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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION
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ARTICULUS UNIC.
Quaestio III. |
ARTICLE SOLE
Question 3 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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QUAESTIO III.
Utrum numerus divinarum personarum sit infinitus. |
QUESTION 3
Whether the number of the Divine Persons is infinite. |
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CONSEQUENTLY TERTIO loco quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo. |
CONSEQUENTLY IN THE THIRD place there is asked, whether among the Divine Persons one is to posit an infinity. And that (this is) so, is shown in this manner. |
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1. Quia creatura est8 finita, et quidquid est in ipsa, est actu finitum: ergo ab oppositis, quia divina essentia est infinita, quidquid est in ipsa, est infinite: ergo cum in Deo sit numerus personarum, erit infinitus; et ia erunt personae infinitae. |
1. Because the creature is8 finite, and whatever is in it, is in act finite: therefore ab oppositis, because the Divine Essence is infinite, whatever is in It, is in an infinite manner [infinite]: therefore since in God there is a number of persons, it will be infinite; and thus there will be infinite Persons. |
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2. Item, cum duplex sit infinitas, virtualis et numeralis,9 infinitas virtualis est in Deo: ergo pari ratione infinitas numeralis: ergo in Deo sunt infinitae personae. |
2. Likewise, since infinity is twofold, virtual and numeral,9 there is a virtual infinity in God: therefore for an equal reason a numeral infinity: therefore in God there are infinite Persons. |
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8 Ita codd. et ed. 1, dum Vat. creatura
cum sit finita. Paulo post cod. cc infinitum pro infinite.
Mox codd. A W loco infinitus habet infinite; aliqui autem codd.
ut M T V X cum ed. 1 minus apte erunt infinitae pro erit infinitus;
sed nihil mutandum duximus. |
8 Thus the codices and edition 1, while
the Vatican text has the creature since it is finite. A little after
this codex cc has infinite in place of infinitely; but the
other codices as M T V X together with edition 1 have less aptly they will
be infinite in place of it will be infinite; but we have judged
that nothing is to be changed. |
p. 55
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3. Item, infinita virtus, cum emanat1 secundum suam totam infinitatem, non tantum producit infinitum intensive, sed etiam extensive; sed virtus Patris in productione personarum emanat secundum omnimodam sui potestatem: ergo non tantum producit personas infinitas in virtute, immo etiam2 infinitas in numero. |
3. Likewise, infinite virtue, when it emanates1 according to its total infinity, it not only produces an infinite intensively, but also extensively; but the virtue of the Father in the production of the Persons emanates according to His own omnimodal power: therefore He not only produces persons infinite in virtue, nay rather also2 infinite in number. |
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4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur sic: multiplicatio personarum aut est virtutis, aut non. Si non: ergo non debet in divinis poni; si est virtutis per se: ergo maior multiplicatio erit maioris virtutis, et summae virtutis infinita multiplicatio: ergo etc. |
4. Likewise, this same is thus shown: a multiplication of persons either belongs to virtue, or (it does) not. If not: therefore it ought not be posited among the Divine; if it does belong to virtue per se: therefore a greater multiplication will belong to greater virtue; and to the most high virtue an infinite multiplication: ergo etc.. |
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CONTRA hoc ostenditur quadruplici conditione, quae sumitur ab hoc quod semper Deo est attribuendum quod nobilius est, quod necesse est ponere finitatem personarum. Prima est distinctio, secunda ordo, tertia connexio, quarta summa completio.3 |
ON THE CONTRARY this is shown by a fourfold condition, which is taken from this, that to God there is always to be attributed what is more noble, wherefore it is necessary to posit a finitude [finitatem] of Persons. The first (condition) is distinction, the second order, the third connection, the fourth most high completion.3 |
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1. Ex prima conditione ostenditur sic: si est ibi distinctio, non ergo confusio; sed ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio: ergo etc. |
1. From the first condition it is thus shown: if there is distinction there, therefore (there is) not a confusion; but where there is infinity, there is confusion: ergo etc.. |
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2. Item, ex secunda sic: ubi est ordo, ibi est terminatio, quia ubi deficit terminatio, deficit et4 mediatio et per consequens ordo; sed ubi est terminatio, non est infinitas: ergo si in personis divinis est ordo, non est infinitas. |
