S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK I

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICULUS II.

 

QUAESTIO UNICA.

ARTICLE II

 

QUESTION SOLE

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 35-37.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 35-37.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quid sit frui.

ARTICLE II

 

What is it "to enjoy"?

Habito de uti et utibili, consequenter quaeritur de frui et fruibili et primo, quid sit frui per essentiam, utrum scilicet sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.

With (the question) of to use and the useable having been considered, consequently there is asked, concerning to enjoy and the enjoyable, first, what is it "to enjoy" essentially [per essentiam], that is, whether it is an act of the will, or whether (it is an act) of the other powers (of the soul) [virium].

 

QUAESTIO UNICA.

 

Utrum frui sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether "to enjoy" is an act of the will, or whether (it is an act) of the other powers (of the soul)

1. Quod sit actus voluntatis, videtur per primam definitionem, quae est: Frui est amore inhaerere etc.;7 sed amor est voluntatis: ergo et frui similiter. Si dicas, quod amor sumitur ibi communiter, secundum quod est in qualibet vi respectu sui actus; contra: in omnibus aliis definitionibus idem dicitur. Unde dicitur in sequenti:8 « Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit ». Quietatio / autem voluntatis est.

1. That it is an act of the will, seems by the first definition, which is: To enjoy is to inhere by love etc.;7 but love belongs to the will: therefore also to enjoy similarly. If you say, that love is taken there in the common sense [communiter], according to which it is in any power [vi] in respect to its act; on the contrary: in all other definitions the same is said.  Whence there is said in the following:8 « We enjoy things cognized, in which the delighted will thoroughly rests [conquiescit] ». But resting / belongs to the will.

7 Vide lit. Magistri, c. 2.
8 Cfr. lit. Magistri, c. 2.

7 See the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.
8 Cf. the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.

p. 36

autem voluntatis est. Et in alia1 similiter: « Frui est uti cum gaudio ». Gaudium autem ad voluntatem proprie pertinet.

But resting / belongs to the will. And in the other (definition)1 similarly: « To enjoy is to use with joy ». But joy pertains properly to the will.

2. Item, ostenditur ratione,2 quia fruitione delectamur, secundum quod delectabile est differentia boni, cum sit bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile; bonum autem obiectum est voluntatis: ergo frui est solius voluntatis.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason, because we take delight in enjoying,2 according to which the delectable is a distinction [differentia] of the good, since it is an honest, conferring and delectable good; but the good is the object of the will: therefore to enjoy belongs only to the will.

3. Item, eo fruimur, quo quietamur; sed quietatio respicit rationem finis, « et finis rationem boni »,3 et « bonum est obiectum voluntatis »: ergo fruitio, quae ordinat ad illud, similiter.

3. Likewise, we enjoy that, by which we rest; but resting respects the reason for the end [rationem finis], « and the end (respects) the reason for the good »3 and « the good is the object of the will »: therefore enjoying, which is ordered to it, similarly.

SED CONTRA: 1. Omnis virtus appetit uniri suo obiecto, quo habito delectatur, si cognoscit, et quiescit: ergo motus cum quietatione et delectatione est omnium virium: ergo cum talis sit fruitio, fruitio erit in omnibus, non tantum in voluntate.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every virtue aims [appetit] to be united to its object, in which when held, it takes delight, if it cognizes (this), and it rests: therefore a movement with resting and delectation belongs to every power: therefore since such is enjoying, enjoying will be in everything, not only in the will..

2. Item, absentia rei amatae potius contristat amantem, quam delectat;4 quod enim delectat ipsum, hoc est, quia videt ipsam et habet. Si ergo motus fruitionis est cum delectatione vel est ipsa delectatio: ergo hoc5 est, quia videt illud in quo est ipsa delectatio; sed visio respicit cognitivam: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the absence of the thing loved thoroughly saddens the lover more than it delights (him);4 for what delights him, is this, that he sees and has it. If therefore the movement of enjoying is with delectation and/or is the very delectation: therefore this5 is, because he sees that in which is the very delectation; but vision respects the cognitive: therefore etc..

