in finem per caritatem quaecumque recte ordinantur; sed sicut dicit Augustinus de Doctrina christiana:5 « Tantum quatuor diligenda sunt ex caritate et tria tantum creata, ut nos, proximus et corpus proprium »: ergo tantum tria referuntur sive ordinantur in finem per caritatem, cum non sit uti recte nisi per caritatem: ergo tantum tribus est utendum, non ergo omni creato.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Charity is (that), through which we use (a thing) in an upright manner, because all things are ordained unto an end through charity, whatever is in an upright manner ordained; but as (St.) Augustine says On Christian Doctrine:5 « Only four things are to be loved out of charity and only three (are) created, that is [ut] we, our neighbor and our own body »: therefore only three are referred or ordained unto (their) end through charity, since one does not use in an upright manner except through charity: therefore one is to use only three (things), therefore not every created (thing).

2. Item, omnia, quibus utimur, subiacent nostrae voluntati; sed quaedam sunt, quae non subiacent nostrae voluntati, ut necessaria et perpetua: ergo illis non est utendum.

2. Likewise, all the things, which we use, are subject [subiacent] to our will; but there are certain (things), which are not subject to our will, (such) as necessaries and perpetuals: therefore one is not to use these.

3. Item, omne illud, quo recte utimur, bono fine facimus; sed quaedam sunt, quae nullo bono fine possunt fieri, ut mentiri et talia, « quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo »:6 ergo talibus non est utendum.

3.  Likewise, all that, which we use in an upright manner, we do for a good end; but there are certain (things), which can be done for no good end, as lying and the such, « which as soon as named are conjoined with evil »:6 therefore one is not to use such things.

4. Item, virtute non contingit male ut, sicut patet ex eius definitione:7 ergo ab oppositis malo culpae sive vitiis non contingit recte uti: ergo non omnibus aliis a Deo est utendum.

4. Likewise, by virtue it does not happen that one uses in an evil manner [male], as is clear from its definition:7 therefore ab oppositis it does not happen that one uses the evil of fault or of vices in an upright manner: therefore one is not use all the other (things) from God.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Non omni re creata possumus uti ut intrumento neque ut habitu neque ut actu, omni tamen re uti possumus ut obiecto, sed quadrupliciter, vel operando, vel acceptando, vel tolerando, vel respuendo.

CONCLUSION

 

We can not use every thing as an instrument nor as a habit nor as an act, however we can use every thing as an object, but in a fourfold manner, by working, and/or accepting, and/or tolerating, and/or rejecting [respuendo]

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod uti aliquo dicitur quatuor modis: aut sicut instrumento, quo operamur, sicut aliquis utitur8 instrumento vel organo; et sic non omnibus contingit uti, utpote potentiis, quae sunt pure naturales, accipiendo uti proprie, sicut accipit Augustinus;9 aut sicut habitu, quo regulamur, utpote virtute; et sic non omnibus contingit recte uti, ut habitu vitii, quo potius contingit obliquari; aut sicut actu, quo movemur; et sic non omni actu contingit bene10 uti, sicut illis / quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; . . . .

I RESPOND: It must be said, that to use anything is said in four senses: either as an instrument, by which we work, as someone uses8 an instrument or organ; and so it does not happen that one uses all (things), insofar as [utpote] (they are) powers, which are purely natural, when accepting to use in the proper sense, as (St.) Augustine accepts it;9 or as a habit, by which we are regulated, insofar as (it is) a virtue; and thus it happens that one does not use all (things) in an upright manner, (such) as a vicious habit, by which it happens that one is rather turned aside; or as an act, by which we are moved; and so it happens that one does not use every act well,10 like [sicut] those (things) / which as soon as named are conjoined with evil; . . .

