S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION
II

ARTICULUS UNIC.

 

Quaestio IV.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 4

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 56-9.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 56-9.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO IV.

 

Utrum tres tantum sint divinae personae.

QUESTION 4

 

Whether there are only three divine Persons.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere trinitatem. Et quod non, immo magis dualitatem, ostenditur sic.

FOURTH AND LAST it is asked, whether among the divine Persons one is to posit a trinity. And that (one is) not, nor what is more a duality, is thus shown.

1. Pater totum quod potest, dat Filio;1 sed qui dat totum quod potest, non potest amplius dare: ergo nec aliam personam producere, cum illud sit dare.

1. The Father gives the whole, of what He can, to the Son;1 but he who gives the whole of what he can, cannot give more: therefore neither (can he) produce another person, since that is a giving [dare].

2. Item, Pater generat Filium tanquam Verbum per omnia aequale et per omnia dicens et exprimens ipsum; sed multiplicatio personarum est ad declarationem virtutis: ergo videtur, quod superfluat alium producere.

2. Likewise, the Father generates the Son as the Word through all things equal and through all things saying and expressing Him; but a multiplication of persons is for the declaration of the Truth: therefore it seems, that it is superfluous to produce another.

3. Item, ostenditur quod ibi debeat esse quaternitas per rationem emanationis. Quia enim Filius emanat per generationem, non per processionem, ideo, quam vis non generet, tamen spirando producit; eadem ratione videtur, quod Spiritus sanctus, quamvis non producat spirando, possit generare sive generet, cum non generetur.

3. Likewise, it is shown that there ought to be a quaternity there by reason of the emanation. For because the Son emanates through generation, not through procession, for that reason, the force [vis] which does not generate, does however by spirating produce; for the same reason it seems, that the Holy Spirit, although He does not produce by spirating, can generate or may generate, since He is not generated.

4. Item, cum in divinis sit duplex modus producendi,2 scilicet unus per modum naturae, alius per modum voluntatis, et ibi debeat esse completa ratio productionis, videtur etiam, quod ibi debeat esse modus producendi tertius per modum artis. Et si sic, erit ibi ponere quartam personam secundum hunc modum producendi.

4. Likewise, since among the divine there is a twofold manner of producing,2 that is one through a manner of nature, another through a manner of will, and there ought to be a complete reckoning of production there, it seems also, that there ought to be there a manner of producing a third through a manner of art. And if so, one will posit there a fourth Person according to this manner of producing.

SED CONTRA: Quod sit ibi trinitas tantum, ostenditur ex suppositionibus superius factis, quia necesse est, in illa Trinitate esse beatitudinem, perfectionem, simplicitatem,3 primitatem.

ON THE CONTRARY: That a trinity alone is there, is shown from the suppositions made above, because it is necessary, in that Trinity there be beatitude, perfection, simplicity, (and)3 primacy.

1. Ex prima suppositione ostenditur sic: si est ibi summa beatitudo: ergo summa concordia; ergo est summa germanitas, summa caritas. Sed si essent plures quam tres, non esset ibi summa germanitas; si pauciores, non esset ibi summa caritas: ergo sunt tres tantum. Probatio minoris. Si est ibi quarta persona, aut procedit ab una, aut a duabus, aut a tribus. Si ab una vel4 duabus tantum, tunc non perfecte et aequaliter convenit cum omnibus; si autem a tribus, tunc duae personae intermediae magis conveniunt ad invicem quam cum extremis, quia producuntur et producunt; et ita non est ibi perfectus nexus. — Item, si essent pauciores quam tres, non esset ibi perfecta caritas, quia perfectus amor et est liberalis et est communis: quia liberalis, ideo tendit in5 alterum; quia communis, ideo vult illum diligi ab altero et diligere alterum sicut se et a se: ergo est ibi dilectio et condilectio; hoc autem non potest esse minus quam in tribus.

1. From the first supposition it is thus shown: if there is a most high beatitude there: therefore a most high concord; therefore there is a most high sharing-of-one-origin [germanitas], a most high charity. But if there were more than three, there would not be a most high sharing-of-one-origin there; if less, there would not be a most high charity there: therefore there are only three. The proof of the minor. If there is a fourth person there, either He proceeds from one, or from two, or from three. If from one and/or4 two only, then He does not perfectly and equally convene with all; but if from three, then the two intermediate persons convene more with one another than with the extremes, because they are produced and produce; and thus there is not a perfect nexus there. — Likewise, if there were less than three, there would not be a perfect charity there, because a perfect love [amor] both is liberal and is common: because (it is) liberal, for that reason it tends unto5 the other; because (it is) common, for that reason it wants one [illum] to be loved [diligi] by the other and that (one) love the other as itself and by itself: therefore there is a dilection and a condilection there; but this cannot be among less than three [minus quam in tribus].

2. Ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo persona producens perfecte producit et quantum ad modum producendi, et quantum ad eum qui producitur. Sed non reperitur nisi duplex modus producendi nobilis; « omne enim agens aut agit per modum naturae, aut per modum voluntatis », sicut vult Philosophus;6 ergo his duo - / -bus modis et tantum his producit; . . .

2. From the second supposition thus: if there is a most high perfection there: therefore the Person producing perfectly produces both as much as regards the manner of producing, and as much as regards Him who is produced. But naught but a twofold, noble manner of producing is found: « for everything acting acts by means of nature, or by means of will », as the Philosopher has it;6 therefore by these two / manners and by these only does He produce; . . .

1 Ioan. 16, 15: Omnia quaecumque habet Pater mea sunt.
2 Plurimi codd. ut A C G I K L M O R S Z etc. minus recte et non sibi constantes procedendi. Paulo infra post artis ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus particulam Et.
3 Codd. X cc et ed. 1 hic addunt et.
4 Plures mss. cum ed. 1 repetunt hic a.
5 Vat., adversantibus mss. et ed. 1, ad loco in et paulo post alium pro illum; deinde, contrariantibus insuper edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post altero legendo sicut a se et vult diligere, omittit postea et a se; quae lectio gracilior quidem est, sed sensum nimis coarctare videtur, eo quod non contineat unum membrum divisionis respectu triplicis mutuae dilectionis. Elliptica constructio textus nostri illud membrum satis indicat. Sensus enim propositionis hic est: ideo Pater vult, quod Filius diligatur a Spiritu sancto, et diligat Spiritum sanctum, sicut vult, quod ipse, scilicet Pater, diligatur ab utroque et a se diligatur uterque.
6 Lib. II. Phys. text. 49. (c. 5.), ubi dicit, quod eorum quae fiunt propter finem « alia quidem secundum propositum fiunt, alia vero non . . . sunt autem propter hoc (i. e. finem) quaecumque ab intellectu utique aguntur et quaecumque a natura ». Cfr. III. Ethic., c. de Voluntario, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. de Spontaneao et seqq.

1 John 16:15 : All things whatsoever the Father has are Mine.
2 Very many of the codices as A C G I K L M O R S Z etc. have less rightly and non-selfconsistently of proceeding. A little below this after of art we have restored from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3 the particle And.
3 Codices X and cc and edition 1 here add and.
4 Very many of the manuscripts together with edition 1 repeat from [a] here.
5 The Vatican text, opposing the manuscripts and edition 1, has to [ad] in place of unto [in] and a little afterwards it has the other [aliud] in place of the one [illum]; then, contrary moreover to editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 after by the other [altero], by reading as by itself and it wants to love [diligere], it afterwards omits and by itself; which reading is indeed more graceful, but it seems that the sense is exceedingly constrained, for the reason that it does not contain on a member of the division in respect to the threefold mutual dilection. The elliptical construction of our reading sufficiently indicates that member. For the sense of the proposition here is: for that reason the Father wants, that the Son be loved by the Holy Spirit, and that He love the Holy Spirit, just as He wants, that He, that is the Father, be loved by both of the two and that both of the two be loved by Himself.
6 (Aristotle,) Physics, Bk. II, text 49 (ch. 5), where he says, that of those things which are made on account of an end « some indeed are made according to a purpose [propositum], but others not . . . but they are on account of this (i.e. the end) both whatsoever is so done by the intellect and whatever by nature ». Cf. Ethics, Bk. III, ch. On the Voluntary, and The Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. On the Spontaneous and the following chapters.

 

p. 57

 

ergo his duo- / -bus modis et tantum his producit; sed persona producta quolibet istorum modorum est perfectissima: ergo si ultra perfectionem omne quod est superfluit, et quod est citra deficit, necesse est, esse tantum duas personas emanantes et non plures nec pauciores, et unam, a qua emanant: ergo tantum tres.

therefore by this two / manners and by these only does He produce; but a person produced by any of those two manners is the most perfect: therefore if there is anything beyond perfection it is superfluous, and what is on this side (of perfection) is lacking, it is necessary, that there be only two persons emanating and not more nor fewer, and one, from whom they emanate: therefore only three.

3. Item, ex tertia sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, Pater totum dat cuilibet: ergo procedentes sive emanantes non distinguuntur penes ea quae accipiunt,1 sed penes modum accipiendi vel emanandi; sed duo tantum sunt modi emanandi: ergo non possunt esse nisi duae peronsae emanantes et tertia producens: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, thus from the third: if there is a most high simplicity there, the Father only gives to each: therefore those proceeding or emanating are not distinguished from within [penes] those things which they accept,1 but from within (their) manner of accepting and/or emanating; but there are only two manners of emanating: therefore there cannot but be two persons emanating and a third producing: ergo etc..

