S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK I

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICULUS III.

QUAESTIO I.

ARTICLE III

QUESTION 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 38-39.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 38-39.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De fruibili.

ARTICLE III

 

On the enjoyable.

Ostenso, quid sit frui per essentiam, quaestio est de fruibili, et

With it shown, what it is to enjoy essentially [per essentiam], the question (now) concerns the enjoyable, and

primo, utrum Deo contingat frui;
secundo, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo.

first, whether it is fitting that one enjoy God;
second, whether one is to enjoy Him alone.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum Deo sit fruendum.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether one is to enjoy God.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod sit Deo fruendum, ostenditur sic.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that one is to enjoy God, it is thus shown:

1. « Eo fruendum est, quod beatos nos facit »,1 quia in beatitudine est recta fruitio; sed Deo beati efficimur, quia ipse est nostra beatitudo: ergo Deo est fruendum.

1. « One is to enjoy that, which makes us blessed »,1 because in beatitude there is an upright enjoying; but we become blessed by God, because He is our beatitude: therefore one is to enjoy God.

2. Item, bonum est amabile; ergo magis bonum magis amabile et summe bonum summe amabile;2 sed eo fruimur, quod summe amamus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the good is lovable [amabile]; therefore the greater the good, the greater (it is) lovable and the most highly Good (is) the most highly lovable;2 but we enjoy that, which we love most highly: ergo etc..

3. Item, pulcrum delectat et3 magis pulcrum magis delectat, ergo summe pulchrum summe delectat; sed eo fruimur, in quo summe delectamur: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, beauty delights and3 the greater the beauty, the greater it delights, therefore the most highly Beautiful most highly delights; but we enjoy that, in which we delight most highly: ergo etc..

SED CONTRA: 1. Ubi est fruitio, ibi est delectatio; « sed delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti »;4 Dei autem ad creaturam nulla est convenientiae, immo summa distantia: ergo nec delectatio, ergo nec fruitio.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Where there is enjoying, there is delectation; « but delectation is the conjunction of convenient with convenient »;4 But there is no convening [nulla convenientiae] of God with the creature; nay rather a most high distance: therefore neither a delectation, therefore neither an enjoying.

2. Item, excellens sensible corrumpit sensum vel saltem contristat, quia delectatio est in mediis:5 ergo pari ratione excellens intelligibile corrumpit vel contristat intellectum. Sed Deus est excellentissima lux: ergo contristat, non delectat, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod sensibilis potentia est corruptibilis, non intellectus; hoc non solvit, quia intellectus, dum est in carne, fatigatur et impeditur in actu, corpore corrupto.

2. Likewise, an excellent sensible corrupts the sense and/or at least saddens it, because delectation is in the means:5 therefore for an equal reason the excellent intelligible corrupts and/or saddens the intellect. But God is the most excellent Light: therefore He saddens, not delights, ergo etc.. If you say, that the sensible potency is corruptible, not the intellect; this does not solve (the matter), because the intellect, while it is in the flesh, is fatigued and impeded in act, by the corrupt body.

3. Item, ubi fruitio, ibi quietatio; sed in infinito non est quietatio, « quia semper est aliquid extra accipere »:6 ergo cum Deus sit infinitus, in Deo non est quietatio, ergo nec fruitio.

3. Likewise, where (there is) enjoying, there (is) resting; but in the infinite there is no resting, « because there is always something extra to accept »:6 therefore since God is infinite, in God there is no resting, therefore neither enjoying.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Deo proprie est fruendum.

CONCLUSION

 

Properly (speaking), one is to enjoy God.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Deo fruendum est, eo quod ipse solus perfecte finit7 et delectat ipsam animam propter se et super omnia.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that one is to enjoy God, for the reason that He alone perfectly finishes7 and delights the soul itself on His own account and above all things.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod delectatio est coniunctio convenientis etc.; dicendum, quod est convenientia per unius naturae partcipationem vel per comparationem communem.8 Prima convenientia facit communitatem univocationis, secunda communitatem analogiae sive proportionis. Et haec est secundum triplicem differentiam: aut secundum similem comparationem durorum ad duo, ut sicut homo9 ad animal, ita albedo se habet ad colorem; aut secundum dissimilem comparationem duorum ad unum, ut animalis et cibi ad sanitatem; vel / . . .