1 Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata pro Deus legit Dominus. — Mox et pluries in seqq. argg. posuimus contingit loco convenit. Notamus hic et pro semper, quod codd. praesertim antiquiores saepissime ista duo vocabula eodem modo exhibeant abbreviata, ita ut sive contingit sive convenit legi possit. [Trans.: Utrum ista interpretatio possit decus argumentibus, agendum est de hac quaestione. Quod non videtur sic: In fundam. 1. opportet esse necessitas, ut argumentum moveatur de ordinabilibus ad utenda; sed si legitur ordinabile in Deum contingit ordinare loco ordinabile in Deum convenit ordinare, non esset necessitas, sed contingentia; ergo non opporteat legi contingit in omne loco ubi convenit legi possit. Et sic interpretatum est. Cfr. etiam p. 38 editionis cuius Sent. I d. 1 a. 3 q. 1, nota 1]
2 Cap. 5. de Div. Nom., ubi secundum textum Graecum legitur: Non aliud dicit esse bonum et aliud ens. — Mox cod. cc sed si omnia.
3 Elicitur ex definitione virtutis, quam August., II. de Lib Arb. c. 18. et 19. ponit: Bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur. — Mox multi codd, ut C G H K O P Q R S U etc. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post poenae omittunt ut patientiae, quod tamen codd. praedicit postea male loco ut poenitentiae ponunt, editiones autem praeallegatae verbis ut poenitentiae praemittunt.
4 Aristot., de Praedicam. ch. de Oppositis circa finem. Vide supra q. 1. fundam. 4.
5 Lib. I. ch. 23. n. 22: Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum, quod supra est; alterum, quod nos sumus; tertium, quod iuxta nos est; quartum, quod infra nos est: de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant. — Et ibidem c. 26. n. 27: Quod si te totum intelligas, id est animum et corpus tuum et proximum tuum, id est animum et corpus eius. — Cod. W post caritate addit scilicet Deus. — Paulo ante fide codd. et ed. 1 addidimus sicut.
6 Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6: Quaedam enim confestim nominata convoluta sunt cum malitia. (Translatio antiqua in ed. Operum S. Thomae a P. Fiaccadori 1866. tom. 21.)
7 August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. et 19. n. 50. Vide paulo supra fundam. 3.
8 Substituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 aliquis utitur pro utimur. Cod. V sicut aliquo utimur. Mox ex plurimus codd. cum ed. 1 bis substituimus utpote loco ut puta.
9 Quatenus uti est assumere aliquid in faculatem voluntatis. Vid. supra q. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. ult., ubi agit de potentiis, quae non subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis.
10 Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit bene, quod antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 suppeditant, mutavimusque convenit in contingit.

1 Verse 4, where the Vulgate reads the Lord instead of God. — Next we have also very often in the following arguments placed it happens that [contingit] in place of it is fitting that [convenit]. We note here and throughout this work, that the codices, especially the more ancient ones, very often exhibit those two words in the same abbreviated manner, so that either it happens or it is fitting can be read. [Trans.: Whether that interpretation befits the arguments, must be dealt with. That it does not seem so: In the fundamental n. 1, it is proper that there be a necessity, to move the argument from the ordainable to that which is to be used; but if one reads it happens that one ordains every ordainable unto God instead of it is fitting that one ordain every ordainable unto God there would be no necessity, but only contingency; therefore it is not proper to read it happens that in every place where it is fitting that can likewise be read. And in this manner the translation proceeds. Cf. also here Sent., I, d.1, a. 3, q. 1, footnote 1]
2 On the Divine Names, ch. 5, where according to the Greek text there is read: One does not say that one thing is good and another is a being. — Then codex cc reads but if all things.
3 This is drawn from the definition of virtue, which (St.) Augustine posits in On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 18 and 19: A good quality of mind, by which one lives in an upright manner and no one uses in an evil manner. — Then many codices, as C G H K O P Q R S U etc. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 omit as patience after of punishment, which however the aforesaid codices afterwards badly replace with as penance; but the cited editions preface these words with as penance.
4 Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On the Opposites about an end". See above, q. 1, fundament n. 4.
5 Book I, ch. 23, n. 22: Therefore since there are four things to be loved: one, which is above; another, which we are; the third, which is next to us; the fourth, which is beneath us: of the second and the forth no precept is to be given. — And ibid., ch. 26, n. 27: Which if you understand the whole, that is your spirit and body and your neighbor, that is his spirit and body. — Codex W adds namely God after out of charity. — A little before on the testimony of the codices and edition 1, we have added as.
6 Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 6: For certain (things) immediately as (they are) named are entwined with wickedness. (Ancient Translation in the edition of the Works of St. Thomas, by Fr. Fiaccadori, 1866, tom. 21)
7 (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 18 and 19, n. 50. See a little above in fundament n.3.
8 We have substituted from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 anyone uses in place of we use. Codex V reads as we use something. Next from very many codices, together with edition 1, we have twice substituted insofar as [utpote] in place of considered as [ut puta].
9 To the extend that "to use" is to assume something into the faculty of the will. See above, q. 1. Cf also Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, last chapter, where he deals with the powers, which are not subject to the command [imperium] of the reason or of the will.
10 The Vatican text, together with codex cc, badly omits well, which the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 have, and we have changed it is fitting into it happens.