4. Item, ex quarta sic: si ratione primitatis est ibi summa fecunditas, nulla persona potest producere aliquo genere producendi, quo producitur,2 quia respectu illius non est prior: ergo cum duae personae emanent secundum duos modos emanandi, impossibile est, quod his modis producant, et non sunt alii modi: ergo non possunt producere aliam personam: ergo sunt tantum tres.

4. Likewise, thus from the fourth: if by reason of primacy there is a most high fecundity there, no person can produce by any genus of producing, whereby he is produced,2 because in respect of that he is not prior: therefore since two persons emanate according to two manners of emanating, it is impossible, that they produce by these two manners, and there are not other manners: therefore they cannot produce another person: therefore there are only three.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Tres tantum esse personas divinas, et fides catholica docet, et ratio suadet.

CONCLUSION

 

That there are only three divine Persons, both the Catholic Faith teaches, and reason persuades.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut fides catholica dicit, ponere est tantum tres personas, non plures nec pauciores. Et ad hoc sumitur ratio necessitatis et congruitatis.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that, as the Catholic Faith says, one is to posit only three Persons, not more nor less. And for this there is employed [sumitur] a reason for (its) necessity and congruity.

Ratio utique3 necessitatis, quare non possunt esse pauciores quam tres, est summa beatitudo et summa perfectio. Nam summa beatitudo exigit dilectionem et condilectionem; summa perfectio duplicem emanationem, sicilicet naturae et liberalitatis; et ad hoc ad minus exiguntur tres personae. — Item, ratio necessitatis, quare non possunt esse plures, est summa simplicitas, quae non patitur personas distingui, nisi secundum modos emanandi; et4 iterum principalis fecunditas, quae non permittit personam producere aliquo genere emanationis, nisi secundum rationem intelligendi sit prior illo. Unde prima persona, quia5 est innascibilis et inspirabilis, generat et spirat; secunda, quia inspirabilis, sed genita, non generat, sed spirat; tertia vero persona, quia spiratur et procedit a generante, nec generat nec spirat. Et ideo impossibile est, esse plures6 quam tres.

Even so3 the reason for the necessity, why there cannot be fewer than three, is most high beatitude and most high perfection. For most high beatitude demands [exigit] dilection and condilection; most high perfection a twofold emanation, that is of nature and of liberality; and for this there is at least three persons demanded. — Likewise, the reason for the necessity, why there cannot be more, is most high simplicity, which does not suffer the persons to be distinguished, except according to the manners of emanating; and4 again the principal fecundity, which does not permit a person to produce by any genus of emanation, except according to the reckoning of understanding it be prior to it. Whence the first Person, because5 He is innascible and inspirable, generates and spirates; the second, because (He is) inspirable, but generated, does not generate, but does spirate; but the third Person, because He is spirated and proceeds from one generating, neither generates nor spirates. And for this reason it is impossible, that there be more6 than three.

Ratio congruitatis sumitur ex sufficientia combinationum et ex perfectione numeri ternarii.

The reason for (its) congruity is taken from the sufficiency of the combinations and from the perfection of the number three [numeri ternarii].

Ex sufficientia combinationum, quia cum « amor sit in omnibus personis », ut dicit Richardus,7 et non sit nisi triplex amor, videlicet « gratuitus et debitus et ex utroque permixtus », tantum erunt tres personae: una, quae tantum dat, in qua est amor gratuitus: alia, quae tantum accipit, in qua est amor debitus; et media, quae dat et accipit, in qua est amor permixtus ex utroque. — Item, alio modo possunt combinari secundum rationem originis; et huiusmodi combinationis sufficientia in tribus consistit. Nam contingit intelligere personam, quae est principium personae et non est principiatum, et rursum personam, quae est principiatum et non principium personae, et tertio modo personam, quae est principiatum et principium. Quartus autem modus,8 quod nec sit principium nec principiatum, est omnino impossibilis et non intelligibilis.

From the sufficiency of the combinations, because since « there is love [amor] among all the Persons », as Richard (of St. Victor) says,7 and there is not but a threefold love, namely « gratuitous and due and a mingling from both », there are only three Persons: One, who only gives, in whom is gratuitous love: the Other, who only accepts, in whom is due love; and a Middle, who gives and accepts, in whom is a love mingled from both. — Likewise, they can be combined in another manner according to the reason of origin; and the sufficiency of this manner of combination consists in three things. For it happens [contingit] that one understands a person, who is the beginning [principium] of a person and is not begun [principatum], and again a person, who is begun and not a beginning of a person, and in a third manner a person, who is begun and a beginning. But the fourth manner,8 because it is neither a beginning nor begun, is entirely impossible and non intelligible.