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that delectation is a conjunction of the convenient etc.; it must be said, that there is a convening through a participation of one nature and/or through a common comparison.8 The first convening causes a community of univocation, the second a community of analogy or of proportion. And this is according to a threefold difference: either according to a similar comparison of two things to two, just as man9 to animal, so whiteness is related [se habere] to color; or according to a dissimilar comparison of two things to one, as of animal and food to health; and/or / . . .

1 August., I. De Doctr. christ. c. 33. n. 37: Illo enim frueris, quo efficieris beatus. — In quo textu cod. R post Illo addit solo. [Trans. Nota:  Supra in divisione articuli Quaracchorum editorum legit contigat pro conveniat secundum explicatio eorum exhibitur hic in p. 32, Sent. I a. 1 q. 2 nota 1: secundum eandem rationem exhibitam traductio sequitur lectio conveniat pro contigat.]
2 Simile argumentum reperitur in Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7, ubi agit de felicitate, quae est bonum optimum, ideoque et maxime exoptandum ac amandum. Cfr. II. Topic. c. 1. seq.
3 Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.
4 Haec delectationis definitio est S. Doctori ceterisque Scholasticis familiaris et convenit cum ea, quam exhibet Avicenna in fine VIII. Metaph. c. 7. circa finem: Delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis, secundum quod conveniens est. — Quae ab Avicenna data definitio fundari videtur in illa, quam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 11. tradit: Est autem delectatio motus quidam animae et constitutio simul tota, sensibilis, in existentem naturam (haec definitio explicatur ab Henr. Gand., S. a. 50 q. 2. ). Ed. Paris. 1878 sic Aristot. interpretatur: Positum sit igitur nobis, voluptatem esse motionem quandam animi et constitutionem subitam sensuque percipiendam in statu conveniente naturae. Cfr. etiam VII. Ethic. c. 11. seq. et praecipue X. Ethic., c. 1-5. ac II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7, ubi plura ad delectationem (voluptatem) pertinentia explicantur. — Mox, contradicentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc facturam pro creaturam. Paulo post cod. R infinita loco summa.
5 Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot, III. c. 2.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 legitur: Manifestum autem ex his, et propter quid excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensitiva. . . . Et manifesta est ex hoc causa, propter quam sensibilia intensa corrumpunt instrumenta sensuum. Et tex. 124. (ed. Paris. loc. cit.): Proportio autem est symphonia. . . unde et delectabilia quidem sunt, dum dicuntur sincera et mixta entia ad rationem . . . excellentia autem contristant aut corrumpunt. Tandem libr. III. text. 29: Et est delectari aut tristari agere sensitiva medietate ad bonum et malum in quantum talia. — Vat. rationem additam contra mss. et ed. 1 ita exhibet: quia vera delectatio non est nisi in mediis. Cod. X circa finem huius argumenti loco in carne ponit in corpore.
6 Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6): Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est; cuius autem nihil est extra, id est perfectum et totum. — Mox praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 non ita bene Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc ergo non fruitio.
7 Id est, quietat.
8 Corruptam lectionem Vat. et recentioris cod. cc, in qua ponitur et pro vel et omittitur communem, restauravimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. X dicendum, quod convenientia dicitur vel per. — De convenientia vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. et VII. Phys. text. 21-34. (c. 4.).
9 Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt se habet, quod Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codd. hic addit.

