S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II

De Unitate et Trinitate secundum quod creditur.

On the Unity and Trinity according to what is believed.

ARTICULUS I.

 

QUAESTIO 1.

 

ARTICLE I

 

QUESTION 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 49-53.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 49-53.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Hoc itaque vera ac pia fide tenendum est etc.

And thus one must hold by a true and pious faith etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Haec est secunda pars, in qua, primi libri materia indagata, incipit Magister prosequi; dividitur autem haec pars1 in duas partes, quoniam dupliciter est considerare res, quibus fruendum, scilicet in se, et in comparatione ad creaturas: in se ratione trinitatis et unitatis; in comparatione ad creaturas ratione scientiae, potentiae et voluntatis. Primo ergo agit2 de sancta Trinitate et Unitate; secundo de scientia et potentia et voluntate, infra distinctione trigesima quinta: Cumque supra disseruerimus.

This is the second part, in which, having tracked down [indagata] the matter of the first book, Master (Peter) begins to follow after it; moreover this part1 is divided into two parts, since twofold is the considering of things, which one is to enjoy, that is in themselves, and in comparison to creatures:  in themselves by a reckoning of (their) trinity and unity; in comparison to creatures by a reckoning of (their) knowledge [scientiae], power, and will. Therefore first he deals2 with the Holy Trinity and Unity; second with knowledge and power and will, below in the thirty-fifth distinction (which begins): And since we have orderly discussed above.

De ipsa autem sacratissima Trinitate tripliciter / contingit tractare, . . .

Moreover one happens to treat of this Most Sacred Trinity in a threefold manner / . . .

1 Nulla freta auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 Vat. textum exhibet sic perturbatum: Secunda pars Primi Libri, in qua materia . . . dividitur praesertim in.
2 Codd. V W agitur.

1 Without an reliance upon the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text exhibits this distorted reading: The second part of the First Book, in which the matter . . . is divided especially into.
2 Codices V and W read one deals with.

 

p. 50

 

contingit tractare, quoniam primo contingit ipsam credere, secundo creditam intelligere, tertio intellectam dicere sive enuntiare. Credere autem est per auctoritatem, intelligere per rationem, dicere per catholicam et rationabilem1 locutionem. Ideo primo de ipsa Trinitate et Unitate agit, secundum quod creditur; secundo de ipsa, secundum quod credita per rationem intelligitur, ibi, distinctione tertia: Apostolus namque ait; tertio, secundum quod credita et intellecta rationabiliter et catholice exprimitur, infra, distinctione vigesima secunda: Post praedicta disserendum nobis videtur de nominum diversitate. Et patet ordo. Prius enim et verius est eam credere quam intelligere; multi enim credunt, qui non intelligunt; et prius similiter est intelligere quam sermone exprimere.

since first one happens to believe It, second to understand (what is) believed, third to say or enunciate (what is) understood. But to believe is through authority, to understand through reason, to say through catholic and reasonable1 speech [locutionem]. For that reason he first deals with the Trinity and Unity Itself, according to what is believed; second with It, according to which the believed is understood through reason, there, in the third distinction (which begins): For the Apostle says; third, according to which the believed and the understood is expressed in a reasonable and catholic manner, below, in the twenty-second distinction (which begins): After the aforesaid things it seems that there must be an orderly discussion by us of the diversity of the Names. And (thus) the order is clear. For believing It is prior and truer than understanding (It); for many believe, who do not understand; and similarly understanding (It) is prior to expressing (It) in speech [sermone].

Prima pars, scilicet secundum quod creditur, continet praesentem disctinctionem; et quoniam materia est difficillima, primo ponit modum procedendi; secundo vero exsequitur, ibi: Proponamus ergo in medium.

The first part, that is according to what is believed, contains the present distinction; and since the matter is most difficult, he first posits a manner of proceeding; but second he seeks it out, there (where he says): Therefore let us put on display in the midst.

Item, prima pars secundum tria capitula2 habet tres partes. In prima tangit modum agendi, quoniam debet esse cum modestia, timore et diligentia, praemittens materiam, circa quam agere intendit. In secunda subiungit intentionem scribentium de Trinitate, ibi, secundo capitulo: Omnes autem catholici tractatores. Tertio tangit ordinem, ibi: Ceterum, ut in libro primo.

Likewise, the first part has three parts according to (its) three chapters2. In the first he touches upon the manner of writing [modum agendi], since (this) ought to be with modestly, fear and diligence, prefacing the matter, about which he intends to write [agere]. In the second he subjoins the intention of those writing of the Trinity, there, in the second chapter (which begins): Moreover all the catholic writers [tractatores]. Third he touches upon the order, there (where he says): Moreover, as (St.) Augustine teaches in the first book.

