S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. I.

PART I

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 71-74.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 71-74.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether God is cognizable through creatures.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum Deus sit cognosciblis per creaturas. Et quod non, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether God is cognizable through creatures. And that (He is) not, it seems:

1. Quia via ad errorem non est via ad cognitionem; sed cognitio per creaturam est via erroris: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Sapientiae decimo quarto:1 Creaturae Dei sunt in deceptionem et in odium et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Praeterea, Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio2 loquitur de his, qui occupantur in creaturis: « Dorsum ad Te vertentes, in corporali opere tanquam in umbra sua defiguntur ».

1. Because the way to error is not the way to cognition; but cognition through a creature is a way of error: ergo etc. Proof of the minor: in the fourteenth (chapter) of Wisdom (it is said):1 The creatures of God are as deception and hatred and a mousetrap for the feet of the unwise. Furthermore, (St.) Augustine in On Free Will speaks of those, who are occupied in creatures: « Turning (their) back to Thee, they are fixed upon a corporal work as upon their own shadow ».

2. Item, tenebra vel tenebrosum non est via ad cognoscendum luminosum sive lucem;3 sed creatura est tenebra, Deus autem est lux: ergo Deus non est cognosciblis per creaturam.

2. Likewise, the dark and/or a dark thing is not the way to cognize a luminous thing or the light;3 but a creature is dark, moreover God is light: therefore God is not cognizable through a creature.

3. Item, medium, per quod cognoscitur aliquid vel probatur de extremo, debet communicare in aliquo cum eo ad quod cognoscendum est;4 sed Creator et creatura nihil habent commune: ergo Deus non cognoscitur per creaturas.

3. Likewise, the medium, through which anything is cognized and/or proven from (its) extreme, ought to communicate in something with that for which it is cognized;4 but the Creator and the creature have nothing common: therefore God is not cognized through creatures.

4. Item, omne medium, per quod ascenditur ad extremum, distat ab illo gradibus finitis;5 sed omnis creatura quantumcumque nobilis distat a Deo gradibus infinitis, quia quantumcumque duplicatur, nunquam perveniet ad eius nobilitatem: ergo per creaturam non ascenditur in cognitionem Dei.

4. Likewise, every medium, through which one ascends [ascenditur] to an extreme, is distant from it by finite steps [gradibus];5 but every creature, howsoever noble, is distant from God by infinite steps, because howsoever it is doubled, (the creature) will never arrive [perveniet] at His nobility: therefore through a creature one does not ascend unto the cognition of God.

CONTRA: Sapientiae decimo tertio:6 A magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri. Unde Isidorus de Summo bono:7 « Ex pulcritudine circumscriptae creaturae pulcritudinem suam, quae circumscribi non potest, facit Deus intelligi ».

ON THE CONTRARY: in the thirteenth (chapter) of Wisdom (there is written):6 From the magnitude of the appearance and of the creature the Creator of these can be seen in a cognizable manner [cognoscibiliter]. Whence (St.) Isidore On the Supreme Good:7 « From the beauty of the circumscribed creature God makes His own Beauty, which cannot be circumscribed, to be understood ».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: contingit non solum effectum cognosci per causam, sed etiam cau- / -sam per effectum: . . .

2. Likewise, it is thus shown by reason: it happens that not only is an effect cognized through (its) cause, but also the cau- /-se through (its) effect: . . .

