S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION
II

ARTICULUS UNIC.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 53-4.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 53-4.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum in Deo ponenda sit personarum pluralitas.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether in God there is to be posited a plurality of persons.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum sit ponere in Deo personarum pluralitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur supponendo de Deo quatuor: primum est, quod in ipso sit summa beatitudo; secundum est, summa perfectio; tertium est, summa simplicitas; quartum est, summa primitas.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether there is to be posited in God a plurality of persons. And that (this is) so, is shown by supposing four things concerning God: the first is, that in Him there is a most high beatitude; the second is, (that in Him is) a most high perfection; the third is, (that in Him is) a most high simplicity; the fourth is, (that in Him is) a most high primacy.

1. Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: si1 est ibi summa beatitudo; sed ubicumque est summa beatitudo, est summa bonitas, summa caritas et summa iucunditas. Sed si est summa bonitas, cum bonitatis sit summe se communicare,2 et hoc est maxime in producendo ex se aequalem et dando esse suum: ergo etc. Si summa caritas, cum caritas non sit amor privatus, sed ad alterum: ergo requirit pluralitatem. Item, si summa iucunditas, cum « nullius boni sine socio sit iucunda possessio »,3 ergo ad summam iucunditatem requiritur societas et ita pluralitas.

1. From the first supposition it is thus argued: if1 there is a most high beatitude there; but wherever there is a most high beatitude, there is a most high goodness, a most high charity and a most high jocundity. But if there is a most high goodness, since it belongs to goodness to communicate itself in a most high manner,2 and this is most greatly in producing from itself an equal and in giving its own ‘being’ [esse]: ergo etc.. If a most high charity, since charity is not a private love [amore], but (a love) for another: therefore it requires a plurality. Likewise, if a most high jocundity, since « there is no jocund possession of any good without company [sine socio] »,3 therefore for the most high jocundity there is required society and thus plurality.

2. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio; sed « prefectionis est producere talem, qualis ipse est in natura »:4 ergo necesse est, ibi esse multiiplicationem; sed hoc non potest esse secundum aliam essentiam: ergo oportet, quod sit secundum aliam personam sive suppositum.

2. Likewise, from the second supposition thus: if there is a most high perfection there; but « to perfection belongs producing such a thing, which is itself in nature »:4 therefore it is necessary, that there be a multiplication; but this cannot be according to another essence: therefore it is proper, that it be according to another person or supposit.

3. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas; sed simplicitas est, quod aliqua natura sit in pluribus, ut patet in universali, sed ex defectu simplicitatis est, quod numeretur in illis:5 ergo si in Deo est simplicitas in nullo deficiens, erit in pluribus non numerata essentia: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, from the third supposition thus: if there is a most high simplicity there; but simplicity is, that any nature be in more [pluribus], as is clear in the universal, but it is from a defect of simplicity, that it is numbered among them:5 therefore if in God there is a simplicity deficient in no manner, the non-numbered Essence will be in more [pluribus]: ergo etc..

4. Item, ex quarta suppositione sic: si est ibi summa primitas; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto fecundius est et aliorum principium:6 ergo sicut essentia divina, quia prima, est principium aliarum essentiarum, sic persona Patris, cum sit prima, quia a nullo, est principium et habet7 fecunditatem respectu personarum; sed fecunditas in Deo respectu Dei non potest esse nisi actui coniuncta: ergo necesse est, plures esse personas.

4. Likewise, from the fourth supposition: if there is a most high primacy there; but as much anything is prior, so much is it more fecund and the principle of others:6 therefore as the Divine Essence, because (it is) first, is the principle of other essences, so the person of the Father, since He is first, because (He is) from no one, is the principle and has7 a fecundity in respect of persons; but a fecundity in God in respect of God cannot be except conjoined to acting [actui]: therefore it is necessary, that there be more persons.

SED CONTRA: 1. Videtur, quod ex eisdem suppositionibus posset argui contrarium, et ita destruuntur rationes et conclusio.8 Si enim ibi est summa beatitudo, cum beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficiat ad beatitudinem: ergo non est necesse ponere aliam personam ad beatitudinem sive iucunditatem.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It seems, that from the same suppositions the contrary could be argued, and thus are destroyed the reasons and the conclusion.8 For if there is a most high beatitude there, since it is sufficient for beatitude (that God be) blessed through the Essence of Himself alone [sibi soli]: therefore it is not necessary to posit another Person for beatitude or jocundity.