Modus scribendi de Trinitate debet esse fundatus supra intellectum fidei et cum modestia et timore propter periculum. Intentio scribentium de Trinitate est ostendere,3 quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae et unus Deus. Ordo scribendi est, primo per auctoritates ostendere veritatem, deinde per rationes et congruas similitudines.

The manner of writing of the Trinity ought to be founded upon the understanding of the Faith and with modesty and fear on account of the danger. The intention of those writing of the Trinity is to show,3 that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are Three Persons and the One God. The order of (Master Peter's) writing is, first to show the truth through authorities, then through reasons and congruous similitudes.

Proponamus ergo in medium. Haec est secunda pars, in qua Magister auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae intendit ostendere Trinitatem et Unitatem; et quoniam4 sacra Scriptura habet duas partes, scilicet novum et vetus Testamentum, ideo primo ostendit hoc per auctoritates verteris Testamenti, deinde per acutoritates novi, ibi: Nunc vero post5 testimonia etc. Et quoniam vetus Testamentum duas habet partes, scilicet Legem et Prophetas, in quibus fides explicatur, ideo ostendit primo per testimonia Legis, secundo per testimonia Prophetarum, ibi: Ille etiam maximus Prophetarum. Prima iterum pars, in qua probat per testimonia Legis, duas habet partes: primo enim probat essentiae unitatem; secundo unitatem simul et trinitatem, ibi: Personarum quoque pluralitatem. Similiter illa6 de testimoniis Prophetarum habet duas: in prima probat essentiae unitatem et personarum pluralitatem in communi; in secunda vero in speciali ostendi Filii generationem et Spiritus sancti processionem, ibi: David quoque aeternam Filii generationem. Similiter illa pars, in qua probat per acutoritates novi Testamenti, habet duas partes: primo enim probat per auctoritates sive per testimonia Iesu Christi; secundo per auctoritates Apostolorum, ibi: Ioannes quoque in Epistola canonica. Auctoritates et earum explanationes et numerus et deveristates satis patent in littera.

Therefore let us put on display in the midst. This is the second part, in which Master (Peter) by the authorities of Sacred Scripture intends to show the Trinity and Unity; and since4 Sacred Scripture has two parts, that is the New and the Old Testament, for that reason he first shows this through the authorities of the Old Testament, then through the authorities of the New, there (where he says): But now after5 the testimonies etc.. And since the Old Testament has two parts, that is the Law and the Prophets, in which the faith is explained, for that reason he shows (this) first through the testimonies of the Law, second through the testimonies of the Prophets, there (where he says): That greatest of the Prophets. Again the first part, in which he proves through the testimonies of the Law, has two parts: for he first proves the unity of the Essence; second the Unity and the Trinity at the same time, there (where he says): The Lord also showed at the same time. Similarly that (part)6 concerning the testimonies of the Prophets has two (parts): in the first he proves the Unity of the Essence and the plurality of the Persons in common; but in the second in particular [in speciali] he shows the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, there (where he says): David also openly hints at the eternal generation. Similarly that part, in which he proves through the authorities of the New Testament, has two parts: for first he proves through the authorities or through the authority of Jesus Christ; second through the authorities of the Apostles, there (where he says): (St.) John also said in his canonical Epistle. The authorities and the explanations, number and diversities of them are sufficiently clear in (Master Peter's) text.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad declarationem eorum quae de sacra Trinitate et Unitate dicit Magister, quatuor possunt quaeri circa partem istam.

For a clarification [declarationem] of the things which Master (Peter) says of the Holy Trinity and Unity, four things can be asked about this part.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem.

First it is asked, whether in God there is to be posited a unity of essence or nature.

Secundo, utrum in Deo sit ponere personarum pluralitatem.

Second, whether in God there is to be posited a plurality of persons.

Tertio, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem.

Third, whether among the divine Persons there is to be posited an infinity.

Quarto et ultimo, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere trinitatem.

Fourth and lastly, whether among the divine Persons there is to be posited a Trinity.

 

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

De unitate divinae essentiae et pluralitate personarum.

 

ARTICLE SOLE

 

On the unity of the Divine Essence and the Plurality of the Persons.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum sit unus tantum Deus.

QUESTION 1.