1 Vers. 11, ubi contra mss. et ed. 1 legit Vulgata: Quoniam creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animabus hominum et in muscipulam etc. Cum hac lectione convenit Vat. eo excepto, quod habet deceptionem loco tentationem.
2 Libr. II. c. 16. n. 43: Tanquam enim dorsum ad Te ponentes in carnali opere velut in umbra sua defiguntur.
3 Aristot., I. Poster. c. 21. (25.): In privativa autem negativa propositio universalis, affirmativa autem negativa prior et notior (per affirmativam enim negativa nota) et prior affirmativa est, sicut esse prius est non esse. Et III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.) docet, privationes non cognosci nisi per contrario, scil. per cognitionem habitus. Cfr. etiam II. de Caelo, text. 18. (c. 3.).
4 Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7: Nam ex eodem genere oportet esse extrema et media. Idem ait X. Metaph. text. 22. (IX. c. 7.). Et III. de Part. Animal. c. 1: Nam et medium particeps utriusque extremi est. — Extremum est nomen logicale significans subiectum vel praedicatum conclusionis, pro quorum nexu cognoscendo medium adhibitum vocatur terminus medius. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 post cum eo minus bene omittit ad.
5 Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 15. seqq. (c. 19. seqq.) ubi simile ostendit respectu ipsius demonstrationis. — Paulo infra ope mss. loco duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur substituimus duplicatur, nunquam perveniet; supple creatura. cod. I propositionem maiorem formaliter melius exhibet Item nullum medium . . . gradibus infinitis. In conclusione plures codd. ut K T etc. ad loco in.
6 Vers. 5.
7 Sive Sentent. I. c. 4.

1 Verse 11, where contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vulgate reads: Since the creatures of God have become as hatred and as a temptation for the souls of men and as a mousetrap etc.. With this reading the Vatican text agrees, except in this, that it has deception in place of temptation.
2 Book II, ch. 16, n. 43: For as they put (their) back to Thee they are fixed upon a carnal work as upon their own shadow.
3 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 21 (25): On one hand [autem] to privative (propositions) a negative, universal proposition is prior and more known, on the other [autem] to affirmative (propositions) the negative is prior and more known [notior] {for through the affirmative the negative is known} and the affirmative is prior, just as ‘being’ [esse] is prior to ‘non being’ [non esse]. And On the Soul, Bk. III, text 25 (ch. 6), where he teaches, that privations are not cognized except through their contrary, that is through the cognition of their habit. Cf. also On Heaven, Bk. II, text 18 (ch. 3).
4 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 7: For from the same genus it is proper that there be extremes and means. He says in the same in his Metaphysics, text 22 (Bk. IX, ch. 7). And in The Parts of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 1: For even the means is a partaker of each extreme. — Extreme is a name in Logic signifying the subject or predicate of a conclusion, for cognizing the union of which the medium employed is called a middle term [terminus medius]. — The Vatican text against the codices and edition 1 omits for [ad] after with that [cum eo]. 5 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 15 ff. (ch. 19 ff.) where he shows (something) similar in respect to this demonstration of his. — A little below this with the help of the manuscripts, in place of it may be doubled, one never arrives we have substituted it is doubled, it will never arrive; supply "creature". Codex I better exhibits the major proposition formally, Likewise no medium . . . by infinite steps. In the conclusion very many codices as K T etc. have to [ad] in place of unto [in].
6 Verse 5.
7 Or Sentences, Bk. I, ch. 4.

 

p. 72

 

sed etiam cau- / -sam per effectum:1 ergo si Deus est causa operans secundum suam nobilitatem, et creatura effectus, poterit Deus cognosci per creaturam.

but also the cau- / -se through the effect:1 therefore if God is the cause operating according to His nobility, and the creature the effect, God can be cognized through a creature.

3. Item, sensibile est via cognoscendi intelligibile;2 sed creatura sensibilis, Deus intelligibilis: ergo per creaturam est devenire in cognitionem Creatoris.

3. Likewise, the sensible is a way of knowing the intelligible:2 but a creature (is) sensible, (and) God (is) intelligible: therefore through a creature there is a departure [devenire] unto the cognition of the Creator.

4. Item, contingit simile cognosci per simile;3 sed omnis creatura est similis Deo vel sicut vestigium, vel sicut imago: ergo per omnem creaturam contingit cognosci Deum.

4. Likewise, it happens that like is cognized through like;3 but every creature is like to God as vestige, and/or as image: therefore through every creature it happens that God is cognized.

