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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III |
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PARS. I. |
PART I |
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ARTCULUS UNICUS.
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI |
ARTICLE SOLE
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram de rationibus illis, quas ponit Magister quantum ad rationem probandi et vim3 inferendi, quia videntur omnes vel non valere vel dubium supponere. |
In that part of his (text) there are doubts [dubitationes] about the text concerning those reasons, which Master (Peter) posits as much as regards the reason for proving and the force3 of inferring, because all seem to not be valid [non valere] and/or to suppose a doubt [dubium]. |
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Prima namque ratio talis est.4 Qui potest quod nulla creatura potest, est supra omnem creaturam; sed qui fecit mundum istum, fecit quod nulla potest creatura: ergo non est creatura, sed super omnem creaturam. Et incipit haec ratio ibi: Nam sicut ait Ambrosius, ut Deus etc. In ista ratione videtur supponi duplex5 dubium, videlicet quod mundus iste sit factus, et quod creatura ipsum non possit facere, quorum utrumque est valde dubium. |
And indeed the first reason is of such a kind.4 He who can (make) what no creature can (make), is above every creature; but the One who made this world of ours, made what no creature can (make): therefore He is not a creature, but above every creature. And this reason starts there (where he says): For as (St.) Ambrose says, that God etc. In that reason of his a twofold5 doubt seems to be supposed, namely that this world of ours has been made, and that a creature could not make it, each of which is very doubtful (valde dubium). |
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Secunda ratio est haec.6 Qui fecit corporalia et spiritus mutabiles, est super omnia corporalia et mutabilia: ergo est spirituale et immutabile. Hic similiter videtur supponi dubium, quod Deus fecerit spiritus. Et iterum, non sequitur ex hoc, quodsi fecit mutabilia, quod7 sit immutabilis, immo potius videtur sequi oppositum, scilicet quod sit mutabilis. |
The second reason is this.6 He who made corporal things and mutable spirits, is above all corporal and mutable things: therefore He is spiritual and immutable. This similarly seems to suppose a doubt, that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this, that if He made mutable things, that7 He is immutable, nay rather the opposite seems to follow, that is, that He is mutable. |
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Tertia ratio haec est. Qui fecit bona et meliora, est optimus; sed Deus fecit corporalia, quae sunt bona, et spiritualia, quae sunt meliora: ergo Deus est optimus. Haec similiter ratio videtur nullam habere apparentiam, quia tunc similiter quilibet artifex, qui facit bona et meliora, esset8 optimus, quod falsum est. |
The third reason is this. He who made good things and better things, is the best; but God made corporal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is the best. This reason similarly seems not to be apparent [nullam habere apparentiam], because then any artisan, who makes good things and better things, would8 similarly be the best, which is false. |
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Quarta ratio haec est. Qui fecit pulcra et pulcriora, est ipsa pulcritudo sive species, et hoc est speciosissimum; sed videmus, corporalia esse speciosa, et spiritualia esse speciosiora:9 ergo qui fecit haec, est speciosissimus. Similiter videtur, quod nec ratio praedicta valeat propter praedictam instantiam. |
The fourth reason is this. He who made beautiful things [pulcra] and more beautiful things, is Beauty [pucritudo] Itself or outward Beauty [species], and this One is most outwardly-beautiful [speciosissimum]; but we see, that corporal things are outwardly-beautiful, and spiritual things are more outwardly-beautiful:9 therefore He who made these, is most outwardly-beautiful. Similarly it seems, that neither aforesaid reason is valid on account of the aforesaid example [instantia]. |
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Item quaeritur de differentia istarum rationum, et quomodo distinguuntur. Si dicas, sicut dicunt aliqui, quod sunt quatuor penes quatuor genera causarum, hoc nihil est, quia genus causae materialis non cadit in Deo. Si dicas, quod penes modos cognoscendi; contra: non sunt nisi tres, scilicet in ratione causae, ablationis et excellentiae.10 |
Likewise there is asked concerning the difference of those reasons of his, and in what manner they are distinguished. If you say, as some say, that there are four from within [penes] the four genera of causes, this is nothing, because the genus of the material cause does not fall in God. If you say, that (they are) from within [penes] the manners of cognizing; on the contrary: there are not but three, that is, in the reckoning of cause, of ablation and of excellence.10 |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod omnes istae rationes ad hoc,11 ut probent et inferant, supponunt aliquod certum. Prima enim ratio supponit, quod productio rei de nihilo non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita. Hoc supposito, cum certum sit, nullam creaturam habere potentiam infinitam,12 sequitur, quod / actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, . . . |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that all those reasons of his suppose something certain for this (purpose), to prove and infer (the conclusion). For the first reason supposes, that the production of a thing from nothing cannot be except from an infinite potency. With this supposed, since it is certain, that no creature has an infinite potency,12 it follows that / the act of production of a thing from nothing belongs to Him, . . . |
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3 Aliqui codd. ut X Y pro vim minus
bene verum, codd. G I inde. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 post omnes
supplevimus vel. |
3 Some codices as X Y in place of force [vim]
have less well truth [verum], codices G and I have thence [inde].
