S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. II.

De cognitione Dei per similitudines propinquas sive per imaginem.

PART II

On the cognition of God through near similitudes or through the image.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 80-82.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 80-82.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem.

But now let us come presently to that disputation etc.

 

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

 

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

ARTICULUS I.

 

De prima assignatione imaginis

ARTICLE I

 

On the first impression of the image

Consequenter ad intelligentiam istius partis secundae praesentis distinctionis, cuius divisio posita est supra,2 quantum ad primam assignationem imaginis, quae est per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, tria quaeruntur.

Consequently for the understanding of the second part of his present distinction, the Division of which has been put above,2 as much as regards the first impression [assignationem] of the image, which is through memory, intelligence and will, three (things) are required.

Primum est, utrum in his tribus attendatur ratio imaginis.
Secundum est de comparatione istarum ad obiectum.
Tertium est de comparatione earum ad animam vel subiectum.

The first is, whether in these three (powers) a reckoning of an image is attained.
The second concerns the comparison of these to the object.
The third concerns their comparison to the soul and/or subject.

 

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum ratio imaginis attendatur in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

 

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the reckoning of the image is attained in the memory, intelligence and will.

QUOD AUTEM in omnibus simul sit, videtur.

MOREOVER THAT it is in all together, seems (from this):

1. Ad rationem enim imaginis requiritur expressa conformatio in distinctione; sed distinctio in divinis attenditur quantum ad tres personas:  ergo maxime3 in imagine creata attenditur quantum ad tres potentias.

1. For there is required for the reckoning of the image an expressed conformation in a distinction; but distinction among the divine is attained as much as regards the Three Persons:  therefore most of all [maxime]3 is it attained in the created image as much as regards the three powers (of the soul).

2. Item, ratio imaginis consistit in perfecta capacitate, quia secundum Augustinum4 « eo est mens imago, quo potest esse capax et particeps Dei »; sed Deus non capitur ab anima plene nisi ametur, neque amatur nisi intelligatur, nec intelligitur nisi praesens ad animam habeatur; sed primum est per voluntatem, secundum per intelligentiam, tertium per memoriam:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the reckoning of the image consists in a perfect capacity, because according to (St.) Augustine4  « the mind is an image by that, whereby it can be a grasper of and sharer in God [capax et particeps Dei] »; but God is not grasped by the soul fully unless He is loved, nor is He loved unless He is understood, nor is He understood unless He is held present to the soul; but the first is through the will, the second through the intelligence, the third through the memory:  ergo etc..

3. Item, notitia sive intelligentia appropriatur Filio, voluntas Spiritui Sancto:  ergo aut truncata et diminuta erit assignatio imaginis, aut necesse est ponere potentiam respondentem Patri.

3. Likewise, knowledge [notitia] or intelligence is appropriated to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit:  therefore either the impression of the image will be truncated or diminished, or it is necessary to posit a power responding to the Father.

SED CONTRA:  1. Ad esse imaginis requiritur repraesentatio in distinctione originis et ordinis; sed in istis potentiis non est talis distinctio, quia simul sunt cum anima concreatae, nec una est ab alia nec una5 post aliam:  ergo in istis non est reperire rationem imaginis.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. To be an image there is required a representation in a distinction of origin and of order; but in these powers (of the soul) there is no such distinction, because all have been co-created [concreatae] together with the soul, nor is one from another nor one5 after another:  therefore among these there is no finding of a reckoning of image.

2. Item, imago est repraesentatio secundum exteriorem dispositionem, ut patet;6 sed istae tres potentiae sunt intimae ipsi animae:  ergo in ipsis non est ratio imaginis.

2. Likewise, an image is a representation according to an exterior disposition, as is clear;6 but those three powers (of the soul) are most interior to the soul itself:  therefore among them there is not a reckoning of an image.

3. Item, quod specialiter memoria non sit de ratione imaginis, videtur, quia imago cum sit animae essentialis et secundum potentiam rationalem sit in ipsa, memoria vero, ut dicit Philosophus,7 est sensibilium, quia est in brutis; unde differt a reminiscentia, quia reminiscentia non est in brutis:  ergo videtur quod memoria non pertineat ad imaginem.  Praeterea, sive8 memoria sit sensibilium sive in- / -telligibilium, . . .