2. Item, contra secundam suppositionem sic obiicitur:9 si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo aeque plene et perfecte est essentia in una persona et in pluribus. Si ergo ultra perfectionem additio est superflua, pluralitas est superflua; et si hoc, cum in divinis nihil sit superfluum, pluralitas non est10 in divinis.

2. Likewise, against the second supposition it is thus objected:9 if there is a most high perfection there: therefore equally, fully and perfectly is the Essence in one Person and in more. If therefore beyond perfection an addition is superfluous, a plurality is superfluous; and if this (is the case), since among divine things nothing is superfluous, there is no plurality10 among the divine (Persons).

3. Item, contra tertiam rationem sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, cum pluralitas opponatur simplicitati, et « opposita non possunt esse circa idem »:11 ergo si Deus est unus et in eo est simplicitas, non ergo pluralitas, cum per omnia sit simplex.

3. Likewise, against the third reason thus: if there is a most high simplicity there, since plurality is opposed to simplicity, and « opposites cannot be about the same thing »:11 therefore if God is one and in Him there is simplicity, therefore not a plurality, since in all things [per omnia] He is simple.

4. Item, contra quartam suppositionem sic: si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.

4. Likewise, against the fourth supposition thus: if there is a most high primacy; therefore since stability is in the first principle, and stability is in unity: therefore primacy does not posit plurality, but unity: therefore it seems, that there is only one Person.

1 Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. hic et in aliis tribus arg. particulam si.
2 Vat. bonitatis summae sit se communicare, sed minus apte et contra auctoritatem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; melius sana foret, si lectio Vat. et mss. inveniretur coniuncta, ita ut legeretur: bonitats summae sit summe se communicare. Hanc lectionem confirmant verba Richardi, hic a. 2. q. 1: ad summam bonitatem pertinet se summe communicare. — Haec ratio fundatur in ista propositione ex Dionys., de Cael. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. sumta: Bonum est diffusivum sui.
3 Seneca, I. Epist. ad Lucilium, epist. 6.
4 Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4). — In principio huius et sequentis argumenti Vat. omittit particulam Item et post suppositione addit arguitur; sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
5 Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 45. (VI. c. 13.): Hoc enim dicitur universale, quod pluribus inesse natum est. Et I. Poster. c. 20 (c. 24): Quantocumque utique magis secundum partes (seu particularis) est, in infinita cadit; universale autem in simplex et in finem. — Mox Vat. contra antiquiores codd.et ed. 1 nihilo pro nullo et est pro erit.
6 Cfr. libr. de Causis, prop. 1. et 17. — Cod. K nobilius vel fecundius.
7 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata, ponit a nullo est principio, habet; quae lectio vim dictis detrahit.
8 Maior pars codd. ut A F G H L O T V W X Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 refragatur Vat. ponenti conclusiones iam positae, et quidem iure, cum tantum una omnium rationem positarum sit conclusio. Aliqui mss. ut C S (A T a prima manu) etc. convictio loco conclusio. Cod. R omittit et conclusio. Paulo post auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. beatum substituimus loco beatus; idem infra in solutione huius obiectionis recurrit.
9 Cod. cc arguitur. Paulo post Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, aeque plena et perfecta . . . ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra.
10 Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus est pro erit.
11 Aristot., II. Elench. c. 5. (c. 25.) et XI. Metaph. c. 4. (X. c. 5.). — Paulo ante cod. X sibi constans habet suppositionem pro rationem.

1 Against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text here and in the other three arguments has the particle if.
2 The Vatican text has it belongs to most high Goodness to communicate itself, but less aptly and against the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3; it would be better, if the reading of the Vatican text and the manuscripts was found conjoined, so that it read: it belongs to most high Goodness to communicate itself in a most high manner. — This reason is founded on that proposition taken from Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 4 and On the Divine Names, ch. 4: The Good is diffusive of itself.
3 Seneca, Epistle to Lucillius, Bk. I, letter 6.
4 Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4). — In the beginning of this and of the following argument, the Vatican text omits the particle Likewise and after supposition adds it is argued; but this opposes the manuscripts and edition 1.
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VIII., text 45 (Bk. VI, ch. 13): For a universal means this, that it is bound to be in more (things). And in Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 20 (ch. 24): And so in however greater a manner it is according to (its) parts {or particulars}, it falls among the unlimited [in infinita]; but the universal among the simple and the end. — Then the Vatican text against the more ancient codices and edition 1 has nothing [nihilo] in place of no manner [nullo] and is in place of will be.
6 Cf. Book of Causes, propositions 1 and 17. — Codex K has more noble and/or more fecund.
7 The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1, with a changed punctuation, has is from no principle, He has; which reading detracts from the force of what is said.
8 A major part of the codices as A F G H L O T V W X Y Z etc. together with edition 1 oppose the Vatican reading the conclusions already posited, and indeed rightly, since only one of all the reasons posited is the conclusion. The other manuscripts as CS (AT by a first hand) etc. have the conviction in place of the conclusion. Codex R omits and the conclusion. A little after this on the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions we have substituted it is sufficient (that God be) blessed [beatum . . . sufficiat] in place of the blessed . . . is sufficient [beatus . . . sufficiat]; the same recurs below in the solution to this objection.
9 Codex cc has it is argued. A little after this the Vatican text, opposing the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has there is an equally full and perfect essence in. . . as in more. But if beyond.
10 From the manuscripts and the six first editions we have substituted is for will be.
11 Aristotle, (The Sophistic) Lists, Bk. II, ch. 5 (ch. 25) and Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 4 (Bk. X, ch. 5). — A little before this codex X self-consistently has supposition in place of reason.

