S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

 

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 42-45.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 42-45.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

DOUBT I

In parte ista circa litteram quaeruntur plura, et primo de hoc quod dicit:  Eorum vero quaedam sunt, quorum usus omnis est in significando, non in iustificando.  Sed contra:  Omnia Sacramenta sunt medicinae, quia secundum Hugonem de sancto Victore4 Sacramenta omni tempore fuerunt medicinae; sed omnis medicina habet effectum in curando:  ergo et Sacramenta similiter; sed ista curatio est iustificatio:  ergo omni tempore Sacramenta habuerunt iustificare.

In this part of my (commentary), very many things are asked about the text (of Master Peter), and first concerning this which he says:  But of these there are certain ones, whose every use is in signifying, not in justifying.  On the contrary:  All the Sacraments are medicines, because according to Hugo of St.  Victor4 the Sacraments were in every season [omni tempore] medicines; but every medicine has an effect in curing:  therefore also the Sacraments similarly; but this curing of theirs is justification:  therefore the Sacraments have to justify in every season.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod dupliciter est considerare Sacramenta veteris Legis, scilicet in se sive ratione operis operati; et sic erant tantum ad significandum; vel ratione fidei annexae sive caritatis sive ratione operis operantis; et sic erant ad iustificandum Sacramenta legalia, praeter Circumcisionem.5

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that there is a twofold manner of considering the Sacraments of the old Law, that is in themselves or by reason of the work worked [ratione operis operati]; and thus they were only for signifying; and/or by reason of annexed faith or of charity or by reason of the work of the worker [ratione operis operantis]; and thus the Sacraments of the Law [legalia], in addition to [praeter] Circumcision, were for justifying.5

DUB. II.

DOUBT II.

Omne igitur signum res est aliqua.  Opponitur de ista divisione.  Videtur enim Magister male dividere, quia superius non dividutur contra suum inferius; sed res est superius ad signum:  ergo etc.

Therefore every sign is .  .  .  some thing.  There is an objection [opponitur] concerning this division of his.  For Master (Peter) seems to have divided badly, because the superior is not divided against its inferior; but the thing is superior to the sign:  ergo etc.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod verum est, quod superius in sua generalitate acceptum non dividitur contra suum inferius; sed contractum6 bene potest dividi.  Hic autem res7 contrahitur ad standum pro re non significante.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that it is true, that the superior accepted in its general sense [in sua generalitate] is not divided against its inferior; but what is contracted [contractum]6 can well be divided.  But here “thing”7 is contracted to stand for a ‘thing not signifying’.

DUB. III.

DOUBT III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister:  Non autem e converso omnis res signum.  Videtur enim male dicere, quia signum est quod ducit in aliud cognoscendum; sed omnis res ducit in aliud, quia omnis res est causa, vel effectus.  Causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus,8 et e converso.  Si tu dicas, quod non omne, quod ducit, est signum, sed quod ducit in prius; tunc omnis creatura est signum, cum ducat in Deum.

Likewise there is asked of this which Master (Peter) says:  But not every thing is a sign.  For he seems to speak badly, because a sign is that which leads unto cognizing another; but every thing leads unto another, because every thing is a cause, and/or an effect.  But a cause leads unto the cognition of the effect,8 and conversely.  If you say, that not every thing, which leads, is a sign, but that what leads unto the first; then every creature is a sign, since it leads unto God.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod duplex est signum, scilicet naturale et institutum.  De primo non intenditur hic, sed de secundo; unde non valet obiectio ad propositum, quoiam hic9 intenditur de signo ex institutione, sicut sunt signa vocalia et sacramentalia.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that a sign is twofold; that is natural and instituted.  The first kind is not intended here, but the second (is); whence the objection to the proposition is not valid, since here9 there is intended the sign from institution, as are the verbal [vocalia] and sacramental signs.

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV.

Item videtur Magister male dicere in hoc quod dicit:  Primum de rebus, postea de signis.  Videtur enim dicere10 debuisse potius e converso, quia signum ducit in cognitionem rei:  ergo prius esset agendum vel dicendum de signis quam de rebus.

Likewise the Master seems to speak badly in this which he says:  First .  .  .  things, afterwards signs.  For he seems that he ought to have said10 rather conversely, because the sign leads unto the cognition of the thing:  therefore one is to deal and/or speak of signs before things.

4 Libr. I. de Sacram. p. 8. c. 12. (ed. Paris. 1526):  Si quis igitur quaerat tempus institutionis Sacramentorum, sciat, quia quamdiu morbus est, tempus medicinae est.
5 Cod. Z addit:  supple, quae non tantum erat ad significandum ratione operis operati, sed ad iustificandum.
6 Hoc est, si genus per differentiam ad speciem contrahitur.
7 Codd. L O satis bene:  Sic est hic, et res contrahitur.
8 Plures codd. ut A C L O R T W X etc. indebite omittunt:  causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus.
9 Contradicentibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, perperam Vat. loco hic habet hoc et post sacramentalia superflue addit tale ergo signum non est omnis res; licet omnis res sit signum primo modo.
10 Multi codd. ut A C F G K L O U W X etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 dixisse.