Then from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied and/or [vel]
after valid. |
p. 78
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actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, qui1 est super omnem creaturam. Et ita ex hoc actu tanquam ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus. In aliis tribus rationibus supponitur status, sicut in tota philosophia supponitur status in causis; et ideo omne mutabile reducitur ad immutabile, quia in mutabili non est status in genere efficientis nisi in movente non moto: omne enim quod movetur, ab alio movetur.2 Similiter bonum et melius reducuntur ad optimum, quia non est status in genere finis nisi in optimo. Similiter pulcrum et puchrius ad pulcherrimum, quia non est status in genere speciei et formae, nisi in eo quod est ipsa species per essentiam. |
the act of the production of a thing belongs to Him, who1 is above every creature. And thus from this act as from what is proper to Him [ex proprio] there is cognized God the Omnipotent, the Immense. In the other three reasons there is supposed a stability [status], just as in all of philosophy there is supposed a stability among causes; and for that reason every mutable is lead back [reducitur] to an immutable, because in the mutable there is not a stability in the genus of the efficient except in the non-moved mover: for everything which is moved, is moved by another.2 Similarly the good and the better are lead back to the best, because stability is not in the genus of the end except in the best. Similarly the beautiful and more beautiful to the most beautiful, because stability is not in the genus of species and form, except in the one which is itself essentially [per essentiam] species. |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur de distinctione rationum, ex dictis iam patet responsio. Non enim possunt distingui penes genus causarum tantum, nec penes modos cognoscendi tantum, sed penes utrumque.3 Prima enim ratio sumitur secundum rationem causae; aliae sumuntur penes rationem causae et excellentiae, quia considerant ordinem et distinguuntur secundum ordinem in triplici genere causae,4 efficientis sive moventis, finientis et exemplaris. |
To that which is asked concerning the distinction of the reasons, from what has been said the response is already clear. For they cannot be distinguished from within [penes] the genus of causes only, nor from within the manners of cognizing only, but (they can) from within both.3 For the first reason is taken according the reckoning of the cause; the others are taken from within the reckoning of cause and excellence, because they consider the order and they are distinguished according to order in a threefold genus of cause,4 the efficient or motive [moventis], the final [finientis] and the exemplar. |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod postea dicit Magister, quod ex perpetuitate intelligitur Conditor aeternus. Nihil enim valet: effectus est perpetuus,5 ergo efficiens est aeternus. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which Master (Peter) says afterwards, that from the perpetuity . . . the eternal Founder is understood. For it has no value (to say): the effect is perpetual,5 therefore the efficient (cause) is eternal. |
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Item quaeritur similiter6 de hoc quod dicit: Ex magnitudine omnipotens. Nihil enim valet: fecit magna, ergo est omnipotens vel potest facere omnia. |
Likewise it is similarly6 asked concerning this which he says: From the magnitude . . . the omnipotent. For it has no value (to say): it made great things, therefore it is omnipotent and/or it can make all things. |
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RESPONDEO: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod tantum est quaedam persuasio per signum, non necessaria argumentatio. Dicunt enim, quod omnipotentia et aeternitas, cum sint infinitae, non possunt sufficienter probari per creaturas, quae sunt finitae.7 Aliter tamen potest dici, quod quamvis non sequatur in quolibet efficiente, tamen necessario sequitur in efficiente sive perpetuante primo. Impossibile enim est, quod creatura habeat esse et magnum esse8 et hoc totum ab aliquo, qui non possit in totum; et qua ratione in hoc totum, et in quodlibet. Similiter, si est primum perpetuans, est omnino in actu et nihil in potentia; et si hoc, cum possit facere durare aliud in infinitum, ipsum est actu infinitum duratione: ergo aeternum. |
I RESPOND: To this some say, that there is only a certain persuasion through a sign, not a necessary argumentation. For they say, that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proven through creatures, which are finite.7 However in another way it can be said, that although it does not follow in every efficient, however it necessarily follows in the efficient or first perpetuating. For it is impossible, that a creature have a being [esse] and a great being [magnum esse]8 and this whole from another, which cannot be in the whole; and by this reason in this whole, and in anything. Similarly, if there is a first perpetuating, it is entirely in act and none (of it is) in potency; and if this (is so), since it can make another endure unto the infinite, it is itself infinite in the duration of its act [actu duratione]: therefore eternal. |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnia quae arte divina condita9 sunt, unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Videtur enim primo dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum haec tria condita sint, tunc habent unitatem, speciem et ordinem, et sic de aliis: ergo si est stare, tunc aliqua condita sunt, quae haec non habent.10 |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: all . . . which have been made by the divine Art, show . . . a certain unity in themselves and an outward-beauty and order.. For he seems to say, first, (that it is) false, because if this (is so), since these three have been founded, then they have a unity, an outward-beauty [species], and an order, and thus concerning the others: therefore if it is to stand, then some have been founded, which do not have these.10 |