Quaeritur ergo, quae differentia sit inter vestigium et imaginem; et cum in omni creatura sit vestigium, quaeritur, quare non similiter imago, et secundum quid attendatur4 vestigium.

Therefore it is asked, what is the difference between the vestige and the image; and since in every creature there is a vestige, it is asked, why not similarly an image, and according to what the vestige is tended towards.4

CONCLUSIO.

 

Deus per creaturas naturali rationis lumine cognosci potest.

CONCLUSION

 

God can be cognized through creatures by the natural light of reason.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, quia relucet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opera, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that, because a cause glitters [relucet] in (its) effect, and the wisdom of the craftsman [artificis] is manifested in (his) works, for that reason God, who is the Craftsman and Cause of a creature, is cognizes through it.

Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam: propter convenientiam, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter indigentiam, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam.5

And for this there is a twofold reason, one is on account of fittingness [convenientiam], the other on account of indigence: on account of fittingness, because every creature leads more unto God than unto something else; on account of indigence, because, since God, as a light most highly spiritual, cannot be cognized in His spirituality by the quasi material intellect, the soul needs [indiget] to cognize Him through a creature.5

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio creaturae est via in errorem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates speciales et6 quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad speciales conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem.

1. To that which is objected, that the cognition of a creature is a way unto error; it must be said, that cognizing a creature is (said) in a twofold manner: as much as regards (its) special properties and6 those which belong to imperfection, and/or as much as regards (its) general conditions, which belong to completion; but if as much as regards special conditions and (those belonging to) imperfection: either by attributing (them) to God, or by removing. By the first manner there is a way of error, by the second a way of cognition; and so God is cognized through ablation [ablationem].

Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura dupliciter cognoscitur: aut sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio:7 « Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et oberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinquunt Te ducem ». Si secundo modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud.8

But if He is cognized in regard to (His) conditions of perfection, He can be thus in a twofold manner, as a picture is cognized in a twofold manner: either as a picture, or as an image; whence either (cognition) stands still [sistitur] in the beauty of the creature, or through this it tends unto another. If by the first manner, then it is a way of deviation; whence (St.) Augustine in (his) book On Free Will:7 « Woe to those who love Thy noddings [nutus] in place of Thee and wander about [oberrant] among Thy footprints [vestigiis] and forsake Thee as (their) leader. ». If by the second manner, insofar as it is a way unto the other, in this manner [sic] there is a reason for cognizing through superexcellence, because every noble property in a creature is to be attributed to God in (its) highest degree [summo]; and thus this is clear.8

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenebrosum medium non est via cognoscendi lucem; dicendum quod est oculus bene dispositus et oculus lippus. De oculo bene disposito verum est, sed non de lippo, cui nubes obtegens vel terra suscipiens luminis claritatem est medium videndi solem; sic intellectui nostro, qui se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae.9

2. To that which is objected, that the dark medium is not a way of cognizing the light; it must be said that there is an eye well disposed and a bleary [lippus] eye. Of the well disposed eye it is true, but not of the bleary one, to which the medium for seeing the sun is (as) a concealing [obtegens] cloud and/or a ground snatching up the clarity of a light [terra suscipiens luminis claritatem]; so (it is) for our intellect, which holds itself as the eye of an owl to the most manifest things of nature.9

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu communitatis, dicendum, quod10 non est commune per univocationem, tamen est commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum.

3. To that which is objected concerning the defect of community, it must be said, that10 there is no common thing through univocation, there is, however, a common thing through analogy, which means a habitude of two to two, as in a sailor and a doctor, and/or of one to one, as of the exemplar to the example [exemplatum].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper sunt infiniti gradus; dicendum, quod ascensus in Deum potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad aspectum praesentiae; et sic quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum, nec sic sunt infiniti gradus; aut quantum ad aequalitatem aequiparantiae; et sic verum est, quod sunt infiniti, quia bonum creatum, quantum- / -cumque duplicatum, . . .