4 On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. 8, ch. 12 (Paris:  1526):  Therefore if one asks the time for the institution of the Sacraments, let him know, that as long as there is disease, it is the time for medicine.
5 Codex Z adds:  supply, which not only was to signify by reason of the work worked, but (also) to justify [supple, quae non tantum erat ad significandum ratione operis operati, sed ad iustificandum].
6 That is, if the genus is contracted by a difference to the species.
7 Codices L and O have well enough:  So it is here, and “ thing” is contracted . . . [Sic est hic, et res contrahitur etc.]
8 Very many of the codices as A C L O R T W Z etc. unduly omit:  But a cause leads unto the cognition of the effect [causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus].
9 Having falsely contradicted the codices and editions 1, 2 and 3, the Vatican text has this [hoc] in place of here [hic] and after sacramental signs [sacramentalia] it superfluously adds therefore every thing is not such a sign; though every this is a sign in the first manner [tale ergo signum non est omnis res; licet omnis res sit signum primo modo].
10 Many of the codices as A C F G K L O U W X etc together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, have ought to had said [debuisse dixisse].

p. 43

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod prior est cognitio signi quam rei, respectu cuius est signum; sed non oportet, quod omnis rei.  Unde ipse primo agit de rebus, quarum sacramenta non sunt signa.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the cognition of the sign is prior to (that) of the thing, in respect of which the sign is; but it is not necessary [non oportet], that (it be) of every thing.  Whence he first deals with the things, of which the sacraments are not signs.

DUB. V.

DOUBT V.

Item videtur, quod ista divisio rerum:  Aliae sunt quibus fruendum etc., sit male assignata respectu divisi, quia divisum simplicius est dividentibus et dividentibus aliquid est1 commune; sed Deo nihil est simplicius nec est aliquid commune Deo et creaturae:  ergo etc.

Likewise it seems, that this division of things:  some things which one is to enjoy etc., is badly assigned in respect of a divided, because the divided is more simple than the ones being divided [dividentibus] and there is1 something common to the ones being divided; but there is nothing more simple than God nor is there anything common to God and a creature:  ergo etc..

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod est divisio unius communis secundum nomen tantum; et sic est divisio aequivoci; est alia divisio communis secundum nomen et rem; et haec est divisio univoci; est etiam tertia medio modo; et ista est analogi, ubi non est communitas secundum unitatem naturae,2 sed secundum similitudinem proportionis; et haec communitas est rationis.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that there is a division of the one thing common according to name only; and thus there is a division of the equivocal; there is another division of the common according to name and thing; and this is the division of the univocal; there is also a third (division) by a middle manner; and that is of the analogue, where there is no commonality [communitas] according to unity of nature2 but according to similitude of proportion; and this commonality belongs to reason.

DUB. VI.

DOUBT VI.

Item videtur mala diviso quantum ad membra:  videtur enim, quod tertium membrum sit superfluum.  Omni enim re aut est utendum, aut fruendum:  ergo tertium superfluit.

Likewise the division seems bad as much as regards its members:  for it seems, that the third member is superfluous.  For every thing either is to be used, or to be enjoyed:  therefore the third is superfluous.

Item, sicut est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ita est res, qua fruendum est et utendum, ut Christus:  ergo qua ratione ponitur3 tertium membrum, deberet poni quartum.

Likewise, as there is a thing, which enjoys and uses, so there is a thing, which one is to enjoy and to use, as (is) Christ:  therefore by the reason by which there is posited3 a third member, there ought to be posited a fourth.

RESPONDEO:  Omnis res, quae est natura aliqua, aut est finis; et sic est res, qua fruendum; aut deducens ad finem; et sic est res, qua utendum; aut ad finem perveniens; et sic est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ut homo:  et sic accipiuntur membra.  Et est ista divisio satis conveniens huic scientiae, quia cum theologia sit de Creatore et de creaturis, utile est, ut theologus doceat, quomodo homo per alias res tendat in Deum.

I RESPOND:  Every thing, which is in someway a nature, either is an end; and thus is a thing, which (one is) to enjoy; or leading toward an end; and thus is a thing, which (one is) to use; or arriving at an end; and thus is a thing, which enjoys and uses, as (is) man:  and in this manner the members are accepted.  And that division is sufficiently convenient to this science, because since theology is of the Creator and of creatures, it is useful, that the theologian teach, in what manner a man tends through other things unto God.

DUB. VII.

DOUBT VII.

Item opponitur de hoc quod dicit:  Res, quibus fruendum; quia si4 tres sunt res per se et non per accidens, et a diversitate rerum est diversitas sive multiplicitas fruitionis:  ergo sicut sunt tres res, sic erunt tres fruitiones.

Likewise there is an objection concerning this which he says:  The things therefore, which one is to enjoy; because if4 there are Three per se and not per accidens, and by a diversity of things there is a diversity or multiplicity of enjoying:  therefore as there are Three things, so there will be three fruitions.

Item, tres articuli sunt, quia5 de tribus personis:  ergo a simili et tres fruitiones.

Likewise, there are three articles, because5 (there are) Three Persons:  therefore by a similar (reason) also three fruitions.

