S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. I.

PART I

ARTCULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio IV.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 4

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 75-77.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 75-77.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum trinitas personarum cum unitate essentiae naturaliter per creaturas cognosci possit.

QUESTION 4

Whether the Trinity of Persons with a unity of essence can be naturally cognized through creatures.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, quid sit de Deo cognoscibile per creaturas. Et dicit Apostolus,4 quod sempiterna virtus et divinitas. Et quaeritur, utrum per creaturas possit cognosci personarum pluralitas. Et videtur quod sic.

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked, what concerning God is cognizable through creatures. And the Apostle says,4 that (it is His) sempiternal virtue and divinity. And it is asked, whether through creatures the plurality of the Persons can be cognized. And it seems that thus (it can):

1. Quia philosophi non habuerunt cognitionem de Deo nisi per creaturas, et cognoverunt Trinitatem: ergo etc. Minor patet per Augustinum de Civitate Dei:5 « Philosophi tripartitam dicunt esse philosophiam », in qua est cognitio Trinitatis.

1. Because philosophers did not have cognition of God except through creatures, and (yet) they cognized the Trinity: ergo etc.. The minor is patent through (St.) Augustine On the City of God:5 « Philosophers say that there is a tripartite philosophy », in which is the cognition of the Trinity.

2. Item, magi defecerunt in tertio signo, Exodi octavo;6 et exponitur, quod defecerunt in cognitione tertiae personae; aut ergo quantum ad propra aut quantum ad appropriata. Non quantum ad ap- / -propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura; . . .

2. Likewise, the magi failed at the third sign, in the eighth (chapter) of Exodus;6 and it is explained [exponitur], that they failed in the cognition of the Third Person; therefore either as much as regards things proper [propria] or as much as regards things appropriated. Not as much as regards things / appropriated, because for us goodness glitters in the greatest manner [maxime] in a creature; . . .

4 Rom. 1, 20.
5 Libr. XI. c. 25: Hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripartitam esse voluerunt. — Ex cod. U adiungimus glossema dicta Augustini exponens: cui hae sunt adscribenda, nisi creatori omnium creaturarum, datori intelligentiae, amorum inspiratori (ex August. loc. cit.)? Unde vult dicere, quod naturalis philosophia est de his quae pertinent ad conditionem naturae; rationalis de his quae pertinent ad rationem et intelligentiam; moralis de his quae pertinent ad amorem. Ideo naturalis adscribitur auctori Patri, rationalis sapientiae Filio, moralis amori seu bonitati Spiritus sancti. 6 Vers. 10. Expositionem huius loci vide apud Lyranum et Magistrum, hic in fine c. 2.

4 Rm. 1:20.
5 Book XI, ch 25: Hence philosophers wanted there to be a tripartite discipline of wisdom. — From codex U we adjoin this gloss explaining the words of (St.) Augustine: to whom are these to be ascribed, unless to the creator of all creatures, to the giver of intelligence, to the inspirer of love? {from (St.) Augustine, loc. cit.} Whence he wants to say, that natural philosophy concerns these things which pertain to the condition of nature; the “rational” concerns those things which pertain to reason and intelligence; “moral” concerns those things which pertain to love. For that reason “natural” is ascribed to the Father as Author, “rational” to the Son as Wisdom, “moral” to the love or goodness of the Holy Spirit.
6 Verse 18. See the exposition of this passage in the writings of (Nicholas) of Lyra and Master (Peter Lombard), here at the end of ch. 2.

 

p. 76

 

Non quantum ad ap- / -propriata, quia bonitas maxime nobis relucet in creatura: ergo quantum ad propria: ergo saltem duas personas cognoverunt.

Not as much as regards things / appropriated, because for us goodness glitters in the greatest manner [maxime] in a creature: therefore as much as regards things proper: therefore they cognized at least two Persons.

3. Item, hoc idem1 videtur per rationem: quia vestigium, cum dicat distinctionem, est ratio cognoscendi Deum distinctive sive in distinctione: sed non est in Deo nisi distinctio personarum: ergo per vestigium potuerunt cognoscere distinctionem personarum.

3. Likewise, this same (argument)1 appears through reason: because the vestige, when it means “distinction,” is a reason for cognizing God distinctively or in distinction: but there is no distinction in God except (that) of the Persons: therefore through a vestige they could cognize the distinction of the Persons.

4. Item, per imaginem est cognitio Trinitatis quantum ad ordinem, distinctionem et aequalitatem; sed cognitio per imaginem est cognitio per creaturam: ergo per creaturam potuerunt cognocere Trinitatem.