4. To that which is objected, that there are always infinite steps; it must be said, that ascent [ascensus] into God can be in two manners: either as much as regards a looking towards the Presence [aspectum praesentiae]; and thus every creature is bound to lead (one) unto God, and so there are not infinite steps; or as much as regards an equality of equiparancy [aequalitatem aequiparantiae]; and so it is true, that they are infinite, because the created good, how- / -soever doubled, . . .

1 Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.). — In hac propositione auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addidimus etiam.
2 Cfr. Aristo., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.): Formis sensibilibus innituntur intelligibilia . . . atque idcirco, qui nihil sentit, nihil discere vel comprehendere potest. — Mox post creatura et post Deus supple cum Vat. est.
3 Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. (c. 2.) loquendo de metaphora ait: Nam metaphora quodammodo notum facit id quod significatur, propter (per) similitudinem. Ibidem et hanc definitionem imaginis, de qua S. Bonav. paulo infra agit, invenies: Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est. Cfr. etiam II. Prior. c. 27. et 28. (29. et 30.), ubi Aristot. agit de icosibus (eixos, i. e. simile, verisimile, consentaneum) et signis, quae si certissima sint, ab ipso indicia, (a Commentatoribus vestigia vel prodigia) nominantur; et Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1.
4 Vat. sibi non constans contra mss. et ed. 1 attenditur.
5 Interpolatam et non aptam Vat. lectionem: quasi materiali luce indiget anima, ut cognoscat ipsum, scilicet per creaturam castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Cod. O pro materiali habet naturaliter.
6 Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post speciales conditiones addidimus et, pro quo cod. I primo loc habet id est, secundo loco qaue sunt. Dein codd. O Z quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt. Mox mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. post si adiiciunt autem et post imperfectionis omittunt hoc est dupliciter.
7 Lib. II. c. 16. n. 43.
8 De triplici cognoscendi Deum via, scil. causalitatis, remotionis et superexcellentiae cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 6. et infra dub. 1.
9 Supple: tenebrosum (seu creatura) est medium cognoscendi lucem sive Deum. De comparatione intellectus cum oculo noctuae cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.): Sicut etiam nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sec et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima (ed. Venet. 1489).
10 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit si. Paulo post pauci codd. ut X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 non bene ductore pro doctore. Cfr. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1 in corp., ubi idem exemplum explicatur, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1 in corp., ubi exemplum de nauta et auriga occurit.

1 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 10 (ch. 13) and Bk. II, ch. 17 (ch. 14). — In this proposition [p.71], on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added also [etiam].
2 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 39 (ch. 8): By sensible forms intelligibles are hinted at . . . and on that account, he who senses nothing, can learn and/or comprehend nothing. — Then after creature and after God supply with the Vatican text is.
3 Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 1 (ch. 2) speaking of metaphor says: For a metaphor in a certain manner makes known that which is signified, on account of (i.e. through) the similitude. In the same place you will also find this definition of an image, with which St. Bonaventure deals a little below: For the image is that, of which generation is through imitation. Cf. also Prior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 27 and 28 (chs. 29 and 30), where Aristotle deals with icons (eixos, i. e. the similar, the very similar, the agreeable) and signs, which if they are the most certain, are named evidences [indicia] by him, {by the Commentators vestiges and/or prodigies}; and Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1.
4 The Vatican text, not consistently against the manuscripts and edition 1, has the indicative is tended towards.
5 The Vatican text's interpolated and not apt reading: as if the soul needed the material light, to cognize Him, that is through a creature we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. Codex O has naturally in place of material.
6 From nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added here and a little below this after special conditions an and [et], in place of which codex I in the first place has that it [id est], in the second which belong to [quae sunt]. Then codices O and Z have as much as regards general properties and those which are. Then the manuscripts together with edition1, against the Vatican text, insert but [autem] in but if as much and after imperfection they omit this is in a twofold manner [hoc est dupliciter].
7 Book II, ch. 16, n. 43.
8 On the threefold way of cognizing God, that is by causality, removing and superexcellence, cf. Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 6, and below in dubium 1.
9 Supply: the dark thing (or creature) is a medium for cognizing the light or god. On the comparison [comparatione] of the intellect with the eye of an owl cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 1 (Bk. I, ch. 1, in the shorter version): For as the eyes of the ravens of the night [nocticoraceum] hold themselves to the light of day, so also the intellect of our soul to those things which are the most manifest of nature {Venetian edition of 1489}.
10 The Vatican text, not trusting in the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, adds if. A little after this a few of the codices as X and Y together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have not well leader [ductore] in place of doctor [doctore]. Cf. d. 25, a. 2. q. 1, in the body of the article, where the same example is explained, and Sent., Bk. II, c. 16. a. 1. q. 1 in the body of the article, where the example of the sailor and the charioteer occurs.  —  [Trans. note:  For the definition of equiparancy see d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 3, p. 347, footnote 5.]