p. 33

quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo; aut sicut obiecto, ad quod inclinamur; et sic omnibus contingit uti et abuti. Omnia enim possunt sumi in facultatem voluntatis ad approbandum vel respuendum; et hoc patet per Augustinum libro octoginta trium Questionum:1 « Utimur assumendis vel respuendis ad valetudinem, tolerandis ad patientiam, ordinandis ad iustitiam ».

which as soon as named are conjoined with evil; or as an object, toward which we are inclined; and so it happens that one uses and abuses all (things). For all (things) can be taken into the faculty of the will to be approved and/or rejected; and this is clear through (St.) Augustine, in the eightieth book of the Three Questions:1 « We use by assuming and/or rejecting (a thing) according to (its) value [valetudinem], tolerating (it) according to (our) patience, ordaining (it) to justice ».

Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate:2 « Voluntas totam intelligentiam capit, dum utor omni eo quod intelligo »; sed mala intelliguntur: ergo contingit uti malis.

Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) On the Trinity:2 « My will seizes my whole intelligence, while I am using every thing [omni eo] that I understand »; but evils are understood: therefore it happens that one uses evils.

Aliter tamen utimur bonis, aliter malis. Ratio enim ordinationis in bonis non tantum est ex parte ordinantis, sed etiam ex parte ordinati, quia per se bona sunt utibilia et ordinabilia, et de sui natura; sed in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed potius ex parte ordinantis; et ideo mala non dicuntur utibilia.

In one manner, however, we use goods, in another (we use) evils. For among goods the reason for being ordained [ratio ordinationis] is not only on the part of the one ordaining, but also on the part of the one ordained, because good things are per se useable and ordainable, and (this they are) from their own nature; but among evils the reason for being ordained is not on the part of the (things) ordained, but rather on the part of the one ordaining; and for that reason evils are not said (to be) “useable”.

Unde nota, quod, cum uti sit assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter: vel in facultatem voluntatis operantis,3 sicut est de his quae proprie pertinent ad usum humanum; vel in faculatem voluntatis acceptantis, sicut est dilectio proximi et huiusmodi; vel in faculatem voluntatis tolerantis, sicut sunt mala poenae; vel in facultatem voluntatis respuentis, et sic assumuntur mala culpae et ordinantur. Primis duobus modis intelligitur illud: « Cuius usus bonus etc. ».

Whence note, that, since "to use" is to assume something into the faculty of the will, this can be in a fourfold manner: into the faculty of the working will,3 as concerns those (things) which properly pertain to human use; and/or into the faculty of the accepting will, as is love [dilectio] of (one's) neighbor and (things) of this kind [huiusmodi]; and/or into the faculty of the tolerating will, as are the evils of punishment; and/or into the faculty of the rejecting will, and thus the evils of fault are assumed and ordained. In the first two manners is understood that (which is said): « The use of which is good etc. ».

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de caritate, quod tantum tria creata4 sunt diligenda; dicendum, quod diligi aliquid ex caritate hoc est ordinari in summum bonum, quod per se caritas diligit. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut enim contingit ordinare quod natus est devenire in finem; et sic tantum tria creata diligenda sunt ex caritate; aut illud per quod devenire est in summum bonum; et quia hoc potest esse suo modo per omnem creaturam, omnis creatura potest diligi ex caritate, et omni creatura contingit uti.