 

Whether there is only one God.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod in Deo sit ponere essentiae sive naturae unitatem, videtur ratione ostensiva, triplici habita suppositione, quam oportet poni, tum propter eius simplicitatem, tum propter communem animi conceptionem, quae est, quod Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest; tum ratione status, qui non est nisi in summo et primo.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that in God there is to be posited a unity of essence or nature, it seems (that it is so) by demonstrative reason [ratione ostensiva], having considered the threefold supposition, which is proper to be posited, both on account of His simplicity, and on account of a common conception of spirit, which is, that God is the one greater than whom (nothing) can be thought, and by reason of (His) status, which is not but in the highest and first (position).

Suppositio prima est, quod Deus est simplicis- / -simus.

(1.) The first supposition is, that God is the most / simple . . .

1 Codd. I cc rationalem.
2 Praeter fidem omnium codd. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. secundum tria capitula; mox post prima addit praemisso prooemio de mysterio Trinitatis et Unitatis, et infra post Trinitate ibi omittit secundo capitulo.
3 Adiecimus ex cod. I ostendere, quod sane subintelligendum est.
4 Vat., nullo suffragante cod. nec ed. 1, omittendo verba Magistri: Proponamus ergo in medium, constructionem sequentis propositionis invertit ponendo Similiter pro Haec est ac habet duas partes secundum quod loco et quoniam.
5 Codd. aa bb cc per.
6 Supple cum Vat. pars, quod Codd. et ed. 1 omittunt. Paulo infra Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post communi minus correcte ponit Secundo vero specialiter.

1 Codices I and cc have rational.
2 Not trusting in all the codices and edition 1, the Vatican text omits according to (its) three chapters; then after in the first it adds premised by a foreword on the Mystery of the Trinity and the Unity, and below after of the Trinity, there it omits in the second chapter.
3 We have inserted from codex I to show, which is certainly implicit [sana subintelligendum].
4 The Vatican text, favoring no codex nor edition 1, by omitting the words of Master (Peter): Therefore let us put on display in the midst, inverts the construction of the following proposition by putting Similarly in place of This is and it has two parts according to which in place of and since.
5 Codices aa bb and cc have through [per].
6 Supply with the Vatican text part, which the Codices and edition 1 omit. A little below this the Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, after in common, puts less correctly But in the second he especially shows.

 

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simplicis- / -simus. Ex hac arguitur, quod cum nullo alio diverso possit communicare aliquid,1 quia, si communicat, et differt: ergo non secundum idem; ergo est ibi compositio. Si nihil potest communicare, ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ergo si sunt duo dii, cum unus sit ens, alter non est ens, si unus est Deus, alter non est Deus: ergo si duo sunt dii, non sunt duo dii.2

the most / simple. From this it argued, that since a thing [aliquid] can communicate with no thing diverse (from itself),1 because, if it does communicate, and it differs: therefore (it does so) not according to the same (respect); therefore there is a composition (of being). If it can communicate nothing, therefore (it can communicate) neither deity nor entity; therefore if there are two gods, since one is Being [ens], the other is not Being [non est ens], if one is God, the other is not God: therefore if there are two gods, there are not two gods.2

2. Item, secunda suppositio est, quod Deus est, quod Deus est omnipotentissimus.3 Ex hac arguitur: igitur poterit facere, quod omnis alia potentia a sua nihil possit: ergo si sunt duo dii diversi in natura, hoc potest facere unus de altero, quod alter nihil possit, et e converso. Sed cui potest potentia auferri, non est Deus: ergo si sunt duo dii, nullus est Deus.

2. Likewise, the second supposition is, that God is, because God is the most Omnipotent.3 From this it is argued: therefore He will be able to bring it about [poterit facere], that every power other than His own can (do) nothing: therefore if there are two gods diverse in nature, one of the two can bring it about, that the other can (do) nothing, and conversely. But the one whose power can be borne away, is not God: therefore if there are two gods, none is God.

3. Item, tertia suppositio est, quod Deus est simpliciter summum.4 Ex hac arguitur: ergo omnia sunt infra ipsum: ergo omnia alia ab ipso et ad ipsum. Si ergo sunt duo dii, unus est infra alterum, et e converso; unus est ab alio secundum naturam diversam, et e converso; unus ad alteram, et e converso; sed quod est infra aliud in natura et ab alio et ad aliud, non est Deus: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, the third supposition is, that God is simply the Most High (Being) [summum].4 From this it is argued: therefore all things are below Him: therefore all others (are) from Him and for Him. If therefore there are two gods, one is below the other, and conversely; one is from the other according to a diverse nature, and conversely; one is for the other, and conversely; but what is below the other in nature and from the other and for the other, is not God: ergo etc..