3. Likewise, that the memory in particular does not concern the reckoning of the image, it seems, because the image, since it of an essential soul and according to (its) rational power is in (the same), but the memory, as the Philosopher says,7 is of sensibles, because it is in brutes; whence it differs from reminiscence, because reminiscence is not in brutes:  therefore it seems that memory does not pertain to the image.  Moreover, whether8 the memory is of sensibles or of in- / -telligibles, . . .

2  Vat. omittit:  cuius divisio posita est supra, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1; et paulo infra post tribus ponit scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.
3  Vat., obnitentibus mss., necessario.  —  De variis imaginis definitionbius, in quibus hoc argumentum et plura sequentia fundantur, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. 1. et 2., ac ibid. dub. 2. et 3.
4  Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.  Vide supra d. III. in lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa initium.  —  Paulo infra post praesens ope mss. posuimus ad loco apud.
5  Plures codd. ut A B I P Q T X etc. hic repetunt est.
6  Codd. I X Y ut in imagine hominis picti patet.  Immediate post cod. I igitur si loco sed.
7  Libr. de Memoria et Reminisc. c. 1. et 2. (in aliis. edd. c. 2. et 4.).  —  Paulo infra post brutis Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit unde differt usque ad in brutis, ac mox habet pertinet loco pertineat.  Paulo ante codd. N Z connaturalis pro essentialis.
8  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 cum loco sive et in fine argumenti temporalibus pro temporibus.

2  The Vatican edition omits:  the Division of which has been put above[cuius division posita est supra], which however is extant in the manuscripts and edition 1; and a little below this after in these three [in his tribus] it has that is the memory, the intelligence and the will [scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate].
3  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts, has necessarily [necessario].  —  On the various definitions of an image, upon which this argument and the many following are founded, cf. d. 31, p. II, q. 1 and 2, and ibid., doubt 2 and 3.
4  On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11.  See the text of Master (Peter), d. 3, ch. 2 near the beginning.  —  A little below this after present [praesens] we have put to [ad] in place of with [apud], with the help of the manuscripts.
5  Very many codices, as A B I P Q T X etc. here repeat is.
6  Codices I X Y read as is patent in the painted image of a man [ut in imagine hominis picit patet].  Immediately after this codex I has therefore if [igitur si] in place of but [sed].
7  (Aristotle's) book On Memory and Reminiscence, chs. 1 and 2 ( in other editions chs. 2 and 4).  —  A little below this after brutes [brutis] the Vatican edition without the authority of any manuscript nor of edition 1 omits whence it differs up to in brutes [unde differt . . . in brutis], and then it has the indicative for pertain [pertinet].  A little before this codices N and Z have connatural [connaturalis] in place of essential [essentialis].
8  The Vatican edition against the manuscripts and edition 1 has since [cum] in place of whether [sive] and at the end of the argument (on the next page) and temporal conditions [temporalibus] in place of conditions and times [temporibus].

p. 81

 sive in- / -telligibilium, concernit differentiam temporis, quia est acceptatio praesens de praeteritis; sed imago abstrahit a conditionibus sensibilibus et temporibus:  ergo etc.

or of in- / -telligibles, it concerns a difference of time, because there is a present acceptance of (things) past; but an image abstracts from sensible conditions and times.:  ergo etc..

4. Item, imago attenditur in his quae sunt nata recipere imaginem reformationis sive similitudines; sed imago illa consistit in tribus virtutibus theologicis, quarum nulla est in memoria:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, the image is attained in those which are bound to receive an image of reformation or similitudes; but that image consists in the three theological virtues, none of which is in the memory:  ergo etc..

5. Item, quod voluntas non sit de integritate imaginis, videtur, quia dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima:1 « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo est in potentia diligendi »; sed voluntas non pertinet ad potentiam cognitivam:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that the will does not concern the integrity of the image, because there is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul:1  « The image is in the power of cognizing, the similitude is in the power of loving [diligendi] »; but the will does not pertain to the cognitive power:  ergo etc..

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae est de imagine, debet aliis aequari, quia ad rationem imaginis requiritur aequalitas; sed voluntas non aequatur aliis, quia multa intelligimus, quae non volumus:  ergo etc.  Si dicas, quod non attenditur aequalitas respectu obiectorum, sed respectu actuum, ut sit sensus:  quaecumque2 intelligo, volo me intelligere, adhuc non est verum, quia multorum meminimus, quae nollemus meminisse.