1. Therefore, to that which is objected concerning charity, that only three created (things)4 are to be loved; it must be said, that that something be loved out of charity this is (for it) to be ordained unto the Most High Good, which charity loves per se. Moreover this happens in two manners: for either it happens that one ordains that which is naturally bound to arrive at (its) end; and thus only three created (things) are to be loved out of charity; or (one ordains) that through which one is to arrive at the most high Good; and because this can be through every creature in its own manner, every creature can be loved out of charity, and it happens that one uses every creature.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non omnia subiacent voluntati; dicendum, quod aliquid5 dicitur subesse dominio voluntatis dupliciter: aut quantum ad esse ipsius rei; et sic non omnia subiacent; aut quantum ad actum voluntatis, qui est in respuendo ipsam rem vel approbando, et hoc6 propter se vel propter aliud; et tali modo omnia subiacent voluntati nostrae, scilicet quantum ad actum appetitionis vel respuitionis, licet non primo modo.

2. To that which is objected, that not all (things) are subject to the will, it must be said, that something5 is said to be subject to the dominion of the will in a twofold manner: either as much as regards the ‘being’ of the thing itself [esse ipsius rei]; and thus all (things) are not subject; or as much as regards the act of the will, which is in rejecting and/or approving the thing itself, and this6 for its own sake and/or for the sake of another; and in such a manner all (things) are subject to our will, that is as much as regards the act of desiring [appetitionis] and/or rejecting, though not in the first manner.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam nullo bono fine possunt fieri, similiter, quod semper vitiis abutimur; dicendum, quod obiicitur secundum viam, qua contingit uti aliquo ut actu medio; et sic non contingit7 uti peccato; vel sicut habitu regulante, similiter; contingit tamen eo uti sicut obiecto recte per motum contritionis et detestationis.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that certain (things) can be done for no good end, similarly, that we always abuse vices; it must be said, that (this) is objected according to the way, by which it happens that one use something as a middle act; and so it happens7 that one uses sin; and/or as a regulating habit, similarly; however it does happen that one uses (sin) in an upright manner as an object, through a movement of contrition and detestation.

 SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem antiqui doctores sub una questione et minus accurate tractare solent. — Ostensum iam supra est, quod uti in sensu activo sit solius voluntatis; in secunda hac quaestione inquiritur, ad quae obiecta se extendat usus voluntatis, sive quibus rebus uti passive conveniat. In responsione S. Doctor primo ponit quadruplicem distinctionem circa obiecta voluntatis ordinanda et resolvit quaestionem in genere. Quoad primum membrum huius distinctionis, patet quod voluntas non possit omnia assumere in facultatem suam, ut iis utatur sicut instrumento. Nam aliquae potentiae ipsius animae non subiacent imperio voluntatis; unde vocantur pure naturales, ut potentiae vegetativae. Secundo, incidendo in specialem quaestionem, scil. quo sensu quis malis uti possit, iterum quadrupliciter distinguit modum voluntatis ordinantis, scil. operantis, acceptantis, tolerantis et respuentis. Hic usus mali ex parte ordinantis est « usus per accidens », uti bene dicit Richard. (hic q. 2. ad ult.), « eo quod ordinatum aliunde accipit ordinabilitatem, scil. a voluntate ». — Circa hanc quaestionem de usu mali S. Thom. (hic loc. cit.) aliis verbis quam S. Bonaventura loquitur, sed in sententia nulla est differentia, immo in S. II. II. q. 78. a. 4. Angelicus etiam in modo loquendi cum illo convenit.

I. This and the following question the ancient doctors are accustomed to treat under one question and less accurately. — It has already been shown above, that to use in the active sense belongs to the will alone; in this second question there is inquired, to what objects does the use of the will extend itself, or which things it is suitable to use passively. In response the Seraphic Doctor first posits a fourfold distinction about the objects of the will to be ordained and resolves the question according to genus. As regards the first member of this distinction, it is clear that the will cannot assume all things into its faculty, to use them as an instrument. For some powers of the soul itself are not subject to the empire of the will; whence they are called purely natural, as the vegetative powers (are). Second, by discussing a special question, that is, in what sense one can use evils, he again distinguishes a fourfold manner of the ordaining will, that is, working, accepting, tolerating, rejecting. This use of evil on the part of the one ordaining is a « use per accidens », as Richard (of Middleton) well says (here in q. 2 at the end),) « for that which has been ordained to another accepts (its) ordinability, namely from the will ». — About this question concerning the use of evil, St. Thomas ( loc. cit. at this question) speaks in different words than St. Bonaventure, but there is no difference in opinion [sententia], indeed in Summa., II. II., q. 78. a. 4, the Angelic (Doctor) agrees also with him in (his) manner of speaking.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 3. et 5. et Quodlib., q. 17. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 16. a. 3. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 10 et 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. ita presse sequitur S. Doctorem, ut Dionys. Carth. de ipso dicat: « Petrus, qui scripsit post Bonaventuram, ex ipso Bonaventura suam responsionem videtur sumsisse ». — Richard., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic. q. 4. — Dionys., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. III., q. 61, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here at q. 3 and 5, and in his Quodlibetals., q. 17. — St. Thomas, here at q. 2, a. 3; Summa. , I. II., q. 16, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here at a. 10 and 11. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 2. so closely follows the Seraphic Doctor, that (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian says of him: « Peter, who wrote after Bonaventure, seems to have taken his response from Bonaventure himself ». — Richard of Middleton, here at a. 1. q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here at 2, the beginning of q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here at q. 4. — (Bl.) Denis (the Carthusian), here at q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here at q. 1.

