S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four
Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK I

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

ARTICULUS III.

 

QUAESTIO II.

ARTICLE III

 

QUESTION 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 39-42.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 39-42.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum solo Deo sive bono increato fruendum sit.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether one is to enjoy God alone or the uncreated Good?

ULTIMO QUAERITUR, utrum solo Deo sive bono increato sit fruendum; et quod sic, videtur.

FINALLY THERE IS ASKED, whether one is to enjoy God alone or the uncreated Good; and that it is, seems (from the following):

1. Illo solo est fruendum, quod est propter se diligendum; sed illud solum10 est propter se diligendum, quod est propter se bonum; illud autem propter se est bonum, quod bonitatem, quam ha- / -bet, nec habet ab alio, nec bonitas illa est ad aliud; . . .

1. One is to enjoy that alone, which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone10 is to be loved for its own sake, which is good on its own account [propter se]; but that is good on its own account, which has the goodness, which it ha- / -s, not from an other, nor is that goodness for an other; . . .

10 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus solum, quod male abest a Vat. et recentiore cod. cc. — De hac propositione minore argum. cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 5: Quod enim absolute bonum ac iucundum est, amabile est atque eligibile; unicuique vero quod unicuique est tale. Cfr. etiam I. Ethic. c. 1. 2. et 8, ubi de ultimo fine; et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2, ubi de bono in communi agitur.

10 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted alone, which is badly absent from the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc. — On this minor proposition of the argument cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. VIII, ch. 5: For what is absolutely good and jocund, is lovable and eligible; but to each (it is) such as it is to each. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1, 2 and 8, where it concerns the last End; and On the Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2, where it deals with the common good.

p. 40

ha- / -bet, nec habet ab alio, nec bonitas illa est ad aliud; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

which it ha- / -s, not from an other, nor is that goodness for an other; but this is God alone: ergo etc..

2. Item, illo solo est fruendum, quod quietat animae appetitum; sed animae appetitus non quietatur sufficienter nisi in eo quod est illa perfectius et maius bonum; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, one is to enjoy that alone, which rests [quietat] the appetite of the soul; but the appetite of the soul is not resteded sufficiently except in that which is more perfect than it and a greater good; but this is God alone: ergo etc..

3. Item, appetitus non sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, quia ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua deficit in plenitudine; sed1 est capax Dei secundum appetitum: ergo si omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet animae appetitum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus:2 « Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere ».

3. Likewise, the appetite is not sufficiently rested except through something, which fills the soul, because for its own part the soul is lacking in the rest, which it lacks in (its) fullness; but (the soul)1 it is capable [capax] of God according to (its) appetite: therefore if every created thing is less than Him unto an infinite (degree), none fulfils the appetite of the soul. And this is what (St.) Augustine says:2 « The soul capable of the whole Trinity: nothing less than the Trinity can fill it ».

4. Item, bonum, quod potest cogitari, potest appeti: ergo si aliquo maius bonum potest cogitari, maius illo potest appeti; sed omni finito maius potest cogitari: ergo maius potest appeti: ergo nullum finitum terminat animae appetitum sufficienter: ergo solo bono infinito, quod Deus est, est fruendum, quo habito, non potest amplius cogitari nec desiderari.

4. Likewise, the good, which can be thought, can be desired [appeti]: therefore if a good greater than something can be thought, it can be desired more than it; but the greater-than-every-finite can be thought: therefore it can be desired more: therefore no finite thing terminates the appetite of the soul sufficiently: therefore one is to enjoy only the infinite Good, which is God, whom when had, nothing more [amplius] can be thought or desired.

CONTRA: 1. Videtur, quod bono creato contingat frui, quia, quamvis appetitus materiae sit infinitus, tamen per formam creatam incorruptibilem3 sufficienter finitur: ergo similiter videtur, quod sit aliquod bonum creatum, quod sufficienter finiet animae appetitum; sed omni tali est fruendum: ergo aliquo bono creato est fruendum.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It seems, that one happens to enjoy the created good, because, although the appetite for matter be infinite, however through the incorruptible,3 created form it is sufficiently ended: therefore it similarly seems, that there is some created good, which will sufficiently end the appetite of the soul; but one is to enjoy every such (thing): therefore one is to enjoy some created good.