RESPONDEO:  Quod res accipitur hic communiter ad essentiam et personam propter sui generalitatem; et quia sumtum6 est hoc vocabulum res ab actu animae, ideo tres dicuntur res, quia tres personae, sed tamen una res, quia una bonitas est in eis.  Quia ergo una bonitas, ideo et una fruitio, quamvis tres res.  — Et quoniam articulus dicit quid a parte animae distinguentis, scilicet intellectus, et fruitio respicit ipsam7 divinam essentiam et bonitatem et unionem affectus communiter, ideo fruitio est una.

I RESPOND:  That “thing” is accepted here commonly as regards essence and person on account of its generality; and because this word, “thing”, is taken6 by an act of the soul, for that reason the Three are said (to be) “things”, because (there are) Three Persons, but however “one Thing”, because there is one Goodness in Them.  Therefore because (there is) one Goodness, for that reason (there is) also one enjoying, although (there are) Three things.  — And since an “article” signifies a ‘what’ [dicit quid] on the part of the soul that distinguishes, that is the intellect, and (since) enjoying respects the very7 divine Essence and Goodness and Union of the affection commonly (speaking), for that reason the enjoying is one.

DUB. VIII.

DOUBT VIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit:  Omnis, qui fruitur, utitur; quia videtur falsum, quoniam stulti8 homines similiter et bestiae fruuntur, quia propter se delectantur in delectabili, sed non utuntur.  Si dicas, quod dicitur translative; quare no similiter transfertur verbum utendi?

Likewise it is objected concerning this which he says:  Everyone, who enjoys, uses; because it seems false, since foolish8 men and beasts similarly enjoy, because they delight for their own sake in the delectable, but they do not use it.  If you say, that it is said in a transferred manner [translative]; why is the verb “to use” not similarly transferred?

RESPONDEO:  Uti importat libertatem in sua generali acceptione, in speciali importat libertatem cum relatione ad aliud; frui importat libertatem cum delectatione; et licet nec libertas nec collatio9 conveniat brutis, convenit eis tamen delectatio.  Ideo uti nullo modo convenit brutis; frui autem convenit eis aliquo modo, licet improprie.10

I RESPOND:  “To use” conveys [importat] liberty in its general acceptation, in a special manner it conveys liberty with a relation to another; “to enjoy” conveys liberty with delectation; and though neither liberty nor conferring [collatio]9 belong [conveniat] to beasts, delectation however does belong to them.  For that reason “to use” in no manner belongs to beasts; but “to enjoy” does belong to them in some manner, though improperly.10

DUB. IX.

DOUBT IX.

Item videtur male dicere, quod in homine spes ponenda non est, quia11 de beata Virgine cantatur Vita, dulcedo et spes ab Ecclesia, quae non errat.

Likewise it seems he badly says, that in man hope is not to be placed, because11 of the Blessed Virgin there is sung “Our life, our sweetness and our hope”  by the Church, which does not err.

1 Praeferimus lectionem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectioni Vat. divisum debet esse loco aliquid est, utpote subnexis conformiorem.
2 Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 emendavimus interpolationem Vat.:  est tertia medio modo, et ista est analogi, sicut ista est, ubi non est communitas creaturae et Creatori secundum naturae participationem, sed. Deinde in fine responsionis codd. D I X Y ee addunt et per hoc patet responsio, quia obiectio procedit de divisione univoci; haec autem divisio est analogi.  Placet haec addititio, utpote continens applicationem principii.  Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.
3 Refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. ponit.  Cod. dd omittit ut Christus et deinde legit ergo tertium superfluit, vel qua ratione.
4 Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 si.  Paulo post cod. R ad diversitatem loco a diversitate.
5 Contra codd. omittit Vat. quia.
6 Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 assumtum et paulo infra post tamen addit aeque bene.
7 Fide fere omnium codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 suffecimus ipsam et paulo infra pro effectus posuimus affectus.
8 Codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam alii, ut A C G K L O R S U V W X etc. cum ed. 1 loco stulti ponunt multi, qui et dein fere omnes omittunt similiter et bestiae, dum e contra aliii ut F H (T a secunda manu correctus), omissis verbis stulti homines similiter et, retinent bestiae, (codd. H T bruta); edd. 4, 5, 6 loco multi habet mali.  Verba Augustini, in quibus obiectio fundatur, sunt:  Et frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate non adeo absurde existimantur et bestiae; uti autem aliqua re non potest nisi animal, quod rationis est particeps.  Scire namque, quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus, sed neque ipsis rationalibus stultis (83 Qq. q. 30.).
9 Substituimus ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H I K O S T U V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 collatio pro relatio; cod. R legit delectio.  Paulo supra cod. O post relatione addit vel collatione.
10 Cfr. August. loc. cit.; insuper B. Albert., hic a. 17. ad 2. — Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1 et S. I. II. q. 11. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 5. — Richard., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3.
11 Ope codd. et ed. 1 expunximus particulam et, quam Vat. ponit post quia.