1 (St.) Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 33, n. 37: For you enjoy Him, by whom you shall be made blessed. In which text, codex R adds alone after Him. [Trans. Note.:  Above this in the division of the article the Quaracchi editors have  primo, utrum Deo contigat frui, here reading contingat in place of conveniat, according to their explanation set forth on p. 32, Sent., I, a. 1, q. 2,  footnote 1:  for the same reason set forth there, the English translation takes the contrary sense and reads it be fitting in place of it happens.]
2 A similar argument is found in Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 7, where he speaks of the felicity, which is the best good, and for that reason both most greatly to be longed for [exoptandum] and loved [amandum]. Cf. Topics, Bk. II, ch. 1 ff..
3 We have supplied from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 the particle and.
4 This definition of delectation is the Seraphic Doctor's and akin to the other Scholastics, and it agrees with that, which Avicenna exhibits at the end of Metaphysics, Bk. VIII., ch. 7, near the end: There is no delectation unless (there is) apprehension of the convenient, according to what is convenient. — Which definition given by Avicenna seems to be founded upon that, which Aristotle, Rhetorics, Bk. I, ch. 11, hands down:  But delectation is a certain movement of the soul and an entire settling at once, of the sensible, in the existent nature (this definition is explained by Henry of Ghent, Summa., A. 50, q. 2). The Parisian Edition of 1878 thus interprets Aristotle:  It is therefore posited for us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the spirit and a sudden and perceived-by-the-sense settling in a state convenient to nature. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. VII, ch. 11 ff. and chiefly Ethics, Bk. X, ch. 1-5 and The Greater Morals, Bk. II, ch. 7, where very many things pertaining to delectation (pleasure) are explained. Then, contradicting the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc has facture [facturam] for creature. A little afterwards codex R has infinite in place of a most high.
5 Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text. 123 (in the Parisian Edition of Firmin-Didot, Bk. III, ch. 2), where according to the Venetian edition of 1489 there is read: But (it is) manifest from these, and on account of that excellent sensibles corrupt the sensitive (part) . . . And the cause is manifest from this, on account of which intense sensibles corrupt the instruments of sense. And text 124 (Parisian Edition, loc. cit.): But the proportion is a symphony . . . wherefore there are even certain delectables, while they are called sincere and mixed beings according to reason . . . but (things) excellent  sadden or corrupt. Finally, in Book III., text 29: And to be delighted or saddened is to set (oneself) in motion [agere] toward good and evil, inasmuch as (they are) such things. — The Vatican text, against the manuscripts and edition 1, exhibits an additional reason: because true delectation is not but in means. Codex X about the end of this argument puts in the body in place of in the flesh.
6 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 63, (ch. 6): Therefore the Infinite is that, according to the quantity of which for those accepting there is always something extra to accept; but of which there is nothing extra, that is perfect and whole. — Then not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc has, not so well, therefore no enjoying.
7 That is, rests.
8 The corrupted reading of the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc, in which there is placed and in place of and/or and there is omitted common, we have restored from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1. A little before this codex X has it must be said, that convening is said either through. — On convenience see Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. 1, and Physics, Bk. VII, text 21-34, (ch. 4).
9 Very many of the codices together with edition 1 omit is related [se habet], which the Vatican text together with only some of the codices adds here.

p. 39

vel / secundum comparationem duorum ad invicem, ut puta cum unum est imitatio vel similitudo alterius. Similitudo enim non convenit cum consimili1 in tertio, sed se ipsa. Sic est in proposito, quia anima est expressa similitudo Dei. Haec convenientia in uno extremo ponit inclinationem et indigentiam, in alio quietationem et sufficientiam, quia unum factum est propter alterum, unde2 ordinatur ad alterum. Et quoniam ad inclinationis quietationem et indigentiae suppletionem, ubi est sensus,3 est delectatio sive sequitur, ideo anima cum tali modo quietatur a Deo, fruitur eo.

and/or / according to a comparison of two things to one another, as, for example, when one thing is the imitation or similitude of the other. For a similitude does not convene with something very similar1 in the third (manner), but with itself. So it is in the proposed (objection), because the soul is the expressed similitude of God. This convening in one extreme posits inclination and indigence, in the other resting and sufficiency, because the one has been made for the sake of the Other, whence (the one)2 is ordered to the Other. And since at the resting of inclination and the supplementation of indigence, where there is sense,3 there is delectation or (it soon) follows, for that reason the soul, when it rests in God [quitetatur a Deo] in such a manner, enjoys Him.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excellentia sensibilis corrumpit sensum: ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile de intelligere et sentire. Et ad hoc est triplex ratio: una est ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, alia ex parte apprehensi sive obiecti, tertia est ex parte modi apprehendendi.

2. To that which is objected, that the excellence of the sensible corrupts sense: ergo etc., it must be said, that it is not similar concerning understanding and sensing. And there is a threefold reason for this: one is on the part of apprehensive virtue, another on the part of the thing apprehended or the object, the third is on the part of the manner of apprehending.

Ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, quia sensus potest corrumpi, intellectus autem non. Cuius ratio est, quia sensus dependet ab organo, in quo est quaedam medietas et harmonia, quae non tantum corrumpitur per contrarium, sed4 per excellens; sed intellectus non dependet ab organo, quia est vis immaterialis, ideo non tristatur in excellenti.5

On the part of apprehensive virtue, because sense can be corrupted, but not the intellect. The reason for this is, because sense depends upon an organ, in which there is a certain mediacy [medietas] and harmony, which is not only corrupted through a contrary, but (also)4 by the excellent; but the intellect does not depend on an organ, because it is an immaterial power, for that reason it is not saddened in the excellent.5

Ex parte obiecti non est simile, quia obiectum intelligibile6 excellens iuvat et confortat, quia influentia talis cognoscibilis procedit ab intimis et intrat ipsam potentiam, et ideo ipsam confortat et corroborat. Sicut si magnus mons daret virtutem portandi se, facilius ferretur quam parvus; sic est in intelligibili, quod Deus est. Sensibile autem obiectum tantum extra excitat, et ideo hoc corrumpit, illud autem non.

On the part of the object it is not similar, because the excellent, intelligible object6 helps and comforts, because the influence of such a cognoscible proceeds from the most interior and enters the power itself, and for that reason it comforts and thoroughly strengthens itself. Just as if a great mountain would give the virtue of carrying itself, more easily would it be borne than a small one (that gave not such virtue); so it is in the Intelligible, which is God. But the sensible object only excites outside itself [extra], and for that reason it corrupts this, but He (does) not.

Ex parte modi apprehendendi similiter est disimilitudo, quia sensus in apprehensione sui obiecti tendit ad exterius, unde percipiendo7 illud dispergitur exterius nec fortificatur interius, ideo debilitatur. Sed obiectum intellectus cum sit intimum ipsi intellectui, in eius perceptione virtus non dispergitur, sed colligitur, et quanto virtus est magis unita, tanto fortior.

On the part of the manner of apprehending there is similarly a dissimilitude, because sense in the apprehension of its own object tends to the exterior, wherefore, by percieving7 that, it disperses the exterior and does not fortify the interior, for that reason it is debilitated. But the object of the intellect, since it is most interior to the intellect itself, is not dispersed in the perception of its virtue, but is gathered together, and as much as the virtue is more united, so much more (is it) stronger.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito; dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet per privationem perfectionis; et sic materia dicitur infinita, et talis infiniti non est finire, sed potius finiri indiget, secundum quod8 est possibile. Alio modo infinitum dicitur per privationem limitationis; et quod sic infinitum est, proprie habet finire, quoniam ultra ipsum, cum non sit maius cogitare, non contingit aliquid appetere. Unde talis infinitas convenit ultimo fini, quae9 maxime habet finiendi rationem.

3. To that which is objected concerning the infinite; it must be said, that the infinite is spoken in a twofold manner, that is through a privation of perfection; and thus matter is said to be infinite, and for such an infinite there is no finishing, but it rather needs to be finished, according to which8 it is a possible. In another manner the infinite is said through a privation of limitation; and what is thus infinite, properly has to end, since beyond itself, when there is nothing greater to think, it does not happen to aim for anything. Whence such an infinity, which9 has the greatest reason to be finished, is agreeable to the last End.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem alii antiqui commentatores Lombardi sub una quaestione tractant. — Circa analogiam eiusque differentias, de qua sermo est in solut. ad 1, fusius S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in corp.; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De comparationem duorum ad duo etc. infra d. 46. q. 5. in corp. — De analogia proportionis et proportionalitatis cfr. infra d. 48. q. 1; d. 35. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a.1. q. 1. ad 4; et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.

I. This and the following question the other ancient commentators on (Peter) Lombard treat under one question. — About analogy and its differences, of which there is a discussion in the solution to n. 1, the Seraphic Doctor speaks more fully below in d. 14, q. 2; d. 29, a. 1, q. 2; d. 7, q. 4, in the body of the question.; d. 25, a. 2, q. 2. in the body of the question. — Concerning the comparison of two things to two etc, see below in d. 46, a. 1, q. 5, in the body of the question. — Concerning the analogy of proportion and proportionality cf. below in d. 48, a. 1, q. 1; d. 35, a. 1, a. 1; Sent., Bk. III, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 4; and in d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 2; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, dubium 3.