2. Item, appetitus humanus est finitae capacitatis, ergo non capit nisi finitum, vel si capiat infinitum, capit finite: ergo si finiatur per aliud quod capit, finitur per bonum finitum: ergo videtur, quod aliquo bono finito sit fruendum.

2. Likewise, the human appetite is of a finite capacity, therefore it captures naught but the finite, and/or if it captures the infinite, it captures it finitely: therefore if it is ended through something which it captures, it is ended through a finite good: therefore it seems, that one is to enjoy some finite good.

3. Item, specialiter videtur, quod homine sit fruendum, quia omni eo est fruendum, quod Deus fruitur; sed Deus homine fruitur, quia hominem amat; sed amore illo, quo amat se, amat hominem, quia non est in eo4 duplex amor; sed primus est fruitionis: ergo et secundus.

3. Likewise, it especially seems, that one is to enjoy man, because one is to enjoy every thing, which God enjoys; but God enjoys man, because He loves man; but by that love [amore], by which He loves [amat] Himself, He loves man, because there is in Him4 no twofold love; but the first belongs to enjoying: therefore also the second.

4. Item, videtur specialiter de virtute; quia omni eo est fruendum, quod est propter se appetendum; haec est manifesta per se; sed omne bonum honestum est propter se appetendum, « quia honestum est quod sua vi nos trahibt et dignitate sua nos allicit », sicut dicit Tullius,5 et Augustinus dividit honestum contra utile; sed virtus cadit in genere honesti: ergo virtute est fruendum.

4. Likewise, it especially seems (so) from virtue; because one is to enjoy every thing, which is to be desired [appetendum] for its own sake; this is self-manifest [manifest per se]; but every honest good is to be desired for its own sake, « because the honest is that which draws us by its own power and allures us by its own dignity »; as (Marcus) Tullius (Cicero) says,5 and (St.) Augustine divides the honest against the useful; but virtue falls in the genus of the honest: therefore one is to enjoy virtue.

5. Item, videtur specialiter de beatitudine. Omni eo est fruendum, quo habito animus quiescit et delectatur et nihil ultra potest quaerere; sed beatitudo creata est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, it especially seems (so) from beatitude. One is to enjoy every thing, by which when had the spirit rests [quiescit] and delights and can seek nothing beyond (it); but created beatitude is of this kind: therefore etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

Solo Deo proprie est fruendum; improprie frui licit bonis spiritualibus, quae delectant et fini sunt coniuncta.

CONCLUSION

 

Properly (speaking), one is to enjoy God alone; improperly (speaking) it is licit to enjoy the spiritual goods, which delight and have been conjoined to (one's) End.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod solo Deo est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione et quietatione. Sed communiter accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione tantum,6 omnibus, quae spiritualiter delectant et coniuncta sunt fini, cuiusmodi sunt fructus, dona et beatitudines, potest frui homo non indebite; sed primo modo solo Deo.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that one is to enjoy God alone, in the proper acceptation of “to enjoy”, insofar as it means [prout dicit] a movement with delectation and a going to rest [quietatione]. But in the common acceptation of “to enjoy”, inasmuch as it means a movement with delectation only,6 all things, which spiritually delight and have been conjoined with (one's) End, of which kind are fruits, gifts and beatitudes, a man can not-unduly enjoy; but in the first manner God alone.

Et ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter finire nisi bonum, ad quod est.7 Hoc autem est bonum summum, quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitium, quod excedit animae vires. Cognitio enim animae naturalis8 est cognitio non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur. Similiter affectio eius nata est diligere omne bonum; ergo nullo bono sufficienter finitur affectus, nisi quod9 est bonum omnis boni et quod est omnia in omnibus. De quo / bono Exodi trigesimo tertio: . . .

And the reason for this is, that nothing can sufficiently finish [finire] the soul except the good, for which it is.7 But this is the Most High Good, which is higher than the soul, and (is) the infinite Good, which exceeds the powers [vires] of the soul. For the soul's natural cognition8 is an unconstrained [non arctata] cognition; whence it is naturally bound [nata sunt] in a certain manner to cognize all things, whence its cognition is not filled with anything cognizable, unless because it has in itself all cognizables and with this cognized all things are cognized. Similarly its affection [affectio] is naturally bound to love [diligere] every good; therefore by no good is (its) affection [affectus] sufficiently ended, unless that (good)9 is the Good of every good and the All in all. Of which / Good (there is said) in the thirty-third (chapter) of Exodus: . . .