4. Item, hoc potest probari per deductionem ad impossible. Si sunt duo dii, aut unus est ubi alius, aut non.5 Si unus ubi alter: ergo unus in altero, cum sint eodem modo essendi: ergo unus est alteri materialis: ergo alter non est Deus. Si unus non est ubi alter: ergo uterque limitatus, ergo neuter infinitus.

4. Likewise, this can be proved through deduction to the impossible. If there are two gods, either one is where the other (is), or (it is) not.5 If one (is) where the other (is): therefore one is in the other, since they are by the same manner of being [eodem modo essendi]: therefore one is material to the other: therefore the other is not God. If one is not where the other (is): therefore each are limited, therefore neither (is) infinite.

5. Item, si plures sunt dii boni,6 aut unus intelligit alterum, aut non. Si non; ergo uterque est ignorans. Si intelligit; aut ergo per praesentiam aut per speciem, aut per se ipsum ut per illius exemplar.7 Si per praesentiam: ergo unus in altero, ergo Deus illabitur Deo et perficit Deum; si per speciem: ergo compositus; si per exemplar: ergo unus est exemplar alterius, ergo et principium.

5. Likewise, if there are very many good gods,6 either one understands the other, or (it does) not. If not; therefore each is ignorant. If it does understand; therefore either (it does so) through a prior-sensing [praesentiam] or through appearance [species], or through its very self as through its exemplar.7 If through a prior-sensing: therefore one (is) in the other, therefore God is inserted into [illabitur] God and perfects God; if through appearance: therefore (there is) a composition [compositus]; if through an exemplar: therefore one is the exemplar of the other, therefore (it is) also (its) principle.

6. Item, si sunt duo dii diversi, quorum uterque est summum bonum; aut unus diligit alterum, ut diligendus est, aut non. Si sic, cum uterque sit summum bonum, uterque est diligendus amore fruitionis: ergo uterque fruitur altero; sed qui fruitur alio bono a se, illo indiget: ergo unus indiget alio: ergo uterque est indigens, ergo neuter Deus.

6. Likewise, if there are two diverse gods, of which each is the Most High Good; either one loves [diligit] the other, as it is to be loved, or not. If so, since each is the Most High Good, each is to be loved with the love of enjoying: therefore each enjoys the other; but what enjoys a good other than itself, is in need of it [indiget]: therefore one is in need of the other: therefore each is indigent, therefore neither (is) God.

SED CONTRA: 1. Plus potest Deus facere, quam intellectus noster possit cogitare. Sed intellectus humanus, utpote gentium,8 intelligit plures deos omnipotentes: ergo Deus potest hoc facere. Sed quidquid potest esse in divina natura, est ibi, quia aeterna:9 ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. God can do more things, than our intellect can think of. But the human intellect, as [utpote] it belongs to the nations,8 understands (that there are) very many omnipotent gods: therefore God can do the same [hoc]. But whatever can be in the Divine Nature, is there, because (It is) eternal:9 ergo etc.

2. Item, plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; sed plures dii sunt plura bona: ergo melius aliquid erunt duo quam unus. Sed secundum Anselmum10 omne, quod melius est, circa Deum est ponendum: ergo est ponere plures deos.

2. Likewise, more good things are better than fewer; but more gods are more goods: therefore two will be a better thing than one. But according to (St.) Anselm10 everything, which is better, is to be posited about God: therefore more gods are to be posited.

3. Item, quorum diversa est operatio, diversa est virtus et diversa est natura;11 sed operatio trium personarum est diversa, quia apparitio in columba fuit solius Spiritus sancti, et solus Filius assumsit humanam naturam: ergo sunt diversi in substantia: ergo sunt plures dii.

3. Likewise, whose operation is diverse, diverse is the virtue and diverse is the nature;11 but the operation of the Three Persons is diverse, because the apparition in the dove was of the Holy Spirit alone, and the Son alone assumed a human nature: therefore they are diverse in substance: therefore there are many [plures] gods.

4. Item, magna potentia est, quae potest magnum, et maior, quae maius, et maxima, quae / maximum.

4. Likewise, great is the power, which a great one can (exercise), and greater (the one), which the greater (can exercise), and greatest (of all that), which / the greatest (can do).