p. 54

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Personarum pluralitatem in divinis esse ponendam, et fides docet et argumentis congruentiae suadetur.

CONCLUSION

 

Both the Faith teaches and one is persuaded by arguments of congruence, that a plurality of Persons is to be posited in divine things.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod in divinis est ponere personarum pluralitatem, sicut fides dicit et rationes praedictae ostendunt, si quis sine contradictione consideret. Nam ratione simplicitatis essentia est communicabilis et potens esse1 in pluribus. Ratione primitatis persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem innascibilitatem, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est fontalis plenitudo in Patre ad omnem emanationem; et hoc infra patebit.2 Ratione perfectionis ad hoc est apta et prompta; ratione beatitudinis et caritatis voluntaria. Quibus conditionibus positis, necesse est ponere personarum pluralitatem.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that in divine things one is to posit a plurality of Persons, as the Faith teaches and (as) the aforesaid reasons show, if one considers (the matter) without contradiction. For by reason of simplicity, the Essence is communicable and able [potens] to be1 in more. By reason of the primacy, the (first) Person is naturally bound [nata est] to produce Another from Himself; and here I the primacy an “innascibility”, by reason of which, as the ancient opinion says, there is a fontal plenitude in the Father towards every emanation; and this will be clear below.2 By reason of perfection, He is apt and prompt for this; by reason of beatitude and charity (He is) willing [voluntaria]. Having posited these conditions, it is necessary to posit a plurality of Persons.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficit, ergo non indiget etc; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indiget; nec ponitur3 alius propter indigentiam neque tanquam beatificans, sed in beatitudine communicans.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the Contrary, that it is sufficient (that God be) blessed through the Essence of Himself alone, therefore He is not in need etc.; it must be said, that it is true, that He is not in need; nor is Another posited3 on account of indigence nor as One beatifying, but (as) One communicating in beatitude.

2. Similiter ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deitas aeque plene est in uno et in pluribus;4 dicendum, quod etsi aeque plene, non tamen ita plene declaratur. Et praeterea, eo ipso quo plene est in Patre, redundat in alias personas redundantia perfectionis.

2. Similarly to that which is objected, that the Deity is equally fully in one and in more;4 it must be said, that even if (It is) equally fully, it is not, however, so fully declared. And besides, by that very reason by which It is fully in the Father, there redounds unto the other Persons a redundancy of perfection.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas repugnat simplicitati; dicendum, quod est quaedam pluralitas per additionem; et haec repugnat; quaedam per originem; et haec non addit nec componit nec repugnat simplicitati, sed potius solitudini; et sic est in divinis, ut infra patebit.5

3. To that which is objected, that a plurality is repugnant to simplicity; it must be said, that there is a certain plurality through addition; and this is repugnant; (and there is) a certain (plurality) through origin; and this does not add nor compose nor is repugnant to simplicity, but rather to solitude; and thus it is among divine things, as will be clear below.5

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in primo est status; dicendum, quod sicut in essentiis una est essentia prima, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam, sic et6 in personis est una persona, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam; et in illa est status originis, quia illa a nullo, et haec est persona Patris. Unde Augustinus7 illi personae appropriat unitatem, dicens: « In Patre unitas » etc.

4. To that which is objected, that in the first there is stability [status]; it must be said, that as among essences there is a prime Essence, from which and for which the others are, so also6 among the Persons there is one Person, from whom and for whom the Others are; and in That is the stability of (Their) origin, because That (is) from none, and this is the Person of the Father. Whence (St.) Augustine7 appropriates unity to that Person, saying: « In the Father unity » etc..