1 Supple cum cod. I anima. Paulo infra fide codd. cum ed. 1 post nullum expunximus creatum; cod. W ponit implet pro supplet.
2 Potius auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 27, ubi sic habetur: Animam tamen hominis, id est mentum, nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola Trinitas. Et paulo inferius: Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere naturam sive substantiam, quam creavit.
3 Vat. et cod. K creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem; omnes fere codd. omittunt corporalem et; melioris notae codd. ut F G H T W aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 retinent solummodo incorruptibilem; alii ut A habent incorporalem; solummodo V corporalem, X corruptibilem; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incorporalem et incorruptibilem. Praeter auctoritatem codd. pro nostra lectione facit eiusdem convenientia tum cum solutione huius obiectionis, tum cum doctrina nostri Doctoris. Intelligi enim potest assertio hic posita tum de caelo empyreo, sicut cod. aa intelligit, addendo: ut patet in corporibus caelestibus, tum de ipsa anima, quae iuxta Seraphicum, licet sit spiritualis et incorporea, non omnino expers est compositionis ex forma et materia; et II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. explicite de ipsa affirmatur, quod appetitum materiae perfecte satiet et quietet. Quoad caelum empyreum Scholastici iuxta Aristotelem communiter asserebant, ipsum esse et incorruptibile et immobile. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1 et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Mox cod. T finiat loco finiet.
4 Cod. K Deo pro eo.
5 Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 53. (ed. Taurin. 1823): Nam (honestum) est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad se, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate. — De divisione boni, quae ex August. affertur, vide ipsius lib. 83 Qq. a. 30. — Immediate post mendum Vat. dividitur loco dividit castigamus ex mss. et primis edd.
6 Cod. K hic addit sic. Mox multi codd. ut A F G H K W X Y Z ee etc. cum ed. 1 pro fini habent frui.
7 Vat. addit creata, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. 1.
8 Naturalis refertur ad cognitio, ita ut sensus sit: Si inspicias naturam cognitionis, quae animae competit, ipsa non est arctata. — Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, rationalis loco naturalis, sed non ita bene. — De propositione, quae deinde sequitur, vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 4. in q. praeced. cit.
9 Cod. K adiungit per illud, quae additio videtur adiuncta, quia suplemendum est eo sive illo.

1 Supply with codex I the soul. A little below on the testimony of the codices and edition 1 we have expunged created after no; codex W has fills [implet] in place of fulfills [supplet].
2 Or rather the author of the book On the Spirit and soul, ch. 27, where it is put thus: However the soul of man, that is the mind, can be filled by no creature according to substance, except the Trinity alone. And a little below this: For it belongs to the Trinity alone to enter and fill the nature or substance, which It created.
3 The Vatican text and codex K has the created, corporal and incorruptible; nearly all the codices omit corporal and; the codices of better note, as F G H T W aa bb ee ff and edition 1 retain only incorruptible; others as A have incorporeal and incorruptible; only V has corporal, X corruptible; editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have incorporeal and incorruptible. Besides the authority of the codices, the convenience of our reading both with the solution of this objection, and with the doctrine of our Doctor, argues on its own behalf. For the assertion here posited can be understood both of the empyrean heaven, as codex aa understands it, by adding as is clear in celestial bodies, and of the soul itself, which according to the Seraphic (Doctor), though it is spiritual and incorporeal, it is not entirely destitute [expers] of composition of form and matter; and in Sent., Bk. II, d. 19, a. 1. q. 1 in the body of the reply there is an explicit affirmation of the same, that the appetite for matter is perfectly satisfied and quieted. As regards the empyrean heaven the Scholastics, following Aristotle, commonly asserted, that it is both incorruptible and immobile. Cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 12, a. 2. q. 1, and d. 14, p. I, a. 3. q. 1 and Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1. q. 3 at n. 6. — Then codex T has does . . . end in place of will . . . end.
4 Codex K has God in place of Him.
5 Rhetorics, Bk. II, ch. 53 (Turin: 1823): For (the honest) is a certain thing, which allures us to itself by its own power, not capturing by any emolument, but drawing by its own dignity. — On the division of the good, which is cited from (St.) Augustine, see his own book 83 Questions, a. 30. — Immediately after this we have corrected the error of the Vatican text, which has is divided in place of divides, from the manuscripts and the first editions.
6 Codex K here adds in this manner [sic]. Then many of the codices as A F G H K W X Y Z ee etc. together with edition 1 have enjoying [frui] in place of (one's) End [fini].
7 The Vatican text adds at this point created, which however is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.
8 Natural refers to cognition, so that the sense is: If you inspect the nature of cognition, which befits the soul, it is not constrained. — The Vatican text, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, has rational in place of natural, but not so well. — On the proposition, which then follows, see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 4, cited in the previous question.
9 Codex K adjoins through that [per illud: rendering the reading, unless through that which is the Good], which seems to have been adjoined, because one must supply by Him [eo] or by that [illo] [trans. -- perhaps the editors here are unaware of the substantive use of the relative adj. quod, meaning that; the English follows this latter usage].