1 Haec phrasis: communicare aliquid cum aliquo hic et alibi significat: habere aliquid cum aliquo commune, sive: convenire cum aliquo in aliqua re. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 hic omittit aliquid et mox, ponendo sunt loco secundum, vim argumenti elidit. Deinde codd. X Y Z legunt unum pro idem. — Cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (ed. Paris. IX. c. 3.).
2 Argumentum hoc a S. Doctore paucis exhibitum sic explicari potest. Primo: si Deus est simplex, non potest habere aliquid commune cum alio Deo, qui supponitur esse. Probatur: si unus Deus aliquid haberet commune cum alio sive si communicaret in aliquo, v. g. in deitate, cum alio, deberet etiam differre, ut sit alius Deus; cum idem secundum idem nequeat cum alio simul communicare seu convenire et differe: ergo alio convenirent, alio differrent seu distinguerentur: ergo uterque esset compositus. Secundo: si autem nihil habent commune: ergo nec deitatem nec entitatem; ex quo sequitur absurdum in littera notatum.
3 Plures codd. ut A C G L O R S U etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omnipotentissimum. Paulo infra post duo ex cod. T adiecimus certe supplendum Deii.
4 Ad normam multorum mss. ut A C G L O R S T U W aa bb cc ff et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 loco summus posuimus summum.
5 Fide plurimorum codd. cum ed. 1 expunximus est, quod Vat. hic addit.
6 Codd. O Y Z omittunt boni, quae lectio magis placeret, si maiore numero codd. fulciretur.
7 Adiecimus ex cod. I ut per illius exemplar, quae verba ultimum disiunctionis membrum exprimunt clarius necnon formam totius argumenti reddunt perfectiorem, quia infra omnes mss. et edd. 1, 3, 6 habet per exemplar loco per se ipsum, quod Vat. ponit. Codd. T cc etiam prima vice pro per se ipsum ponunt per exemplar, sed a secunda manu scriptum.
8 Codd. F aa bb gentilium.
9 Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32: Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — Idem textus recurrit infra in 4. arg. ad opp.
10 Monolog. c. 15: Sicut nefas est putare, quod substantia summae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquo modo non-ipsum: sic necesse est, ut sit quidquid omnino melius est, quam non-ipsum. Illa enim sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius: et quae melior est omnibus, quae non sunt quod est ipsa. Cfr. etiam Proslog. c. 5. convenit Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (ed. Paris. XI. c. 7.): Dicimus itaque, Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse, quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest, hoc enim est Deus. Cfr. et Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 10.
11 Averroes, XII. Metaph. text. 25: Activa diversificantur in potentia et actu per diversitatem formarum et materiarum. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. conversam huius propositionis exhibet: Eadem namque substantia est eorum, quorum naturaliter non est diversus effectus. Utraque propositio fundatur in illo axiomate: operari sequitur esse, seu: idem est principium essendi et operandi. — In conclusione huius argumenti cod. O habet natura pro substantia. — B. Albert., S. I. tract. 6. q. 29. m. 1. a. 1. idem argumentum profert, dein adiungit: Et haec fuit fortior obiectio Arianorum et Nestorianorum et Eutychianorum et Paulis Samosatenorum.

1 This phrase: a thing . . . communicate with . . thing here and elsewhere signifies: to have something common with another, or: to convene with another in some matter. — The Vatican text against the codices and edition 1 here omits a thing [aliquid] and then, by putting they are in place of according, it shatters the force of the argument [ by reading therefore they are not the same ]. Then codices X Y and Z read one (thing) in place of the same (nature). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text. 12 (Parisian edition: Bk. IX, ch. 3).
2 This argument exhibited by the Seraphic Doctor with a few words can be thus explained: First: if God is simple, he cannot have anything common with another god, who is supposed to exist [esse]. It is proven: if one God had anything common with another or if he would communicate in another, e. g. in deity, with another, he would also differ, so that he would be another God; since the same thing according to the same cannot at the same time communicate or convene with another and differ (with it): therefore they would convene with another, and differ or be distinguished by another: therefore each would be composed. Second: but if they had nothing common: therefore neither (would they have) deity or entity; from which follows the absurdity noted in the text.
3 Very many of the codices as A C G L O R S U etc. together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 have the most omnipotent (being) [omnipotenissimum].
4 According to the norm of many of the manuscripts as A C G L O R S T U W aa bb ee and ff and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 we have put the Most High (being) [summum] in place of the Most High [summus].