4. Likewise, through the image there is a cognition of the Trinity as much as regards order, distinction and equality; but cognition through an image is cognition through a creature: therefore through a creature they could cognize the Trinity.

5. Item, difficilior est cognitio propriatatum occultarum creaturae quam cognitio pluralitatis personarum, quia illa non capitur nisi a magnis et subtilibus, haec autem capitur etiam2 a rudibus et insipientibus: ergo si potuerunt per propriatates creaturarum visibiles pervenire ad invisibiles, multo fortius ad cognoscendum, personas esse plures. Et hoc est quod dicitur Sapientiae decimo tertio:3 Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent saeculum aestimare, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt?

5. Likewise, the cognition of the hidden properties of creatures is more difficult than the cognition of the plurality of the Persons, because the former [illa] is not seized except by the great and subtle, but the latter [haec] is seized even2 by the rough [rudibus] and foolish: therefore if they could through the visible properties of creatures arrive at the invisible ones, much more strongly (did they arrive) at cognizing, that there are more Persons. And this is what is said in the thirteenth (chapter) of Wisdom:3 For if they could know so much, that they could estimate the age, [saeculum aestimare] why did they not more easily find its Lord?

CONTRA: 1. Cognitio Trinitatis est cognitio fidei: sed cognitio fidei est4 de his quae sunt supra rationem; et quae sunt supra rationem non possunt cognosci per creaturas: ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The cognition of the Trinity is a cognition of the Faith: but cognition of the Faith is4 of these things which are above reason; and those which are above reason cannot be cognized through creatures: ergo etc..

2. Item, non est nisi duobus modis5 de Deo cognoscere per creaturam, aut affirmando quod est in creatura vel simile, aut removendo; sed Trinitas non cognoscitur per remotionem, sed per positionem; sed in nulla creatura invenitur pluralitas suppositorum cum unitate essentiae: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, there is no cognizing of God through a creature except in two manners,5 either by affirming what is in the creature and/or (its) like, or by removing; but the Trinity is not cognized through a removal, but through a positing; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits with a unity of essence: ergo etc..

3. Item, lex scripta est super6 legem naturae, sive liber sacrae Scripturae super librum mundanae creaturae; sed nullus fide carens per sacram Scripturam venit in cognitionem pluralitatis personarum: ergo multo minus per librum mundanae creaturae.

3. Likewise, written law is above6 the law of nature, or the book of Sacred Scripture above the book of created world [mundanae creaturae]; but no one lacking faith comes through Sacred Scripture unto the cognition of the plurality of the Persons: therefore much less through the book of the created world.

CONCLUSIO.

Trinitas personarum non est cognoscibilis per creaturas, sed tantum trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitas, veritas, bonitas.

CONCLUSION

The Trinity of Persons is not cognizable through creatures, but only a trinity of appropriated things, that is, unity, truth, (and) goodness.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum cum unitate essentiae est proprium divinae naturae solius, cuius simile nec reperitur in creatura nec potest reperiri nec rationabiliter cogitari: ideo nullo modo trinitas personarum est cognoscibilis per creaturam, rationabiliter ascendendo a creatura in7 Deum. Sed licet non habeat omnino simile, habet tamen aliquod modo quod creditur simile in creatura. Unde dico, quod philosophi nunquam per rationem cognoverunt personarum trinitatem nec etiam8 pluralitatem, nisi haberent aliquem habitum fidei, sicut habet aliqui haeretici; unde quae dixerunt, aut locuti sunt non intelligentes, aut fidei radio illustrati.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that a plurality of persons with a unity of essence is proper to the Divine Nature alone, the like of which is not discovered [reperitur] in a creature, neither can it be discovered nor be rationally thought: for that reason in no manner is the Trinity of the Persons cognizable through a creature, by ascending rationally from the creature into7 God. But although It does not have (anything) entirely like (It), It does have, however, in some manner that which is believed (to be) its like in a creature. Whence I say, that the philosophers never through reason cognized the Trinity of the Persons nor even8 (Their) plurality, unless they had some habit of faith, as some heretics have; whence what they said, either they spoke (as) ones not understanding, or (as) ones enlightened by a ray of faith.

Est alia trinitas appropriatorum, scilicet unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis,9 et hanc cognoverunt, quia habet simile.