6. Likewise, every power, which concerns the image, ought to be equal to the others, because for the reckoning of an image there is required equality; but the will is not equal to the others, because we understand many (things), which we do not will:  ergo etc..  If you say, that equality is not attained in respect of objects, but in respect of acts, as is sensing:  whatever2 I understand, I want myself to understand, yet it is not true, because we remember many (things), which we will to remember not.

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Ratio imaginis attenditur in his tribus potentiis, memoria, intellectu et voluntate, cum comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The reckoning of the image is attained in these three powers, memory, intellect and will, with a comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister recitat,3 imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quaendam disponendi.  Nam retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum, si quod intelligitur est bonum.4

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that, as (St.) Augustine says and Master (Peter) recites,3 the image is attained in these three powers, however (this is) in comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts, in which there is distinction and order and origin of one from another through the a certain manner of disposing.  For the retention of species disposes to understanding and understanding to loving, if what is understood is good.4

1. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud quod obiicitur:  in istis potentiis non est distinctio per originem:  ergo etc.

1. And through this the solution to that which is objected is clear:  in those powers (of the soul) there is not a distinction through origin:  ergo etc..

2. Ad illud5 quod obiicitur, quod imago attenditur secundum exteriorem dispositionem; dicendum, quod est imago rei corporalis et sensibilis; et haec, quia offert se cognitioni per exteriora, habet imaginem repraesentantem secundum exteriorem dispositionem.  Est iterum imago rei spiritualis, quae est intima cuilibet rei, et quae cognoscitur secundum quod virtus recolligitur ad intima; et haec6 habet imaginem repraesentantem quantum ad intimas dispositiones.

2. To that5 which is objected, that an image is attained according to an exterior disposition; it must be said, that there is a corporal and a sensible image of a thing; and this, because it offers itself to cognition through exteriors, has an image representing according to an exterior disposition.  And again there is a spiritual image of a thing, which is most interior [intima] to each thing, and which is cognized according to which (its) virtue is recovered at a most interior level [recolligitur ad intima]; and this6 has an image representing as much as regards most interior dispositions.

3. Ad illud7 quod obiicitur, quod memoria est sensibilium; dicendum, quod memoria accipitur tripliciter:  uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum.  Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiectio currit de aliis primis duobus modis.  Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondet Patri.

3. To that7 which is objected, that memory is of sensibles; it must be said, that memory is accepted in a threefold manner:  in one manner insofar as it is receptive and retentive of sensibles and things past; in another manner insofar as it is retentive of things past, whether sensibles or intelligibles; and in the third manner insofar as it is retentive of species, by abstracting from every difference of time, as of innate species.  And in this third manner there is a part of the image; but the objection depends upon [currit de] the other first two manners.  In the first manner the memory follows sensing, in the second manner it follows the intelligence itself and the will, in the third manner it precedes and (thus) corresponds to the Father.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria non reformatur; dicendum, quod immo memoria reformatur et quantum ad statum viae et quantum ad statum patriae:  in primo per spem; et hoc patet per expositionem Augustini super illud verbum Matthaei vigesimo secundo:8 Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde, « id est, intellectu sine errore, ex tota anima, id est, voluntate sine contradictione, ex tota mente, id est, memoria sine oblivione ».  In secundo statu reformatur quantum ad tentionem; unde Bernardus9 dicit, quod « Deus est futurus intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntatis multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ».  Nec est10 inconveniens, quod memoria, quamvis sit prima, reformetur per dotem ultimam; quia ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori, ordo autem informationis11 incipit a superiori:  ideo a voluntate incipit reformatio et tendit usque in memoriam.

4. To that which is objected, that the memory is not reformed:  it must be said, that nay rather the memory is reformed both as much as regards the state of way and the state of fatherland:  in the first through hope; and this is clear through the exposition of (St.) Augustine on that verse in the twenty-second (chapter) of (St.) Matthew:8  You shall love the Lord thy God with (thy) whole heart, « that is, with an intellect without error, with (thy) whole soul, that is, with a will without contradiction, with (thy) whole mind, that is, with a memory without forgetting ».  In the second state it is reformed as much as regards (its) grasp [tentionem]; whence (St.) Bernard9 says, that « God is going to be the fullness of light for the intelligence, the multitude of peace for the will, the continuation of eternity for the memory ».  Nor is it10 unfitting, that the memory, although it be first, be reformed through the last dowry; because the order of reformation and deformation begins from the posterior [a posteriori], but the order of information11 begins from the superior:  for that reason reformation begins from the will and tends even unto the memory.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi; dicendum, quod similitudo dicit quid gratuitum, et ideo dicitur esse per ap- / -propriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione.

