S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. II.

PART II

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio III.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 84-88.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 84-88.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO III.

 

Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether memory, intelligence and will are the same in essence with the soul.

TERTIO LOCO quaeritur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad animam sive ad3 subiectum, utrum videlicet sint idem in essentia cum anima. Et videtur quod sic.

IN THE THIRD PLACE there is asked concerning the comparison of those powers (of the soul) to the soul or to3 (their) subject, whether namely they are the same in essence with the soul. And it seems that (it is) so.

1. Augustinus dicit in decimo de Trinitate:4  « Haec tria, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una vita, una essentia, ac per hoc una substantia ».

1. (St.) Augustine says in the tenth (book of) On the Trinity:4  « These three, memory, intelligence and will are one mind, one life, one essence, and through this one substance ».

2. Item, Bernardus super Cantica:5 « Tria quaedam in anima intueor, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et haec tria ipsam ».  Si tu dicas, quod hoc dicitur per causam; hoc nihil est, quia Augustinus de Spiritu et anima6 dicit, quod anima « est quaedam sua, ut potentiae, et quaedam non sua, ut virtutes »; quod si per causam esset dictum, utrumque posset dici.

2. Likewise, (St.) Bernard in On the Song of Songs:5  « I intuit a certain three in the soul, memory, intelligence and will, and that these three (are the soul) itself ».  If you say, that this is said by way of [per] a cause; this is nothing, because (St.) Augustine in On the Spirit and the Soul6 says, that the soul « is a certain its-own, as powers, and a certain not-its-own, as virtues »; which if it were said by way of a cause, each could be said.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur velle dicere Philosophus,7 quia idem dicit esse principium essendi et operandi:  ergo cum principium essendi sit ipsa forma substantialis, principium operandi erit ipsa; sed principium operandi est potentia:  ergo potentia est principium essendi; sed non est principium essendi nisi forma substantialis in homine:  ergo potentia et forma substantialis sunt idem in substantia.

3. Likewise, this itself the Philosopher seems to want to say,7 because he says the same is the principle of being [principium essendi] and of operating:  therefore since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be that itself [ipsa]; but the principle of operating is a power:  therefore a power is the principle of being; but there is not a principle of being in man except the substantial form:  therefore a power and the substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur:  Sicut materia prima nata est recipere omnia per veritatem, sic anima secundum similitudinem;8 sed potentia materiae primae respectu formarum suscipiendarum non differt per essentiam ab ipsa:9  ergo similiter videtur, quod potentia animae.  Probatio:  si enim per essentiam differret, aut esset substantia, aut accidens.  Non accidens, quia antecedit omnem formam et omne / accidens;

4. Likewise, it is shown by reason:  Just as prime matter is bound to receive all through truth, so the soul according to similitude;8 but the power of prime matter in respect to forms to be received [suscipiendarum] does not differ by [per] essence from it:9  therefore it similarly seems, that the power of the soul (is thus related).  Proof:  for if it would differ by essence, either it would be a substance, or an accident.  Not an accident, because it antecedes every form and every / accident;

3  Cod. O addit suum.
4  Cap. 11. n. 18. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2 in initio.
5  Serm. 11. In fine textus citati supple cum ed. operum Bernardi animam esse.  Vat. in initio huius textus omittit Tria et circa finem legit haec tria ipsa est.
6  Cap. 13:  Deus est omnia sua, et anima quaedam sua.  Habet siquidem naturalia et ipsa omnia est.  Potentiae namque eius et vires idem sunt quod ipsa.  Habet accidentalia, et ipsa non est. Suae vires est, suae virtutes non est.  —  In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit dictum.
7  Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3); VII. Metaph. text. 59. 60. (VI. c. 17.) et VIII. Metaph. text. 8. (VII. c. 3.) ac II. de Anima, text. 2, ubi docet, formam substantialem esse principium essendi, in quantum scil. sua actualitate dat esse rei remque in certa specie constituit; II. Phys. text. 11. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi asserit, formam substantialem esse naturam i. e. principium motus et quiestis; II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.), ubi animam ut formam substantialem describet:  id quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligemus primo.
8  Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima text. 17. et 37. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).
9  Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. ult.); VIII. Metaph. text. 3. seqq. et XII. text. 26. (VII. c. 1. et XI. c. 5.). Ita docet Averroes, in libr. de Substantia orbis.  —  Mox post quod substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 potentia loco potentiae.  Dein post Probatio Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit minoris.