2. Likewise, from the second, thus: where there is order, there is termination, because where termination is lacking, there is also4 lacking mediation and per consequens order; but where there is termination, there is not infinity: therefore if among the divine Persons there is order, there is not infinity. |
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3. Item, ex tertia sic: ubi est connexio, necesse est, quod omnes personae procedant ab una; nam si una ab alia et ita consequenter, tunc est infinita distantia inter primam et ultimam; sed5 hoc est inconveniens: ergo omnes ab una: aut ergo eisdem modis, aut diversis. Si eisdem: ergo nulla distinctio; si diversis, sed diversi modi emanandi sunt finiti: ergo etc. |
3. Likewise, from the third, thus: where there is connection, it is necessary, that all the persons proceed from one; for if one (is) from another and thus consequently, then there is an infinite distance between the first and the last; but5 this is inconvenient: therefore all (are) from one: therefore either in the same manners, or in diverse ones. If in the same: therefore no distinction; if in diverse, but diverse manners of emanating are finite: ergo etc.. |
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4. Item, ex quarta sic: si est ibi summa completio, ergo nata est divinitas alia complere: ergo cum completio personarum sit in beatitudine, nata est beatificare.6 Sed si essent personare infinitae, impossibile esset aliquem beatificari a Deo; cognitio enim cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis, cum tota bonitas, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet personarum; ergo aut anima omnes cognosceret, aut non esset beata; sed impossibilie esset7 omnes cognoscere, cum virtus eius sit finita: ergo etc. |
4. Likewise, from the fourth, thus: if there is a most high completion there, therefore the Divinity is bound [nata est] to complete others: therefore since there is a completion of persons in beatitude, It is bound to beatify (them).6 But if the persons were infinite, it would be impossible that anyone would be beatified by God; for cognition of whatever person concerns the substance of beatitude, since the whole goodness, which is the substantial reward [praemium], is in each of the persons; therefore either the soul would cognize all (of them), or it would not be blessed; but it would be7 impossible that it cognized all, since its virtue is finite: ergo etc.. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Numerum divinarum personarum esse finitum, et fides tenet et ratio suadet. |
CONCLUSION
That the number of divine Persons is finite, both faith holds and reason persuades. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod in divinis personis quantum ad numerum non est ponere infinitatem sed finitatem. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that among the divine Persons as much as regards (their) number, one is not to posit an infinity but a finitude [finitatem]. |
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Ratio autem huius est, quia infinitas numeralis repugnat perfectioni et ordini, quia est per recessum ab unitate sive ab origine sua. Similiter et8 infinitas molis; et ideo neutrum est in Deo. Infinitas autem virtutis est per accessum ad unitatem et originem; et ideo, cum ista sit perfectionis, ponenda est in Deo, alia non. |
But the reason for this is, that a numeral infinity is repugnant to perfection and order, because it is through a withdrawal [recessum] form unity or from its origin. Similarly also8 an infinity of mass; and for that reason neither is in God. But an infinity of virtue is through an approach [accessum] to unity and origin; and for that reason, since it belongs to perfection, it is to be posited in God, the others not (so). |
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1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est in Deo, est infinite; dicendum, quod verum est infinite, sed non qualicumque9 infinitate, sed illa qua Deus est infinitus; et haec est infinitas immensitatis, et tali modo est Trinitas infinita, non infinitate numerali, quae non congruit Deo.10 |
1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected, that whatever is in God, is infinitely (so); it must be said, that the True [verum] is there infinitely, but not in any kind of9 infinite manner [qualicumque infinite], rather [sed] by that which God is infinite; and this is the infinity of immensity, and in such a manner the Trinity is infinite, not by a numeral infinity, which is not congruent with God.10 |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinita virtus, infinite11 emanas, producit infinita; dicendum, quod divinae virtuti non convenit productio nisi perfecti; et ideo non convenit ei productio alicuius infinitatis nisi illius, quae stat cum summa perfectione. Haec autem non est infinitas numeralis, et ideo non est in Deo. |
3. To that which is objected, that infinite virtue, infinitely11 emanating, produces infinites; it must be said, that no production, except of the perfect, agrees with divine virtue; and for that reason there agrees with it no production of any infinity except of that, which stands with most high perfection. But this is not a numeral infinity, and for that reason it is not in God. |