There is another trinity of things appropriated, that is, of unity, of truth and of goodness,9 and this they did cognize, because it has a like.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod per tripartitam philosophiam cognoverunt philosophi Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod per illud et per alia venerunt in10 cognitionem appropriatorum, credentes vero in cognitionem utriusque trinitatis.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that through a tripartite philosophy philosophers cognized the Trinity; it must be said, that it is true, that through that and through other things they came into10 the cognition of things appropriated, but as ones believing into the cognition of each trinity.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de tertio signo, dicitur et bene, quia sapientes ideo dicuntur defecisse in tertio signo, quia defecerunt in cognitione effectus potissimi11 bonitatis, scilicet redemptionis.

2. To that which is objected concerning the third sign, it is also well said, that the wise for that reason are said to have failed at the third sign, because they failed in the cognition of the most powerful effect11 of Goodness, that is, of the Redemption.

3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod vestigium dicit disctinctionem proprietatum essentialium, et huic respondet trinitas appropriatorum, non propriorum sive personarum.

3. To the other it must be said, that “vestige” means “a distinction of essential properties,” and to this responds the trinity of things appropriated, not of things proper or of the Persons.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imagine, dicendum, quod est cognoscere animam secundum id quod est; et cognitio ista est rationis; vel secundum12 quod imago; et cognitio ista est solius fidei.

4. To that which is objected concerning the image, it must be said, that there is a cognizing of the soul according to that which it is; and that cognition belongs to reason; and/or according12 to which (it is) an image; and that cognition belongs to the Faith alone.

1 Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit idem, pro quo cod. Z habet ipsum.
2 Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus etiam, quod Vat. minus bene omittit. Mox cod. R post si adiungit philosophi, ac plurimi codd. ut A F G J I K S T Y etc. post creaturarum addunt reru,, in qua lectione creaturarum falso positum est loco creatarum.
3 Vers. 9, ubi Vat. post scire ponit quod poterant saeculum mensurare, quomodo.
4 Ed. 1 hic repetit cognitio. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 1 §. 2.
5 Cod. K satis bene adiungit aliquid, cod. X Deum ponit loco de Deo. Mox plurimi codd. ut A C F C H I L O S T U X etc. vel simile vel removendo, pro quo Vat. aut simile aut removendo; sequimur codd. quoad primam partem ponendo vel simile, et Vat. quoad secundam retinendo aut removendo, quia in hac lectione membra divisionis et subdivisionis clarius exhibentur. Cod. Y omittit vel et ed. 1 loco vel ponit ut ante simile. — De hoc argumento vide Dionys., De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 2.
6 Plures codd. ut B S bb et ed. 1 hic et paulo post supra.
7 Ed. 1 ad. Cod. R paulo post loco quod habet et ac cod. T cernitur pro creditur.
8 Desideratur in Vat. etiam, quod tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo post Vat. unde qui dixerunt hanc Trinitatem aut; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 in eo conveniunt, quod omittant hanc Trinitatem, dissentiunt tamen inter se, quod alii cum Vat. habeant qui dixerunt, cod. I qui hoc dixerunt, alii ut O T etc. quae dixerunt, quos sequimur; ed. 1 tandem legit qui aliquid inde dixerunt.
9 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte veritas, unitas et bonitas et paulo post habent.
10 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ad.
11 Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene potissimae. Mox cod. O ante redemptionis praemittit incarnationis et.
12 Vat. contra plurimos codd. minus bene addit id.