1 Quaest. 30: Sic enim utitur suo corpore: quibusdam assumendis vel respuendis ad valitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustititam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod veritatis documentum. — In quo textu plurimi codd. ut A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omittunt assumendis vel, pro quo ed. 1 ponit conferendis aut.
2 Cap. 11. n. 18: Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam, totam memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor, quod intelligo et memini.
3 Renitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 Vat. pro operantis ponit imperantis, sed mendose, quia hoc membrum non excludit alia membra divisionis. Eamdem distinctionem Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. breviter sic proponit: Potest aliquid assumi in facultatem voluntatis quadrupliciter: vel voluntatis operantis, ut bona nostra, vel approbantis, ut aliena bona, vel tolerantis, ut mala poenae propria et culpae alienae, vel respuentis, ut mala culpae propriae.
4 Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt creata, quod, ut certo subintelligendum, claritatis gratia retinuimus, praesertim cum et paulo post in mss. inveniatur. Mox Vat., post caritate omisso hoc, propositionem ipsam exhibet modo activo: diligere, aliquid ex caritate est ordinare, renitentibus tamen mss. et ed. 1. — Obiectionem, quam hic S. Doctor solvit, infra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. sub alio respectu pertractat.
5 Nullo sufffragante ms. nec ed. 1, Vat. aliquis.
6 Cod. Z hic non male addit vel.
7 Postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus sic pro hoc modo, et bis contingit loco convenit. Mox mendum Vat. recto per modum castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.

1 Question 30: For thus does one use one's own body: assuming and/or rejecting certain things for (their) value [valitudinem], tolerating certain things according to (one's) patience, ordaining certain things to justice, considering certain things according to some pattern [documentum] of truth. — In which text very many codices, as A B C D F G H I K S T W Z etc. omit assuming and/or, in place of which edition 1 has conferring or.
2 Chapter 11, n. 18: My will also seizes my whole intelligence, my whole memory, while I wholly use, what I understand and remember.
3 Opposing the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, the Vatican text puts of the commanding in place of of the working, but faultily, because this member does not exclude the other members of the division. The same distinction Peter of Tarentaise thus briefly proposes here at q. 1, a. 2: One can assume something into the faculty of the will in a fourfold manner: of the working will, as our goods, and/or of the approving (will), as another's goods, and/or of the tolerating (will), as the evils of one's own [propria read as propriae] punishment and another's fault, and/or of the rejecting (will), as the evils of one's own fault.
4 The codices together with edition 1 omit created things [creata], which, as certainly must be understood, we have retained for the sake of clarity, especially when it is also found a little later in the manuscripts. Next the Vatican text, after out of charity, having omitted this, exhibits that proposition in the active voice: to love, is to ordain something out of charity, however in opposition to the manuscripts and edition 1. The objection, which the Seraphic Doctor here solves, he treats in another respect below in d. 17, p. I., q. 2.
5 With no supporting manuscript nor edition 1, the Vatican text reads someone.
6 Codex Z adds not badly here vel [Trans.: which does not alter the translation].
7 As demanded by nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted in this manner [hoc modo] with thus [sic], and twice it happens in place of it is fitting. Then we have corrected the fault of the Vatican text, as an upright object through a movement on the basis of the manuscripts and edition 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.