II. De ipsa hac quaestione: Scot., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic q. 12. et seqq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3, n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. Biel, hic q. 4.

II. On this question: (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa. , I. II., q. 11, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in q. 12 ff. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 72, q. 3, n. 11. — Durandus, here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 4. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 4.

1 Plures mss. ut A F G H K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 simili. Mox mendum Vat., quae post se ipsa addit anima, castigamus ex mss. et ed. 1; cod. X sed est se ipsa similis. In lectione in textum recepta similitudo sumitur concrete et sensus est: simile ratione similitudinis convenit immediate cum consimili. — Paulo post cod. T homo pro anima; plures vero codd. ut C L T S U omittunt anima, sed non bene.
2 Cod. X hic repetit unum.
3 Cod. W X Z adiungunt ibi, et mox cod. A post sequitur repetit delectatio.
4 Cod. X addit etiam. Paulo post codd. aa bb spiritualis loco immaterialis. Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam codd. A C G I L S T U V post tristatur omittunt in; codd. R et ff ponunt ab; cod. bb vero ex; plures autem ut F H K etc. cum ed. 1 in.
5 De hac differentia inter sensum et intellectum vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. et 143. Paulo supra relatos, et libr. III. text. 4. (ed. Paris. c. 4.): Necesse est itaque, quoniam (intellectus) omnia intelligit, immixtum esse; et text. 7: Quod autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est ex sensoriis et sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire ex vehementi sensibili . . . sed intellectus cum aliquid intellexerit valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit inferiora, sed et magis; sensitivum enim non sine corpore est, hic (intellectus) autem separabilis est.
6 Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. substitutimus intelligibile loco intelligentiae.
7 Ita codd. C H K O S T U Y aa bb et ed. 1, sed codd. A F I L M R V W X Z participando; Vat. autem cum cod. cc per. Mox codd. X et Y confortatur loco fortificatur.
8 Cod. cc scilicet quantum pro secundum quod.
9 Codd. F et I qui, satis bene, et conveniunt quoad sensum cum cod. T, qui habet quia.

1 Very many of the manuscripts, as A F G H K S T Y etc, together with edition 1 have similar [trans. -- simili instead of very similar (consimili)]. Then the error of the Vatican text, which adds itself to itself [se ipsa] after the soul, we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1; codex X reads but it is similar to itself. In the reading received in the text similitude is taken concretely and the sense is: by a similar reason of similitude it agrees immediately with something very similar. — A little afterward codex T has man in place of soul; but very many codices, as C L T S U, omit the soul, but not well.
2 Codex X here repeats one.
3 Codices W X and Z adjoin here, and then codex A repeats delectation before follows.
4 Codex X adds also. A little afterwards codices aa and bb have spiritual in place of immaterial. Then the codices do not agree among themselves; for codices A C G I L S T UV omit in after are saddened [trans. -- thus rendering it as are saddened by]; codices R and FF have are saddened by [ab]; but codex bb has from [ex]; but very many as F H K etc. together with edition 1 have are saddened in.
5 On this difference among sense and intellect see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 123 and 143. A little above these, there is also Bk. III, text 4 (Parisian Edition, ch. 4): Therefore it is necessary, that (the intellect) understands all things, to be intermixed; and text 7: But that there is no similar impassibility of the sensitive and intellective, is manifest from sensors and sense. For sense can not sense from the vehement sensible . . . but the intellect when it understands anything very intelligible, does not understand inferiors less, but even more; for the sensitive is not without a body, this (intellect) however is separable.
6 On the authority of the more ancient manuscripts we have substituted intelligible in place of of the intelligence.
7 Thus reads codices C H K O S TU Y aa bb and edition 1, but codices A F I L M R V W X Z read by participating; but the Vatican text together with codex cc has through. Then codices X and Y have comfort in place of fortify.
8 Codex cc has that is as much as in place of according to what.
9 Codex F and I read to the last End which [qui etc.], well enough, and they agree according to sense with codex T, which has the last End, because . . . [quia etc.].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.