3  Codex O adds their own [suum].
4  Chapter 11, n. 18. See also here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2 at the beginning.
5  Sermon 11. At the end of the text cited supply together with the edition of Works of St. Bernard is are the soul [animam esse].  The Vatican edition at the beginning of this text omits three [Tria] and near the end reads and it itself is these three [haec tria ipsa est].
6  Chapter 13:  God is all His own, and the soul a certain its-own.  If indeed it has natural (powers) and is itself all (things).  For its powers and strengths [vires] are the same (as) what it itself (is). It has accidentals, and it itself is not (these). It is its own strengths, it is not its own virtues.  —  At the end of the argument the Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits said [dictum].
7  See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 28 (ch. 3); Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 59 & 60 (Bk. VI, ch. 17) and Bk. VIII, text 8 (Bk. VII, ch. 3) and On the Soul, Bk. II, text 2, where he teaches, that the substantial form is the principle of being, inasmuch as, that is, by its own actuality it gives the “being” of a thing and constitutes it in a certain species; Physics, Bk. II, text 11 ff. (ch. 1), where he asserts, that the substantial form is the nature, i. e. the principle of moving and resting; On the Soul, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2), where he describes the soul as the substantial form:  that by which we live and sense and are moved and understand first [primo].
8  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 17 and 37 ff. (ch. 5 and 8).
9  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 ff. (last ch.); Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 3 ff. and Bk. XII, text 26 (Bk. VII, ch. 1 and Bk. XI, ch. 5). Thus does Averroës teach, in his book On the Substance of the Orb.  —  Then after that [quod] we have substituted from the manuscripts and edition 1 power [potentia] in place of of the power [potentiae].  Then after Proof [Probatio] the Vatican edition contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds of the minor [minoris].

p. 85

 accidens; si substantia, aut ergo materia, aut forma. Praeterea, si differret, illius esset materia capax.1

accident; if a substance, therefore either matter, or form. Moreover, if it would differ, (power) would be a capable matter for it.1

5. Item, forma accidentalis non est simplicior forma substantiali; sed potentia operandi non differt a forma accidentali, utpote potentia calefaciendi non differt per essentiam a caliditate, nec potentia illuminandi ab ipsa luce:  ergo similiter videtur, quod nec potentia animae ab ipsa anima.

5. Likewise, the accidental form is not more simple than the substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from the accidental form, as for example [utpote], the power of making warm does not differ by essence from warmth, nor the power of illuminating from light itself:  therefore it similarly seems, that neither does the power of the soul from the soul itself.

6. Item, quod est accidens, nulli substantiae est substantiale;2 sed potentiae istae sunt substantiales:  ergo animae non sunt accidentia:3  ergo sunt substantia; constat quod non alia quam anima.  Probatio minoris:  quia anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine non dicit diversitatem substantiarum, sed potentiarum:  ergo constat, quod in homine istae differentiae:  vegetabile, sensiblile, rationale, accipiuntur a potentiis; sed4 huiusmodi differentiae sunt substantiales:  ergo et potentiae:  ergo etc.

6. Likewise, what is an accident, is substantial of no substance;2 but its powers are substantial:  therefore they are not accidents of the soul:3  therefore they are substances; it is established that (they are) not other than the soul.  Proof of the minor:  because in man the rational, sensible, vegetable soul does not mean a diversity of substances, but of powers:  therefore it is established, that in man these differences:  vegetable, sensible, rational, are accepted as powers; but4 differences of this kind are substantial:  therefore also the powers:  ergo etc..

CONTRA:  1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate5 assignat differentiam imaginis creatae ad Trinitatem illam, scilicet increatam, quia in illa Trinitate est habens id quod habetur, hic autem habens non est id quod habetur:  ergo si anima habet tres potentias, ergo essentialiter non est illae.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth (book of) On the Trinity5 assigns the difference of the created image to that Trinity, that is the Uncreated One, because in that Trinity there is One having that which it had, but here there is not one having that which is had:  therefore if the soul has three powers, therefore essentially it is not those.

2. Item, Dionysius6 dicit, quod in quolibet creato differunt haec tria:  substantia, virtus et operatio:  ergo et in anima differunt substantia et potentiae.

2. Likewise, Dionysius (the Areopagite)6 says, that in every created these three differ:  substance, virtue and operation:  therefore also in the soul do the substance and the powers differ.

3. Item, Boethius:7  « In quolibet creato differunt quo est et quod est, sive quid est et esse »:  ergo similiter, immo multo fortius, quod potest et quo potest.

3. Likewise (St. Severinus) Boethius (says):7  « In every created there differ ‘that whereby it is’ and ‘that which it is’, or ‘what it is’ and (its) ‘to be’ [esse] »:  therefore similarly, nay rather more strongly, ‘that it can’ and ‘that whereby it can’.

4. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic:  quae differrunt genere, differunt essentia, et unum de altero non praedicatur essentialiter;8 sed potentiae et anima sunt huiusmodi, quia anima est in genere substantiae, sed potentiae eius sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, scilicet naturalis potentiae vel impotentiae:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, it is thus shown by reasons:  what differs in genus, differs in essence, and one is not predicated of the other essentially;8 but the powers and the soul are of this kind, because the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality, that is of a natural power and/or impotence:  ergo etc..

5. Item, illa quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt essentialiter et substantialiter; sed virtus egreditur substantiam,9 quia operatur in obiectum, quod est extra; sed impossibile est, quod operetur ubi non est; si ergo virtus est ubi operatur, et operatur extra substantiam cuiuslibet:  ergo egreditur extra substantiam:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, those of which one is outside the other, differ essentially and substantially; but virtue steps forth from substance,9 because it works on the object, which is outside; but it is impossible, that it works where it is not; if therefore virtue is where it works, it works outside the substance of each [cuiuslibet]:  therefore it steps forth from substance:  ergo etc..