p. 41

De quo / bono Exodi trigesimo tertio:1 Ostendam tibi omne bonum. Hoc autem est summum bonum: ergo etc.

Of which / Good (there is said) in the thirty-third (chapter) of Exodus:1 I shall show you every good. But this is the most high Good: ergo etc..

Item,2 nihil sufficientur finit animam nisi bonum infinitum, quia ad hoc, ut finiatur, necesse est, ipsam finiri secundum aestimationem; alioquin non esset beata, nisi se existimaret beatam. Aestimatio autem supergreditur omne finitum, quia omni finito potest maius cogitari aliquid: ergo cum affectio possit3 se extendere ubi et aestimatio, necessario affectio animae supergreditur omne finitum; et si hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est ergo solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum.

Likewise,2 nothing sufficiently finishes the soul except the infinite Good, because for this, that it be finished, it is necessary, that it be finished according to (its) estimation; otherwise it would not be blessed, unless it considered [existimaret] itself (to be) blessed. But estimation oversteps every finite, because something greater than every finite can be thought: therefore since affection can3 extend itself where (there is) also estimation, the affection of the soul necessarily oversteps every finite; and if this (is so), (then) by no finite good is it sufficiently finished. Therefore one is to enjoy God alone, because (He is) the most high Good and the Infinite One.

Et non solum Deo fruendum propter perfectam finitionem, sed etiam propter perfectam delectationem. Ad delectationem enim concurrit4 delectabile et coniunctio eius cum eo quod delectatur. Omne autem, quod delectat animam, delectat in ratione boni et pulcri; et quoniam solus Deus est ipsa5 bonitas et pulcritudo, ideo in Deo solo est perfecta delectatio.

And one (is) not only to enjoy God on account of perfect finishing, but also on account of perfect delectation. For, for delectation there concurrs4 the delectable and its conjunction with that which is delighted. But everything, which delights the soul, delights it in the reckoning of good and beauty; and since God alone is Goodness and Beauty Itself5, for that reason only in God is there perfect delectation.

Item, quia ibi est coniunctio; solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur. Nam coniungitur secundum6 veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi.

Likewise, because there is a conjunction; but only God is the one who is most perfectly conjoined. For He is conjoined according to6 truth and deepest interiority [intimitatem]. For only God according to (His) most high simplicity and spirituality glides into the soul, so that in [secundum] truth He is in the soul and more interior to the soul than it (is) to itself.

Omnes enim7 hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc: quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui.

For7 all these four reasons are reduced to one, that is to this: because the soul is naturally bound to perceive the infinite Good, which is God, for that reason in Him alone ought it rest and Him enjoy.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de appetitu materiae; dicendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad perfectionem substantialem, ex qua8 et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam: ideo finita est omnis talis forma. Talis autem, si sit incorruptibilis, propter necessariam sui9 unionem arctat appetitum materiae et arctatum finit; unde non finitur in sua amplitudine. Appetitus autem animae non sic arctatur propter unionem cum appetibili, immo dilatatur; et ideo oportet, quod perficiatur aliquo omnino summo.