5 Trusting in the very many codices together with edition 1, we have expunged the est, which the Vatican text adds here [and which is necessary for the English syntax].
6 Codices O Y and Z omit good, which reading would be more pleasing, if it were supported by a greater number of codices.
7 We have inserted from codex I as through its exemplar, which words express the last member of the disjunction more clearly and render the form of the whole argument more perfect, because below all the manuscripts and editions 1, 3 and 6 have if through an exemplar in place of if through its very self, which the Vatican text has. Codices T and cc also in the first case put through an exemplar in place of through its very self, but (this) written by a second hand.
8 Codices F aa and bb have it belongs to the gentiles [gentilium].
9 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 32: For being able to be by Himself He does not differ throughout the perpetual (ages).
10 Monologion, ch. 15: Just as it is a wicked thing to think, that the substance of the Most High Nature be anything, than which a not-Itself is better in any manner: so it is necessary, that it be whatever is entirely better, than what (is) not-Itself. For it alone is, than which nothing is thoroughly better. Cf. also Proslogion, ch. 5. Aristotle agrees, Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 39 (Parisian edition: Bk. XI, ch. 7): And so we say, that there is a living, sempiternal, best God, wherefore life and the continual and eternal aevum is in Him, for this is (what) God (means). Cf. also (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, Prose 10.
11 Averroλs, Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 25: The active is diversified in power and act through a diversity of forms and matters. [Trans. note:  Averroλs is the Latin name for the famous Almohad scholar Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd (b. A. D. 1126, d. A. D. 1198, whose principle works were Tahafut al-Tahafut or The Incoherence of Incoherence ] (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, Prose 11, exhibits the converse of this proposition: For indeed the substance belongs to those, which naturally are not a diverse effect. Each proposition is founded upon this axiom: operating follows being [esse], or: the same is the principle of being and operating. — In the conclusion of this argument codex O has nature in place of substance. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa, I, tract. 6, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1, proffers the same argument, and then adds: And this was the stronger objection of the Arians and Nestorians and Eutychians and the followers of Paul of Samosata.

 

p. 52

 

quae / maximum; sed Deus super omnia est summe potens: ergo potest producere summum;1 sed hoc est Deus: ergo cum « in aeternis sit idem esse et posse », ergo etc.

which / the greatest (can do); but God above all thing is most highly potent: therefore he can produce the Most High (Being);1 but this is God: therefore since « in eternal (ages) it is the same "to be" and "to be able" », ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

Plures esse deos est impossibile, immo si recte intelligatur, quid sit Deus, non est intelligibile.

CONCLUSION

 

That there are more gods is impossible, nay rather if it is rightly understood, what God is, it is not (even) intelligible.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod impossibile est esse plures deos, et si recte accipiatur significatum huius nominis Deus, non solum est impossibile, sed etiam non intelligibile. Deus enim dicit simpliciter summum et in re et in opinione cogitantis. Quia in re, ideo omnia ab ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum, et in ipso omnino est status;2 ideo impossiblie est intelligere, salvo hoc intellectu, quod aliquid sibi parificetur aliud ab ipso. Item, nihil maius Deo cogitari potest nec etiam aequale, quia summum in opinione. Ideo impossibile et non intelligibile est ponere plures deos.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that it is impossible that there be more gods, and if the thing signified by this name God be rightly accepted, it is not only impossible, but also not intelligible: for God means simply the Most High (Being) both in reality [in re] and in the opinion of the one thinking. Because (He is such) in reality, for that reason all things (are) from Him and in Him and for Him, and in Him entirely is (their) stability [status];2 for that reason it is impossible to understand, without violation of the intellect, that anything makes another equal to itself [sibi parificetur] from itself. Likewise, nothing greater than God can be thought nor even (anything) equal, because (He is) the Most High (Being) in the opinion (of rational creatures). For that reason it is impossible and not intelligible to posit more gods.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de gentibus; dicendum, quod non fuit intellectus, sed fictio;3 praeterea non intelligebant Deum secundum nobilitatem divinam: ideo non valet.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected concerning the nations; it must be said, that it was not an understanding, but a fiction;3 besides (at that time) they did not understand God according to the divine nobility: for that reason (the argument) is not valid.

Et ad illud: plus potest Deus facere etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est intellectus, scilicet rationalis et phantasticus. De primo verum est, sed de secundo non; quia multa possumus cogitare secundum phantasiam, quae Deus non potest facere, quia non convenit illi, « in quo inconveniens est impossibile ».4

And for that: God can do more etc.; it must be said, that twofold is the intellect, that is the rational and the fantastic. Of the first it is true, but of the second not (so); because we can thing many things according to (our) fantasy, which God cannot do, because it is not agreeable [non convenit] to Him, « in whom the inconvenient is impossible ».4

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plura bona sunt meliora paucioribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in bono creato et finito, quod ratione suae finitatis recipit bonitatis augmentum per additionem alterius boni; non autem habet veritatem in bono infinito, quia quantumcumque addas bonum infinitum infinito, semper ego intelligo de bonitate tantum in uno, quantum tu5 in pluribus.