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4. Ad ultimam quod obiicitur, quod potentiae est se multiplicare; dicendum, quod non omni modo12 est potentiae, sed perfecte multiplicare se potentiae est; et ideo non sequitur: ergo magis se multiplicare est maior perfectio, nisi intelligatur perfecte; sed infinite se multiplicare secundum numerum est imperfecte; et ideo non convenit Deo. |
4. To the last which is objected, that to power it belongs to multiply oneself; it must be said, that not in every manner12 does (multiplying oneself) belong to power, but to multiply oneself perfectly does belong to power; and for that reason it does not follow: therefore that it multiplies itself more is a greater perfection, if it be understood perfectly; but that it multiplies itself infinitely according to number is (to be understood) imperfectly; and for that reason it does not agree with God. |
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1 Sensu et mss. cum ed. 1 ita exigentibus,
mutavimus emanet, quod habet Vat. |
1 From the sense and the manuscripts,
together with edition 1, which exhibit it, we have altered the subjunctive since
it emanates [cum emanet], which the Vatican text has. |
p. 56
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SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM. |
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I. Communiter triplex distinguitur infinitas, scil. numeralis, quae est in quantitate discreta, molis, quae est in quantitate continua, et virtutis sive immensitatis; cfr. infra d. 19. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 et 2. — Pro faciliore intelligentia quatuor argumentorum in fundam. haec notamus. Istae quatuor proprietates divinitatis, saltem tres primae, ita inter se connexae sunt, ut secunda (ordo) supponat primam (distinctionem) et tertia (connexio)utramque. Primum arg. ex distinctione sumtum sic procedit: si Deo attribuendum quod nobilius est, et si ibi est distinctio, ipsa distinctio debet esse sine confusione, cum confusio sit imperfectionis; sed ubi infinita multitudo, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.; cfr. infra d. 43. a. 1. q. 3. Secundum arg. procedit ex hoc axiomate, quod, ubi est ordo, ibi necessario est primum et ultimum (terminus) et medium. Tertium arg. est satis perspicuum. In quarto arg., quod sumitur ex summa completione, i. e. plenitudine perfectionis, S. Doctor supponit cum sententia communi, quod « cognitio cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis ». De hoc tamen Scot. (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) dubitat et opinatur, non esse, absolute loquendo, impossibile, quod in caelo aliquis fruatur essentia Dei, non vero personis. De qua sententia videri potest Macedo. Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti, collat. 3. differ. 3. |
I. Commonly a threefold infinity is distinguished, namely a numeral, which in a discrete quantity, one of mass [molis], which is in a continuous quantity, and one of virtue or of immensity; cf. below in d. 19, p. I, q. 1, q. 1 and 2. — For an easier understanding of the four arguments in the fundament we note the following: Those four properties of the Divinity, at least the first three, have been so interconnected, that the second, order, supposes the first, distinction, and the third, connection, both of them. The first argument taken from distinction proceeds thus: if that He is more noble is to be attributed to God, and if there is distinction there, that distinction ought to be without confusion, since confusion belongs to imperfection; but where there is an infinite multitude, there is confusion: ergo etc.; cf. below in d. 43, a. 1. q. 3. The second argument proceeds from this axiom, that, where there is order, there is necessarily a first and last (terminus) and a middle. The third argument is sufficiently evident. In the fourth argument, that is taken from a most high completion, i. e. from a plenitude of perfection, the Seraphic Doctor supposes with the common opinion, that « the cognition of any Person concerns the substance of beatitude ». Of this, however, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., d. 1, q. 1) is doubtful and he opines, that it is not, absolutely speaking, impossible, that in Heaven one enjoys the Essence of God, but not a Person. Concerning which sentence one can see Macedo, Collationes doctrinae S.Thom. et Scoti, conf. 3, diff. 3. |
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II. Circa ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 45. m. 6., ubi latius fund. 1. et 2. explicantur. — Scot., hic q. 5. et 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. quaest. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1. |
II. About the next question: Alexander of Hales, Summa. p. I, q. 45, m. 6, where fundament 1 and 2 is more broadly explained. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5 and 7. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 30, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), on this question and the following, Summa., p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 53, q. 9. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, q. 1. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.