3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana:6 « Haec est summa merces, ut ipso perfruamur ». Sed super illud Psalmi: Ostendam illi salutare etc., dicit Glossa,7 quod « visio est tota merces »: ergo si fruitio est merces, fruitio est visio per essentiam; sed visio est in cognitiva sive in ratione: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) book On Christian Doctrine:6 « This is the most high wage, that we thoroughly enjoy Him ». But on this (verse) of the Psalm: I shall show him salvation etc., the Gloss says,7 that « vision is the whole wage » [tota merces]: therefore if enjoying is the wage, enjoying is essentially [per essentiam] vision; but vision is in the cognitive (part) or in the reason: therefore etc..

4. Item, fide et spe tendimus in Deum: aut ergo fruendo, aut utendo; sed non utendo, cum Deo non sit utendum: ergo fruendo: ergo fide et spe fruimur; sed fides est habitus rationis cognitivae; sed cuius est habitus, eius est actus: ergo actus fruitionis est actus8 rationis; similiter videtur de irascibili: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, by faith and hope we tend into God: therefore either by enjoying, or by using; but not by using, since one is not to use God: therefore by enjoying: therefore by faith and hope we enjoy; but faith is a habit of the cognitive reason; but to whom belongs the habit, to him belongs the act: therefore the act of enjoying is an act8 of the reason; it seems similarly concerning the irascible (part): therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

Frui sumtum essentialiter est actus voluntatis, sumtum dispositive est actus etiam aliarum potentiarum.

CONCLUSION

 

"To enjoy", taken essentially, is an act of the will; taken dispositively, it is an act also of the other powers

RESPONDEO: Secundum aliquos9 frui pertinet ad omnes vires; et hoc dicunt, quia omnes vires remunerabuntur; qui dicut etiam, quod10 in gloria erit magis proprie rationis, quia immediatius se habet ad delectationem.

I RESPOND: According to some9 to enjoy pertains to all powers; and they say this, because all powers will be remunerated; these also say, that10 in glory it shall more properly belong to reason, because it holds itself more immediately to delectation.

Sed aliter videtur dicendum secundum Augustinum, scilicet quod sit actus ipsius voluntatis. Cum enim tres dentur definitiones de frui, omnes dantur penes actum voluntatis, quem tripliciter est considerare. Primo modo communiter, prout dicit motum cum delectatione; et sic definit Augustinus:11 « Frui est uti cum gaudio ». Secundo modo, prout dicit motum cum quietatione; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana: « Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam »; et hoc modo accipitur proprie. Tertio modo accipitur, prout complectitur utrumque, scilicet quietationem et delectationem; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: « Frui est quiescere in cognitis, voluntate propter se delectata », et sic accipitur propriissime.

But it seems that it must be said otherwise according to (St.) Augustine, namely that it is an act of the will itself. For though three definitions are given for to enjoy, they are all given from within [penes] the act of the will, the considering of which is threefold. In the first manner (it is said) commonly, insofar as it means [prout dicit] movement with delectation; and thus does (St.) Augustine define (it):11 « "To enjoy" is to use with joy ». In the second manner, insofar as it means movement with rest; and in this manner it is defined by (St.) Augustine in On Christian Doctrine: « "To enjoy" is to inhere by love to another thing for its own sake » and in this manner it is accepted properly. In the third manner it is accepted, insofar as it embraces both, that is resting and delectation; and in this manner it is defined by (St.) Augustine in the tenth (book) of On the Trinity: « "To enjoy" is to rest in things known, the will having taken delight for its own sake », and thus it is accepted most properly.

Quia ergo frui secundum omnem acceptionem dicit delectationem vel quietem vel utrumque, et omne tale habet rationem boni, et hoc est objiectum voluntatis: ideo loquendo essentialiter, frui est actus voluntatis. Sed quia voluntas nec delectatur nec quietatur nisi in eo, quod cognoscit vel per fidem vel per speciem,12 et in eo, quod habet per spem vel in re, ideo actus aliarum virium ad hunc disponunt, non tamen sunt ipsum frui, essentialiter loquendo.

Therefore because to enjoy according to every acceptation means delectation and/or rest and/or both of these, and every such has a reckoning of the good, and this is the object of the will: for that reason, speaking essentially [essentialiter], "to enjoy" is an act of the will. But because the will neither delights nor rests except in that, which it cognizes through faith and/or appearance [speciem],12 and in that, which it holds through faith and/or in reality, for that reason acts of the other powers dispose to this, (but) they are not, however, enjoying itself, essentially speaking.

Ex hoc patet solutio13 ad illud quod communiter solet quaeri, quare frui non definitur per actum cognitionis, sicut delectationis. Tamen14 haec quae- / -stio fundata est super falsum.