1. But to that which is objected concerning the appetite for matter; it must be said, that the appetite for matter is ordered to form as to substantial perfection, out of which (form)8 and matter there is made one thing; and for that reason it is necessary that the form be of the same genus with the matter, nor is (the form) entirely above the matter: for that reason every such form is finite. But such, if it be incorruptible, on account of the necessary union of itself9 constrains (its) appetite for matter and finishes (what has been) constrained; whence it is not ended in its fullness. But the appetite of the soul is not thus constrained on account of (its) union with a desirable [appetibili], nay rather it is dilated; and for that reason it is proper, that it be perfected by something entirely most high.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod10 non capit nisi finite; dicendum, quod infinitum bonum finite capit, quoniam ipsa est finita. Sed quoniam bonum illud est infinitum, ideo ab ipso totaliter absorbetur, ut iam eius capacitas undique terminetur. Unde non tantum gaudebit, sed sicut dicit Anselmus,11 in gaudium Domini introibit. Quod si tantum caperet et non vinceretur nec absorberetur, adhuc posset insurgere appetitus ad amplius aliquid capiendum. Patet igitur, quod ad hoc quod anima compleatur, quamvis capacitatem habeat finitam,12 tamen necesse est adesse bonum infinitum.

2. To that which is objected, that (the appetite of the soul)10 does not capture except in a finite manner; it must be said, that it captures the infinite Good in a finite manner, since it itself is finite. But since that Good is infinite, for that reason it is totally absorbed by It, so that its capacity is already terminated on all sides. Whence it not only rejoices, but as (St.) Anselm says,11 it shall enter into joy of the Lord. Because if it only captured and was not conquered nor was absorbed, the appetite could still rise up to capture something more. Therefore it is clear, that for this, that the soul be thoroughly filled [compleatur], although it has a finite capacity,12 it is however necessary that the infinite Good be present [adesse].

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de homine; dicendum, quod Deus diligit hominem, et amor Dei est amor fruitionis; tamen homine non fuitur, quia diligendo se diligit hominem, id est, fruendo se utitur homine. Quod patet sic: quia dilectio Dei ad creaturam non est affectio, sed effectus13 communicatio. Communicatio autem secundum rationem habitualem attenditur secundum bonitatem; quia bonum est quod natum est se communicare. Secundum rationem vero actualem attenditur sive respicit voluntatem; quia enim vult, ideo facit. Ratio ergo communicandi venit ex voluntate et bonitate, sicut ratio cognoscendi ab exemplari et intelligentia. Quia igitur ex conversione voluntatis supra suam bonitatem nos diligit,14 ideo se fruendo nos diligt.

3. But to that which is objected concerning man; it must be said, that God loves [diligit] man, and the love [amor] of God is a love of enjoying; however He does not enjoy man, because by loving [diligendo] Himself He loves man, that is, by enjoying Himself He uses man. Which is thus clear: because the love [dilectio] of God for a creature is not an affection, but the effect13 (is) a communication. But a communication according to a habitual reason is attended according to goodness; because the good is what is naturally bound to communicate itself. According to a reason truly actual it is attended or respects the will; for because He wants, for that reason He does. Therefore the reason for communicating comes from (His) will and goodness, just as the reason for knowing from the exemplar and intelligence. Therefore because He14 loves us from a conversion of (His) will upon His own goodness, for that reason by enjoying Himself He loves us.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de virtute, quod virtus est bonum honestum; dicendum, quod bonum honestum dicitur dupliciter: aut quod est pure bonum, aut in quo relucet eius similitudo. Primo modo honesto est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, quia hoc solum terminat et quietat. Secundo modo non, nisi communiter accipiatur, prout dicit dele- / -ctationem. . . .

4. To that which is objected concerning virtue, that virtue is an honest good; it must be said, that a honest good is said in a twofold manner: either what is purely good, or in that which glitters its similitude. In the first manner one is to enjoy the honest, in the proper acceptation of “to enjoy”, because this alone terminates and gives rest [quietat]. In the second manner (it is) not, unless one accepts (the term) in a common sense, insofar as it means dele- / -ctation. . . .