1 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits same (argument) [idem], for which codex Z has very (argument) [ipsum].
2 Favoring the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added even [etiam], which the Vatican text not so well omitts. Then codex R has philosophers after if and very many of the codices as A F G H I K S T Y etc. add things [rerum] after of creatures, in which reading of creatures [creaturarum] has been falsely put in place of of created [creatarum].
3 Verse 9, where the Vatican text after know so much [tantum . . .scire] puts that they could measure the age, why.
4 Edition 1 here repeats a cognition. — Concerning this argument cf. Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 1 § 2,
5 Codex K, well enough, adds something [aliquid: which alters the reading to to cognize something of God through creatures is not but in two manners], codex X puts God in place of of God [which alters the reading to to cognize God through . . . etc.]. Then very many of the codices as A C F C H I L O S T U X etc. have and/or (its) like, and/or by removing; we follow the codices in regard to the first part by putting and/or (its) like [vel simile], and the Vatican text in regard to the second part by retaining or by removing [aut removendo], because in this reading the members of the division and subdivision are more clearly exhibited. Codec Y omits and/or [vel] and edition 1 in place of and/or puts as [ut] before (its) like. — Concerning this argument see Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2.
6 Very many of the codices as B S and bb and edition 1 have here and a little afterwards above [supra].
7 Edition 1 has to [ad]. Codex R a little afterwards in place of that which has and [trans. -- which alters the reading to It does have (it), however, in some manner and (its) like believed (to be) in a creature] and codex T has is discerned [cernitur] for is believed.
8 There is wanting in the Vatican text even [etiam], which, however, is had in the manuscripts and edition 1. A little after this the Vatican text has whence those who meant [dixerunt] this Trinity, either; all the codices together with edition 1 agree in this, that they omit this Trinity, however they disagree among themselves, because some with the Vatican text have those who said, codex I those who said this, others as O T etc. what they said, which we follow; finally edition 1 reads those who for that reason said anything.
9 The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has less aptly truth, unity and goodness and a little after this they have a like.
10 The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has to [ad].
11 The Vatican text, striving against the manuscripts and edition 1, has less well of the effect of most powerful Goodness [effectus potissimae bonitatis]. Then codex O prefaces of the Redemption with of the Incarnation and.
12 The Vatican text against very many codices adds less well that which (is) [id quod].

 

p. 77

 

5. Ad illud quod ultimo1 obiicitur, quod difficilius est cognoscere mundum; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur, supposito divino adminiculo; simpliciter autem loquendo falsum est. Citius enim disponeretur homo ad fidem, quam acquireret2 cogntionem philosophiae. Intellectus tamen noster plus potest in cognitionem rerum mundanarum quam Trinitatis; quia illa est supra rationem, et contrarium eius videt in sensu; et ideo indiget nova elevatione, utpote cognitione per infusionem.

5. To that which lastly2 is objected, that it is more difficult to cognize the world; it must be said, that that is understood, with the Divine Assistance supposed [supposito divino adminiculo]; but simply speaking it is false. For more swiftly would a man be disposed to the Faith, than would he acquire2 a cognition of philosophy. Our intellect, however, is more able for [plus potest in] the cognition of mundane things than (those) of the Trinity; because That is above reason, and it sees Its contrary in sensing; and for that reason it needs a new elevation, in the form of [utpote] a cognition through infusion.

 SCHOLION.

 SCHOLIUM

I. Quoad propositionem in corp., quae attribuit haereticis aliquem habitum fidei, sciendum, quod duplex distinguitur habitus fidei, scil. infusus et acquisitus, et hic est ordinis naturalis. Acquisitum habitum vel ipsi haeretici formales habere possunt.

I. In regard to the proposition in the body (of the question), which attributes to heretics some habit of faith, it must be known, that there is distinguished a twofold habit of faith, that is, infused and acquired, and the latter belongs to the natural order. Formal heretics themselves can also have the acquired habit.

Recte dicitur in solut. ad 4, quod cognitio imaginis sit solius fidei. Imago enim, in quantum imago, dicit respectum ad id cuius est imago. Nullus autem respectus potest cognosci nisi cognito utroque extremo. Licet igitur cognoscatur fundamentum relationis in anima, i. e. imago materialiter intellecta, tamen non cognoscitur formaliter ut imago, quamdiu alter terminus relationis non cognoscitur, nempe tres personae divinae.

It is rightly said in the solution to n. 4, that cognition of the image belongs to the Faith alone. For the image, inasmuch as (it is) an image, means “a looking back” [respectum] to that of which it is the image. But no “looking back” can be cognized unless each extreme has been cognized. Therefore although the foundation of the relation in the soul is cognized, i. e. the image understood in a material sense [materialiter], however (the soul) is not recognized formally as an image, so long as the other terminus of the relation is not cognized, namely the Three Divine Persons.

II. S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. I. c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Quodlib. q. 14. — S. Thom., hic. q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 32. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. q. 4. n. 25. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

II. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. I, ch. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 2, m. 1, a. 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Quodlibetals., q. 14. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 32, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 18; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the first principle of q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 22, q. 4, n. 25. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 4.

1 Ope mss. substituimus ultimo pro ulterius et immediate post adiunximus quod.
2 Cod. Y quam ad acquirendam; lectio haud spernenda.

1 With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted lastly [ultimo] for further [ulterius] and immediately afterwards we have adjoined that [quod].
2 Codex Y has than to acquire [quam ad acquirendam]; a reading by no means to be spurned [trans. -- though it does alter the significance of the comparison, which is rather of the effort on the part of man, than of the goodness of the objects].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.