From this the solution13 to that which is commonly accustomed to be asked, why to enjoy is not defined by an act of cognition, as (is) of delectation. However14 this que- / -stion has been founded upon a false (assertion).

1 In Vat. hic additur definitione probatur idipsum, quod tamen abest a mss. et ed. 1. — De hac definitione vide lit. Magistri, c. 3.
2 Concinnius mss. cum sex primis edd., omittendo hic a Vat. additum sed delectabile.
3 Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c.2: Absolutus namque finis bonum est nec non finis bonum. — Et de sequenti propositione ait I. Rhetor. c. 10. (in ed. Stoer, c. 25.): Est autem voluntas quidem appetitio boni cum ratione coniuncta; nemo enim vult, nisi quando aliquid bonum esse putaverit. Vide etiam I. Ethic., c. 1. — Mox cod. 1 ordinatur pro ordinat.
4 Sequimur maiorem partem codd. ut A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 6 substituendo delectat loco delectet, ac mox (exceptis edd. 2, 3 et 6) quia loco quod.
5 Perturbatam lectionem Vat., quae hic addit delectare, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.
6 Libr. I. c. 32. n. 35.
7 August., in Expos. Psalmi 90, 16.
8 Plures codd. ut A G H I K M V W Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt actus.
9 Huius opinionis fertur fuisse Antisiodorensis, sive melius Autisiodorensis, test Dionysio Carthusiano, hic. q. 3.
10 Cod. X satis bene hic addit frui. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc non ita bene immediate pro immediatius.
11 De tribus sequentibus definitionibus fruitionis ex Augustino sumti vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post Secundo omittit modo.
12 Mendosam lectionem Vat. ponentis spem loco speciem correximus ope codd. F H I ee gg hh ii et ed. 1; error multorum codd., qui cum Vat. habent spem, provenit ex modo consimili ista duo verba abbreviandi. Sumta est haec locutio ex verbis Apostoli II. Cor. 5, 7: Per fidem enim abulamus, et non per speciem. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. — Mox cod. R post tamen addit ipsi.
13 Contra mss. et sex primas edd. habet Vat. resolutio, et paulo post contra maiorem partem mss. ut A C F G H K L R S T U V etc. et ed. 1 consuevit pro solet. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 dilectionis loco delectationis, sed non bene, sicuti ex corp. questionis patet..
14 Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione et posito cum pro Tamen, legit delectationis, cum haec questio fundata sit super falsum; sed minus apte, quia responsio cum ipsa questione incongrue coniungitur contra morem Seraphici; insuper est contra omnes antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.

1 In the Vatican text there is here added definition the very same is proven, which however is absent from the manuscripts and edition 1. Concerning this definition see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3.
2 The manuscripts together with the six first editions, by omitting here what has been added by the Vatican text, but the delectable, (are) more carefully edited.
3 Aristotle, The Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2: For the absolute end is the Good nor (is) the non-end the Good. — And concerning the following proposition, he says in Rhetorics, Bk. I, ch. 10 (in the Stoer edition, ch. 25): But the will is indeed the aiming [appetitio] for the good together with a conjoined reason; for no one wants, except when he has thought something is good. See also Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1. Then codex 1 has is ordered in place of it orders.
4 We follow the greater part of the codices, as A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z etc., and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 by substituting it delights (him) in place of it may delight (him), and then (excepting editions 2, 3 and 6) that [quia] in place of that [quod].
5 The confused reading of the Vatican text, which adds at this point delighting, we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1.
6 Bk. I, ch. 32, n. 35.
7 (St.) Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms, n. 90, 16.
8 Very many of the codices, as A G H I K M V W Y Z etc., together with edition 1 omit act.
9 This is thought to have been the opinion of Antisiodorensis, or rather Autisiodorensis, as testified by (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here at q. 3.
10 Codex X here adds, well enough, to enjoy. Then the Vatican text together with codex cc has, not so well, immediately for more immediately.
11 Concerning the three following definitions of enjoying, taken from (St.) Augustine, see here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2 and 3. — Then the Vatican text together with codex cc omits manner after In the second.
12 The faulty reading of the Vatican text (of putting hope in place of appearance) we have corrected with the help of codices F H I ee gg hh and ii and edition 1; the error of many codices, who together with the Vatican text have hope, comes from the very same manner of abbreviating these two words. This saying is taken from the words of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5:7: For we walk through faith, and not through appearance. Cf. also Sent., Bk. III, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, reply to n. 5. — Then codex R has (but) these are not instead of (but) they are not.
13 Against the manuscripts and the six first editions, the Vatican text has resolution, and a little after this against a greater part of the manuscripts, as A C F G H K L R S T U V etc. and edition 1, it has is accustomed [consuevit] for is accustomed [solet]. Then many codices together with edition 1 have of love [dilectionis] in place of of delectation [delectationis], but not well, as it clear from the body of the question.
14 The Vatican text together with codex cc, having changed the punctuation and put since [cum] in place of however, reads of delectation, since this question is founded upon a false (assertion); but lest aptly, because the response together with this question is incongruously conjoined against the custom of the Seraphic (Doctor); besides it is against all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.