1 We prefer the reading of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, to the reading of the Vatican text:  i.e. and there ought to be a common divided among the ones being divided [divisum debet esse] in place of and there is something common to the ones being divided [aliquid est], as it is more conformable to what is subjoined.
2 From nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have emended the interpolation of the Vatican text:  the third (division) is by a middle manner, and that is of the analogue, as is that, where there is not a community of the creature and God according to a participation of nature, but [est tertia medio modo, et ista est analogi, sicut ista est, ubi non est communitas creaturae et Creatori secundum naturae participationem, sed].  Then at the end of the response codices D I X Y and ee add and through this the response is clear, because the objection proceeds from a division of the univocal; but this division is of the analogue [et per hoc patet responsio, quia obiectio procedit de divisione univoci; haec autem divisio est analogi].  This addition is pleasing, as it contains an application of the principle.  Cf. above in a. 3, q. 1, in reply to n. 1.
3 Breaking again with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text has he posits [ponit].  Codex dd omits as (is) Christ [ut Christus] and then reads therefore the third is superfluous, and/or by the reason [ergo tertium superfluity, vel qua ratione].
4 We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 if [si].  A little afterwards codex R has for a diversity [ad diversitatem] in place of by a diversity [a diversitate].
5 Against the codices the Vatican text omits because [quia].
6 The Vatican text against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3 has assumed [assumtum] and a little below this after however it adds equally well [aeque bene].
7 Trusting in nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have supplied the very [ipsam] and a little below this we have put the affection [affectus] in place of effect [effectus].
8 The codices do not agree among themselves; for some, as A C G K L O R S U V W X etc. together with edition 1 put many [multi]in place of foolish [stulti], and then nearly all of them omit and beasts similarly [similiter et bestiae], while on the other hand the others as F H (T as corrected by a second hand), having omitted foolish men and . . . similarly [stulti hominess similiter], retain beasts [bestiase], (codices H T have a brute [bruta]); editions 4, 5 and 6 have wicked [mali] in place of many [multi].  The words of (St.) Augustine, upon which the objection is founded, are:  And indeed to that extent they are not judged harshly to enjoy food any corporal pleasure; but none, except the animal, which is a sharer in reason, can use any thing.  For to know, that to which anything is to be referred, is not given to the ones who have no share in reason [rationis expertibus], but neither to those rational fools (Eighty-three Questions, q. 30).
9 We have substituted from very many of the manuscripts as A C F G H I K O S T U V W X Z etc. and edition 1 conferring [collation — Trans. Note:   here in the sense of “conferring meaning or purpose on another”] in place of relation [relatio]; codex R reads delight [delectio].  A little above this codex O after relation [relatione] adds and/or conferring [vel collatione].
10 Cf. (St.) Augustine, loc. cit.; in addition Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 17, in reply to n. 2. — (St.) Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, and in Summa., I, II, q. 11, a. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5. — Richard (of Middleton), here in a. 2, q. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3.
11 With the help of the codices and edition 1 we have expunged the particle also [et], which the Vatican text places after because [quia].

p. 44

Item, Ionae primo:1 Accessit ad eum gubernator; Glossa:  « Naturale est homini magis de aliis quam de se in periculis confidere ».

Likewise, (as there is said) in the first (chapter) of Jonas:1 There came to him the governor; the Gloss (reads):  « It is natural for a man in dangers to confide more in others than in himself ».

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod sperare de aliquo est dupliciter, aut sicut de adiutore, aut sicut de salvatore.  Prima spes potest esse in homine, secunda non.  — Vel est sperare finale praemium; et hoc debet esse tantum in Deo; vel temporale beneficium; et hoc potest esse in homine.  Primum si ponitur2 in homine, meretur maledictionem, secundum vero non.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that to hope in something is (said) in a twofold manner, either as in a helper, or as in a savior.  The first hope can be (placed) in a man, the second not.  — There is hoping for a final reward; and this ought to be only in God; and/or for a temporal benefice; and this can be in a man.  The first, if it is placed2 in a man, merits a curse, but the second does not.

DUB. X.

DOUBT X.

Item quaeritur, quare dicit de homine:  Itaque frater, ego fruar te in Domino, magis quam de asino vel de alia creatura, cum in omnibus creaturis reluceat vestigium divinae bonitatis.

Likewise there is asked, why he says of man:  And thus, brother do I enjoy you in the Lord, more than of the ass and/or of another creature, since in all creatures there glitters the vestige of the Divine Goodness.

RESPONDEO:  Quod dicatur3 aliquis aliquo frui in Deo, non facit repraesentatio, sed magis inhabitatio.  Unde conversa est propria, videlicet haec:  Ego fruar Domino in te, dum per opera sciam, Deum habitare in te; et est figurativa locutio.

I RESPOND:  That someone be said3 to enjoy another in God, the cause is not [non facit] representation, but rather inhabitation.  Whence the converse is proper, namely the (words):  I enjoy the Lord in you, since through (your) works I know, that God dwells in you; and (this) is figurative speech.

DUB. XI.

DOUBT XI.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Augustini, qua solvit auctoritatem praedictam per illam determinationem in Domino.  Sed Ecclesiastici octavo4 simpliciter dicitur:  Fruere magnatis.  Item, Deuteronomii vigesimo octavo:5  Filios generabis et filias, et non frueris eis; ex hoc implicat, quod, si non peccarent, fruerentur.