1 Vers. 19.
2 Vat. contra fere omnes mss.: Similiter pro Item et paulo post ter existimatio loco aestimatio.
3 Vat. contra codd. A T aa bb etc. posset, sed minus apte, quia agitur hic de naturali consecutione, quae subiecto semper inest. Hinc et immediate post Vat., obnitente maiore parte mss. ut A G K L O T V W X Y Z etc. et ed. 1, minus bene extendere eo, ubi est existimatio. Cod. cc. ut loco ubi. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. ut A C F G H K L O S T U V W Z etc. cum ed. 1 post et si substituimus hoc pro haec. Cod. K planius et si hoc, ergo.
4 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus concurrit loco concernitur et paulo post castigavimus mendum Vat., quae cum recentiore cod. cc habet delectat pro delectatur. — Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1 arg. 1. ad opp.
5 Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ipsa, quod Vat. indebite omittit.
6 Cod. W per.
7 Cod. R autem.
8 Supple hic, sicuti et paulo infra, post omnimo cum cod. T forma.
9 Multi codd. antiquiores et meliores ut A C F G L O R S T U X Y Z etc. ponunt sibi pro sui. Mox cod. T post unde falso omittit non. — Sententiam hic positam S. Doctor breviter complectitur III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. his verbis: Sicut dicimus de forma caeli, quod complet appetitum materiae, quia materia eius non appetit esse sub ulteriori forma, adeo forma ipsam statuit in actualitate complete. Cfr. Scot., II Physc., q. 4. n. 4. et 15.
10 Subaudi cum cod. X anima humana. Mox cod. A post bonum finite addit anima.
11 Proslog. c. 26: « Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in guadentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium ». Alludit ad Matth. 25, 21. — Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 totum pro tantum.
12 Plures antiquiorum codd. ut A C G O S T U X bb ee ff cum ed. 1, sensu eodem remanente, quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est.
13 Vat., quae habet affectus, emendatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
14 Ed. 1 hic addit Deus, quod certe subaudiendum est.

1 Verse 19.
2 The Vatican text against nearly all the manuscripts: Similarly in place of Likewise and a little afterwards it has consideration [existimatio] in place of estimation [aestimatio].
3 The Vatican text against codices A T aa bb etc. has could, but less aptly, because there one deals with natural consequence, which is always in a subject. From this point and immediately afterwards, the Vatican text disagreeing with the greater part of the manuscripts as A G K L O T V W X Y Z etc. and edition 1, has less well extend itself to that, where there is esteem. Codex cc has as also estimation [ut et . . .] in place of where (there is)] [ubi et . . .]. A little below this on the authority of very many of the codices, as A C F G H K L O S T U V W Z etc., together with edition 1 we have substituted this [hoc] in place of this [haec]. Codex K more plainly reads: and if this (is so), therefore.
4 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted concurs [concurrit] in place of combined [concernitur] and a little after this we have corrected the error of the Vatican text, which together with the more recent codex cc has delights in place of is delighted. — Cf. above in a. 3, q. 1, sed contra n. 1.
5 We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 Itself, which the Vatican text unduly omits.
6 Codex W has through [per].
7 Codex R has but [autem].
8 Supply here, just as a little below this, with codex T after entirely, form.
9 Many of the more ancient and better codices as A C F G L O R S T U X Y Z etc. have to itself [sibi] in place of of itself [sui]. Then codex T falsely omits not after whence. — The sentence here posited by the Seraphic Doctor is briefly comprised in Sent., Bk. III, d. 13, a. 1. q. 3 at n. 6 with these words: As we speak of the form of the heaven, which completes the appetite for matter, because its matter does not aim [appetit] to be under an ulterior form, to the extent it establishes the very form completely in actuality. Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Physics, Bk. II, q. 4, n. 4 and 15.
10 Understand with codex X the human soul [trans. more exactly the appetite of the soul]. Then codex A reads the soul before captures the infinite Good in a finite manner.
11 Prologion, ch. 26: « Therefore that whole joy will not enter into those rejoicing, but the whole of those rejoicing will enter into joy ». He alludes to Mt. 25:21. — Immediately afterwards the Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, has the whole in place of only.
12 Very many of the more ancient codices as A C G O S T U X bb ee ff together with edition 1, retaining the same sense, have although it has a finitude in (its) capacity, it is necessary that. 13 The Vatican text, which has the affection, is emended from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6.
14 Edition 1 has God, which certainly must be understood.