p. 37

quae- / stio fundata est super falsum. Augustinus enim ponit in notificatione una, quod est cognitionis, cum dicit: « Frui est quiescere in cognitis » cadit tamen ibi sicut dispositio.

que- / -stion is founded upon a false (assertion). For (St.) Augustine puts in one note, what belongs to cognition, when he says: « To enjoy is to rest in things known » it is defined [cadit] there, however, as a disposition.

Ex hoc etiam patet, quare non definitur per fidem et1 spem, sicut per caritatem, quia caritas informat concupiscibilem, cuius est frui. Tamen ista quaestio similiter fundata est super falsum, quia amor, quo definitur frui, est communis ad amorem castum et libidinosum,2 quo avarus fruitur auro, non proprius ispius caritatis.

From this it is also clear, why it is not defined by faith and1 hope, as by charity, because charity informs the concupiscible (part), to which belongs enjoying. However this question is similarly founded upon a false (assertion), because love [amor], by which enjoying is defined, is common to love, chaste and libidinous,2 by which the avaricious enjoys gold, (it does) not properly (belong) to charity itself.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus habet delectari et quietari,3 cum unitur suo obiecto; dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas, ut vult Augustinus,4 amat sibi et aliis. Et sicut etiam dicit Anselmus:5 « Voluntas inclinat alias vires et aliis meretur », ideo eius quietatio et delectatio redundat in alias vires. Unde sicut voluntas non sibi cognoscit, sed ratio cognoscit sibi et voluntati, ita voluntas sibi et rationi delectatur et ipsam quiescere facit.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that every virtue has to delight and take rest,3 when it is united with its object; it must be said, that the will itself, as (St.) Augustine maintains,4 loves itself and others. And as (St.) Anselm also says:5 « The will inclines the other powers and merits by them », for that reason its resting and delectation redound in the other powers. Whence just as the will does not cognize itself, but reason cognizes itself and the will, so the will takes delight in itself and in reason and causes it to rest.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amans non fruitur, nisi videat vel habeat; dicendum, quod videre et habere requiruntur ad frui, similiter et amare. Nam si quis videt aliquid et habet, nunquam delectatur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans,6 et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare: ideo essentialiter, non dispositive, est fruitio. Propter quod est intelligendum, quod actus voluntatis potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet per modum appetitus et7 complacentiae. Primo modo antecedere potest ipsam visionem; secundo vero consequitur, et in hoc est perfecta ratio ipsius fruitionis, scilicet in complacentia rei visae et habitae.

2. To that which is objected, that the lover does not enjoy, unless he sees and/or has; it must be said, that seeing and having are required for enjoying, similarly also loving [amare]. For is one sees and has anything, he never takes delight (in it), unless he loves it; however vision is required in another manner than love. For vision disposes, similarly also holding, but love supplies delights. Whence it is like a penetrating acumen,6 and for that reason it is most fitting for it to unite and, as a consequence, to take delight and rest: for that reason essentially, not dispositively, it is enjoying. On account of which it is to be understood, that the act of the will can be considered in a twofold manner, that is, in the manner of an appetite and7 of a complacence. In the first manner it can go before antecede the vision itself; but in the second it follows it, and in this is the perfect reckoning of enjoying itself, that is, in complacence in the thing seen and had.

3. Ad illud: Viso est tota merces; dicendum, quod illud non dicitur proprie, sed per concomitantiam,8 quia visio et complacentia, in qua est perfecta ratio fruitionis, inseparabiliter se habent.