Likewise there is asked of this solution of (St) Augustine, by which he resolves the aforesaid authority through that determination “in the Lord”.  But in the eighth (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus4 there is simply said:  Enjoy the great.  Likewise, in the twenty-eighth (chapter) of Deuteronomy:5  Sons and daughters you shall beget, and you shall not enjoy them.; from this there is implied, that, if they had not sinned, they would enjoy (them).

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod praedicta solutio non est generalis, sed solum ad propositam auctoritatem.  Et ideo recurrendum est ad solutionem praedictam extra litteram in quaestionibus,6 quod, cum frui accipiatur communiter et proprie, in praedictis locutionibus accipitur communiter tantum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the aforesaid solution is not a general one, but only for the proposed authority.  And for that reason one must recur to the aforesaid solution outside the text in the questions,6 because, though “to enjoy” is accepted commonly and properly, in the aforesaid expressions [locutionibus] it is accepted only commonly.

DUB. XII.

DOUBT XII.

Item non videtur valere quod dicit Magister:  Si enim nec fruitur, nec utitur etc., quia Deus diligit se, non tamen utitur, quia non diligit se propter aliud; nec fruitur, quia ubi fruitio, ibi est inhaerentia et indigentia, ut dicit Augustinus;7 Deus autem utroque caret etc.

Likewise what Master (Peter) says does not seem valid:  For if one neither enjoys, nor uses etc., because God loves Himself, he does not however use (Himself), because He does not love Himself for the sake of an other; nor does He enjoy (Himself), because where (there is) enjoying; there is inherence and indigence, as (St.) Augustine says;7 but God lacks both(:  ergo) etc.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod fruitio de sui generali ratione dicit amoris unionem, scilicet fruibilis cum fruente.  Quoniam igitur contingit aliquid uniri sibi et alii, contingit non tantum frui alio, sed etiam se ipso; sed ubi est unio ad alterum, ibi est dependentia, inhaerentia et indigentia; ubi vero ad se ipsum, si ipsum est summum bonum, ibi8 non est inhaerentia nec dependentia vel indigentia, sed omnimoda sufficientia.  Si vero ipsum bonum deficiens est, indiget; et inde est, quod solus Deus se ipso perfecte fruitur, nihil autem aliud ab ipso potest perfecte se ipso frui.  Solus enim Deus est summum bonum et diligit se fruendo se, diliget etiam alia fruendo se:  et ita nec fruitio Dei nec usus est cum indigentia, sicut nostra fruitio et usus.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “enjoying” in its general reckoning means a union of love [amoris], that is of the enjoyable with the one enjoying.  Therefore since it happens that something is united to itself and to an other, it happens that it not only enjoys the other, but also its very self; but where there is union to the other, there is dependency, inherence and indigence; but where (there is union) to its very self, if it is the Most High Good, there8 is no inherence nor dependency and/or indigence, but (rather) sufficiency in every manner [omnimoda].  But if that good is deficient, it is lacking; and hence it is, that only God perfectly enjoys His very self, but nothing other by itself can perfectly enjoy its very self.  For God alone is the Most High Good and He loves Himself by enjoying Himself, (and) He also loves others by enjoying Himself:  and thus neither the enjoying of God nor the use is with indigence, as our enjoying and use (are).

DUB. XIII.

DOUBT XIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit:  Quia bonus est, sumus:  ergo quia ab aeterno bonus est, ab aeterno sumus.

Likewise it is objected concerning that which he says:  Because He is good, we are:  therefore because He is good from eternity, we are good from eternity.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum breviter, quod hoc est, quia bonus dicit causam.9 Sed est causa naturalis et necessaria, et causa voluntaria.  Bonitas autem divina est causa nostri esse et boni esse per modum voluntatis, non naturae; haec autem causa non ponit effectum statim, cum est.

I RESPOND:  It must be briefly said, that this is, because good means a cause.9 But there is a natural and a necessary cause, and a voluntary cause.  But the Divine Goodness is the Cause of our ‘being’ [esse] and of (our) ‘being good’ [boni esse] through the manner of a will, not of nature; but this (kind of) cause does not posit its effect immediately, when it is.

DUB. XIV.

DOUBT XIV.

Item, adhuc obiicitur, quare similiter non sequitur; quia iustus est, iusti sumus?10 Si dicas, quod iustitia non est eius dispositio in quantum causa; contra:  sapientia est dispositio Dei in quantum causa:  ergo pari ratione, quia sapiens est, sapientes sumus.  Si tu dicas, quod non est dispositio immediata, sicut bonitas; obiicitur de voluntate, quae est immediatissima, et tamen non sequitur:  quia volens est, volentes sumus.

Likewise, it is still objected, why it similarly does not follow; because He is just, are we just?10 If (you) say, that justice is not a disposition for Him inasmuch as (He is) a cause; on the contrary:  wisdom is the disposition of God inasmuch as (He is) a cause:  therefore by an equal reason, because He is wise, we are wise.  If you say, that it is not an immediate disposition, as (is) goodness; it is objected concerning the will, which is most immediate, and however it does not follow:  because He is willing, we are willing.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod ratio huius consequentiae triplex est.  Una est, quia bonitas est conditio causae in quantum causa; secunda est, quia / est proxima ad actum; .  .  .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the reason for this consequence is threefold.  One is, because goodness is a condition of a cause inasmuch as (it is) a cause; the second is, because / it is proximate to the act; .  .  .