6. Item, ad hoc est alia ratio, quia si eadem per essentiam essent anima et potentiae, ergo10 unum non multiplicaretur nisi secundum multiplicationem alterius; et sic, cum una tantum sit anima, haberet tantum unam potentiam; sed hoc est falsum:  ergo etc.

6. Likewise, for this there is another reason, because if by the same essence there were soul and powers, therefore10 one would not be multiplied unless according to the multiplication of the other; and thus, since there is only one soul, it would have only one power; but this is false:  ergo etc..

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus, by reduction, in which the soul is; however they are not entirely the same with it by essence.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod potentia naturalis dicitur dupliciter.11  Uno modo, prout dicit modum existendi naturalis potentiae in subiecto, secundum quem dicitur subiectum facile vel difficile ad aliquid agendum; et sic naturalis potentia dicit modum qualitatis et est generaliter in secunda specie qualitatis, ut patet, cum dicitur cursor et pugillator, quorum utrumque dicit facilitatem, quae consequitur12 modum existendi potentiae gradiendi vel resistendi sive agendi in subiecto.  Alio modo potentia naturalis dicitur potentia naturaliter egrediens a subiecto.13  Et hoc potest esse dupliciter.  Nam aliqua potentia egreditur a substantia cum accidente, ut / potentia calefaciendi.

I RESPOND:  For the understanding of the aforesaid things it must be noted, that “natural power” is meant in a twofold manner.11  In one manner, insofar as it means the manner of existing of a natural power in a subject, according to which it means a subject to do something easily and/or difficultly; and thus “natural power” means a manner of quality and is generally in the second species of quality, as is clear, when there is said runner [cursor] and fighter [pugillator], each of which means a faculty, which persues12 a manner of existing of the power of stepping and/or of resisting or acting in the subject.  In another manner, “natural power” is meant (as) a power naturally stepping forth from a subject.13  And this can be in a twofold manner.  For any power steps forth from a substance with an accident, as / the power of making-warm (does).

1  Ed. 1 illius esset incapax.
2  Est simpliciter conversa huius propositionis:  Quod vere est (i. e. substantia) nulli accidit, quam ponit Aristot., I. Phys. text. 27. (c. 3.).
3  Interpolatam Vat. lectionem quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentalis, castigavimus ex. mss. et ed. 1, qui et mox post constat omittunt a Vat. additum autem.
4  Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, et loco sed.  Paulo ante cod. M potentiis praemittit istis.
5  Textum vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.
6  De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11.  Cfr. supra p. I. huius d. dub. 3.  —  Fide codd. et ed. 1 paulo infra post ergo adiecimus et.
7  In libro, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, sive de Hebdomadibus ait:  Diversum est esse et id quod est.  Et paulo post:  Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.  In huius propositionis explicatione Gilbertus Porretan. ait:  Aliud est quod est, aliud quo est. Vide etiam libr. de Trin. c. 2.  —  Plures codd. ut A E S V W X post sive legunt quid est esse, cod Y quidquid erat esse.
8  Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.):  Genere (differunt) quidem, quorum non est communis materia nec generatio ad invicem, quorumcumque alia figura categoriae (praedicationis).  —  Paulo infra post sed potentiae restituimus lectionem mss. et ed. 1 addendo eius et paulo post vel impotentiae.  Paulo ante cod. X sed potentiae animae et anima.  —  De quatuor qualitatum speciebus vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali.
9  Hoc est, extra substantiam; sic Tacitus pluries dicit terminos egredi.  —  Paulo post verbo operetur cod. X praemittit ibi.  Mox cod. M loco cuiuslibet habet cuius est, cod. T vero cuiusque.
10  Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ergo et paulo infra ex codd. B D H N P Q V W X aa ee pro unum substituimus una.  Cod. F sicut anima est una tantum, cum quo concordant codd. I O, eo excepto, quod pro una legunt unum ac dien post tantum addunt sic anima.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. idem argumentum refert additque principium, in quo fundatur, scil.:  Quaecumque enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem.
11  Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus correcte tripliciter.  Mox, postulantibus mss., substituimus uno et paulo infra Alio modo loco Primo et Secundo modo.
12  Vat. sequitur et paulo post et loco vel, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
13  Vat., minus stricte exhibet oppositionem cum primo divisionis membro ponendo a substantia loco a subiecto, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1; mox pro Nam habet Uno modo.