5. To that which is objected, that the image is in the power of cognizing; it must be said, that the similitude (of the soul to God) means something gratuitous, and for that reason it is said to be through an ap- / -propriation in the will or in dilection.

1  Cap. 39:  Anima rationalis et intellectus facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat.  Ex imagine nameque Dei habet rationem et ex similitudine caritatem.
2  Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C F G H I K T etc. et ed. 1 quidquid.
3  Hic c. 2.  —  Paulo post Vat. cum loco tamen in, sed minus signanter et contra mss. et ed. 1.
4  Corruptam lectionem Vat. amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum emendavimus ope mss. et ed. 1.
5  Plures codd. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 aliud loco illud.
6  Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 haec. Paulo ante post virtus in cod.  A additur intelligibiliter.
7  Ope antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus a Vat. additum ergo.  Paulo intra post sensibilium cod. O omittit et moxque cod.  M loco retentiva ponit receptiva.
8  Vers. 37.  Expositionem huius loci, non solum a S. Bonaventura, sed etiam a S. Thomas (III. Sent. d. 37. expos. textus) Augustino adscriptam, non potuimus invenire in ipsius operibus.  S. Thomas in Catena aurea (Matt. 22, 37.) eam attribuit Glossae interlineari, in qua sic legitur:  Ex toto corde, id est intellectu, ut nullam in confessione divinitatis relinquae errori locum; in tota anima, id est voluntate, ut nihil ei contrarium velis, in tota mente, nihil reminiscens quo minus de eo sentias.  —  Tam in libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 35, quam in libr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2, qui inter opera S. Augustini recensebantur, simpliciter dicitur:  Id est ex toto intellectu tuo et ex tota voluntate tua et ex tota memoria tua.
9  In Cant. Cant. Serm. 11. n. 5.  —  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 quia loco quod.
10  Ope mss. et ed. 1 delevimus etiam. Paulo post cod. T prior loco prima.
11  Vat. formationis, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1, qui etiam paulo post omittunt reformatio, quod tamen claritatis gratia non expunximus.  Vide plura infra in Scholio ad hanc quaestionem.

1  Chapter 39:  The rational soul and the intellect have been made to the image and similitude of God, that one may cognize his Maker in virtue of (His) image [pro imagine], and love (Him) in virtue of His similitude [pro similitudine diligat].  For from the image of God it has reason and from (His) similitude charity.
2  The Vatican edition contrary to many codices, as A C F G H I K T etc. and edition 1 reads anything [quidquid].
3  Here in ch. 2.  —  A little after this the Vatican edition has with [cum] in place of however (this is) in [tamen in], but less clearly [signanter] and contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
4  The corrupted reading of the Vatican edition, love according to what is understood to be good [amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum], we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.
5 Very many codices as A T etc. and edition 1 have the other [aliud] in place of that [illud].
6  We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 this [haec].  A little before this after virtue [ virtus] there is added in codex A in an intelligible manner [intelligibiliter].
7  With the help of the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged from the Vatican edition the added therefore [ergo].  A little below this after of sensibles [sensibilium] codex O omits and [et] and then codex M puts receptive [receptiva] in place of retentive [retentiva].
8  Verse 37.  The exposition of this passage, ascribed to (St.) Augustine not only by St. Bonaventure, but also by St. Thomas (Sent., Bk. III, d. 27, exposition of the text), we could not find among the former's works.  St. Thomas in the Catena Aurea, Mt. 22:37, attributes it to the Glossa interlinearis, in which it reads thus:  With (thy) whole heart, that is with the intellect, so that you leave no place for error in (your) confession of (His) Divinity; in (thy) whole soul, that is with the will, so that you will nothing contrary to Him, in (thy) whole mind, reminiscing nothing whereby you may think [sentias] less of him.  —  Both in the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 35, and in the book On Loving God, ch. 2, which are reckoned among the works of St. Augustine, there is said simply:  That is with thy whole intellect and with thy whole will and with thy whole memory.
9  In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, Sermon 11, n. 5.  —  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has that [quia] in place of that [quod].
10  With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted also [etiam].  A little after this codex T has prior [prior] in place of first [prima].
11  The Vatican edition reads formation [formationis], but this is opposed to the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, which a little after this also omit reformation [reformatio], which for the sake of clarity we have not expunged.  See the many things below in the Scholium regarding this question.