1 Vers. 6. Textus Glossae interlinearis apud Lyranum est:  Naturale est, unumquemque in suo periculo plus de alio quam de se sperare.
2 Vat. contra multos codd. ut A F G K T W X etc. et sex primas edd. ponatur.
3 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 dicitur. Paulo infra Vat. contra codd. C I S T V W X Z etc. et ed 1 post conversa supervacanee addit per consequens.
4 Vers. 10. Ita codd. et ed. 1 ac Hugo de S. Charo in hunc locum; Vulgata vero servire magnatis; Vat. autem citando Ecclesiasten 7, 15. legit fruere bonis.
5 Vers. 41. — Mox post fruerentur in Vat. additur eis.
6 Hic, a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Deinde Vat. praeter fidem omnium codd. et sex primar. edd. post quod omittit cum et post praedictis contra antiquiores mss. loco locutionibus ponit auctoritatibus.
7 Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 31. n. 34:  Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. Ex antiquioribus codd. cum ed. 1 post ibi adiecimus est.
8 Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus ibi. Paulo infra cod. dd post dependentia habet nec pro vel.
9 Vat. quod hoc quia bonus est dicit causam, sed secuti sumus auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1. Mox lectio Vat. minus recta sed est aliqua causa naturalis etiam necessaria et est aliqua causa voluntaria castigatur ex codd. et ed. 1. Paulo infra Vat. post naturae, contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, addit et necessitatis.
10 Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus verba, quae Vat. hic addit sicut quia bonus est, boni sumus.

1 Verse 6. The text of the Glossa interlinearis according to (Nicholas) of Lyra is:   It is natural for each one in danger to hope more in another than in himself.
2 The Vatican text against many codices, as A F G K T W X etc. and the six first editions, has (the subjunctive) it be placed [ponatur] [Trans. Note:   here first and second refer not to the division in the first sentence of the paragraph, but to that of the third.]
3 The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 has (the indicative) is said [dicitur]. A little below this the Vatican text against the codices C I S T V W X Z etc. and edition 1 superfluously add consequently [per consequens] after the converse is [conversa]
4 Verse 10. Thus the codices and edition 1 and (Cardinal) Hugo of St. Charo on this passage; but the Vulgate has to serve the great [servire magnatis]; but the Vatican text by citing Ecclesiastes 7:15 reads enjoy the good things [fruere bonis].
5 Verse 41 — Then after they would enjoy [fruerentur] in the Vatican text there is added them [eis].
6 Here, in a. 2. q. 1. in the body of the reply. — Then the Vatican text not trusting in all the codices and six first editions, after because omits though [cum] and after aforesaid [praedictis] against the more ancient manuscripts puts authorities [auctoritatibus] in place of discourses [locutionibus].
7 On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 31, n. 34:  But if He enjoys, He is in want of our good, which no one sane would have said. From the more ancient codices together with edition 1 we have inserted is [est] before inherence [ibi].
8 On the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have supplied there [ibi]. A little below this codex dd has nor [nec] in place of and/or [vel] after dependence [dependentia].
9 The Vatican text reads that this (is) because "He is good" means a cause [quod hoc quia bonus est dicit causam], but we have followed the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1. Then the reading of the Vatican text, (which) less rightly has but there is some natural, even necessary, cause and there is some voluntary cause [sed est aliqua causa naturalis etiam necessaria et est aliqua causa voluntaria], is corrected from the codices and edition 1. A little below this the Vatican text, after of nature [naturae], contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, adds and necessity [et necessitatis].
10 With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the words, which the Vatican text here adds:  just as because He is good, we are good [sicut quia bonus est, boni sumus].

p. 45

secunda est, quia / est proxima ad actum;1 tertia, quia dispositio generalis, in qua consistit vestigii ratio:  dicit enim respectum ad finem.  Unde sicut Deus unus imprimit unitate, ita bonus bonitatem.

the second is, because / it is proximate to the act;1 the third, because (it is) a general disposition, in which consists the reason for the vestige:  for it means [dicit] a looking-back [respectum] to the end.  Whence as the one God impresses unity, so the good (God impresses) goodness.

DUB. XV.

DOUBT XV.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicitur:  Ut scilicet ametur propter se ipsam tantum, quia sicut per se ad per accidens, ita propter se ad propter aliud.  Sed nihil, quod convenit alicui per accidens, convenit per se:  ergo nihil, quod convenit alicui propter aliud, convenit propter se.  Si ergo virtutes sunt appetendae propter aliud, non ergo propter se.

Likewise it is objected of this which is said:  that, namely, it is to be loved for its own sake only, because as per se (is) to per accidens, so for its own sake (is) to for the sake of another.  But nothing, which convenes with someone per accidens, convenes per se:  therefore nothing, which convenes someone for another's sake, convenes for its own sake.  If therefore the virtues are to be desired [appentendae] for another's sake, therefore not for their own sake.