1  Edition 1 reads it would be incapable of it [illius esset incapax].
2  It is simply the converse of this proposition:  What truly is (i.e. a substance) accedes to nothing, which Aristotle posts in Physics, Bk. I, text 27, (ch. 3).
3  The interpolated reading of the Vatican edition what is an accident of one, is a substance of none, but those powers (of the soul) are substantial to the soul itself, therefore they are not accidental to it and consequently they are not accidents [quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentalis], we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1, which also at it is established [constat] omit the but [autem], added by the Vatican edition.
4  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has and [et] in place of but [sed].  A little before this codex M prefaces powers [potentiis] with those [istis].
5  See the passage above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 at the beginning.
6  On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11.  Cf. above in p. I of this distinction, dubium 3.  —  Trusting in the codices and edition 1, a little after this we have inserted also [et] after therefore [ergo].
7  In the book, How substances to the extent that they are, are good or On the Seventh Days says:  Diverse is the “to be” [esse] and “that which is”. And a little after this:  For every composite the “to be” [esse] is one part [aliud], “itself” is the other.  In explanation of this proposition Gilbert of Porretain says:  The one is what it is, the other that whereby it is.  See also the book On the Trinity, ch. 2.  —  Very many codices as A E S V W X after or [sive] read what its’ to be’ is [quid est esse], codex Y has whatever its ‘to be’ was [quiquid erat esse].
8  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 12, (Bk. IX, ch. 3):  In genus (they differ) indeed, of which there is not a common matter nor a generation for one another, to whichever of these (belongs) the other figure of the category (of predication).  —  A little below this after but . . . powers [sed potentiae] we have restored the reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 by adding its [eius] and a little after this and/or impotence [vel impotentiae].  A little before this codex X reads but the powers of the soul and the soul [sed potentiae animae et anima].  —  Concerning the four species of quality see Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. on Qualities.
9  That is, outside of substance; thus Tacitus very often says to step forth from the boundaries [terminos egredi].  —  A little after this to the word it works [operetur] codex X adds there [ibi]. Then codex M in place of of each [cuiuslibet] has to which it belongs [cuius est], but codex T has of anything [cuiusque].
10  Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the therefore [ergo] and a little below this from codices B D H N P Q V W X aa ee we have substituted one [una] for one (thing) [unum].  Codex F has just as the soul is only one [sicut anima est una tantum], with which codices I and O agree, with this exception, that for one [una] they read one (thing) [unum] and then after only one (thing) [tantum] they add as (is) the soul [sic anima].  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1, refers to the same argument and adds the principles upon which it founded, that is:  For whatever same are of one and of the same, are among themselves the same.
11  The Vatican edition against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3 has less correctly in a threefold manner [tripliciter].  Then, having questioned the manuscripts, we have substituted In one [Uno] and a little below In another manner [Alio modo] in place of In the first [Primo]and In the second manner [Secundo modo].
12  The Vatican edition has follows and a little after this it has and [et] in place of and/or [vel], but the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this.
13  The Vatican edition, less strictly exhibits opposition with the first member of the division by putting from a substance [a substantia] in place of from a subject [a subiecto], in disagreement with the manuscripts and edition 1; then in place of For [Nam] it has In one manner [Uno modo].

p. 86

 ut / potentia calefaciendi. Ignis enim per suam substantiam non calefacit sine caliditate; et haec potentia non est alterius generis quam sit qualitas, a qua egreditur; unde potentia1 calefaciendi est in eodem genere cum caliditate. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae naturaliter egreditur a2 substantia et immediate, sicut potentia generandi quantum ad inductionem ultimae formae; et haec quidem non est alterius generis quam substantia, sed reducitur ad genus substantiae tanquam substantialis differentia.

as / the power of making-warm (does). For first through its substance does not make (anything) warm without warmth; and this power does not belong to another genus than is the quality, from which it steps forth; whence the power1 of making-warm is in the same genus with warmth.  In another manner is meant “natural power”, which naturally steps forth from2 a substance and (does so) immediately, as (is) the power of generating as much as regards the induction of the ultimate form; and this indeed does not belong to another genus than substance, but it is reduced to the genus of substance as a substantial difference.

Per hunc modum intelligendum est in potentiis animae.  Nam uno modo contingit nominare potentias animae secundum primum modum, ut dicunt facilitatem, quae dicit modum potentiae existendi in subiecto, sicut ingeniositas et tarditas; et haec quidem sunt in secunda specie qualitatis. Alio modo contingit nominare potentias, prout dicunt ordinem substantiae ad actum, qui est mediante aliqua proprietate accidentali, ut potentiae syllogizandi, quae est in anima, cum habet habitum syllogizandi; et haec est in eodem genere, in quo est scientia syllogizandi, ut3 in prima specie qualitatis.  Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per4 haec tria:  memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem.  Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto,5 intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se.  Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales6 et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima.  Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima  —  potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis  —  non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem.

In [per] this manner it must be understood in the powers of the soul.  For in one manner one happens to name the powers of the soul according to the first manner, as they mean the facility, which means the manner of the existing of the power in the subject, as (are) ingeniousness and tardiness (of mind); and these indeed are in the second species of quality. In another manner one happens to name the powers, insofar as they mean the order of substance toward an act, which is by means of [mediante] some accidental property, as (is) the power of syllogizing, which is in the soul, when it has the power of syllogizing; and this is in the same genus, in which the science of syllogizing is, as3 (being) in the first species of quality.  Again it happens that one names the powers of the soul, as they immediately step forth from the substance, as (one does) by4 these three:  memory, intelligence and will.  And this is clear, because since every accident is circumscribed,5 having understood that the soul is a spiritual substance, by this very (accident) which is present to itself and has been conjoined with itself, it has power to remember and understand and love itself.  Whence its powers are consubstantial6 to the soul and are in the same genus through reduction, unto that which is the soul.  But however, since they step forth from the soul  —  for power possesses [habet] itself by means of stepping forth  —  they are not entirely the same by essence, nor however to that extent do they differ, so as to belong to another genus, but they are in the same genus through reduction.