p. 82

 per ap- / -propriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione.  Imago vero non dicit gratuitum, et1 ideo dicitur esse in potentia cognoscendi.

through ap- / -propriation in the will or in dilection.  But "the image" does not mean "the gratuitous", and1 for that reason it is said to be in the power of cognizing.

Vel aliter de imagine:  quia in Filio est propria2 imago, et Filio appropriatur intelligentia, quae est in potentia cognitiva; ideo dicitur imago esse in potentia cognoscendi.

And/or otherwise concerning the image:  because in the Son there is a proper2 image, and to the Son is appropriated intelligence, which is in the cognitive power; for that reason the image is said to be in the power of cognizing.

6. Ad illud:3 Voluntas non aequatur intelligentiae; dicendum, quod voluntas, prout communiter accipitur ad velle et nolle, quorum utrumque est actus voluntatis, bene aequatur, secundum quod dicitur uti esse commmune ad utrumque, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera,4 quod voluntas capit alia, dum utor etc.  Quidquid enim recordamur vel intelligimus, in facultatem voluntatis accipimus ad eligendum vel ad respuendum; et istud est, secundum quod dicit actum communem voluntatis;5 sed secundum actum specialem, qui est velle tantum, non aequatur; et de isto opponitur, quia6 sic velle non comprehendit totam voluntatem, sicut meminisse totam memoriam et intelligere totam intelligentiam.

6. To that:3 The will is not equal to the intelligence; it must be said, that the will, insofar as it is commonly accepted for willing and not-willing, each of which is an act of the will, is well an equal [bene aequatur], according to which to use is said to be common to each, just as (St.) Augustine says and as is had in the text (of Master Peter),4 that the will seizes the others, while it uses etc..  For anything we think of [recordamur] and/or understand, we accept into the faculty of the will to be chosen and/or rejected; and that is, according to this that it means a common act of the will;5 but according to a special act, which is willing only, it is not equal; and from that it is opposed, because6 willing in this manner does not comprehend the whole will, as forgetting (does) the whole memory and understanding the whole intelligence.

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I. In responsione duplex est propositio.  Prima est ipsa conclusio principalis, quae dicit, quod imago summae Trinitatis consistit in dictis tribus animae potentiis, quatenus includunt et unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum secundorum.  Secunda propositio, quae illam explicat et probat, est haec:  sicut in divinis personis est et distinctio et ordo et origo, ita etiam in actibus harum potentiarum haec tria inveniuntur.  Nam actus earum realiter distinguuntur; porro memoriae actus sive retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum.  Unde ex memoria quasi procedit actus intellectus, et ex memoria et intellectu amor.

II. In the response there is a twofold proposition.  The first is the principal conclusion itself, which says, that the image of the Most High Trinity consists in the said three powers of the soul, to the extent that they include both unity of essence and plurality of second acts.  The second proposition, which explicates and proves that, is this:  just as among the Divine Persons there is both distinction and order and origin, so also among the acts of these powers are these three found.  For their acts are really distinguished; further the act of memory or the retention of species disposes to understanding and understanding to loving.  Whence from the memory there quasi proceeds the act of the intellect, and from the memory and the intellect love.

Triplex illa distinctio memoriae (in solut. ad 3.) invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. et Petr. a. Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.

That threefold distinction of memory (in solution to n. 3) is found also in Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7 and in (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 5, a. 1.