Ratio congruitatis ex parte numeri est, quia numerus iste, scilicet ternarius, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam, sive consideretur in se, sive in quantitate continua, sive in creatura.9

The reason for the congruity on the part of number is, that this number, that is "three", has in itself the first and most high perfection, considered in itself, or in (its) continuous quantity, or in the creature.9

In se habet primam perfectionem, quoniam primus numberus est, qui constat ex omnibus partibus suis, scilicet unitate et dualitate, quae simul iunctae10 faciunt tria. Senarius autem dicitur primus perfectorum, quia constat ex omnibus partibus suis aliquotis, scilicet tribus, duobus et uno. — Item, summa perfectio est in eo, quia unitas, quae est principium et completio omnis numeri, reflexa supra se reduplicatione perfecta,11 qualis in solido quadrato, triplicatur secundum rationem, remanens una secundum veritatem; ut si dicatur: semel unum semel. Et istud est valde simile Trinitati increatae, . . .

In itself it has first perfection, since it is the first number, which is composed [constat] from all its parts, that is from unity and duality, which joined10 together makes three. But six [senarius] is called the first of perfect (numbers), because it is composed from all of its several parts, that is from three, two, and one. — Likewise, there is a most high perfection in it, because unity, which is the principle and completion of every number, reflected upon itself by a perfect11 reduplication, of the kind [qualis] (as is) in a solid quadrate, is tripled according to reason, remaining one according to truth; as if it were called: once one once. And that is very similar to the uncreated Trinity, . . .

1 Salvo sensu multi codd. A C F G L O S U V W etc. accipiuntur. Paulo infra post accipiendi substituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 vel pro et; cod. O sive.
2 Cod. I producere aliam illo genere, quo producitur, et paulo infra quod his duobus modis emanandi producant.
3 Adiecimus ex mss. et ed. 1 utique.
4 Faventibus codd. et ed. 1, substituimus et loco Est. Immeditate post plures codd. ut A C R S W pro fecunditas ponunt fecunditatis, sed male.
5 Restituimus ope plurimorum antiquorum mss. ut A G I K M R S T U W X Y etc. et ed. 1 quia, quod Vat. cum aliquibus codd. minus congrue mutavit in quae. Mox Vat., antiquioribus mss. obnitentibus, legit secunda vero persona et omittit vero post tertia.
6 Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt hic personas, quod legitur in Vat. Paulo infra post sumitur ed. 1 adiungit et.
7 Libr. V. de Trin. c. 23: Quantum igitur ad substantiam dilectionis erit unus atque idem amor in omnibus personis. Et ibid. c. 16: Constat autem, quod verus amor potest esse aut solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut ex utroque permixtus.
8 Cod. X Quarto modo et consequenter impossibile nec intelligibile.
9 Licet pauci solummodo codd. B D T habeant creatura pro natura, praeferimus tamen eorum lectoinem, quia et congruentior est, et omnes codd. cum Vat. infra in explicatione huius membri legunt creatura.
10 Multi codd. ut A F G H K S T V W X Y etc. cum ed. 1 iuncta.
11 Adstipulantibus mss. et ed. 1, delevimus quadrata, quod Vat. hic addit. Paulo infra post rationem in cod. U adiungitur tamen et in pluribus aliis codd. ut A C G K R S V nec non in ed. 1 ratio; cod. ff post rationem inserit ratione mutando remanens in remanente.

1 To save the sense, many codices, A C F G L O S U V W etc., have are accepted. A little below this after of accepting we have substituted from the older manuscripts and edition 1 and/or in place of and; codex O has or [sive].
2 Codex I has produce another by that genus, by which it is produced, and a little below this that they produce by these two manners of emanating.
3 We have added from the manuscripts and edition 1 Even so [utique].
4 Favoring the codices and edition 1, we have substituted and in place of There is. Immediately after this many of the codices as A C R S W put of fecundity in place of fecundity, but badly.
5 We have restored with the help of very many of the ancient manuscripts as A G I K M R S T U W X Y etc. and edition 1 because [quia], which the Vatican text together with the other codices has less congruously changed into who [quae]. Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts, reads but the second person and omits but at the third.
6 The codices together with edition 1 omit the persons here, which is read in the Vatican text. A little below this edition 1 inserts both [et] after is taken [sumiter].
7 On the Trinity , Bk. V, ch. 23: Therefore as much as for the substance of dilection there will be one at the same love in all the persons. And ibid., ch. 16: Moreover it is established, that true love can be either only gratuitous, or only due, or a mingling from both.
8 Codex X In a fourth manner and consequently impossible and not [nec] intelligible.
9 Though only few of the codices B D T have the creature in place of nature, we, however, prefer their reading, because it is both more congruous, and all the codices together with the Vatican below [p.58] in the explanation of this member (of the argument) read the creature.
10 Many of the codices as A F G H K S T V W X Y etc. together with edtion 1 have the neuter plural joined [iuncta].
11 With the agreement of hte manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted quadrate, which the Vatican text adds here. A little below this, after reason [rationem], there is inserted in codex U however [tamen] and in very many of the other codices as A C G K R S V as also in edition 1 the word the reason [ratio]; codex ff after reason [rationem] inserts with (its) reckoning [ratione] by changing remaining [remanens] in to remaining [remanente].