Et potest satis manifestum exemplum dari in re et in similitudine eius.  Nam res non habet tantam identitatem cum sua similitudine, ut sint unum numero, nec tantam diversitatem, ut differant genere.7  Similitudo enim Martini non adeo distat a Martino, ut penitus differat ab eo.  Et ita similitudo rei in eodem genere est per reductionem cum eo, cuius est similitudo.  Quia enim egreditur, ideo differt, sed non transit in aliud genus.  Et loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis, id est, prout a subiecto8 exit et non recedit, ut splendor a luce.  Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod anima non est suae potentiae per essentiam.

And example, manifest enough, can be given in thing and in its similitude.  For a thing does not have so much an identity with its similitude, so that they are one in number, nor so much diversity, that they differ in genus.7  For the similitude of Martin does not stand so far from Martin, that it differs thoroughly from him. And thus the similitude of a thing is in the same genus by being leading back [reductionem] with that, of which it is the similitude. For because it steps forth, for that reason it differs, but it does not pass over into another genus.  And I speak of similitude according to the reckoning of similitude, not of intention, that is, insofar that it exits from a subject8 and does not recede (from it), as brilliance [splendor] (does) from a light.  Therefore the reasons proving, that the soul is not its powers by essence, are to be conceded.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Augustino et Bernardo, quod anima est suae potentiae; dicendum quod non est ibi praedicatio accidentis de subiecto, nec eiusdem per essentiam, sed substantialis vel essentialis.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary concerning (Sts.) Augustine and Bernard, that the soul is its own powers; it must be said that There there is no predication of accident from a subject, nor of the same by essence, but of the substantial and/or essential.

Propter quod notandum, quod essentiale dicitur quatuor modis. Primo modo essentiale dicitur9 quod dicit rei essentiam totam, sicut species singularis. Secundo modo dicitur essentiale quod est de essentiae et constitutione rei, ut materia et forma. Tertio modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest esse nec potest intelligi esse, ut sunt illa in quibus attenditur ratio vestigii, ut unitas, veritas, bonitas. Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus:  ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.10

On account of which it must be noted, that (something) is said (to be) “essential” in four manners.  In the first manner the “essential” is said9 (to be) that which means the whole essence of the thing, as the species of the singular.  In the second manner the “essential” is said (to be) that which concerns the essence and the constitution of the thing, as matter and form.  In the third manner the “essential” is said (to be that) without which the thing cannot be nor can it be understood to be, as are those in which the reckoning of the vestige is attained, as unity, truth, (and) goodness.  In the fourth manner the “essential” is said (to be that) without which the thing cannot be thought to have been perfected, as are the powers in the soul, in which the image is attained; and this is in the least manner substantial or essential; however it does not pass over into another genus:  for that reason the soul is said (to be) its powers.10

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impos- / -sibile.

3. To that which is objected, that the same is the principle of being and operating; it must be said, that it is true of a remote principle, but of a proximate it is impos- / -sible.

1  Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additim quae est.  Paulo post cod. Y Secundo modo loco Alio modo, pro quo multi codd. ut A B D E I N S T etc. cum ed. 1 minus apte Tertio modo.
2  Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, de loco a et immediate post imus bene omittit et.  Paulo infra eadem auctoritate post generis posuimus quam pro cum, utpote grammatice melius ac praecedentibus magis conforme.
3  Edd. 4, 5 videlicet loco ut.  Mox cod. X Ultra tertio modo contingit pro Contingit iterum.
4  Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit per.  —  Immediate egredi potentias a substantia docet etiam S. Thom.; S. I. q. 77. a. 6.  Cfr. insuper Dionys. Carth., hic q. 14.
5  Hoc est, excluso sive praescindendo ab ipso.  —  In fine huius propositionis in Vat. omittitur et diligendum, in plurimus vero codd. et intelligendum, sed contra contextum et alios codd. ut I T aa cum ed. 1.
6  Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 posuimus consubstantiales pro substantiales.
7  In plurimis mss. et Vat. manifeste falso habetur numero pro genere, quod tamen exhibet cod. Z. Mox plerique codd. cum ed. 1 mendose Petrus differt loco penitus differat. Iaon. Damasc., Orat. 3. de Imag. dicit:  Nam aliud est imago, et aliud it quod imagine repraesentatur; ac necesse est, ut non-nihil inter utrumque discriminis animadvertatur; siquidem nec istd alia res esset, nec illud alia.  —  Paulo infra, postulantibus mss. substituimus ita pro ideo.
8  Cod. A substantia. In fine responsionis cod. aa addit haec:  Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam, aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundatur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis. Glossema ad mentem Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1 ad. 2. et q. 65. m. 1.
9  Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supllevimus dictur. Mox mss. sunt dubiae lectionis; legi enim potest totam et tantum; quamvis ed. 1 ponat tantum, retinemus tamen totam propter contextum. Et confirmatur a B. Alberto, S. I. tract. 3. q. 13. m. 5 dicente:  Dicit enim Boethius, quod species est totum esse individuorum. (Boeth., III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de species ait:  Homo vero Socratis aut Ciceronis tota substantia est.)  —  Dein post species claritatis gratia Vat. addit dicit totam essentiam, licet desit in mss.
10  Vat. prater fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic quia non transit in aliud genus.

