S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. I.

De cognitione Dei per simillitudines longinquas.

PART I.

On the cognition of God through distant similitudes

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio I.

 

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 66-71.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 66-71.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Apostolus namque ait, quod invisibilia Dei etc.

For the Apostle also said, that the invisible things of God etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Superius egit Magister de sancta Trinitate et Unitate,1 in quantum creditur. In hac secunda parte agit de ipsa, in quantum intelligutur.  Et haec pars dividitur in tres partes, in quarum prima ad intelligendum Trinitatem adducit congruas similitudines et rationes. In secunda solvit emergentes dubitationes, infra distinctione quarta in principio:  Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat etc.  In tertia, illis dubitationibus solutis, determinat Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones, infra distinctione octava:  Nunc de veritate sive proprietate2 etc.

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the Holy Trinity and Unity,1 inasmuch as It is believed. In this second part he deals with It, inasmuch as It is understood.  And this part is divided into three parts, in the first of which to understand the Trinity he adduces congruent similitudes and reasons.  In the second he solves emerging doubts, below in the fourth distinction at the beginning:  Here there rises the sufficiently necessary question. It is established etc.. In the third, having solved those doubts, he determines the properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity, below in the eighth distinction:  Now concerning the truth or property2 etc..

Item prima pars habet duas. In prima adducit similitudines longinquas; in secunda similitudines propinquas sive expressas, quae attenduntur in imagine, ibi:  Nunc vero iam ad eam perveniamus disputationem.

Likewise the first part has two (parts). In the first he adduces distant similitudes; in the second near or express similitudes, which are tended towards in the image, there (where he says):  But now let us come presently to that disputation.

Item prima pars habet duas partes. In prima ostendit Unitatem, in secunda Trinitatem, ibi:  Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt etc. Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima probat auctoritate Apostoli ad Romanos primo,3 quod Deus est cognoscibilis per creaturam. In secunda vero adducit varios modos cognoscendi et rationes, ibi:  Nam sicut ait Ambrosius. In tertia dicit, illos modos in auctoritate Apostoli implicari, ibi:  Ecce tot modis. In quarta tangit, quid per praedictas rationes possit probari, scilicet essentiae unitas, non trinitas, ibi:  Haec autem omnia ad unitatem etc.

Likewise the first part has two parts. In the first he shows the Unity, in the second the Trinity, there (where he says):  Now it remains to show, whether through those things which have been made etc.. The first part has four smaller parts. In the first he proves by the authority of the Apostle in the first (chapter of the Letter) to the Romans,3 that God is cognizable through a creature. But in the second he adduces various manners of cognizing and reasons, there (where he says):  For as (St.) Ambrose said. In the third he says, that those manners are implied in the authority of the Apostle, there (where he says):  Behold in so many manners. In the fourth he touches upon, what through the aforesaid reasons it can be proven, that is the unity of the essence, not the trinity, there (where he says):  Moreover all these things tend ultimately to manifest the unity etc..

Nunc4 restat ostendere, utrum etc. Supra ostendit Magister per rationes divinae essentiae unitatem sive entitatem. In hac secunda parte ostendit Trinitatem similitudine longinqua, quae attenditur in vestigio, et habet hoc capitulum quatuor particulas. In prima ostendit Magister rationem vestigii in creatura. In secunda ostendit, quid respondeat vestigio in Creatore, quoniam trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet originis, pulchritudinis et delectationis, ut singula reddantur singulis, ibi:  In illa enim Trinitate summa.

Now4 it remains to show, whether etc.. Above Master (Peter) shows through reasons the Unity or Entity of the Divine Essence. In this second part he shows the Trinity by a distant similitude, which is tended towards in the vestige, and this chapter has four smaller parts. In the first Master (Peter) shows the reason for the vestige in the creature. In the second he shows, what responds to the vestige in the Creator, since the trinity of appropriators, namely of origin, beauty and delectation, as singulars are rendered to singulars, there (where he says):  For in that Most High Trinity.

1  Absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. et Unitate.
2  Cod. O hic addit:  Item prima pars habet duas partes, in quarum prima ostendit Magister, quod Deus est trinus et unus; in secunda, quia rationes et similitudines, quas adducit non sunt sufficientes ad plene intelligendum Trinitatem et Unitatem in divinis, concludit, hoc esse in dubio, in fine istius distinctionis:  quapropter iuxta istam considerationem.
3  Vers. 20.
4  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omissis verbis Nunc restat usque ad entitatem et mutata constructione, prosequitur:  Similiter secunda pars, in qua ostendit Trinitatem per similitudinem longinquam, quae attenditur in vestigio, habet quatuor particulas.

1  Without the authority of any manuscript or edition 1, the Vatican edition omits and Unity
2  Here codex O adds:  Likewise the first part has two parts, in the first of which Master (Peter) shows, that God is triune and one; in the second, because the reasons and similitudes, which he adduces, are not sufficient to fully understand the Trinity and Unity in the divine, he concludes, that this is in doubt, at the end of that distinction of his:  wherefore in accord with this consideration of his.
3  Verse 20.
4  The Vatican edition against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, having omitted the words Now it remains . . . entity and having changed the construction, proceeds:  Similarly the second part, in which he shows the Trinity through a distant similitude, which is tended towards in the vestige, has four smaller parts.

 

p. 67

 

In tertia docet contemplari in Deo trinitatem per considerationem vestigii in creatura, ibi:  Per considerationem itaque creaturarum etc., ubi ostendit trinitatem appropriatorum in Deo et quantum ad actum conditionis, et quantum ad actum reformationis. In quarta autem particula ostendit, quod consideratio Trinitatis per vestigium non est sufficiens, sed longinqua, ibi:  Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis.

In the third he teaches one to contemplate the Trinity in God through a consideration of the vestige in the creature, there (where he says):  And so through a consideration of creatures etc., where he shows the Trinity of Appropriators in God both as much as regards the act of condition, and as much as regards the act of reformation. But in the fourth smaller part he shows, that the consideration of the Trinity through the vestige is not sufficient, but distant, there (where he says):  Behold it has been shown, how among creatures.

Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem. Haec1 est secunda pars istius distinctionis, in qua Magister probat Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudinem propinquam et expressam, cuiusmodi est imago. Et dividitur haec pars in duas:  in prima ostendit trinitatem et unitatem in Creatore per trinitatem et unitatem consideratam in potentiis animae; in secunda vero in habitibus, ibi:  Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus.

But now let us come presently to that disputation. This1 is the second part of that distinction of his, in which Master (Peter) proves the Trinity and Unity through a near and express similitude, of which manner is the image. And this part is divided into two:  in the first he shows the Trinity and Unity in the Creator through the trinity and unity considered among the powers of the soul; but in the second among (its) habits, there (where he says):  There can also be distinguished in another manner and by other names.

Prima iterum pars habet quatuor2 particulas. In quarum prima ostendit, ubi quaerenda sit imago in anima, quoniam in parte superiori et in3 tribus potentiis eius, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate. In secunda vero tangit imaginis conditiones, quae sunt trinitas, unitas et aequalitas, ibi:  Haec ergo tria, ut ait Augustinus. In tertia vero movet et solvit dubitationem, quae oritur ex praedictis:  utrum scilicet anima sit suae potentiae, ibi:  Hic attendendum est diligenter. In quarta autem docet cavere errorem, qui posset causari vel4 oriri ex ostensione trinitatis creatae, quod omnimoda similitudo esset ad increatam; ubi ostendit, quod maxima est dissimilitudo imaginis ad Deum, ibi:  Verumtamen caveat.