 

p. 73

 

quantum- / -cumque duplicatum, nunquam aequiparatur increato.

how- / -soever doubled, is never compared [aequiparatur] to the uncreated (Good).

Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia « imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur ».1

But the first step as much as (it) regards the ascent towards the sight [aspectum] of the Presence is in the consideration of visibles, the second in the consideration of invisibles, as (it belongs to) the soul and/or another spiritual substance; the third is from the soul unto God, because « the image is formed by the Truth Himself and is immediately conjoined to God ».1

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia vestigii et imaginis, quidam assignant,2 quod vestigium est in sensibilibus, imago in spiritualibus. Sed ista distinctio et positio non valet, quia vestigium est etiam in spiritualibus. Nam unitas, veritas, bonitas, in quibus consistit vestigium, sunt conditiones maxime universales et intelligibiles.

To that which is lastly asked concerning the difference of the vestige and the image, certain ones assign,2 the vestige among sensibles, the image among spirituals. But that distinction and position of theirs is not valid, because the vestige is also among spirituals. For the unity, truth, (and) goodness, in which the vestige consists, are the conditions most universal and intelligible.

Alii3 dicunt, quod vestigium dicitur, quia repraesentat secundum partem, sed imago secundum totum. Sed haec iterum differentia non valet, quia, cum Deus sit simplex, non habet repraesentans secundum partem; cum iterum sit infinitus, a nulla omnino creatura, etiam a toto mundo non potest repraesentari secundum totum.

Others3 say, that “vestige” is said, because it represents according to a part, but “image” according to the whole. But again this difference is not valid, because, since God is simple, He does not have (something) representing (Him) according to a part; again, since He is infinite, by entirely no creature, nor even by the whole world can He be represented according to the whole.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod cum creatura ducat in cognitionem Dei per modum umbrae,4 per modum vestigii et per modum imaginis, differentia eorum notior, a qua etiam denominatur, accipitur penes modum repraesentandi. Nam umbra dicitur, in quantum representat in quadam elongatione et confusione; vestigium, in quantum in5 elongatione, sed distinctione; imago vero, in quantum in propinquitate et distinctione.

And for that reason it must be understood, that since the creature leads unto the cognition of God through a shadow,4 through a vestige and through an image, their more knowable [notior] difference, by which they are also denominated, is accepted from within [penes] (their) manner of representing. For shadow is said, inasmuch as it represents in a certain elongation and confusion; vestige, inasmuch as in5 elongation, but in distinction; but image, inasmuch as (it represents) in nearness and distinction.

Ex hac differentia colligitur secunda, quae est penes conditiones, in quibus attenduntur haec. Nam creaturae dicuntur umbra quantum ad proprietates, quae respiciunt Deum in aliquo genere causae secundum rationem6 indeterminatem; vestigium quantum ad proprietatem, quae respicit Deum sub ratione triplicis causae, efficientis, formalis7 et finalis, sicut sunt unum, verum et bonum; imago quantum ad conditiones, quae respiciunt Deum non tantum in ratione causae, sed et obiecti, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas.