1  With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here the badly added which is [quae est].  A little after this codex Y reads In the second manner [Secudno modo] in place of In another manner [Alio modo], for which many codices as A B D E I N S T etc. together with edition 1 have, less aptly, In a third manner [Tertio modo].
2  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has from [de] in place of from [a] and immediately after this omits, less well, and [et].  A little below this same authority, after to another genus [generis] we have put than [quam] in place of with [cum], as being better grammatically and more conformable to the preceding things.
3  Editions 4 & 5 have namely [videlicet] in place of as [ut].  Then codex X has Beyond the third manner one happens [Ultra tertio modo contingit] in place of Again one happens [Contingit iterum].
4  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and the six first editions omits by [per]. That the powers immediately step forth from the substance, St. Thomas also teaches, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 6. Cf. in addition (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 14.
5  That is, having excluded or prescinded from it.  —  At the end of this proposition in the Vatican edition there is omitted and love [et diligendum], but in very many codices (there is omitted) and to understand [et intelligendum], but contrary to the context and to the other codices, as I T aa together with edition 1.
6  On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have put consubstantial [consubstantiales] in place of substantial [substantiales].
7  In very many manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is had in a manifestly false manner in number [numero] in place of in genus [genere], which however codex Z exhibits. Then the greater part of the codices together with edition 1 faultily read Peter differs [Petrus differt] in place of it differs thoroughly [penitus differat]. (St.) John Damascene, On Images, Oration 3, says:  For one is the image, and the other that which is represented by the image; and it is necessary, that not-nothing of a diving line between each be perceived; if indeed this one would not be the other thing, nor that one the other.  —  A little below this, having reviewed the manuscripts, we have substituted thus [ita] for for that reason [ideo].
8  Codex A the substance. At the end of the response codex aa adds these (words):  And/or it can be said, that the soul is considered either according to essence as an essence, or according to essence as a substance, or according to essence as a subject. If in the first manner, it thus consists from its own principles, and thus the soul is not the very thing [idipsum] which its powers (are), but consequently they are held for it, for this reason that they are founded upon the vigor of its existence according to its principles. If in the second manner, then the soul is also its powers, because the soul subsists in its powers. If in the third manner according to essence in the reckoning of a subject, thus the soul itself is subjected to its virtues, and thus it is not the same with its powers [Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam, aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundatur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis].  A gloss according to the mind of Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 21, m. 1, at n. 2 and q. 65, m. 1.
9  From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 & 6, we have supplied is said (to be) [dicitur]. Then the manuscripts have a doubtful reading, which can be read the whole [tantum] and only the [tantum]; although edition 1 has only the [tantum], we however retain the whole on account of the context. And this is confirmed by Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., I, tract 3, q. 13, m. 5, saying:  For (St. Severinus) Boethius says, that species is the whole being [totum esse] of individuals. (Commentary on Porphyry, Bk. III, dealing with species says:  But man is the whole substance of Socrates or Cicero.)  —  Then after species [species] for the sake of clarity the Vatican edition adds means the whole essence [dicit totam essentiam], though this is lacking in the manuscripts.
10  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 repeats here because it does not pass over into another genus [quia non transit in aliud genus].

p. 87

est impos- / -sibile.  Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari.  Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operari.  Quoniam igitur1 forma dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem.

it is impos- / -sible.  For if the same where entirely the proximate principle, then it would be the same in the thing ‘to be’ and ‘to work’.  Similarly, if the same were the proximate principle, since the thing always has a being [esse], it would always have a working [operari].  Therefore since1 form means the proximate and immediate principle of being, but power the proximate and immediate principle of working, it is clear that it is impossible to be entirely the same.

4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de potentia materiae, dicendum, quod materia non est sua potentia per essentiam, quoniam non est ipsa ordinatio ad formam; est tamen ipsa potentia materiae essentialis ipsi materiae, sicut potentia activa ipsi substantiae.  Et minus quidem elongatur potentia materiae a materia quam potentia activa a substantia; quoniam potentia materiae est potentia passiva, quae dicit ordinem ad aliud cum privatione, sed potentia activa dicit ordinem cum positione; et ideo minus addit potentiae materiae supra materiam, quam potentia activa supra2 substantiam.  Et hinc est, quod non ita distinguuntur diversae potentiae in eadem materia, sicut in eadem subtantia.

4. To that which is objected concerning the power of matter, it must be said, that matter is not its own power by essence, since it is not itself an ordination to form; however there is a power itself of matter essential to matter itself, just as an active power (is) to the substance itself.  And indeed the power of matter is less distanced [elongatur] from matter than an active power (is) from substance; since the power of matter is a passive power, which means an ‘order to something with a privation’, but an active power means an ‘order with position’; and for that reason it adds less to the power of matter upon matter, than an active power upon2 substance.  And hence it is, that the diverse powers are not so distinguished in the same matter, as (they are) in the same substance.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de forma accidentali, dicendum, quod forma accidentalis non est sua potentia.  Nam potentia eius est, in quantum influit in alterum; attamen potentia illa non tantum addit quantum potentia formae substantialis, quoniam potentia formae accidentalis dicit ordinationem ad actum, sed non sufficientem per se, sed per virtutem substantiae.  Sicut enim accidens non est per se, ita non habet virtutem operandi per se, sed per virtutem substantiae; et ita hoc patet.