Again the first part has four2 smaller parts. In the first of which he shows, where the image is be sought in the soul, since (it is) in the superior part and in3 its three powers, that is in the memory, intelligence, and will. But in the second he touches upon the conditions of the image, which are trinity, unity and equality, there (where he says):  Therefore these three, as (St.) Augustine says. But in the third he moves and solves the doubt, which rises out of the aforesaid:  that is whether the soul is its powers, there (where he says):  Here it must be attended to diligently. But in the fourth he teaches one to beware of the error, which can be caused and/or4 rise from showing, that the created trinity [trinitatis creatae quod] is an omnimodal similitude to the uncreated (Trinity); where he shows, that there is the greatest dissimilitude of the image to God, there (where he says):  However let one still beware.

Potest etiam alio modo aliisque etc. Haec est secunda pars partis secundae huius distinctionis,5 in qua intendit investigare Magister imaginem in habitibus animae secundum quod possibile est, et dividitur haec pars in quatuor particulas. Primo enim illa tangit, in quibus imago Trinitatis attenditur, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Secundo, illis praetactis, ostendit, quod in his attenditur imago propter consubstantialitatem, ordinem et aequalitatem, ibi:  Haec autem tria cum sint etc. Tertia ostendit, quomodo mens rationalis in contemplatione trinitatis creatae proficit ad videndam et cognoscendam Trinitatem increatam in Unitate, ibi:  Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria. Quarto vero breviter recolligit quae supra sunt demonstrata, ibi:  Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem.

There can also be distinguished in another manner and in other etc.. This is the second part of the second part of this distinction,5 in which Master (Peter) intends to investigate the image in the habits of the soul according to what is possible, and this part is divided into four smaller parts. For first he touches upon those things, among which the image of the Trinity is tended towards, which are the mind, knowledge [notitia] and love [amor]. Second, having already touched upon them [praetactis], he shows, that in these the image is tended towards on account of consubstantiality, order and equality, there (where he says):  But these three, though they be etc. Third he shows, in what manner the rational mind makes progress in the contemplation of the created trinity to see and cognize the uncreated Trinity in Unity, there (where he says):  And thus the rational mind, considering these three. But fourth he briefly recollects those things which have been demonstrated above, there (where he says):  Wherefore in accord with that consideration of his.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae in hac parte prima praesentis distinctionis tanguntur, quatuor quaeruntur.

For an understanding of those things which are touched upon in this first part of the present distinction, four things are asked.

Primum est, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

The first is, whether God is cognizable by a creature.

Secundum est, utrum sit cognoscibilis per creaturam.

The second is, whether He is cognizable through a creature.

Tertium est, utrum modus cognoscendi per creaturam conveniat homini quantum ad omnem statum, scilicet statum innocentiae, statum naturae lapsae et statum naturae glorificatae.

The third is, whether the manner of cognizing (Him) through a creature befits [conveniat] man as much as regards his every state, namely the state of innocence, the state of fallen nature and the state of glorified nature.

Quartum est, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturam.

The fourth is, what concerning God is cognizable through a creature.

ARTICULUS UNICUS

 

De cognoscibilitate Dei.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

On the cognizability of God

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

QUESTION I

Whether God is cognizable by a creature.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod non sit Deus cognoscibilis a creatura, ostenditur:

ABOUT THE FIRST, that God is not cognizable by a creature, is shown:

1. Per auctoritatem Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus:6 « Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est ».

1. Through the authority of Dionysius (the Areopagite) On the Divine Names:6 « It is possible neither to say nor to understand (what) God (is) ».

2. Item ostenditur ratione per quadruplicem suppositionem, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet proportionem, unionem sive receptionem, iudicium et7 informationem. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur.

2. Likewise it is shown by reason through a fourfold supposition, which must necessarily be [quam necesse est esse] in cognition, that is proportion, union or reception, judgment and7 being informed [informationem]. For the intellect does not understand except what is proportionable to it, and what is united to it in some manner, and of which it judges, and by which the insight [acies] of the intelligence is informed.

Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic:  necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentis ad cognoscibile;8 sed Dei ad intellectum non est proportio, quia Deus / est infinitus, . . .

From the first supposition it is argued thus:  it is necessary, that there be a proportion of the one cognizing to the thing cognizable;8 but there is no proportion of God to the intellect, because God / is infinite, . . .

1  Vat. seiungendo duas praesentis distincitonis partes, sequentem expositionem litterae infra in principio secundae partis huius distinctionis affert, sed contra mss. Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 huius loco istius.
2  Cod. O habet sex particulas et singulas enumerando, ubi de tertia agit, legit:  In tertia ad evidentiam dictorum docet, quomodo in dicta assignatione imaginis accipiatur mens et memoria, ibi:  Mens autem hic pro animo, deinde sub quarta et quinta exhibet tertiam et quartam in textu positam, ac demum addit:  In sexta particula docet, respectu cuius obiecti attenditur imago in dictis potentiis, ibi:  Sciendum vero, quod haec trinitas mentis.
3  Vat. contra unanimem consensum mss. et ed. 1 omittit in et eius.
4  Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene et pro vel.
5  Vat., omissi verbis Magistri variataque constructione, sic:  Similiter secunda pars, in qua . . . possibile est, dividitur in quatuor; sed contra miss. et ed. 1.
6  Cap. 1. circa medium:  Quem neque intelligere poossiblie est neque dicere (ed Migne iuxta transl. Scoti Erigenae).
7  Omittitur contra codd. et ed. 1 in Vat. et.
8  Aristot., VI Ethic. c. 1:  Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (scil. potentiis animae).  —  Paulo infra post intellectum subaudi creaturae sive humanum. Mox / codd. et edd. inter se dissident; multi codd. ut A F G K M S T W X Z bb ee post infinitus omittunt minus bene et intellectus finitus; plures ut H Y ff cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ponunt sed pro et, cod. R vero; tandem cod. ee post intellectus addit noster; nihil duximus immutandum.  —  Aristot., I de Caelo, text. 52 (c. 6):  Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.

1  The Vatican edition by separating the two parts of the present distinction, transposes the following exposition of the text below in the beginning of the second part of this distinction, but contrary to the manuscripts. Immediately after this the Vatican edition against the testimony of the codices and edition 1 has of this [huius] in place of of this . . . of his [istius].
2  Codex O reads has six smaller parts and enumerating them singly, where it deals with the third, it reads:  In the third he teaches to evidence what is said, how in the aforesaid assignment of the image the mind and memory are interpreted, there (where he says):  But the mind is here accepted for the human spirit [animo], then under the fourth and fifth it exhibits the third and fourth points in the text, and finally adds:  In the sixth smaller part he teaches, in respect of which object the image is tended towards in the said powers, there (where he says):  But it must be known, that this trinity of the mind.
3  The Vatican edition against the unanimous consensus of the manuscripts and edition 1 omits in and its.
4  The Vatican edition, opposing the manuscripts and edition 1, in place of and/or [vel] has less well and [et].
5  The Vatican edition, having omitted the words of Master (Peter) and varied the construction of the sentence, reads:  Similarly the second part, in which . . . is possible, is divided into four; but this is against the manuscripts and edition 1.
6  Chapter 1. about the middle of the text:  Whom it is neither possible to understand nor speak of (Migne's ed., according to the translation of Scotus Erigena).
7  In the Vatican edition and [et] is omitted contrary to the codices and edition 1.
8  Aristotle, Ethics, Bk VI, ch. 1:  If indeed out of a certain similitude and affinity cognition exists by them (scil. the powers of the soul).  —  A little below after intellect understand of the creature or human. [trans.:  what follows pertains to the text on p. 68] Then / the codices and the editions disagree among themselves; many codices such as A F G K M S T W X Z bb and ee after infinite omit less well and the finite intellect; very many such as H Y ff together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 put but [sed] in place of and [et]; codex R has but [vero] at this point; following this codex ee before intellect adds our; we judge that nothing is to be changed.  —  Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. I, text. 52 (ch. 6):  But there is no reckoning of the infinite to the finite.