RESPONDEO:  Sicut dicit Philosophus,2 « Idem est finis et propter quod ».  Finis autem dupliciter est:  uno modo finis ultimus, qui propriisime est finis, in quo est status; alio modo finis sub fine, qui3 dicitur proprie terminus.  Sic et propter quod diversificatur; unde uno modo excludit finem, alio modo non, ut dicit Magister.

I RESPOND:  As the Philosopher says,2 « The same is the end and the for the sake of which ».  But the end is twofold:  in one manner (it is) the last end, which most properly is the End, in which there is a standing still [status]; in another manner (it is) an end under the end, which3 is properly called the terminus.  So also the for the sake of which is diversified; whence in one manner it excludes the end, in another manner (it does) not, as Master (Peter) says.

Quod ergo obiicitur de per se; dico, quod, sicut per se uno modo opponitur ei quod est per aliud — et sic idem est per se et secundum quod ipsum, sive primum universale4 — alio modo opponitur ei quod est per accidens:  sic et propter se dupliciter accipitur.  Uno modo opponitur ei quod est proper aliud, alio modo ei quod est per accidens, quia5 ad illud accidentaliter ordinatur.  Secundum hoc distinguit Magister propter se, et consequenter honestum sive fruibile, et ipsam denique fruitionem.6

Therefore what is objected concerning per se; I say, that, as per se in one manner is opposed to that which is through an other [per aliud] — and thus per se is also the same as according to what it itself (is) [secundum quod ipsum], or the prime universal4 — in another manner it is opposed to that which is per accidens:  thus for its own sake is also accepted in a twofold manner.  In one manner it is opposed to that which is for the sake of an other, in another manner to that which is per accidens, because5 it is ordered to that accidentally.  According to this Master (Peter) distinguishes for its own sake, and consequently the honest or enjoyable, and then enjoying itself.6

DUB. XVI.

DOUBT XVI.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit:  Et quaedam sunt res, per quas fruimur, ut virtutes.  Videtur quod solis potentiis possit frui anima.7 Sine omni enim virtute potest frui bono creato; ergo cum magis sit fruibile bonum increatum, et anima magis ad hoc nata est, poterit eo frui solis potentiis.

Likewise it is objected of this which he says:  And there are certain things, through which we enjoy, as (are) the virtues.  It seems that the soul can enjoy powers themselves [solis].7 For without any virtue one can enjoy a created good; therefore since the uncreated good is more enjoyable, and the soul is more naturally bound to (do) this, by this logic [eo] it can enjoy powers by themselves.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod summum bonum est quod supra nos est; ad hoc ergo, quod illi uniamur, necessario intervenit duplex medium:  medium unum, per quod anima nata est uniri alii a se diverso; et hoc est potentia; aliud speciale8 supra hoc, quod ipsam sublevet; et hoc est virtus.  Quod obiicitur non est simile, quia potentia per se potest deficere et inclinari, sed non per se elevari.9

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the Most High Good is what is above us; therefore for this, that we be united to It, a twofold medium necessarily intervenes:  one medium, through which the soul is naturally bound to be united to an other diverse from itself; and this is power; the other a special one8 above this, which lifts it up; and this is virtue.  What is objected is not similar, because power per se can fail and be inclined, but not per se be elevated.9

1 Absque ulla auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 hic Vat. addit:  quia cum bonum sit sui communicativum, de sui ratione importat communicabilitatem, importat etiam voluntatem, quae duo ponunt effectum in actu.  Paulo ante, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. dispositio pro conditio et paulo infra post dicit omittit enim.  Hoc et praecedens dubium fuse ab Alex. Hal. explicantur S. I. q. 17. m. 9. — De ratione vestigii cfr. infra d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. in fine et ibidem dub. 6.
2 Libr. II. Phys. text. 298. (c. 3.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489:   Dicitur etiam (causa) secundum finem intentum, et hoc est illud propter quod.
3 Vat. cum pluribus codd. F G K etc. et pro qui.
4 Propositio haec, ex Aristot., I. Poster. text. 11. (c. 4.) sumta, iuxta antiquam versionem (ed. Venet. apud Octavianum Scotum, 1538) sic exhibetur:  « Per se autem et secundum quod ipsum, idem, ut per se lineae inest punctus et rectum:  etenim secundum quod linea ». Et paulo ante:  « Universale autem dico, quod utique et de omni sit et per se et secundum quod ipsum...Universale autem est tunc, quando in quolibet et primo monstretur ». — S. Thomas in Commentario ad hunc locum observat, quod hic « universale non hoc modo accipitur, prout omne quod praedicatur de pluribus dicitur universale, secundum quod Porphyrius determinat de quinque universalibus; sed dicitur hic universale secundum quandam adaptionem vel adequationem praedicati ad subiectu, cum scilicet neque praedicatum invenitur extra subiectum neque subiectum sine praedicato...Primo dicit, quod universale, scilicet praedicatum, est etiam quod de omni est, id est, universaliter praedicatur de subiecto; et etiam per se, scilicet inest ei, convenit subiecto, secundum quod ipsum subiectum est. Multa enim de aliquibus praedicantur universaliter, quae non conveniunt ei per se et secundum quod ipsum est. Sicut omnis lapis coloratus est, non tamen secundum quod lapis, sed secundum quod ipsum est superficiem habens » (ed. Parmae 1865). — Vocatur illud primum universale, quando universale pradicatum non solum in quolibet est, de quo praedicatur, sed et primo demonstratur in esse ei, de quo praedicatur; sic, ut in exemplo ab Aristotele persistamus, habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis non convenit primo isosceli, sed triangulo (quia isosceli convenit in quantum triangulus est), adeoque et primum universale trianguli, non isoscelis est.  Plura videsis apud S. Thomam loc. cit. et Scot. in I. Poster. q. 15-39. — Ad normam ed. operum Aristot. et codd. nec non ed. 1 substituimus in propositione praedicta post per se particulam et pro quod.
5 Praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. hic Vat. addit aliud.
6 In solutione huius dubii concordat Richard., hic a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.
7 Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus verba hic a Vat. adiecta sine omni virtute, utpote quae iam satis indicantur particula exclusiva solis.
8 Additur hic a Vat. vel spirituale, quod deest in fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1; pauci codd., ut H R W cc loco speciale ponunt minus recte spirituale. Paulo ante cod. R pro intervenit habet concurrit, et cod. X loco unum satis bene legit generale.
9 Quo sensu virtutibus sit fruendum, vide supra a. 3. a. 2 et II. Sent. d . 18. a. 1. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