 

p. 58

 

in quae in unitate substantiae est trinitas rationum;1 non tamen est omnino simile, quia ibi cum unitate substantiae est trinitas rationum et rerum, scilicet personarum; hic tantummodo rationum.

in which in the unity of the substance there is a trinity of reasons;1 however it is not entirely similar, because there with the unity of substance there is a trinity of reasons and of things, that is of Persons; here only a trinity of reasons.

Similiter, si consideretur numerus iste in quantitate continua, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam: primam, quia omnis quantitas habet principium,2 medium et ultimum; summam, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae suprema consistit in trina dimensione, scilicet longitudine, latitudine et altitudine. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in principio de Caelo et mundo:3 « Omne enim perfectum in tribus dicimus, et hoc numero adhibuimus nosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium, eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata ».

Similarly, if that number is considered in (its) continuous quantity, it has in itself a first and most high perfection: first, because every quantity has a principle,2 middle and last; most high, because the most high perfection of continuous quantity consists in a triune dimension, that is in length, width and height. And this is what the Philosopher says in the beginning of On Heaven and the World:3 « For we say everything perfect in threes, and by this number we invite [adhibuimus] our very selves to magnify the one God, the Creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those things which have been created ».

Similiter, si consideretur iste numerus in creatura, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam: primam, quia trinitatem vestigii contingit reperire in qualibet creatura, quantumcumque parva, quantumcunque minima: summam,4 quia secundum trinitatem imaginis reformatam et deiformatam attenditur summa et nobilissima perfectio creaturae, scilicet beatitudo.

Similarly, if that number is considered in the creature, it has in itself a first and most high perfection: first, because one happens to find a trinity of the vestige in every creature, howsoever small, howsoever least: most high,4 because according to the reformed and deiformed trinity of the image the most high and most noble perfection of a creature, that is (its) beatitude, is tended towards.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Pater dat Filio totum quod potest; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non dat5 omni modo, quo potest. Et ideo in illatione est accidens: « non potest amplius dare, ergo nec aliam personam producere », quia hoc non est dare amplius, sed alio modo.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Father gives the Son the whole which He can; it must be said, that it is true, but He does not give5 in every manner, in which He can. And for that reason there is a (fallacy of) accident in the illation: « He cannot give more, therefore neither (can) He produce another person », because this is not giving more, but in another manner.

2. Similiter sequens6 patet, quia Filius non omni modo declarat, quia etsi secundum rationem naturae, non tamen secundum liberalitatem voluntatis, nisi in quantum ex ipso Verbo procedit Spiritus.

2. Similarly the following6 is clear, because the Son does not declare in every manner, because even if (He does) according to a reckoning of nature, (He does) not, however, according to a liberality of will, except inasmuch as the Spirit proceeds from the Word Himself.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Spiritus sanctus debet generare; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia7 persona Filii praecedit spirationem, ideo habet rationem primitatis; persona Spiritus sancti sequitur generationem, et ideo non generat, quia non est innascibilis.

3. To that which is objected, that the Holy Spirit ought to generate; it must be said, that it is not similar, because7 the Person of the Son precedes spiration, for that reason He has a reason for primacy; the Person of the Holy Spirit follows generation, and for that reason He does generate, because He is not innascible.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio modo emanandi, scilicet de arte: dicendum, quod ars non habet fecunditatem ad emanandum sive ad producendum nisi per voluntatem; et ideo modus ille non debet distingui a modo producendi8 per modum liberalitatis sive voluntatis.

4. To that which is objected concerning the third manner of emanating, that is concerning art: it must be said, that art does not have a fecundity for emanating or for producing except through the will; and for that reason that manner ought not be distinguished from the manner of producing8 through the manner of liberality or of the will.

Vel aliter et melius. Modus producendi per artem convenit cum modo producendi per naturam in hoc, quod utrobique producitur simile. Differt autem, quia in productione naturali producitur similis9 in substantia et natura, alius in persona; in productione autem artis producitur simile secundum rationem formae exemplaris, dissimile vero in substantia et natura. Talis autem modus producendi est incompossibilis divinae essentiae, quae non compatitur diversitatem essentiarum.

And/or in another manner and better. The manner of producing through art convenes with the manner of producing through nature in this, that both ways a like is produced. But it differs, because in the production of a natural (thing) there is produced (a thing) alike9 in substance and nature, (but) an other in person; but in the production of art there is produced a like according to the reckoning of the exemplar form, an unlike in substance and nature. But such a manner of producing cannot be composed [est incompossibilis] with the Divine Essence, which is incompatible [non compatitur] with a diversity of essences.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM.