 

p. 68

 

est infinitus, et intellectus finitus:  ergo etc. Praeterea, si est aliqua proportio, videtur quod non sit sufficiens, quia plus distat verum increatum ab intellectu humano, quam quodlibet creatum intelligible a sensu.1 Sed sensus, qui est perceptivus sensibilis, nunquam elevatur ad cognitionem intellegibilis creati:  ergo nec intellectus unquam elevabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilis increati.

is infinite, and the intellect finite:  ergo etc.. Furthermore, if there is any proportion, it seems that it is not sufficient, because the truly uncreated is more distant from the human intellect, than any created intelligible (is) from sense.1 But sense, which is perceptive of the sensible, is never elevated to the cognition of the created intelligible:  therefore neither shall the intellect ever be elevated to the cognition of the uncreated intelligible.

3. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic:  necesse est, esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem, ita quod unum sit in altero;2 sed cognoscens non est in cognoscibili, sed e converso; sed impossibile est, infinitum capi ab ipso finito:  ergo impossibile est esse in illo:  ergo Deum esse in intellectu est impossibile, cum sit infinitus.

3. Likewise, thus from the second supposition:  it is necessary, that there be a union of the cognizable and the one cognizing, so that one is in the other; 2 but the one cognizing is not in the cognizable, but just the opposite [e converso]; but it is impossible, that the infinite be seized by the finite itself:  therefore it is impossible that it be in it:  therefore that God is in the intellect is impossible, since He is infinite.

4. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic:  ad cognitionem necesse est, esse in cognoscente iudicium de cognito; sed omne iudicans habet posse super iudicatum;3 finitum autem non habet posse super infinitum:  ergo de illo non iudicat; sed ad cognitionem requirebatur iudicium:  ergo intellectus finitus non cognoscit Deum infinitum, super quem non habet posse.

4. Likewise, from the third supposition thus:  for cognition it is necessary, that there be in the one cognizing a judgment of the cognized; but everything judging has an ability [posse] over the thing judged;3 but the finite does not have an ability over the infinite:  therefore it does not judge of it; but for cognition there was required judgment:  therefore the finite intellect does not cognize the infinite God, over whom it has no ability.

5. Item, ex quarta sic:  necesse est, intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito;4 sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per essentiam, aut per similitudinem; sed Deus non informat per essentiam, quia nulli unitur ut forma, nec per similitudinem abstractam, quia similitudo abstracta est spiritualior eo a quo abstrahitur; Deo autem nihil est spiritualius nec potest esse:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, from the fourth thus:  it is necessary, that the cognizing intellect be informed by the cognized;4 but everything which informs another, either informs through (its own) essence, or through a similitude (of it); but God does not inform (the intellect) through (His) essence, because as a form He is united to nothing, nor through an abstract similitude (of it), because an abstract similitude is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted; but nothing is more spiritual than God nor can it be:  ergo etc..

CONTRA:  1. Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate, et est in littera praesentis distinctionis:5 « Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest ». Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis:  ergo per cognitionem et amorem:  ergo Deus potest cognosci a creatura.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. The rational soul is (made) to the image of God. But as (St.) Augustine says in (his) book On the Trinity, and (as) it is (quoted) in the text of the present distinction:5 « For that reason the mind is the image of God, by which it is able to seize [capax] God and can be a partaker (in Him) ». But seizing [capere] is not (here said) according to substance and/or essence, because in this manner [sic] they are in all creatures:  therefore (it is said) through cognition and love [amorem]:  therefore God can be cognized by a creature.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic:  omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis; 6 sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deus est summa lux:  ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus:  every spiritual cognition comes into being [fit] by reason of light, and by reason of uncreated light, as (St.) Augustine says in the Soliloquies;6 but light is the most cognizable, and God is Most High Light:  therefore He is most cognizable to the soul itself:  ergo etc..

3. Item, cum sit7 cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per similitudinem, illa cognoscuntur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus;8 sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam:  ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem.

3. Likewise, since there is7 cognition of some things through presence, (and) of some things through similitude, those are more truly cognized, which are cognized through presence, as (St.) Augustine says;8 but God is united to the soul itself through presence:  therefore God is more truly cognized than other things, which are cognized through similitude.

4. Item, sicut se habet summa bonitas ad dilectionem, sic summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed summa bonitas est summe amabilis ab affectu:  ergo9 summa veritas est summe cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

4. Likewise, as most high Goodness is related to [se habet ad] goodness, so most high Truth (is) to cognition; but most high Goodness is most highly lovable by the affection [affectu]:  therefore9 most high Truth is most highly cognizable by the intellect.

5. Item, unumquodque efficacius potest in id ad quod naturaliter ordinatur;10 sed intellectus noster naturaliter ordinatur ad cognitionem summae lucis:  ergo illa maxime cognoscibilis est.

5. Likewise, anything whatsoever [unumquodque] can be more efficacious unto that toward which it is naturally ordered;10 but our intellect is naturally ordered to cognition of the most high light:  therefore that (light) is most highly cognizable.