p. 42

prout dicit dele- / -ctationem. Huiusmodi enim1 propter assimilationem ad Deum habent pulcritudinem, qua nos delectant et alliciunt; tamen in ipsis non est quiescendum, quia tunc amittunt pulcritudinem, quia « virtutes, cum ad se referuntur, superbae sunt et inflatae ».2

insofar as it means dele- / -ctation. For (virtues)1 of this kind on account of (their) assimilation to God have beauty, by which they delight and allure us; however one is not to rest [quiescendum] in them, because then they lose their beauty, because « the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and puffed up ».2

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beatitudine; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non finit appetitum per se, sed per coniunctionem cum increata: unde anima ipsam3 diligit propter Deum, non propter se.

5. To that which is objected concerning beatitude; it must be said, that created beatitude does not end the appetite by itself, but through a conjunction with uncreated (Beatitude): whence the soul loves [diligit] itself3 for God's sake, not for its own sake.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Omnes antiqui doctores, excepto Durando, conveniunt in ea sententia, quod solo Deo obiective et materialiter sit fruendum, beatitudine vero creata sive beatitudine subiective sumta (ut moderni loquuntur), formaliter tantum. Seraphicus Doctor in solut. ad 5. iam reprobaverat Durandi (hic. q. 2.) singularem et falsam opinionem, quod actus mentis, quo Deus immediate attingitur, sit fruitionis obiectum immediatum, Deus vero eiusdem obiectum remotum.

I. All the ancient doctors, except Durandus, agree in that sentence, that one is to enjoy only God objectively and materially, but created beatitude or beatitude taken subjectively (as the moderns speak), only formally. The Seraphic Doctor in his solution to n. 5 already reproved Durandus' (here at q. 2) singular and false opinion, that the act of the mind, by which God is immediately attained, it the immediate object of fruition, but God its remote object.

II. Quomodo quis improprie frui possit virtutibus, magis explicatur II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, ubi etiam exponitur, quomodo dona, fructus et beatitudines coniuncta sint fini, qui secundum Scripturam est caritas. — Valde notanda sunt profunda et copiosa argumenta, quibus Seraphicus probat, quod in Deo solo sit perfecta delectatio et quietatio, de quo etiam egregie loquitur II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam S. Thom. S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — Quoad illapsum Dei in animam cfr. II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

II. How anyone can improperly enjoy virtues, is explained at greater length in Sent., Bk. II, d. 38, a. 1, a. 2, in reply to n. 3, where there is also expounded, how gifts, fruits and beatitudes are conjoined with (their) End, which according to Scripture is charity. — Well noted are the profound and copious arguments, by which the Seraphic (Doctor) proves, that in God alone is there a perfect delectation and going to rest, of which he also speaks egregiously in Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 1. q. 1. Cf. also St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. I, ch. 43; Bk. III, ch. 48 and 50. — As regards God's sliding into the soul cf. Sent., Bk. II, p. II, a. 1. q. 2.

Quoad quaestionem principalem vide auctores in Scholio praecedenti.

As regards the principal question see the authors (cited) in the preceding Scholium.

1 Subintellige cum cod. R virtutes. Mox plures antiquiores codd. ut A C F G K L O R S U T Z ee post pulritudinem loco qua habent quia.
2 August., XIX de Civ. Dei, c. 25: Virtutes, cum ad se ipsas referuntur nec propter aliud expetuntur, etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt.
3 Lapsum librariorum Vat. ponentium ipsa pro ipsam correximus ope mss. et ed. 1.

1 Understand with codex R virtues. Then very many of the more ancient codices as A C F G K L O R S U T Z and ee have because in place of by which.
2 (St.) Augustine, The City of God, Bk. XIX, ch. 25: The virtues, when they are referred to themselves and are not sought out on account of another, are then also puffed up and proud.
3 The lapsus of the compilers of the Vatican text of placing itself [ipsa] in place of itself [ipsam] we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.