3. To that (which is objected): Vision is the whole wage; it must be said that that is not said properly, but through concomitance,8 because vision and complacence, in which there is a perfect reckoning of enjoying, hold themselves inseparably.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fide et spe fuimur; dicendum, quod illud non est verum per se, quia quaelibet harum accipit rationem tendentiae9 a caritate; unde fruitio non est ex istis nisi per caritatem. Sola enim caritas considerat finem in ratione finis et obiecti. Unde non dicitur aliquis sperare Deum, sicut amare.

4. To that which is objected, that by faith and hope we enjoy, it must be said, that that is not true per se, because each of these accepts a reason for holding9 from charity; whence enjoying is not from these except through charity. For only charity considers the end in the reason for the end and the object. Whence one is not said to hope God, as (he is) to love (Him).

 SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. In solutione principali huius questionis, scil. quod fruitio sit actus voluntatis, omnes antiqui doctores cum Seraphico conveniunt; attamen iam istis temporibus circa quasdam subtiles de hac re questiones erant controversiae.

I. In the solution of the principal part of the question, that is, that to enjoy is an act of the will, all the ancient doctors agree with the Seraphic (Doctor); but there were, however, already in those times questions of controversy about certain subtle points of this matter.

Primo quoad ipsum conceptum fruitionis S. Bonaventura docet, fruitionem praesupponere quidem cognitionem sive visionem tanquam dispositionem, tamen, essentialiter loquendo, ipsam esse actum voluntatis, qui importet tum dilectionem tum delectatione, sive esse formaliter actionem voluntatis, nempe amorosam eius inhaesionem, ad quam sequitur inseparabiliter passio delectationis; cfr. hic ad 2. et dub. 12; III. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2, et ibid. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Haexaλ. Serm. 12. in fine. Idem docet Scotus cum suis, Richard. a Med., B. Albert. M., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand. — Alii vero doctores volunt, fruitionem esse formaliter ipsam delectationem, non quidem qualemcumque, sed ultimatam, seu quae coniuncta est cum quietatione; ipsam vero non esse amorem nisi connotative et causaliter; ita discipuli S. Thomae, test. Caietano (ad S. I. II. q. 1. a. 1.), Dionys. Carth. aliique.

First as regards the concept itself of enjoying, St. Bonaventure teaches, that enjoying presupposes a certain cognition or vision as (its) disposition, however, essentially speaking, it itself is an act of the will, which imports both dilection and delectation, or is formally the action of the will, namely its amorous inhesion, according to which there follows inseparably the passion of delectation; cf. here in the reply to n. 2 and in doubt 12; Sent., Bk. III, d. 29, a. 1. q. 2, and ibid., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 in the body; Sent., Bk. II, d. 38, a. 1, a. 2 in reply to n. 4; On the Hexaλmeron, Sermon 12, at the end. Likewise (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, together with his (disciples), Richard of Middleton, Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent. — But other doctors hold, that enjoying is formally delectation itself, not indeed whatever kind, but the last (kind), or which has be conjoined with resting; but this is not love [amorem] except connotatively and causally; thus the disciples of St. Thomas, as Cajetan testifies {commenting on the Summa., I. II., q. 1, a. 1}, (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian and others.

Secundo, quoad actum, in quo fruitio formaliter consistit, docet S. Bonav., hic ad 1. et 2; II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1: omnem delectationem spiritualem ortum habere ex amore voluntatis, praesupposita perceptione convenientis. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., Henr. Gand., Richard. a Med. qui inter alia dicit: « Actum cognitivae non sequitur delectatio nisi mediate actu appetitivae. » Hoc negatur ab auctoribus secundae sententiae.

Second, as regards the act, in which enjoying formally consists, St. Bonaventure teaches, here in reply to n. 1 and 2; Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1: that every spiritual delectation has its rise from the love of the will, presupposing the perception of something agreeable. Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, and Richard of Middleton agree, who among others says: « An act of the cognitive (part) does not follow delectation except by means of an act of the appetitive (part). » This is denied by the authors of the second opinion.

Tertio, hinc orta est celebris controversia, praecipus inter asseclas S. Thomae et Scoti agitata, utrum scil. beatitudo in patria formaliter consistat in actu intellectus sive in visione, qui tum amorem tum delecationem inseparabiliter habet annexa, immo « virtualiter continet et causaliter exerit » (Caietanus), an potius, ut vult Scotus cum aliis multis, in actu voluntatis, qui visionem supponit et delectatione completur. Haec questionem tangit S. Bonav., hic ad 3.; plura vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. 1, a. 5. Haec controversia cohaeret cum doctrinis psychologicis praecipue de relatione inter intellectum et voluntatem.