1  Ex mss. I X Z pro sensibili, quod Vat. cum plurimis mss. habet, substituimus sensu, quod contextui magis correpsondet formamque argumenti completiorem reddit ac confirmatur ex Richardo Med., hic a. 1. q.1 et Petro a Tar., hic q. 1, qui idem argumentum eodem modo proponut. Paulo ante cod. K creato pro humano.  —  De propositione minore huius argumenti cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. Prosa 4.
2  Colligitur ex eo, quod cognitio sit acta immanens, de qua vide Aristot., IX Metaph. text. 16 (VIII. 8.); et cupponitur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. et 37-39. (c. 4 et 8.), ubi dicit, animam esse locum formarum, ipsam cognoscendo quodammodo esse omnia, in ipsa non esse ipsas res, sed formas earum intellectumque esse formam formarum.
3  August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53:  Iudicare de corporibus non sentientis tantum vitae, sed etiam rationcinantis est... I am vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam ill ares est, de qua iudicatur.  —  Cod. X hic addit sicut dicit Augustinus.
4  Textus Aristot. de hac re vide supra in arg. ex secunda suppositione.  —  De duplici modo informationis, scil, per essentiam et per similitudinem cfr. infra fundam. 3.  —  Mox post Deus non informat supple sum cod. R intellectum.
5  Cap. 2 circum initium. In ipso textu Augustini mss. cum ed. 1 habent et pro eiusque, quod habet Vat. cum originali.  —  Paulo infra post autem cod. O addit hic.
6  Sensus, non verba Augustinis allegantur ex I. Sollioq. c. 8, ubi sic habetur:  Credendum est, ea (intelligibila disciplinarum spectamina) non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustremur (qui sol, ut ex ibi sequentibus patet, ipse secretissimus Deus est).  —  Vat. hoc argumentum mutilate exhibet, omittendo scilicet in propositione maiore et ratione lucis, et in minore Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognosciblis.
7  Substituimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 sit pro fiat.
8  Forte repiciuntur illa quae X. de Trin. c. 8-11. habentur, ubi ostentidur, animam eo ipso, quod sibi sit praesens, certiorem cognitionem habere de se quam de rebus exterioribus, quas per imagines sive similitudines percipit; vel etiam haec VIII. de Trin. c. 8 n. 12:  Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem; plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem, notiorem, quia interiorem, notiorem, quia certiorem. Quae verba S. Bonaventura infra d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. tali explicat modo, qui sensum huius argumenti illustrat. Cfr. etiam libr. de Magistro, c. 12. n. 39. 40 et de Videndo Deo, c. 16. n. 38, ubi et duplex cognoscendi modus, scilicet per praesentiam et per similitudinem proponitur.  —  Plures antiquiorum mss. ut C I M S T V Y etc. post cognoscuntur, licet non falso, tamen propter argumenti formam minus bene per essentiam loco per praesentiam; melius codd. L O per essentiam vel praesentiam. Paulo post cod. Y illa pro alia.
9  Ed. 1 satis bene addit particulam et.
10  Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11.  —  Cod. C hanc propositionem ita exhibet; unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id. In fine argumenti cod. X addit ipsi animae; melius placeret intellectui nostro.

1  From manuscripts I X and Z we have substituted in place of the sensible, which the Vatican edition has along with very many of the manuscripts, sense, which more corresponds to the context and renders the form of the argument more complete, and is confirmed from Richard of Middleton's (text), here at a. 1. q. 1, and from (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, who likewise expound the argument in the same manner. A little before this codex K has created place of human.  —  Concerning the minor proposition of this argument, cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V., Discourse 4.
2  It is gathered from this, that cognition is an immanent act, concerning which see Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 16 (VIII. 8.); and it is supposed from Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 6 and 37-39. (c. 4 and 8), where he says, that the soul is a place of forms, by cognizing that it is in a certain sense all things, (and that) in it there are not things themselves, but forms of them and that the intellect is the form of forms.
3  (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, c. 29, n. 53:  To judge of the bodies not only of sentient life, but also of reasoning is . . . But it is already very easy to see that, more present is the one judging, than is that thing, of which it is judged.  —  Codex X here adds as (St.) Augustine says.
4  See the text of Aristotle on this matter above in the argument from the second supposition.  —  Concerning the twofold manner of informing, namely, through essence and through similitude, cf. below at the bottom of 3.  —  Then after God does not inform supply with codex R the intellect. 5 About the beginning of chapter 2. In the text itself of (St.) Augustine the manuscripts together with edition 1 have and [et] in place of and . . . of Him [eiusque], which the Vatican edition together with the original has.  —  A little below, after But codex O adds here.
6  The sense, not the words of (St.) Augustine chosen from his Soliloquies, Bk. I, ch. 8, where it is had thus:  It must be believed, that those things (the intelligible considerations of the disciplines) cannot be understood, unless we be brightened by something like our sun (which sun, as is clear from what follows here, is God Himself most secret).  —  The Vatican edition has this text in mutilated from, that is, by omitting in the major proposition and by reason of the light, and in the minor God is the most high Light, therefore He is most cognizable.
7  We have substituted, as a support from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, is [sit] in place of becomes [fiat].
8  Perhaps these words refer to those which are hand in On the Trinity, Bk. X, ch. 8-11, where it is shown, that the soul by itself, because it is present to itself, has a more certain cognition of itself than of exterior things, which it perceives through images or similitudes; and/or also to those which are had in On the Trinity, Bk. VIII, ch. 8, n. 12:  Behold one can already have God more known [notiorem] (to him), than a brother; plainly more known, because more present, more known, because more interior, more known, because more certain. Which words St. Bonaventure explains in this manner below in d. 17. p. I., dub. 2, as he illustrates the sense of this argument. Cf. also his book On the Teacher, ch. 12, n. 39 and 40 and On Seeing God, ch. 16, n. 38, where there is also proposed (this) twofold manner of cognizing, namely through presence and through similitude.  —  Very many of the more ancient manuscripts, as C I M S T V Y etc. after are cognized, though not incorrectly, have, however, what is not as good on account of the form of the argument, placing through essence for through presence; codices L and O have the better through essence and/or presence. A little after this codex Y has those in place of other things.
9  Edition 1 adds and well enough.
10  Cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, Discourse 11.  —  Codex C exhibits this proposition thus:  anything is more efficacious, when it can be unto that. At the end of the argument codex X adds to the soul itself; it would be more pleasing to say to our intellect.

 

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CONCLUSIO

 

Deus, in se summe cognoscibilis, etiam nobis esset summe cognoscibilis, si non esset defectus ex parte intellectus nostri.

CONCLUSION

 

God, most highly cognizable in Himself, would be also most highly cognizable to us, if it were not for a defect on the part of our intellect.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Deus in se tanquam summa lux est summe cognoscibilis; et tanquam lux summe intellectum nostrum complens,1 et quantum est de se, esset summe cognoscibilis etiam nobis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis; qui quidem non tollitur perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. Concedendae sunt igitur rationes,2 quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus, sicut post patebit.3

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that God in Himself as the most high Light is most highly cognizable; both as the Light most highly completing our intellect,1 and as much as it concerns Him [est de se], He would be most highly cognizable even to us, unless there were some defect on the part [a parte] of the virtue of the one cognizing; which indeed is not borne away perfectly except through the deiformity of glory. Therefore the reasons must be conceded (which prove):  2 that God is cognizable by a creature and also most clearly cognizable, as much as it concerns Him, unless there was some impediment and/or deficient (thing) on part of the intellect, as will be clear afterwards.3

1. Ad obiecta in contrarium dicendum, quod est cognitio per comprehensionem et per apprehensionem. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis.4 Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia « quodam modo est anima omnia »,5 per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia, et maxime est capax Dei per assimilationem, quia est imago et similitudo Dei. Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet; et de hac intelligit Dionysius, et de illa currit6 obiectio, de alia vero non.

1. To the objections in the Contrary it must be said, that there is cognition through comprehension and through apprehension. Cognition through apprehension consists in the manifestation of the truth of a thing cognized; but cognition of comprehension consists in the inclusion of the totatilty.4 For the first cognition there is required a proportion of convenience; and such is in the soul in respect of God, because « in a certain manner the soul is all things »,5 through assimilation to all things, because it has been born [nata est] to cognize all things, and it is most able to seize [capax] God through assimilation, because it is the image and similitude of God. As much as regards the cognition of comprehension there is required a proportion of equality and equiparancy [aequiparantiae]; and such is not in the soul in respect of God, because the soul is finite, but God is infinite; and for that reason it does not have this; and this is what Dionysius understands, and what the objection is speaking [currit] about,6, but not about the other.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia intelligibilis et sensibilis; dicendum, quod7 est distantia secundum rationem entis, et secundum rationem cognoscibilis. Primo modo est maior distantia; secundo modo non, quia utrumque est intelligibile, scilicet Deus et anima. Non sic est de intellectu et sensu; quia sensus est potentia determinata,8 sed intellectus non.