I. Quae hic de proprietatibus numerorum dicuntur, occurrunt etiam Hexaλm. Serm. 4. nec non in illa Expositione Psalmorum (Psal. 129.), quae inter Opera S. Bonav. impressa, sed auctori suo Michaeli Meldensi, Archiepiscopo Senonensi († 1199), a P. Fidele a Fanna (Ratio novae collectionis p. 180 seqq.) vindicata est. Haec antiquam doctrinam exhibent mathematicorum Graecorum, ut Euclidis (Elemnt. IX. 36.), quos sequuntur S. August. (Gen. ad lit. IV. c. 2.), S. Isidor. (Etymol. III. c. 3. n. 11; . . .

I. What is here said of the properties of numbers, occurs also in the Hexaλmeron, Sermon 4, and also in that Exposition of the Psalms, (Ps. 129), which has been included among the Opera of St. Bonaventure, but whose author has been proven to be Michael Meldensis, Archbishop of Siena {† 1199 A.D.}, by Father Fidelis a Fanna (Ratio novae collectionis, p. 180 ff.). This ancient doctrine was exhibited by the Greek mathematicians, such as Euclid (Elementals, Bk. IX, ch. 36), whom St. Augustine (On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. IV, ch. 2), and St. Isidore (Etymologies, Bk. III, ch. 3, n. 11; . . .

1 Cod. Z addit vel rationum. Pro horum maiore intelligentia notentur haec B. Albert. verba: Dicunt quidam modernorum, quod relatio est medium entis et non entis, eo quod ipsa est ratio rei et non res etc. (I. Sent. d. 26. a. 10.) — Paulo post Cod. R in unitate loco cum unitate.
2 Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U Z etc. cum ed. 1 primum loco principium.
3 Libr. I. text. 2, ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 in translatione arabico-latina ita habetur: Et hoc (ternarius) est numerus cuiuslibet, et est demonstrans trinitatem rerum, et non invenimus istum numerum nisi ex natura, et sustinemus ipsum quasi legem nobis; et secundum istum numerum tenemur magnificare Deum creatorem remotum a modis creaturarum. Ed. Paris. hunc text. sic exhibet: Nam, ut Pythagorici etiam inquiunt, ipsum omne atque omnia tribus sunt definita: finis enim, medium atque principium ipsius omnis numerum habent: haec autem trinitatis. Quapropter hoc a natura numero sumto, perinde atque quadam illius lege et in deorum sacrificiis celebrandis uti solemus.
4 Praeferimus lectionem cod. Z summam pro perfectam utpote praecedentibus correspondentem. Cod. T penes et cod. V per loco secundum; deinde ope omnium mss. et ed. 2, 3 substituimus deiformatam pro deiformem addit in qua, ita ut trinitatem imaginis referatur ad superius positum contingit reperire; plures alii codd. ut A C G K O R S huic lectioni in tantum favent, in quantum omittunt praepositionem secundum.
5 Plurimi codd. non ita bene omittunt dat. Paulo post quando S. Doctor dicit accidens, intellige fallaciam accidentis, de qua Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5): Ex accidente quidem paralogismi sunt, quum quidvis postulatum fuerit aeque rei atque accidenti inesse. Quoniam enim multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse, omnibus praedicatis et subiecto, de quo illa praedicantur, haec omnia inesse; nam aliquin omnia erunt eadem. — Hoc loco a re ad modum rei falso concluditur.
6 Acutoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus hic a Vat. additum obiectio per hoc. Paulo infra post rationem codd. Y ee addunt originis et perfectionem, cum quibus concordant codd. G H N X in eo tantum divergentes, quod codd. H N omittant et, cuius loco cod. G habet seu, cod. X vero declaret. — De differentia utriusque modi procedendi cfr. infra d. 13. q. 3.
7 cod. R addit enim. Deinde plures antiquiorum codd. ut A B C L O T W etc. ponunt principium loco rationem moxque post persona codd. cum ed. 1 supprimunt autem, quod Vat. addit.
8 Sequimur cod. Y loco procedendi ponendo producendi, quod et praecedentibus et sequentibus magis conforme est, licet sensus in utraque lectione sit idem.
9 Cod. O simile, qui et sum codd. C Y post natura adiungit et. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A F G K T etc. cum ed. 1 dissimilis loco dissimile. Mox ex plurimis mss. ut A D F G H K N T etc. ed. 1 substituimus incompossibilis pro impossibilis.