2. To that which is objected, that more good things are better than few; it must be said, that (the argument) has truth in (the case of) a created and finite good, which by reason of its finiteness [finitatis] receives an augment of goodness through addition of another good; but it does not have truth in (the case of) a infinite good, because however much you add an infinite good to an infinite, I will always understand as much of goodness in the one, as you5 (do) among the more.

3. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de diversitate operationum; dicendum, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus in omni operatione conveniunt, sed in relatione differunt. Unde in incarnatione est operatio productionis illius naturae et est unio; in primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo non. — Similiter in columba est columbae formatio et eius significatio;6 in primo conveniunt, in secundo non. Exemplum Augustini7 de Trinitate est, quod ad formationem huius nominis memoria concurrit memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; tamen hoc nomen memoria significat alteram potentiarum; simili modo est in proposito.

3. To the other which is objected concerning the diversity of operations; it must be said, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit convene in every operation, but differ in relation. Whence in the Incarnation there is an operation of the production of that nature and there is a union; in the first the Three Persons convene, in the second not (so). — Similarly in the dove there is the formation of a dove and its signification;6 in the first they convene, in the second not (so). The example of (St.) Augustine7 concerns the Trinity, which for the formation of this name memory there convenes memory, intelligence and will; however this name memory signifies one of the powers; it is (so) in a similar manner in the proposed (argument).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magna potentia, etc.; dicendum, quod producere aliquem8 est tripliciter: vel de se ipso, vel de aliquo creato, vel de nihilo. De se ipso potest Deus producere summum simpliciter, sed ille non erit alius in natura propter naturae simplicitatem. De alio vel de nihilo non potest producere summum simpliciter, sed in genere, non propter defectum potentiae agentis, sed propter defectum creaturae, quam necesse est esse limitatam; et ita non potest producere alium Deum.

4. To that which is objected, that a great power, etc.; it must be said, that to produce anyone8 is (said) in a threefold manner: from one's very self, and/or from another created (thing), and/or from nothing. From His very self God can produce the most high (being) simply (speaking), but It will not be another in nature on account of the simplicity of (His) nature. From another and/or from nothing He cannot produce the most high (being) simply (speaking), but (He can) according to the genus [in genere] (of created things), not on account of a defect of the power of the agent, but on account of a defect of the creature, which of necessity [necesse est] is limited; and thus He cannot produce another God.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Argumentum primum in fundam. diffusius proponitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 14. m. 2. et a Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 3. — Contra secundum argumentum, sumtum ex omnipotentia, Scot. (I. Sent. d. 2. a. 3.) movet difficultatem, quia ipse contra communem sententiam supponit, Dei omnipotentiam non nisi ex fide certo sciri posse.

I. The first argument at the bottom is proposed more diffusely by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 14, m. 2, and by Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2. a. 3. — Against the second argument, taken from omnipotence, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus {Sent., Bk. I, d. 2. a. 3} removes [movet] a difficulty, because he against the common sentence supposes, that the omnipotence of God cannot be known certainly except by faith.

II. Contra doctrinam in solut. ad 2. traditam opponit Durand. (I. Sent. d. 44. q. 3.), quod Deus et mundus simul sint maius bonum quam Deus solus. Sed haec assertio merito ab omnibus theologis classicis ut falsa reprobatur; cfr. infra. d. 43. q. 2. fundam. 5; Itiner. mentis c. 5. — In solut. ad 3. quoad propositionem: « In primo conveniunt tres personae, in secundo (scil. unione) non », notandum est, quod unio in duplici sensu accipi potest, vel ut actio unitiva, vel ut relatio unionis. Illa est communis tribus Trinitatis personis, haec vero spectat ad solam Filii personam; et de hac loquitur hic S. Doctor.

II. Against the doctrine handed down in the solution to n. 2 Durandus opposes {Sent., Bk. I, d. 44, q. 3}, that God and the world together are a greater good than God alone. But this assertion is deservedly reprobated by all the classical theologians as false; cf. below d. 43, q. 2 at the bottom of n. 5; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 5. — In the solution to n. 3 as regards the proposition: « In the first the Three Persons convene, in the second {that is in the union} not (so) », it must be noted, that union can be accepted in a twofold send, as a unitive action, and/or as a relation of union. That (last) is common to the Three Persons of the Trinity, but this (former) respects the Person of the Son alone; and of this the Seraphic Doctor speaks here.

III. Unitas Dei definita est a Concilio Laternanensi IV. c. 1. Firmiter, nec non a Vaticano, Const. de Fide, tit. de Deo creatore.

III. The unity of God has been defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, in ch. 1 of Firmiter, and also by Vatican (I), in the Constitution de Fide, under the title On God the Creator.