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Item videtur male enumerare, quia Augustinus11 ponit ista tria: modum, species et ordinem, et haec alia: unitatem, veritatem, bonitatem. Quaeritur ergo de diversis modis enumerandi, unde veniant. |
Likewise he seems to badly enumerate, because (St.) Augustine11 posits these three: measure [modum], outward-beauty and order, and these others: unity, truth, goodness. Therefore it is asked concerning the diverse manners of enumerating, whence do they come? |
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RESPONDEO: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod hoc intelligitur de creaturis perfectis, vel si de omnibus,12 tunc illa tria non dicunt conditiones in re creata, sed in exemplari increato. Potest tamen dici, quod in primis intentionibus et generalibus13 est reflexio et ideo status, nec est ultra procedendum. |
I RESPOND: To this some say, that this is understood of perfect creatures, and/or if of all things,12 then those three are not called conditions in the created thing, but in the uncreated exemplar. However it can be said, that in the first and general intentions13 there is reflection and for that reason stability [status], and one is not to proceed beyond (this). |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur de enumeratione illorum trium, quod non videtur conveniens; dicendum quod res creata habet tripliciter considerari: aut in / se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas . . . |
To that which is asked concerning the enumeration of the other three, that it does not seem to be fitting [conveniens]; it must be said that a created thing has to be considered in a threefold manner: either in / itself, or in comparison to other creatures . . . |
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1 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 quae.
Paulo infra ed. 1 primo pro proprio. |
1 The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and to
edition 1 reads that (power), which [eius, quae]. A little below this
edition 1 has the first in place of its own. |
p. 79
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aut in / se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas, aut in comparatione ad causam primam. Et secundum hos omnes modos contingit reperire trinitatem dupliciter. |
either in / itself, or in comparison to other creatures, or in comparison to the first cause. And according to all these manners it happens that one finds a twofold trinity. |
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Si enim consideretur quantum in se vel quantum ad se, hoc est, aut quantum ad substantiam principiorum; et sic est illa trinitas; materia, forma, compositio, quae ponitur in libro de Regula fidei;1 aut quantum ad habitudines; et sic est illa, Sapientiae undecimo:2 Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. In numero enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in pondere propria ipsorum inclinatio, in mensura eorum3 ad invicem proportio. |
For if it is considered as much as (it is) in itself and/or as much as (it is) for itself, that this, either as much as regards the substance of its principles; and thus there is that trinity: matter, form, composition, which is posited in (that) book on the Rule of faith;1 or as much as regards (its) habitudes; and thus it is that (trinity spoken of), in the eleventh (chapter) of Wisdom:2 Thou has disposed all thing in number, weight and measure. For in number there is understood a distinction of principles, in weight their proper inclination, in measure their3 proportion to one another. |
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Item, si consideretur una creatura in comparatione ad alias creaturas, hoc potest esse4 aut in quantum agit actione naturali; et sic sumitur illa trinitas Dionysii,5 substantia, virtus et operatio; aut in quantum agit actione spirituali; et sic illa Augustini, de octoginta tribus Quaestionibus,6 « quo constat, quo congruit, quo discernitur », et ultimum refertur ad animam. |
Likewise, if one creature is considered in comparison to other creatures, this can be4 either inasmuch as it acts by natural action; and thus is taken that trinity of Dionysius (the Areopagite),5 substance, virtue and operation; or inasmuch as it acts by spiritual action; and thus that (trinity) of (St.) Augustine, On the Eighty-three Questions,6 « that whereby it is established, that to which it is suitable, that whereby it is distinguished », and the last is referred to the soul. |
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Si autem considerentur7 in comparatione ad Deum, hoc potest esse duplicitur: aut in quantum referuntur tantum; et sic est illa, modus, species et ordo; aut in quantum referuntur et assimiliantur; et sic est illa, unitas, veritas et8 bonitas. |
But if (creatures) are considered7 in comparison to God, this can be in a twofold manner: either inasmuch as they are referred only; and thus is there is that (trinity of), manner, species and order; or inasmuch as they are referred and assimilated; and thus there is that (trinity of), unity, truth and8 goodness. |
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Quoniam ergo vestigium attenditur in comparatione ad Deum proprie, ideo in his ultimis conditionibus proprie accipitur vestigium. Et quia magna est inter istas comparationes convenientia, ideo Magister miscet haec ad invicem propter multam convenientiam et correspondentiam;9 quia unitas respondet modo, qui respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; veritas speciei, quae respicit ipsum ut exemplar; bonitas ordini, qui10 respicit Deum ut finem. |