1 Codex Z adds and/or reasons. For a greater understanding of these things there is noted these words of Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great): Certain of the moderns say, that relation is a medium of one being and one not being, for this that it is a reckoning of the thing and not a thing etc. (Sent., Bk. I, d. 26, a. 10). — A little after this Codex R has in the unity in place of with the unity.
2 Many codices as A C F G I K L O S T U Z etc. together with edition 1 have a first in place of a principle.
3 Book I, text 2, where according the Venetian edition of 1489 it is had in the Arabic-Latin translation thus: And this {"three"} is the number of anything, and it demonstrates a trinity of things, and we do not find this number except from nature, and we sustain it as if (it were) a law for us; and according to this number we are bound to magnify God the creator remote from the manners of creatures. The Parisian edition has this text thus: For, as the Pythagoreans also say, that every and all things have been defined by three: for the end, the middle and the principle of every thing has a number: but this (belongs to) a trinity. Wherefore I reckon [numero] this as taken from nature, in a like manner both for the certain law belonging to it [illius] and in celebrating the sacrifices of the gods, as we are accustomed.
4 We prefer the reading of codex Z which has most high in place of perfect as corresponding to the preceding (points). Codex T has from within [penes] and Codex V through in place of according; then with the help of all the manuscripts and editions 2 and 3, we have substituted deiformed [deformatam] for deiform [deiformem]. Codex R, having omitted the preposition according, after of the image adds in which [in qua], so that trinity of image is referred to the above placed one happens to find; very many of the other codices as A C G K O R S favor this reading inasmuch as they omit the preposition according.
5 Very many of the codices not so well omit He gives. A little after this when the Seraphic Doctor says a fault [accidens], understand a fallacy of accident, of which Aristotle, List of Sophisms, Bk. I, ch. 4 (ch. 5): From accident there are certain paralogisms, since anything whatsoever has been postulated equally to be in [inesse] thing and accident. For since many things accede to the same thing, it is not necessary, for every predicate and subject, of which they are predicated, that all these be in (it); for otherwise all things will be the same. — In this one concludes falsely from a thing to a manner of thing.
6 On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed here objection by this, added by the Vatican text. A little below this after a reckoning codices Y and ee adds of the origin and (according to) the perfection of (His), with which codices G H N and X concord, diverging in this only, that codices H and N omit and, in which place codex G has or [seu], but codex X He declares. — On the difference of the manner of proceeding of both cf. below d. 13, q. 3.
7 Codex R prefaces this with for [enim]. Then very many of the more ancient codices as A B C L O T W etc. put principle in place of reason and then before the person of the Holy the codices together with edition 1 suppress the but [autem], which the Vatican text has.
8 We follow codex Y by putting of producing in place of of proceeding, which is more conforming to both the preceding and the following, though the sense is the same in both readings.
9 Codex O has a like [similis], which also together with codices C and Y inserts and after nature. A little below this very many of the codices as A F G K T etc. together with edition 1 have (a thing) unlike [dissimilis] in place of an unlike[dissimile]. Then from very many manuscripts as A D F G H K N T etc. and edition 1 we have substituted not able to be composed with [incompossiblis] in place of impossible for.

 

p. 59

de Arithmet. I. c. 20.) aliique innumeri cum Petro Bunghi (de Numerorum Mysteriis, Paris. 1617. p. 456.) et Steph. Brulifero (Comment. in hanc quest.). Ex his auctoribus excerpta sunt quae sequuntur.

On Arithmetic, Bk. I, ch. 20) follow, and innumerable others together with Peter Bunghi (de Numerorum Mysteriis., Paris 1617, p. 456) and Stephen Brόlifer (in his Commentary on this question). From these authors have been excerpted the things that follow.

1. Partes aliquotae sive aliquantae alicuius numeri ab antiquis dicebantur illae, quae aliquoties sumtae reddunt praecise suum totum. Ita 5 et 2 sunt partes aliquotae numeri 10. Pars non aliquota est illa, quae aliquoties sumta non potest reddere totum aliquem numerum, ut 3 respectu numeri 10. Numerus 1 est quidem pars aliquota cuiusvis numeri; tamen ab antiquis arithmeticis non recensebatur proprie inter numeros, sed vocabatur principium numeri, ut dicit Isidorus (loc. cit. c. 1.), unum semen numeri esse, non numerum.

1. Several [aliquotae] parts or (parts) of some size of any number used to be called by the ancients those things, which summed several times rendered precisely their whole. Thus 5 and 2 are some parts of the number 10. A non-several part is that, which summed several times cannot render any whole number, as 3 (is) in respect to the number 10. The number 1 is indeed a several part of any number; however by the ancient mathematicians it did not used to be counted properly among the numbers, but was called the principle of number, as (St.) Isidore says (loc. cit., ch. 1), one is the seed of numbers, not a number.