From this difference there is gathered a second, which is from within [penes] the conditions, in which these are tended towards. For creatures are said (to be) a shadow as much as regards (their) properties, which respect God in some genus of cause according to an indeterminate reckoning;6 a vestige as much as regards (their) property, which respects God under a reckoning of a triple cause, the efficient, the formal7 and the final, as are the one, the true and the good; an image as much as regards (their) conditions, which respect God not only in the reckoning of a cause, but also of an object, which (conditions) are memory, intelligence and will.

Ex his concluduntur aliae duae differentiae: quantum ad ea ad quae ducunt; nam creatura ut umbra ducit ad cognitionem communium, ut communia; vestigium in cognitionem communium, ut appropriata; imago ad cognitionem propriorum, ut propria.8

From these there are concluded two other differences: as much as regards those things which lead; for the creature as a shadow leads to the cognition of things common, as common; the vestige unto cognition of things common, as appropriated; the image to cognition of things proper , as proper.8

Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum et9 in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago.

The other difference is from within [penes] those things in which they are discovered. For since every creature is compared [comparatur] to God both9 in the reckoning of cause and in the reckoning of a triple cause, for that reason every creature is a shadow and/or a vestige. But since only the rational creature is compared to God as an object, because it alone is able to seize [capax] God through cognition and love [amorem]: for that reason it alone is an image.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Deum non immediate in se nec a priori a viatoribus cognosci, sed per ea quae ab ipso facta sunt, post Concilium Vaticanum (de Fide can 1. de Revelatione) in dubium vocari nequit. Hic canon: Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, a. s., omnino convenit cum doctrina Seraphici Doctoris. — In fine conclusionis iuxta textum a nobis reformatum intellectus humanus vocatur quasi materialis, quod intelligendum est in comparatione ad puram spiritualitatem divinam. In hoc sensu S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1 ad 4.) dicit: Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae (vel potius Gennadius de Dogm. Eccles. c. 2.): Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet.

I. That God is not cognized immediately in Himself nor a priori by wayfarers, but through those things which have been made by Him, no one after the (First) Vatican Council (de Fide, canon 1 on Revelation) can call into doubt. This canon: “If anyone has said, that God the one and true, Creator and Our Lord, through those things which have been made, cannot be certainly cognized by the natural light of human reason, anathema sit,” entirely agrees with the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. — At the end of the conclusion, in accord with the text reformed by us, the human intellect is called quasi material, which must be understood in comparison to the pure, divine spirituality. In this sense St. Bonaventure (Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at n. 4) says: For nothing is entirely spiritual, except God alone, as (St.) Augustine says On the Customs of the Church (and/or rather Gennadius, On the Dogma of the Church, ch. 2): God alone is incorporeal, because He fills all things.

II. Quod vestigium Trinitatis in omni creatura inveniatur, est sententia communis. Omnis enim creatura, quatenus habet in se unum esse, distinctum a quolibet alio, respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; quatenus habet verum esse, respicit ipsum ut causam exemplarem; quatenus habet bonum esse, respicit eundum ut causam finalem. — Differentiam inter imaginem et vestigium non omnes eodem modo assignant. S. Doctor, ut ex textu apparet, quadruplicem dat differentiam, cui S. Thomas aliam adiungit (S. I. q. 45. a. 7.). Scotus autem contra verba S. Thomae aliquas difficultates affert (hic. q. 3). De hac doctrina cfr. ipse S. Doctor, hic dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. 12; Hexaλm. Serm. 12. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 8. per totam et q. 7. m. 7; p. I. q. 18. m. 1. 5. — Scot., hic q. 5. 9. — S. Thom., hic. q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. 5. — Biel, hic q. 9.