2. To that which is objected concerning the distance of the intelligible and the sensible; it must be said, that there is7 distance according to the reckoning of being [rationem entis], and according to the reckoning of a cognizable. In the first manner there is greater distance; in the second manner not (so), because each of the two is intelligible, that is God and the soul. Not so it is concerning the intellect and the sense; because the sense is a determinate potency,8 but the intellect not (so).

3. Ad illud, quod infinitum non capitur a finito; dicunt aliqui, quod capere infinitum est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad essentiam; et sic capitur; et quantum ad virtutem;9 et sic non capitur, sicut punctus a linea totus attingitur secundum substantiam, sed non totaliter secundum virtutem. Sed ista solutio non videtur solvere, quia in Deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.

3. To that, that the infinite cannot be seized by the finite; some say that to seize the infinite is (spoken of) in a twofold manner, that is as much as regards essence; and thus (the infinite) is seized; and as much as regards virtue;9 and thus it is not seized, as a point as a whole is touched by a line according to substance, but not totally according to virtue. But that solution of theirs does not seem to solve (the matter), because in God that which is the virtue is the same as the essence, and each of the two is infinite.

Ideo dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum:  unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplicitate, ut Deus; et tale infinitum , quia simplex, est ubique totum, quia infinitum, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi cognoscitur totus, quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura10 immensitatem.

For that reason it must be said, that twofold is the infinite:  one, which has itself through opposition to the simple; and such is not seized by (that) finite, which is an infinite mass [molis]; the other is, what has infinity together with simplicity, as God (does); and such an infinite, because (it is) simple, is everywhere whole, because (as an) infinite, it is thus in nothing, which it is not outside of. So it must be understood in the cognition of God. And for that reason it does not follow, that if the whole is cognized, that it is comprehended, because the intellect does not include His totality, just as the creature (does) not (contain10 His) immensity.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur:  Iudicans habet posse etc.; dicendum, quod iudicare de aliquo est dupliciter:  primo11 modo discernendo, utrum sit vel non sit; et hoc modo convenit iudicium omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti; alio modo approbando vel reprobando, utrum ita debeat esse; et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione,12 quod « iudex non iudicat de lege, sed secundum ipsam iudicat de aliis ». Et de hoc modo verum est quod dicit Augustinus, quod « nullus de illa veritate iudicat, nullus tamen sine illa iudicat ». Et de hoc secundo13 modo verum est quod opponit, quod iudicans potest super iudicatum; de primo vero non est verum, quod possit super; potest tamen dirigi ut in obiectum adminiculo illius.

4. To that which is objected:  The one judging has an ability etc.; it must be said, that to judge of anything is (spoken of) in a twofold manner:  in the first11 manner by discerning, whether it is and/or is not; and in this manner judgment befits every intellect cognizing in respect of every object; in another manner by approving and/or reproving, whether it ought to be thus [ita]; and so it does not judge of truth, but of other things according to it, as (St.) Augustine says On the True Religion,12 that « a judge does not judge of the law, but judges of other things according to it ». And of this manner it is true what (St.) Augustine says, that « no one judges of that truth, no one, however, judges without it ». And of this second13 manner it is true that it opposes (the thesis), that the one judging can (be) above the thing judged; but of the first it is not true, that it can be above; however it can be directed as unto an object for its support.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de informa- / -tione

5. To that which is lastly objected concerning informa- / -tion:

1  Hoc est, illuminando perficiens.  —  Immediate post Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omitit et, sed minus bene; et paulo post substituit deiformationem pro deiformitatem.
2  Supple cum codd. N V quae probant. Paulo infra VAt. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 aliud loco aliquid, sed minus apte.
3  In duabus seqq. qq. et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.
4  August., de Videndo Deo, c. 9. n. 21. ait:  Aliud est enim videre, aliud et totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur:  totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.
5  Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).
6  Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus currit pro certat.
7  Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit Vat. duplex.
8  Hoc est, propter alligationem ad organum seu propter materialitatem est ad unum obiectorum genus percipiendum limitata. De hac sensus et intellectus differentia vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3-6. (c. 4).
9  Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 virtuositatem.
10  Cod. R hic addit eius
11  Ed. 1 uno. Mox cod. O post non sit addit et quod hoc sit.
12  Cap. 31 n. 58:  Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae atque firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas.  —  Loco citato inveniuntur etiam verba, quae immediate post S. Doctor ex Augustino affert:  Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secudnum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando ei cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat . . . ita etiam quantum potest lex ipsa, etiam ipse (homo spiritualis et Deo coniunctus) fit, secundum quam iudicat omnia, de qua iudicare nullius potest.  —  Plures codd. ut H W Y, omissa particula de, legunt Et hoc modo.
13  Posuimus in textu hoc secundo modo et paulo post de primo modo non est verum, licet alii codd. ut D G H Y etc. pro hoc secundo modo habeant de hoc primo modo, alii ut F T bb de primo modo, alii ut A cum Vat. de hoc modo et paulo post omnes codd. legant de secundo vero non est verum. Ex contextu siquidem constat, lectiones codicum esse erroneas; quod confirmatur etiam ex Augustino loc. cit. circa finam, ubi iisdem fere verbis eadem proponit ac S. Bonaventura. Scriptores in errorem videntur esse inducti ex eo, quod isti duo numeri ponendi sint ordine inverso.  —  Codd. aa bb satis bene posse habet loco potest. Circa finem huius responsionis post dirigi supplevimus ex mss. et sex primis edd. ut.

1  That is, perfecting by illuminating.  —  Immediately after this the Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and six first editions, omits and [et], but less well; and a little after this it substitutes deiformation [deiformationem] for deiformity [deiformitatem].
2  Supply together with codices N and V which prove [which prove]. A little below this the Vatican edition not trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 has another thing [aliud] in place of something [aliquid], but less aptly.
3  In the two following questions and in Sent., Bk. II. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
4  (St.) Augustine, On Seeing God, ch. 9, n. 21, says:  For it is one thing to see, and another to comprehend the whole by seeing. Since when that, which is in whatever manner [utcumque] sensed as present, is seen:  the whole, however, is comprehended by seeing, because it is seen to such a degree [ita], that nothing of it lies hidden (to) the one seeing it, or that the ends of it can be circumspected.
5  Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 37, (ch. 8).  [Trans. note:  For the definition of equiparancy see d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 3, p. 347, footnote 5.]
6  From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the idiomatic is speaking [currit] for disputes [certat].
7  Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican edition adds here a twofold.
8  That is, on account of its binding to an organ or on account of its materiality it is limited to perceiving one genus of objects. On this difference of sense and intellect see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 3-6, (ch. 4).
9  The Vatican edition against the codices and edition 1 has virtuosity [virtuositatem].
10  Codex R adds here His [eius].
11  Edition 1 has one [uno]. Then codex O after is not adds and what it is.
12  Ch. 31, n. 58:  As is those temporal laws of theirs, although men judge of them, when they have instituted them, however when they have been instituted and made firm, it will not be licit for a judge to judge of them, but according to them.  —  In the place cited there are also found the words, which the Seraphic Doctor quotes from (St.) Augustine immediately afterwards:  For as we and all rational souls rightly judge, according to the truth, of inferior things, so of us, when we cleave to it, truth itself alone judges . . . thus as much as it can also (be) a law, (the man who is spiritual and conjoined to God) also himself becomes (that), according to which he judges all things, of which (law) he can judge of nothing.  —  After this passage, very many codices as H W and Y, having omitted the particle of, read And in this manner.
13  We have placed in the text this second manner and a little after this of the first manner it is not true, though other codices as D G H and Y etc. have of this first manner for this second manner (sic), others as F T and bb have of the first manner, others as A together with the Vatican edition have of this manner and a little after this all the codices read but of the second it is not true. Even if from the context it is established, that the readings of the codices are erroneous; this is also confirmed from (St.) Augustine loc. cit., near the end, where in nearly the same words he proposes the same thing as St. Bonaventure. The writers seem to have been lead into error from this, that those two numbers have been placed in inverse order.  —  The codices aa and bb have in the last sentences of this paragraph has an ability to [posse habet] in place of can, well enough. Near the end of this response after be directed we have supplied from the manuscripts and the six first editions as [ut].