5. To that which is objected concerning the accidental form, it must be said, that an accidental form is not its own power.  For the power belongs to it, inasmuch as it inflows into another; but however that power does not add as much as the power of the substantial form (does), since the power of the substantial form means an ordination to act, but not ‘one sufficient through itself’, but (rather) ‘(sufficient) by virtue of the substance’.  For just as the accident is not through itself, so that it does not have the virtue of operating through itself, but by the virtue of the substance; and thus this (argument) it is clear.

6. Ad illud quod obiictur ultimo, dicendum est,3 quod potentiae animae non sunt accidentales.  Tamen argumentum non valet, quia fortassis rationale, sensibile, vegetabile non accipiuntur a potentiis, sed a diversis naturis repertis in anima.

6. To that which is objected lastly, it must be said,3 that the powers of the soul are not accidental.  However the argument is not valid, because perhaps the rational, sensible, (and) vegetable are not accepted as powers, but as diverse natures discovered in the soul.

Illud autem argumentum, quod factum est ad oppositum, quod differunt, quia sunt in diversis generibus, solvendum est per interemptionem,4 quia non sunt in diversis generibus, sed in eodem per reductionem.

But that argument, that has been made to the opposite, that they do differ, because they are in diverse genera, must be explained through interemption,4 because they are not in diverse genera, but (they are) in the same (genus) by reduction.

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I. Circa principalem quaestionem illis temporibus tres sententiae defendebantur, quas S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.) accurate explicat.  Prima sententia ibi posita non admittit inter essentiam animae et potentias nisi distinctionem rationis. Ita Gulielmus Paris., Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), Henr. Gand. (Quodl. IV. q. 7.), insuper omnes Nominales.  —  Secunda docet distinctionem realem, et quidem talem, ut potentiae nec in genere cum substantia conveniant, cum ad genus accidentium trahantur.  Ita S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et q. 77. a. 1. et 3; de Spirit. Creaturis a. 11; de Anima q. 12.); B. Albert. (hic a. 34.); Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2).  —  Tertia sententia praecedenti valde appropinquat, quam docet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. et q. 21. m. 1.).  Huic etiam S. Bonav. magis favet; tamen dicit:  « Quaelibet autem dictarum positionem suos habet defensores, nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare ». Haec igitur ultima sententia admittit quidem inter animae substantiam et potentias eius connaturales et consubstantiales distinctionem quandam realem, quae tamen non tahat potentias ad diversum genus praedicamenti, nempe accidentis (tamen habitus acquisiti, quibus alia extra animam cognoscuntur et amantur, certe cadunt sub genere accidentium).  Immo si potentiae non essent animae consubstantiales, nunquam anima sciret et amaret aliquid ad extra, quia, ut dicit S. Augustinus, nullum accidens excedit subiectum, scil. sua virtute.  Nam accidens, sicut non est nisi virtute substantiae, sic nec operari potest nisi virtute substantiae, et nisi aliquid substantiale ei subsertnatur.  Unde nec habitus acquisiti agere possunt nisi virtute habituum vel potentiarum substantialium, cfr. ad 5. et art. 2. a. 2. ad 4. et S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 4.  —  Videtur autem, quod S. Bonav. et Alex. conceptum accidentis sumant pro accidente logico, S. Thom. pro accidente metaphysico, ita ut in re conveniant.  En verba Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1.):  « Dicendum, quod anima est quodammodo sua potentia, ut fiat distinctio inter potentias substantiales sive vires ex una parte et accidentia ex alia, quantum ad hoc, quod potentiae et vires substantialiter inhaerent et unum sunt cum anima quantum ad substantiam, non dico quantum ad essentiam; potentiis enim substantialibus subsistit anima.  Accidentia vero, ut prudentia, fortitudo et huiusmodi, non adhaerent substantialiter, quia haec accidentaliter adsunt.  Unde potentiae et vires substantiales dicuntur idem quod anima ratione indivisionis et adhaerentiae substantialis, accidentia vero non, quia substantialiter non adhaerent ». Fere idem est quod S. Thom. (S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.) docet.  Hic enim distinguit duplicem sensum vocabuli accidentis, et in secundo sensu, sive « secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium », concedit, quod « potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales ».