II. In solut. ad 4. dicitur cum sententia tunc communi, quod memoria reformatur in statu viae per spem, in statu gloriae per tentionem.  Rationem, cur spes attribuatur memoriae, S. Doctor exhibet II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., scil. « quia habent conformitatem in actu, qui est tenere ».  — Verba ibidem posita:  « Ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori » hunc sensum habent:  deformatio imaginis per culpam et reformatio per gratiam incipit a voluntate, quae in ordine potentiarum est ultima sive posterior, quia actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, et hic actum memoriae, si memoria sumitur in tertio sensu, immediate antea explicato.  In hoc sensu memoria est prior et intimior et per consequens superior.  Nam « in anima humana idem est intimum et supremum » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2). In ordine vero formationis sive informationis hae tres potentiae consistunt ipsam vitam spiritualem quasi per modum formae informantis; et sic memoria est prima potentia, et in hoc sensu informatio incipit ab ipsa.  Pro explicatione cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. praesertim ad 4.  — Ad obiect. 5. duplex datur responsio; de prima cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

II. In the solution to n. 4 there is said with the then sententia communis, that the memory is reformed in the state of way through hope, in the state of glory through grasping.  The reason, why hope is attributed to the memory, the Seraphic Doctor exhibits in Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3 in the body, that is « because they have a conformity in act, which is holding ».  — The words posited in the same place:  « The order of reformation and of deformation begins from the posterior » have this sense:  the deformation of the image through fault and the reformation through grace begin from the will, which in the order of powers is the last or the posterior, because the act of the will presupposes the act of the intellect, and here the act of the memory, if "memory" is taken in the third sense, has been explained immediately before this.  In this sense the memory is prior and more innermost [intimior] and consequently superior.  For « in the human soul the same is most interior and supreme » (Sent., Bk. III, d. 8, p. II, q. 2).  But in the order of formation or information these three powers consist of the spiritual life itself as if through a manner of informing form; and so the memory is the first power, and in this sense information begins from it.  For an explanation cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 26, a. 1. q. 5 chiefly in n. 4.  — To objection 5 a twofold response is given; concerning the first cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

III. Quoad rationem imaginis vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1 et Schol. Alia plura, quae in hac et seqq. qq. occurrunt, exponuntur et probantur ab ipso S. Doctore II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 3. et 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93 praesertim a. 5. 6.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. a. 62. m. 5. a. 6 et 7.  —  Scot., hic. q. 9. et Report. hic q. 7.  —  Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic p. II. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1.  —  Henr. Gand., S. a. 40. q. 7. n. 16.  —  Durand., hic. p. II. q. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8.  —  Biel, hic q. 10.

III. In regard to the reckoning of the image see below in d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and the Scholium. The other very many things, which occur in this and the following questions, are expounded and proven by the Seraphic Doctor himself in Sent., d. 16; Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 12; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 4.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 3 & 4; Sent., Bk II, d. 16; Summa., I, q. 93, chiefly in a. 5 & 6.  — A lexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6 and 7.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9 and in the Reportatio, here in q. 7.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 19; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2. supposition n. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in p. II, a. 1, q. 1. —  Giles the Roman, here in n. 2. at the beginning of q. 1.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 40, q. 7, n. 16.  —  Durandus, here in p. II, q. 1.  —  (Bl) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 8.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 10.

1 Fide mss. restituimus particulam et.
2 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 prima.  Cod. R quia enim in Filio proprie est imago. Mox codd. P Q cognitiva loco cognoscendi.
3 Plures codd. ut X Y hic addunt quod, alii ut B I aa bb quod obiicitur quod.
4 Hic. c. 2, circa medium, iuxta quem textum et ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus hoc loco illam in alia, scilicet intelligentiam et memoriam.  — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt particulam enim.
5 Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
6 Ita mss. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco quia minus bene habeant quod, sed Vat.:  De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic.

1 Trusting in the manuscripts we have restored the particle and [et].
2 The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 reads the prime [prima].  Codex R reads for because in the Son properly there is an image [quia enim in Filio proprie est imago]. Then codices P and Q have the cognitive power [potentia cognitiva] in place of the power of cognizing [potentia cognoscendi].
3 Very many codices as X and Y here add that [quod], others as B I aa and bb which is objected that [quod obiicitur quod].
4 Here in ch. 2, near the middle, according to which text and with the help of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have changed in this passage that [illam] into the others [alia], that is the intelligence and the memory.  — Then many codices together with edition 1 omit the particle for [enim].
5 Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
6 Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1, though others in place of because [quia] have less well because [quod], but the Vatican edition:  From that there is opposition, in what manner willing in this manner [De isto est opposition, quo modo sic].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.