2. Numerus 6 est primus numerus perfectus in sensu stricto, quia est aequlis omnibus suis partibus aliquotis simul aggregatis. Nam partes aliquotae huius numeri sunt 1, 2, 3 = 6. In hoc sensu pauci numeri sunt perfecti, nempe in serie numerorum usque ad 10,000, ut dicit Bunghi, tantum hi quatuor: 6, 28, 496, 8128. Et sic nec numerus ternarius est perfectus, quia habet solummodo unam partem aliquotam, scil. unitatem, quae proprie non est numerus.

2. The number 6 is the first perfect number in the strict sense, because it is equal to all its own several parts aggregated together. For the several parts of this number are 1, 2, 3 = 6. In this sense few numbers are perfect, namely in the series of numbers up to 10,000, as Bunghi says, (there are) only these four: 6, 28, 496, 8128. And thus the number "three" is not perfect, because it has only one several part, that is unity, which properly is not a number.

3. In sensu minus stricto perfectus dicitur numerus, qui constat ex omnibus suis partibus tam aliquotis, quam non aliquotis, simul sumtis; et in hoc sensu numerus ternarius est primus perfectus, quia constat ex parte aliquota (1) et non aliquota (2), quae simul iuncta faciunt tria. Dicitur primus numerus perfectus, quia binarius, licet constet ex suis partibus simul sumtis i. e. duabus unitatibus, non dicitur numerus perfectus, quia unum proprie non dicebatur numerus.

3. In a less strict sense a number is said (to be) perfect, which consists of all its own parts both several, as non-several, summed together; and in this sense the number "three" is the first perfect, because it consists of a several part {1} and a non several {2}, which joined together make three. It is called the first perfect number, because "two", though it consists of its parts summed together, i. e. two unities, it is not said (to be) a perfect number, because one properly did not used to be called a number.

4. Aliquis numerus potest super se reflecti duobus modis, vel imperfecte, quando semel ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 x 2 = 4), et tunc efficitur numerus quadratus, sed non solidus; vel perfecte, quando bis ducitur in se ipsum (ut 2 x 2 x 2 = 8 ), et haec reduplicatio perfecta reddit quadratum solidum.

4. Any number can be reflected in two manners upon itself, imperfectly, when it is multiplied by itself [ducitur in se ipsum] a single time {as 2 x 2 = 4}, and then the number becomes a quadrate, but not a solid; and/or perfectly, when it is multiplied by itself twice ({as 2 x 2 x 2 = 8}, and this perfect reduplication renders it a solid quadrate.

II. His praesuppositis, patet triplex proposito S. Doctoris.

II. With these things presupposed, the threefold proposition of the Seraphic Doctor is clear.

1. Numerus ternarius in se consideratus habet primam et summam perfectionem; primam quidem, quia est primus numerus constans ex omnibus suis partibus per additionem simul sumtis; summam vero, quia unum triplicatum manet unum ( 1 x 1 x 1 = 1).

1. The number "three" considered in itself has the first and most high perfection; first indeed, because it is the first number consisting [contans] of all of its parts summed together through addition; but most high, because one tripled remains one ( 1 x 1 x 1 = 1).

2. Consideratus ut in quanitate continua, i. e. in quantum applicatur ad quantitatem, habet primam perfectionem, « quia omnis quantitas habet principium, medium et ultimum; summam vero, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae consistit in trina dimensione, scil. longitudine, latitudine et altitudine », ut habetur in textu.

2. Considered as (it is) in a continuous quantity, i. e. inasmuch as it is applied to quantity, it has first perfection, « because every quantity has a principle, middle and last; but most high, because the perfection of continuous quantity consists [consistit] in a triune dimension, that is, in length, width and height », as is had in the text.

3. Consideratus ut in qualibet creatura iterum habet primam et summam perfectionem: primam quidem, quia in qualibet etiam minima creatura invenitur trinitas vestigii (unum, verum, bonum); summam vero, quia in angelica et humana natura invenitur trinitas imaginis, praesertim quando nobilissima pars animae est reformata vel imperfecte per deiformitatem gratiae vel perfecte per deiformitatem gloriae. De hoc cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et p. II. per totam et II. Sent. d. 16. per totam.

3. Considered as (it is) in any creature it again has a first and most high perfection: first indeed, because in any, even the least, creature there is found a trinity of vestige {the one, the true, the good}; but most high, because in the angelic and human nature there is found a trinity of image, especially when the most noble part of the soul is reformed imperfectly through the deiformity of grace and/or perfectly through the deiformity of glory. Concerning this cf. below in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2 and p. II throughout and in Sent., Bk. II, d. 16 throughout.

III. De tota quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 45. m. 7. — Scot., hic. q. 5. et 7, et Report. hic q. 8. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 10. a. 12. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 10. princ. 2. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

III. On this entire question: Alexander of Hales, Summa. p. I, q. 45, m. 7. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5 and 7, and in Reportatio, here in q. 8. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 5; Summa., I., q. 30, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, a. 12. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, at the beginning of n. 2. in q. 3. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 6.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.