II. That the vestige of the Trinity is found in every creature, is the common sentence. For every creature to the extent that is has in itself one ‘to be’ [unum esse], distinct from any other, looks back to God as its efficient cause; to the extent that it has a true ‘being’ [verum esse], looks back to Him as (its) exemplar cause; to the extent that it has a good ‘being’ [bonum esse], it looks back to the Same as (its) final cause. — Not all assign the difference between the image and the vestige in the same manner. The Seraphic Doctor, as he appears from the text, gives a fourfold difference, to which St. Thomas adjoins another (Summa., I. q. 45. a. 7). But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus brings forward some difficulties against the words of St. Thomas (here in q. 3). Of this doctrine cf. the Seraphic Doctor himself, here in dubium 3; Sent., Bk. II, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1; Breviloquium, p. II, c. 1 and 12; Hexaλmeron, sermon 12. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 8, throughout and q. 7, m. 7; p. I, q. 18, m. 1 and 5. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in qq. 5 and 9. — St Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1, 2 and 3; Summa., I, q. 45, a. 7. — Bl. (now St.) Albert the Great, here in a. 14 and 18. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here in p. I, q. 4. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in qq. 4 and 5. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 9.

III. Plura de hac quaestione: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1 et 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. q. 3; S. I. a. 2 . . .

III. For more on this question: St. Bonaventure, Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1 and 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in qq. 1, 2, and 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3; Summa., I, q. 2, . . .

1 August., 83 QQ. q. 51. n. 2 dicit: Quare cum homo possit particeps esse secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius. Et auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Quae (mens) ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur.
2 Addit Vat. claritatis gratia talem differentiam, quae tamen verba desunt in mss. et ed. 1.
3 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit autem. Paulo post plures codd. ut S V X bb omittunt differentia, pro quo ed 1 habet distinctio.
4 Vat. addit et, quod deest in mss.
5 Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic et immediate post substituimus quantum in pro quadam. Mox cod. Q post sed addit cum.
6 Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum causae.
7 Intellige de causa formali extrinseca sive de exemplari, non de causa formali intrinseca. Cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 ad 2.
8 Iuxta sententiam communem attributa divina distinguuntur in communia ut communia sive communia simpliciter, quae sunt essentialia, ut esse, vivere, intelligere; communia ut appropriata, quae sunt illa essentialia, quae nos uni personae prae alia tribuimus, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui sancto; propria sunt parternitas, filiatio et spiratio.
9 Supplevimus ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 particulam et, qua distinctior redditur lectio. Paulo post cod. Z loco vel bene ponit et.

1 (St.) Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 51, n. 2 says: Wherefore since man can be a partaker according to the interior man, he is thus, according to him, as an image, so that he is formed by no interposed nature, and for that reason nothing is more conjoined to God. And the author of the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 11: Which (mind) has been thus made to the image of God, so that it is formed by the Truth itself (and by) no interposed nature.
2 The Vatican text adds for the sake of clarity such a difference, which words, however, are lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.
3 The Vatican text against the manuscripts and edition 1 adds But [autem]. A little after this very many of the codices as S V X and bb omit difference, in place of which edition 1 has distinction.
4 The Vatican text adds and [et], which is lacking in the manuscripts.
5 On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have here and immediately afterwards substituted as much as in [quantum in] for certain things [quadam]. Then codex A after but [sed] adds with [cum].
6 With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here what was added by the Vatican text: of cause.
7 Understand this of the formal extrinsic cause or of the exemplar cause, not of the formal intrinsic cause. Cf. below in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2.
8 In accord with the common sentence the divine attributes are distinguished in common ones as common or common ones simply speaking, which are the essentials, as to be, to live, (and) to understand; the common ones as appropriated, which are those essentials, which we grant to one Person before the others, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; the proper ones are paternity, filiation and spiration.
9 We have supplied from very many codices and edition 1 the particle both [et], by which a more distinct reading is rendered. A little after this codex Z in place of and/or put and [et].

 

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a. 2. et 3. — S. c. Gent. I. c. 13. — B. Albert., hic. a. 2. et 3; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1 et a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 24. q. 6. — Durand., hic. p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., et Biel sicut in praec. quest.

a. 2 and 3. — Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 13. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 2 and 3; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 24, q. 6. — Durandus, here in p. I, q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, and (Gabriel) Biel as in the preceding question.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.