Plura circa hanc quaetionem S. Bonav. docet infra d. 4. q. 3; d. 23. a. 2. q. 3; II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; / . . .

St. Bonaventure teaches more things about this question below in d. 4, q. 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 3; Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1; / . . .

1 Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc contra omnes antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 indebite adiungit bonum.
2 Respicitur illud ad Rom. 11, 36: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Sensus est: a Deo omnia procedunt, in Deo omnia convervantur, ad Deum omnia referuntur. Cfr. infra d. 36. dub. 4. — In ipso omnino est status i. e. Deus est principium, ultra quod in resolvendo seu causas quaerendo nullo modo possumus transire. Paulo infra ed. 1 ei loco sibi.
3 Cod. U non male: fictio potius; non enim intelligebant. Cod. T veritatem pro nobilitatem.
4 Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20: Sed hoc est praestitutum, quia quamlibet (quodlibet) parvum inconveniens in Deo impossibile est. — Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post inconveniens addit minimum. Paulo ante cod. I phantastica loco secundum phantasiam.
5 Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. ut A C F G H K L O P S T etc. adiecimus tu. Paulo ante codd. S X post bonum omittunt infinitum; lectio haud spernenda.
6 Sic plures codd. ut K R X Y Z ff cum ed. 1; alii sunt dubiae lectionis; codd. I aa figuratio; sed Vat. cum aliquibus codd. signatio.
7 Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 21. n. 30: Quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt etc. Sensus est: ad formationem vocabuli memoria omnes tres animi potentiae active concurrunt, tamen significatio eiusdem refertur ad unam solam potentiam.
8 Fide plurimorum mss. ut A C F G H L O R S T U Z etc. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquem pro aliquid. Agitur enim de productione Dei, et in subnexis habetur genus masculinum ille, quod refertur ad summum simplicitur absque dubio pro eodem genere sumendum, scil. summum aliquem etc. Cod. H habet Deum producere aliquem.

1 The Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc, contrary to all the more ancient codices and edition 1, unduly reads the most high Good.
2 This respects Rm 11:36: Since from Him and through Him and in Him are all things. The sense is: from God all things proceed, in God all things are conserved, to God all things are returned. Cf. below in d. 36, dub. 4. — In Him entirely is (their) stability, i. e. God is the principle, beyond which we can in no manner pass in resolving or seeking the causes (of things). A little below this edition 1 has to Him in place of to Himself.
3 Codex U has not badly: rather a fiction; for (at that time) they did not understand. Codex T has truth in place of nobility.
4 (St.) Anselm, Cur Deus homo, Bk. I, ch. 20: But this is a postulate [praestitutum], because however small the inconvenient it is impossible in God. — The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, to the inconvenient adds the least. A little before this codex I has many fantastic things [multa . . . phantastica] in place of many . . . according to (our) fantasy [multa . . . secundum phantasiam].
5 From very many of the more ancient manuscripts as A C F G H K L O P S T etc. we have inserted you. A little before this codices S and X before good omit infinite; a reading not at all to be spurned.
6 In this manner very many of the codices as K R X Y Z and ff together with edition 1 read; the others are of a doubtful reading; codices I and aa read figuring [figuratio]; but the Vatican text together with the other codices has indication [signatio].
7 On the Trinity, Bk. IV, ch. 21, n. 30: Since in accord with the manner I name my memory and intellect and will, singular names indeed are referred to singular things, but, however, singulars are signified [facta] by all three etc.. The sense is: for the formation of the word memory all three of the powers of the soul actively concur, however the signification of the same is referred to one power alone.
8 Trusting in the very many manuscripts as A C F G H L O R S T U Z etc. and edition 1 we have substituted anyone in place of anything. For it deals here with the production of God, and in what follows the masculine gender of It is used, which refers to that most high (being) simply (speaking) without doubt to be taken for the same genus, that is anyone most high etc.. Codex H has God produce anyone.

 

p. 53

 

Breviloq. p. I. c. 2. 5. 6; Itiner. mentis ch. 5. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 14. m. 2. — Scot., hic q. 3; de Rerum Principio q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 11. a. 3; et praecipue S. c. Gent. I. c. 42. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 21; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. a. 1. m. 1. — Petr. a Tra., hic . q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R. , hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 25. q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic. q. 1.

Breviloquium, p. I, ch. 2, 5, 6; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 5. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 14, m. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 3; de Rerum Principio, q. 1. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, here at q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 11, a. 3; and chiefly Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 42. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 2, 21; Summa., p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, a. 1, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in (a. ?) 1, at the beginning of q. 1. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 25, q. 2, 3. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.