1 Without any authority from the codices and edition 1 the Vatican text here adds:  because since the good is communicative of itself, from its own reckoning it conveys communicability, it also conveys a will, which two things put an effect in act [quia cum bonum sit sui communicativum, de sui ratione importat communicabilitatem, importat etiam voluntatem, quae duo ponunt effectum in actu].  A little before this (on the previous page), disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text puts disposition [dispositio]in place of condition [conditio] and a little below this before it means [dicit] it omits for [enim]. This and the previous dubium is explained at length by Alexander of Hales, Summa., I, q. 17, m. 9. — On the reason for the vestige cf. below in d. 3, p. 1, q. 2 at the end and in dubium 6.
2 Physics, Bk. II, text 298, (ch. 3), where according to the Venetian edition of 1489 (there is read):   (A cause) is also said according to the intended end, and this is that-for-the-sake-of-which.
3 The Vatican text together with very many codices, F G K etc., has and it [et] in place of which [qui].
4 This proposition, taken from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, text 11 (ch. 4), according to the ancient version (Venice:  Octavianus Scotus, 1538), is thus exhibited:  But per se and ‘that according to what it itself (is)’ (is) the same thing, just as per se there is in a line (both) the point and straightness [rectum]:  and indeed [etenim] according to which (it is) a line ».  And a little before this:  « But I call a universal, what is both thus and from every, both per se and ‘that according to what it itself (is)’ . . .But there is then a universal, when it is shown [monstraretur] (to be) in any and in the first ». — St. Thomas observes in his Commentary at this point, that here « a universal is not accepted in this manner, insofar as everything which is predicated of very many is called a universal, according to what Porphyry determines of the five universals; but it a universal is said here according to a certain adaptation and/or adequation of the predicate to the subject, when, that is, neither is the predicate found outside the subject nor the subject without the predicate . . . First he says, that the universal, that is the predicate, is also that which is from all, that is, it is universally predicated of the subject; and also per se, that is it is in it, it convenes with the subject, according to which it itself is a subject. For many things are predicated universally of somethings, which do not convene with it per se and ‘that according to which it itself is’. As every stone is colored, not however according to which (it is) a stone, but according to which it itself is a thing having a surface » (Parma:  1865). — It is called the first universal, when the universal predicated is not only in anything, of which it is predicated, but also is demonstrated (to be) first in the ‘being’ [in esse] of that, of which it is predicated; thus, to keep the example by Aristotle, to have three angles equal to two right (angles) does not convene first to an isosceles (triangle), but (rather) to a triangle (simply speaking) {because it convenes with an isosceles inasmuch as it is a triangle), and to that extent it is also the first universal of a triangle, not of an isosceles.  See the very many things pertaining to this matter [plura vide eis] in St. Thomas, loc. cit., and in (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, q. 15-39. — According to the norm of the edition of the works of Aristotle and the codices, not excepting edition 1, we have substituted in the aforesaid proposition after per se the particle and [et] in place of what [quod].
5 Not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions the Vatican text here adds the other [aliud].
6 In the solution of this doubt Richard (of Middleton) agrees, here in a. 2, q. 3 in reply to n. 1.
7 On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted the words here inserted by the Vatican text without any virtue [sine omni virtute], which are able to be already, sufficiently indicated by the exclusive themselves [solis].
8 Here there is added by the Vatican text and/or spiritual one [vel spirituale], which is lacking in nearly all the codices and edition 1; a few of the codices, as H R W and cc put, less rightly, spiritual one [spirituale] in place of special one [speciale].  A little before this codex R has concurs [concurrit] for intervenes [intervenit], and codex X reads, well enough, a general medium [generale] in place of one medium [unum].
9 In which sense one is to enjoy the virtues, see above in a. 3. q. 2 and in Sent., d. 18, a. 1. q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 21. — Giles the Roman, here at the beginning of n. 1, q. 2.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.