Therefore since the vestige is attained in comparison to God properly (speaking), for this reason in this last conditions the vestige is accepted properly. And because there is a great fittingness among those comparisons of his, for that reason Master (Peter) mingles these together [ad invicem] on account of much fittingness and correspondence;9 because unity responds to the manner, which looks back to God as efficient cause; truth to the species, which looks back to Him as exemplar; goodness to the order, which looks back to God as end. |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod appropriat veritatem Filio dicens: Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris. Sed contra Augustinus in Soliloquio:11 « Veritas est id quod est »; sed ens nulli personae appropriatur: ergo nec veritas. |
Likewise is asked concerning that saying which appropriates the truth to the Son: The most perfect beauty is understood (to be) the Son, that is the Truth of the Father. But against (this speaks St.) Augustine in the Soliloquies:11 « The truth is that which is »; but being is appropriated to no Person: therefore neither truth. |
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Item videtur male appropriare ordinem Spiritui sancto, quia in praecedenti capitulo dicit, quod ex ordine intelligitur sapiens;12 sed sapientia appropriatur Filio: ergo et ordo. |
Likewise it seems that order is badly appropriated to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says, that from order the wise is understood;12 but wisdom is appropriated to the Son: therefore also order. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod veritas potest dupliciter considerari, sicut et13 color. Nam uno modo color consideratur secundum id in quo est; et sic definitur in libro de Sensu et sensato:14 « Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato ». Alio modo in comparatione ad visum, quem movet; et sic definitur in libro de Anima:15 « Color est motivum visus secundum actum lucidi ». |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that truth can be considered in a twofold manner, just as also13 color. For in one manner color is considered according to that in which it is; and thus it is defined in the book On Sensing and the sensed:14 « Color is the extremity of the evident in a bounded body ». In another manner in comparison to the seeing, which it moves; and thus is it defined in the book On the Soul:15 « Color is a motive of seeing according to the act of the lucid thing ». |
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Similiter veritas potest considerari in compartione ad id in quo est; et sic verum est16 id quod est; alio modo per comparationem ad intellectum, quem movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in secundo Metaphysicae,17 « est finis intelligentiae speculativae ». Secundum primum modum dicit Anselmus:18 « Veritas Patris est essentia Patris ». Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius,19 quod « veritas est delcarativum esse ». Et quoniam Filius20 procedit ut Verbum, cui appropriatur ratio decla- / -randi, . . . |
Similarly truth can be considered in comparison to that in which it is; and thus the truth is16 that which is; in another manner through a comparison to the intellect, which it moves; and thus truth, as the Philosopher says in the second (Book) of Metaphysics,17 « is the end of speculative intelligence ». According to the first manner (St.) Anselm says:18 « The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father ». As much as regard the second manner (St.) Hilary says,19 that « truth is declarative being [esse] ». And since the Son20 proceeds as the Word, to whom is appropriated the reckoning of the one decla - / -ring, . . . |
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1 Alanus ab Insulis, de Arte seu Articulis
catholicae fidei, a. 24: Materia et forma earumque compago tria prorsus
diversa sunt. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus convenienter ponuntur.
Cod V compositum loco compositio. |
1 Alan of Lille, On the Art or Articles of the
Catholic Faith, a. 24: Matter and form and their joining-together are
three utterly diverse (things). The Vatican text against the manuscripts
and edition 1 has less conveniently are posited. Codex V has composite
in place of composition. |
p. 80
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ratio decla - / -randi, ideo ei appropriatur ratio exemplaris et per consequens ratio veritatis, quantum ad secundum modum veritatis; ipse autem accipit primo modo.1 |
reckoning of the one decla- / -ring, for that reason there is appropriated to Him the reckoning of the exemplar and consequently the reckoning of the truth, as much as it regards the second manner of truth; but He accepts it in the first manner. |
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Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine, dicendum, quod est ordo rerum in universo; et hic appropriatur sapientiae; et est ordo rerum in finem; et hic appropriatur bonitati; et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas. |
To that which is objected concerning order, it must be said, that there is an order of things in the universe; and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is an order of things to the end; and this is appropriated to goodness; and thus it is clear, that there is no contrariety. |
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1 De veritate plura vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. |
1 Concerning truth, see the many things (said) below at d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.