 

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informa- / -tione; dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen,1 dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo:2 « Quemadmodum, cum per sensus corporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro:  ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; illa notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est ».

information; it must be said, that God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth; for that reason it is not necessary, that there be abstracted from Him a similitude, through which He is cognized; nevertheless, however,1 while He is cognized by the intellect, the intellect is informed by a certain knowledge [quadam notitia], which is as a certain similitude, not abstracted, but impressed, inferior to God, because it is inferior in nature, superior, however, to the soul, because it makes it better. And this (St.) Augustine says in the ninth (book) On the Trinity, in chapter eleven:2 « In accord with the manner, when through the sensation [sensus] of bodies we learn about bodies, there comes into being [fit] some similitude of them in our soul:  thus when we know [novimus] God, there comes into being some similitude of God; that knowledge [notitia], however, is inferior, because it is inferior in nature ».

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Verba S. Doctoris in 2 fund., quod ratione lucis increatae fit omnis spiritualis cognitio, et infra ad 5, quod Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem, aliaque similia plurima, quae praesertim in Itinerario mentis in Deum et in Hexaemeron leguntur, a Malebranche aliisque multis ita intellecta sunt, ut S. Bonaventuram cum ipsis docere putaverint, intellectum humanum videre res intelligibiles obscure quidem, sed immediate in Verbo sive in rationibus aeternis. Sed haec sententia, sicut non postes conciliari cum Decreto S. Congr. Inquisitionis (18. Sept. 1861), quo reprobatur propositio:  « Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale »; ita etiam manifeste contradicit exploratae nostri Doctoris doctrinae. Ipse enim docet, nec hominem in statu innocentiae, nec ipsos Angelos naturalibus suis viribus immediatam aliquam Dei visonem sive cognitionem habere posse. Quoad Angelos cfr. II. S. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi inter alia dicit:  « Divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccesibilis viribus omnis creaturae »; quoad homines in statu integritatis cfr. II. Sen. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, qui locus est omnino peremptorius. Reiectis enim variis opinionibus, diffuse ibi docetur, in solo statu gloriae videri Deum immediate et in sui substantia et sine obscuritate; « in statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo, sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus per speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula; in statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et in aenigmate ». Reprobatur ibi etiam sententia eorum, qui saltem « exilem » quendam gradum immediate Deum videndi viris contemplativis pro hac vita a Deo concedi putarunt. Concludit his verbis valde notandis:  « Unde si quae auctoritates illud dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videatur in sua essentiae, sed quod in aliguo effectu inferiori cognoscitur »* etc.  —  Idem docetur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 3 et simul refutatur distinctio, quam quidam faciunt inter claritatem Dei eiusque naturam, quia « ipsa natura est claritas et claritas natura », et « non differt essentia luminis et actus lucendi ». Et q. 2. dicitur, quod Deus, si immediate cognoscitur, « iam non secundum partem, sed totus cognoscitur ». Cfr etiam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. aliique loci passim. Plura vide apud Em. Card. Zigliara:  Della Luce intellettuale II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi:  Examen. philos. theol. de Ontologismo c. 17; et ex nostris, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio:  Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Romae 1874. p. 61. et seqq.

I. The words of the Seraphic Doctor at the bottom of On the Contrary, n. 2, that every spiritual cognition comes into being by reason of the uncreated light, and below in reply n. 5, that God is present to every intellect through truth, and the other, very many, similar (words) which are read chiefly in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum and the Hexaλmeron, have been understood by Malebranche and many others thus, that they thought St. Bonaventure was teaching with them, that the human intellect indeed sees intelligible things obscurely, but immediately in the Word or in eternal reasons. But this sentence, as one cannot reconcile it with the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition (Sept. 18, 1861), by which there is reproved the proposition:  « The immediate cognition of God, at least habitually, is essential to the human intellect, so that without this it cannot cognize anything, even if it is the intellectual light itself »; (which) also so manifestly contradicts the established [exploratae] doctrine of our Doctor. For he himself teaches, that not man in the state of innocence, nor the Angels themselves by their own natural powers can have any immediate vision or cognition of God. In regard to the Angels cf. II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, where among other things he says:  « The divine light on account of its own eminence is inaccessible to the powers of every creature »; in regard to men in the state of integrity cf. II. Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, which passage entirely refutes (the said proposition). For having rejected various opinions, there is taught there at great length, that only in the state of glory is God seen immediately and in His substance and without obscurity; « but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen by means of a mirror, but differently, because in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror; for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror obscured through the sin of the first man; and for that reason He is now seen through a mirror and in an enigma [aenigmtate] ». There is also reproved there the sentence of those, who think that there is at least conceded by God in this life to contemplative men a certain, exilic grade of seeing God immediately. He concludes with these words (which) must be strongly noted:  « Whence if there is found authorities which say this, that God is seen and distinguished [cernit] by man in the present (life), they are not to be understood, that He is seen in His essence, but that in some inferior effect He is cognized »* etc.  —  The same is taught in III. Sent., d. 14, a. 1, q. 3 and there is at the same time refuted the distinction, which certain ones make between the clarity of God and His nature, because « the very nature is the clarity and the clarity the nature » and « the essence of the light does not differ from the act of lighting ». And in q. 2 there is said, that God, if He is immediately cognized, « now not accord to a part, but the whole is cognized » Cf. also I. Sent., d. 17, p. I, dubium n. 2, and other places passim. See the many things said in Cardinal Zigliara's, Della Luce intellettuale, II. c. 14-18; Father Lepidus', Examen. philos. theol. de Ontologismo, ch. 17; and among our own, Father Luigi of Castroplanio's, Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Rome 1874, p. 61 ff.

S. Doctor omnino contrarius est etiam errori Averroistarum, qui unitatem intellectus agentis in omnibus hominibus statuebant. Affirmat enim, quod « hic error destruit totum ordinem vivendi et agendi » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), et manifestissime docet, in anima humana, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, essentialiter esse potentiam intellectualem, quae propriam et activam virtutem ad eliciendos varios actus intellectuales habet; unde lumen quoddam creatum apte vocari potest. Hoc docet II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4; et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicit, quod « ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges eternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum ». Cfr. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, et passim; cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2 et p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 3.