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Infra d. 3. p. I. q. 4. S. Doctor docet, mysterium sanctissimae Trinitatis sola fide cognosci posse. Inde patet, quo sensu argumenta rationis in hac quaestione et alibi allata intelligenda sint, scil. non ut stricte demonstrativa, sed tantum ut persuasiva sive probabilia per quandam congruentiam ex principiis fidei resultatem. Scot. hic q. 7. diffuse de valore horum argumentorum disputat et inter alia etiam argumentum hic secundo loco positum refellere nititur. — Quoad argumentum ex quarta suppositione sumtum cfr. infra d. 28. q. 1. — Quot modis sacra Scriptura doceat personarum pluralitatem in Deo, breviter docetur infra, hic dub. 8. — Eadem fere argumenta exhibent Alex. Hal. (qui diffuse hanc materiam tractat, et ex quo, test Dionysio Carth., plurima posteriorum doctorum argumenta sumta videntur), S. Thom., Richard., qui addit quintum argumentum, aliique.

I. Below in d. 3, p. I, q. 4, the Seraphic Doctor teaches, that the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity can only be known by faith. Hence it is clear, in what sense the arguments from reason in this question and those brought forward elsewhere are to be understood, that is not as strictly demonstrative, but only as persuasive or probable through a certain congruence resulting from the principles of the Faith. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 7, disputes at length the value of these arguments and among others strives to refute this argument placed in second place. — As regards the argument taken from the fourth supposition cf. below in d. 28, q. 1. — How many manners Sacred Scripture teaches the plurality of the Persons, is briefly taught below, here in dub. 8. — Nearly the same arguments are exhibited by Alexander of Hales (who treats of this matter at length, and from whom, as testifies (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, very many of the arguments of latter doctors seem to have been taken), by St. Thomas, by Richard (of Middleton), who adds a fifth argument, and by others

II. S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. 1. c. 2; Itiner. mentis c. 6; Hexaem. Serm. 11. et 21. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 14. m. 1. 5. 6. — Scot., hic q. 4. 7; Report. hic q. 5. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 30. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 26; Quodl. 7. a. 6. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 20; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 29. a. 2. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. A. 53. q. 8. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 11.

II. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. 1, c. 2; Itinerarium mentis ch. 6; Hexaλmeron., Sermon 11 and 21. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 14, m. 1, 5, 6. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 4, 7; Reportatio. here in q. 5. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 30, a. 1, 2; Summa contra Gentiles, IV, ch. 26; Quodlibetals., 7, a. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here in a. 20; Summa., p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, a. 2, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter a Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in n. 2. at the beginning of q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 53, q. 8. — Durandus, here in q. 4. — (Bl. ) Denis (the Carthusian), here in q. 5. — (Gabriel) Biel, here q. 11.

1 Cod. K et potest esse. Cod. O ut potens esse.
2 Dist. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. — Mox post caritatis additur in Vat. eadem essentia divina est, quod abest a mss. et ed. 1. Cod R verbo beatitudinis praemittit bonitatis.
3 Restituimus lectionem fere omnium antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 substituendo ponitur loco ponendus est et addendo neque, quod Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc indebite omittit.
4 Vat. hic, sicuti supra, contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 aeque plena et perfecta est in uno et in pluribus, liceat ipsa in sequentibus semper adhibeat adverbium plene.
5 Dist. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 1 et d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Paulo ante cod. X solum loco potius.
6 In Vat. et recentiore cod. cc deest et, quod tamen in antiquis mss. et ed. 1 habetur, et quidem bene. Paulo post cod. X nulla pro nullo.
7 Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 5. n. 5: In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu S. unitatis aequalitatisque concordia.

1 Codex K has and can be. Codex O has as one able to be.
2 Distinction 27, p. I, q. 2 in reply to n. 3. — Then after and charity there is added in the Vatican text the same divine Essence is, which is absent from the manuscripts and edition 1. Codex R prefaces the word beatitude with the goodness of.
3 We have restored the reading of nearly all the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 by substituting is . . . posited in place of is . . . to be posited and by adding neither, which the Vatican text together with the more recent codex cc omits unduly.
4 The Vatican text here, as above, against the more ancient codices and edition 1 has there is equally a full and perfect (essence) in one and in more, though the same always exhibit in the following passages the adverb fully.
5 Distinction 8, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — A little before this codex X has solely in place of rather.
6 In the Vatican text and the more recent codex cc also is lacking, which however is had in the ancient manuscripts and edition 1, and indeed well so. A little after this codex X has none [nulla] in place of none [nullo].
7 On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 5, n. 5: In the Father unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality.


The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.