Third, here rises the celebrated controversy, chiefly promoted among the followers of St. Thomas and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, whether, that is, beatitude in our fatherland formally consists in an act of the intellect or in the vision, which has inseparably annexed both love and delectation, nay rather « it virtually contains and causally passes away » (Cajetan), or rather, as (Bl.) Scotus holds with many others, in an act of the will, which supposes vision and is completed by delectation. St. Bonaventure touches upon this question, here in reply to n. 3; see more in Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, p. 1, a. 5. This controversy is chiefly founded upon the psychological doctrines concerning the relation among the intellect and the will.

II. De questione hic proposita: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 3. in Oxon. et Report. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 1. et 2. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 12. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 49. q. 6. n. 26.; de delectatione etiam agit S. a. 50. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.

II. On the question here proposed: Alexander of Hales, Sent., Bk. IV, q. 26, m. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3, in the Oxford Lectures and the Reportatio. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I. II., q. 11, a. 1 and 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here in a. 12 and 17. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in Bk. I, beginning of q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 49, q. 6, n. 26.; he also deals with delectation in Summa., a. 50, q. 2. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

1 Cod. W vel.
2 Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus particulam vel, quae hic a Vat. male additur, quia verbum libidinosum large acceptum etiam concupiscentiam oculorum complectitur. Codd. P et Q post caritas addunt est; cod. X autem legit: ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis.
3 Licet multi mss. ut A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z omittant et quietari, retinendum tamen duximus, tum quia in aliquibus antiquioribus mss. ut F H I etc. invenitur, tum quia superius in ipsa obiectione exhibetur.
4 Colligitur ex XV. de Trin. c. 22, ubi ostendit, quod memoria, intellectus et amor seu voluntas non sint sua nec sibi, sed supposito agant, quiquid agunt. Et in praecedentibus capitulis trinitatem in anima repertam cum Trinitate divina comparando, c. 17 de Spiritu S. ait: ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligit. — Plurimi codd. ut vult pro ut dicit.
5 Libr. de Concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arb. c. 11. et 12, ubi dicit, quod voluntas movet omnia instrumenta, quae in nobis sunt, ut manus etc.; et quod ex ipsa « descendit omne meritum hominis ». — De doctrina hic posita vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
6 Hic loquendi modus sumtus est ex Hugonis de S. Victore Expos. in Dionysii libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 7.
7 Cod. X hic repetit per modum.
8 Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 magis usitatum verbum concomitantiam loco concomitationem.
9 Cod. X tendentis. In fine responsionis cod. R addit et propter hoc non valet.

1 Codex W has and/or [vel].
2 On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed the particle and/or [vel], which has been badly added by the Vatican text, because the word libidinous broadly accepted comprises even the concupiscence of the eyes. Codices P and Q add it does belong [est] before to charity [trans. -- which is retained in the English for clarity]; but codex X reads: for that reason it does not properly belong to charity itself.
3 Though many manuscripts, as A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z, omit and to take rest, we have however decided to retain it, both because it is found in the other more ancient manuscripts, as F H I etc., and because it is exhibited above in the very objection.
4 This is gathered from On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 22, where it is shown, that memory, intellect, and love or will are not their own nor for themselves, but drive, whatever the drive, for the subject. And in the preceding chapters, by comparing the trinity discovered in the soul with the divine Trinity, he says in ch. 17 "On the Holy Spirit": but He himself naught but loves [diligit] both Himself and them. — Very many of the codices have as (St.) Augustine holds [ut vult] for as (St.) Augustine says [ut dicit].
5 On the Harmony of the Prescience of God with Free Will, ch. 11 and 12, where he says, that the will moves all instruments, which are in us, such as the hands, etc.; and that from it « descends a man's every merit ». — On the doctrine here proposed see Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
6 Here the manner of speaking is taken from Hugo of St. Victor, Exposition upon the Celestial Hierarchy of (St.) Denis, ch. 7.
7 Codex X here repeats in the manner.
8 We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the more common concomitance in place of concomitation [concomitationem].
9 Codex X of holding. At the end of the response, codex R adds an on account of this it is not valid..

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.