The Seraphic Doctor is also contrary to the error of the Averroists, who supported the unity of the agent intellect in all men. For he affirms, that « this error destroyed the whole order of living and acting » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), and he most manifestly teaches, that in the human soul, which has been created to the image of God, there is essentially an intellectual potency, which has its own proper [propram] and active virtue to elicit various intellectual acts; whence it can be aptly called a certain [quoddam] created light. This he teaches in II. Sent., d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4; and p. II, a. 1, q. 1, where he says, that « the superior reason does not only have to judge according to eternal laws, but it also has to judge according to its own [proprium] light and according to the light acquired by itself from the lesser (intellect) ». Cf. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6; Hexaλmeron. Serm. 12, ff; cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 27, m. 1, a. 2 and p. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 3.

Licet ergo immediatum et proximum principium actuum intellectualium sit animae potentia, sive lumen creatum naturaliter menti inditum, tamen iuxta sententiam scholasticorum communem veritas, certitudo et infallibilitas cognitionis humanae refundi debet in primam et increatum veritatem, quae est omnium rerum et intellectuum prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis. Unde recte dicitur, quod intellectus creatus omnia vera cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, non ut in obiecto prius cognito, sed ut in cognitionis principio, sive ut verbis Alex. Hal. ( S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1 ad 1.) utamur, non in rationibus, sed per eas. Ita S. Thom., S. I. q. 84. a. 5; q. 88. a. 3. ad 1; a. 12. a. 11. ad 3; q. 16. a. 6. ad 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 7. ad 9; S. c. Gent. III. c. 47; de Veritate q. 1. a. 4; q. 10. a. 11. ad 12; Quodl. 10. q. 4. a. 7. et alibi.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1.  —  Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. a. 4. praesertim n. 18-23.  —  Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 4; aliiquie multi.

Therefore, though the immediate and proximate principle of intellectual acts is the potency of the soul, or a created light naturally conferred by the mind, however in accord with the sententia communis of the scholastics, the truth, certitude and infallibility of human cognition ought to be traced back [refundi] into the prime and uncreated Truth, which is the first efficient, exemplar, and final cause of all things and intellects. Whence it is rightly said, that the created intellect cognizes all truth things in eternal reasons, not as in an object cognized beforehand, but as in the principle of cognition, or in the words of Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1 reply to n. 1), not in reasons, but through them. Thus St. Thomas, Summa, I., q. 84, a. 5; q. 88, a. 3, reply to n.1; q. 12, a. 11. reply to n. 3; q. 16, a. 6, reply to n. 1; IV. Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, reply to n. 9 ; Summa contra Gentiles III., ch. 47; de Veritate, q. 1, a. 4; q. 10, a. 11, reply to n. 12; Quodlibetals., n. 10, q. 4, a. 7, and elsewhere.  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III., q. 27, m. 1, a. 2, reply to n. 1.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, I. Sent., d. 3, a. 4, chiefly nn. 18-23.  —  Richard of Middleton, II. Sent., d. 24, a. 2, q. 4; and many others.

Fundamentalis huius doctrinae ratio, quae communiter ab antiquis scholasticis proponitur, haec est, quod increatae Veritatis lux secundum similitudinem refulget in veritate creata, sive haec accipiatur in sensu obiectivo, sive subiectivo. De veritate creata in sensu obiectivo dicit S. Bonav. (Hexaem. Serm. 12.):  « In qualibet creatura est refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebris permixta ». In sensu subiectivo veritas creata est ipsum mentis lumen creatum, quod est impressio quaedam primae veritatis, cuius similitudo refulget in intellectu nostro, qui, ut imago Dei, « fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini » (S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1; cfr. St. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I. q. 105. a. 3.).

The fundamental reason for this doctrine, which is commonly proposed by the ancient scholastics, is this, that the light of the uncreated Truth according to a similitude glitters in created truth, either this is accepted in the objective sense, or in the subjective (sense). Of created truth in the objective sense St. Bonaventure says (Hexaλmeron, Sermon 12):  « in every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but thoroughly mixed together with shadows ». In the subjective sense created truth is the created light itself of the mind, which is a certain [quaedam] impression of prime truth, whose similitude glitters in our intellect, which as the image of God, « bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance » (St. Bonaventure, II. Sent d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; cf. St. Thomas, Expositio in Psalmis, ps. 34; Summa I., q. 105, a. 3).

Ratio secunda est , quod Deus non tantum lumen intellectus ad exemplar divinum creat et conservat, sed etiam ad actus eiusdem concurrit, dum immediate eum movet et dirigit. Etiam hac ratione actus intellectuales a Deo dependere et in eum debere aliquo modo refundi, est sententia communis antiquorum scholasticorum; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3; I. II. q. 10. a. 4.  —  Scot., pluribus in locis, collectis ab Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5.  —  Iste concursus divinus non immerito quaedam illuminatio Dei immediata vocari potest, uti bene docent Em. Card. Zigliara in opere:  Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cfr. etiam S. Thom. in Ian. c. 1 lect. 3. n. 2; S. III. q. 5. a. 4. ad 2; S. I. q. 79. a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5. ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1. et alibi.

The second reason is, that God not only creates and conserves the light of the intellect according to the divine exemplar, but also concurs to its acting, while He immediately moves and directs it. Even by this reckoning, that the intellectual acts depend from God and ought in some manner be traced back [refundi] into Him, is the sententia communis of the ancient scholastics; cf. St. Thomas, Summa I., q. 105, a. 3; I. II., q. 10, a. 4.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in the very many places, collected by Jerome of Montefortino in Summa Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5.  —  That divine concursus can not unworthily be called a certain immediate illumination of God, as his Eminence Cardinal Zigliara teaches in the work:  Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cf. also St Thomas, in Ioannem ch. 1, reading 3, n. 2; Summa III., q. 5, a. 4, reply to 2; Summa I., q. 79, a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima, a. 5, reply to n. 9; Opuscula 73 on (St. Severinus) Boethius, q. 1. and elsewhere.

Hanc cooperationem divinam sive illuminationem multum urgent et S. August. et S. Bonav. Mens Doctoris Seraphici de / hac re,

The mind of both St. Augustine and the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure, greatly stress this divine cooperation or illumination concerning / this point,

1  Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus tamen.
2  Num. 16; in quo textu plures codd. ut A G I T Y Z aa bb cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 discutimus, codd. F K X discernimus loco discimus, ac mox plurimi codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee ff similitudine pro similitudo Dei.

1  From the manuscripts and edition 1, 2, 3 and 6 we have added however.
2  Num. 16; in which text very many of the codices as A G I T Y Z aa bb together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have we discuss; codex F K and X have we discern in place of we learn, and just after this very many of the codices as A C F G H K L O R S T U V W Y aa ee and ff have by some similitude [aliqua similitudine] for a similitude of God [similitudo Dei].

*  [Trans.:  Id est, in ordine naturale; Christus enim Iesus ipse fruebatur visione beatifica dum viatoris, ex virtute gratia unionis hypostatica; et rursum, est sententia approbata, quod interdum B. Maria Virgo eadem fructa est pro sua vita mortali (cf. B. Maria de Agreda, Civitas Dei). Atque adeo non est irrationabile considerare hoc capitis munus nonnumquam communicatum esse etiam pro hac vita sanctis maximis ut munus gratuitum. Quia brevissimus, et non tensibile nisi in effectibus, habitum fidei non extinguit, sed anima ex desiderio huius vitae elevat, secundum Scripturas, "Oculus non visit, auris non audivit, nec in mentem hominis intravit quod Deus preparavit pro se amantibus", et "Nemo Deum videre potest et vivet," et rursum, "Hoc est vita aeterna:  cognoscere te Deum Unicum Verum et Iesum Christum qui missus es."]

*  [Trans.:  That is, in the natural order; for Christ Jesus Himself enjoyed the beatific vision while still a wayfarer, by virtue of the grace of the hypostatic union; and again, it is an approved opinion that the Blessed Virgin Mary enjoyed the same on occasion during Her own mortal life [cf. Bl. Mary of Agreda, The Mystical City of God]. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to consider that this gift of the Head is also communicated at times during this life to the greatest of the saints as a gratuitous gift. Since it is momentary and cannot be retained except in its effects, it does not destroy the habit of faith, but raises the soul from desire for this life, in accord with the Scriptures, “Eye has not seen, ear has not heard, nor has it even entered into the mind of man what God has prepared for those who love him,” and “No man can see God and live,” and again, “Eternal life is this, to cognize Thee the Only True God and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent.”]

 

p. 71

 

hac re, sexcenties breviter expressa, fuse declaratur anecdota quadam quaestione disputata, a P. Fidele a Fanna reperta et quoad partem principalem in lucem edita (Ratio nova collectionis etc. Taurini, 1874, p. 222). Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium eiusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Ioan. Pechami et cuiusdam Eustachii, Deo favente, libro speciali proxime in lucem dabimus, quo tum sententiae S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contarium docere.

this point, having briefly expressed it six hundred times, it is manifested at length by a certain unpublished, disputed question, reported by Father Fidele a Fanna and in regards to its principal part, published by Ratio nova collectionis etc., Turin, 1874, p. 222. This entire question, with the addition of other unedited documents both of (St.) Bonaventure himself and of his three disciples, namely Matthew of Aquasparta, John Peckham and a certain Eustasius, God willing, we will publish very soon in a special book, by which both the sentence of the Seraphic Doctor will be thoroughly manifested, and it will be demonstrated that, Bl. (now St.) Albertus Magnus and the other ancients consented entirely with the Seraphic (Doctor) himself, and that St. Thomas did not teach the contrary on the principal point.

II. His praesuppositis, verba:  « Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem », nullam faciunt difficultatem, praesertim cum ab ipso S. Doctore interpretatio Ontologistarum explicite reprobetur (II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et ibid. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. 4.). Egregie sinceram suam sententiam explicat infra d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in corp., ubi cum S. August. distinguit cognitionem per speciem a rebus materialibus abstractam ab illa cognitione, quae fit per veritatem, id est « per similitudinem infusam vel innatam »; et addit:  « Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in veritate » De similitudine vel habitu innato cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.  —  Recte S. Doctor (ad 5.) negat, Deum cognosci per similitudinem ab ipso abstractam, quia de Deo non habemus conceptum nisi analogum et aliunde formatum. Etiam S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) docet:  « Non dicimur cognoscere ea (Deum et Angelos) per abstractionem, sed per impressionem in intelligentias nostras ». Consentiunt B. Albert. (hic a. 2. ad 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1. ad 4.).

II. Having presupposed these things, the words « God is present to every intellect through truth », cause no difficulty, chiefly when by the Seraphic Doctor himself the interpretation of the Ontologists is explicitly reproved (II. Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, reply to n. 1, and ibid. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, reply to nn. 3 and 4). He excellently explains his own sincere sentence below in d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in the body, where with St. Augustine he distinguishes cognition through species from infused and/or innate (cognition) »; and he adds:  « But both, which are so cognized, are said by Augustine to be cognized in truth » On the similitude and/or innate habit cf. II. Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2..  —  Rightly does the Seraphic Doctor (at n. 5) deny, that God is cognized through a similitude abstracted from Him, because we have no concept of God but one (which is) analogous and formed from elsewhere. Even St. Thomas (I. Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, reply to n. 3) teaches:  « We are not said to cognized those things (God and Angels) through abstraction, but through impression in our understanding ». (St.) Albertus (Magnus) (here in a. 2, in reply to n. 2) and (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in a. 1, in reply to n. 4) agree.

III. In solut. ad 5. verba:  « Intellectus noster informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa », explicari possunt de specie sive impressa sive expressa, quam intellectus format ex veritate creata et animae essentialiter impressa, de qua S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Non tamen excluditur, quod sub voce notitia intelligi possit etiam illa illuminatio divina, de qua supra locuti sumus. Hoc insinuare videntur alii loci S. Bonav., imprimis II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, ubi loquendo de cognitione Angelorum, sic concludit:  « Adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scil. per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura » etc. Cfr. etiam quae de scientia Christi dicit III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1, 2. In hoc sensu istum locum S. Augustini, a S. Bonav. hic laudatam, intelligit Fr. Eustachius, discipulus , Doctor Parisiensis saec. XIII., uti colligitur ex quadam quaestione anecdota ipsius proxime a nobis in libra supra memorato edenda.

III. In the solution to n. 5 the words « Our intellect is informed by a certain knowledge [notitia], which is like a certain similitude, not abstracted, but impressed », can be explained from the species, either impressed or expressed, which the intellect forms from truth created and impressed essentially upon the soul, of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks in d. 17, p. II, q. 4. However this does not exclude, that under the term knowledge [notitia] one can understand also that divine illumination, of which we have spoken above. Other places in St. Bonaventure's (writings) seem to insinuate this, first of all II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2 in reply to n. 4,, where having spoken of the cognition of the Angels, he concludes thus:  « There is still a third manner of cognizing, namely through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the cognizing power, which (light) is a certain similitude of God, not abstracted, but infused, inferior to God, because in an inferior nature » etc.. Cf. also what he says of the knowledge [scientia] of Christ in III. Sent. d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to nn. 1 and 2. In this sense Fr. Eustasius, a disciple, a Doctor at Paris in the 13th century, understands that the same passage from St. Augustine is praised here by St. Bonaventure, as is gathered from a certain unpublished question of the same author, soon to be published by us in the above mentioned book.

IV. Hanc et sequentem questionem mire illustrat S. Bonav. in Intiner. mentis in Deum, et Hexaem. Serm. 5. 10.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. seqq.  —  Scot., hic q. 1.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 12 a . 12.  —  B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 15; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 1. et q. 14. m. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic princ. q. 1.  —  Henr. Gand., S. a. 33.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.  —  Biel, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. et d. 3. q. 2. 3.

IV. St. Bonaventure wonderfully illustrated this and the following question in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, and in the Hexaλmeron, Sermon 5 and 10. —Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I., q. 2, m. 1 ff..  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I., q. 12, a. 12.  —  Bl (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), I. Sent., d. 1, a. 15; Summa ., p. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 1, and q. 14, m . 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in p. I, a. 1, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here principally in q. 1.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 33.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, I. Sent. d. 2, q. 9, and d. 3, q. 2 and 3.

 The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author.  The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition.  The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text.  Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.  Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.