I. About the principal question, in those times three sentences used to be defended, which St. Bonaventure (Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1) accurately explains.  The first sentence posited there does not admit between the essence of the soul and the powers (anything) except a distinction of reason.  Thus William of Paris, Richard of Middleton (here in a. 2, q. 1), Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, Bk. IV, q. 7), besides all the Nominalists.  —  The second teaches a real distinction, and indeed such, that the powers agree neither in genus with the substance, since they are drawn to the genus of accidents.  Thus St. Thomas (here in q. 4, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 54, a. 3 and q. 77 a. 1 and 3; de Spiritu Creaturis, a. 11; On the Soul, q. 12); Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) (here in a. 34); (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 5, a. 2).  —  The third sentence, which Alexander of Hales teaches (Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1, and q. 21, m . 1), nearly approaches the preceding one. St. Bonaventure also favors this one more; however he says:  « But each of the said positions has its own defenders, nor it is easy to disprove any of them with cogent reasons ».  Therefore this last sentence indeed admits among the substance of the soul and its connatural and consubstantial powers a certain [quandam] real distinction, which however does not draw the powers to a diverse genus of predicament, namely of accident (however the acquired habits, by which other (things) outside the soul are cognized and loved, certainly fall under the genus of accidents).  Nay if the powers were not consubstantial with the soul, the soul would never know and love anything outside itself, because, as St. Augustine says, no accident exceeds a subject, that is its own virtue. F or an accident, just as it is not except by virtue of its substance, so neither can it work except by virtue of the substance, and unless something substantial is spread beneath it.  Whence neither can the acquired habits act except by virtue of the habits and/or substantial powers, cf. here at n. 5 and article 2, q. 2. at n. 4 and St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1 at n. 4.  —  But it seems, that St. Bonaventure and Alexander (of Hales) take the concept of the accident as a logical accident, (and) St. Thomas as a metaphysical accident, so that in re they do agree.  Behold the words of Alexander (of Hales) (Summa., p. II, q. 21, m. 1):  « It must be said, that the soul is in a certain manner its own power, to make a distinction among the substantial powers or strengths on one part and the accidents on the other, as much as regards this, that the powers and strengths substantially inhere and are one with the soul as much as regards the substance, I do not say as much as regards the essence; for by the substantial powers does the soul subsist. But the accidents, as prudence, fortitude and the like, do not adhere substantially, because they are there accidentally.  Whence the powers and substantial strengths are said (to be) the same that the soul (is) by reason of indivision and substantial adherence ». Nearly the same is what St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 5) teaches.  For he distinguishes a twofold sense of the word accident, and in the second sense, or « according to which it is posited as one of the five universals », he concedes, that « something is the medium between the substance and the accident », and that « the powers of the soul cant be said to be the media between the substance and the accident, as if natural properties of the soul ».

Quartam sententiam adiunxit Scot. (II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica § Dico igitur), qui hic applicat suam distinctionem formalem; in re autem a S. Bonav. vix discedit, ut vult Brulifer in Comment. ad hunc locum.

The fourth sentence is added by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, q. sole, § "Therefore I say", who here applies his formal distinction; but in re St. Bonaventure scarcely departs, as Brülifer would have it in his Commentary on this point.

De quaestione hac cfr. praeter iam citatos B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic 3. pinc. q. 1. a. 2.  —  Durand., hic p. II. q. 2 et seqq.  —  Dionyus. Carth., hic q. 13.  —  Biel, II. Sent. d. 24. et 25.

On this question cf. besides those cited above, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 3. q. 15, m. 2, q. 2, subp. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in n. 3 at the beginning of q. 1, a. 2.  —  Durandus, here in p. II, q. 2 and ff..  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 13.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 24 and 25.

II. Ut facilius intelligantur verba Doctoris in fine conclusionis posita:  « Loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis », haec notamus.  Praeter similitudinem accidentalem, quae est v. g. in figura exteriori, et essentialem,

II. So that there may be more easily understood the Doctor's words placed at the end of the conclusion:  « I speak of the similitude according to the reckoning of similitude, not of intention », we note these things.  Besides the accidental similitude, which is for example in an exterior figure, and the essential,

1  Vat. contra polurmos codd. et ed. 1 Quia ergo.
2  Cod. O addit formam aut.
3  Ex codd. et ed. 1 addidimus est.  Plures codd. ut A T etc. paulo ante habent quaeritur loco obiicitur.
4  Petrus Hispan., Summula, tract. de Syll. soph. seu de Fallaciis, in fine de fall. aequivocationis ait:  Recta solutio est manifestatio syllogismi falsi et propter quid est falsus.  Et contingit dupliciter, scil. vel distinguendo vel aliam praemissarum interimendo; et hoc secundo modo respondendum est ad omnes preccants in mattera (i. e. propositiones falsa).  Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 18.) duplicem hanc solutionis speciem proponendo usus est verbis diairein et anairein, quae Boethius lingua latina reddidit per verba dintinguere et interimere (i. e. negando auferre.).  —  Paulo supra aliqui codd. ut A G H K T etc. cum ed. differant pro differunt.

1  The Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1 has Therefore because [Quia ergo].
2  Codex O adds form or [formam aut].
3  From the codices and edition 1 we have added must [est].  Very many codices as A T etc. a little before this have is asked [quaeritur] in place of is objected [obiicitur].
4  Peter of Spain, Summula., tract "On sophistic Syllogisms or on Fallacies", at the end of the (discussion on) the fallacy of equivocation says:  The right solution is a manifestation of the false syllogism and that on account of which it is false.  And this happens in a two fold manner, that is by distinguishing and/or by interemption [interimendo]; and in this second manner one must respond to everything sinning in the matter (i. e. to the false propositions).  Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors., Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 18), when proposing this twofold species of solution used the words diairein and anairein, which (St. Severinus) Boethius rendered in the Latin tongue by the words distinguere and interimere (i.e. to take away by negating).  —  A little above this some codices as A G H K T etc. together with edition 1 have the subjunctive for they differ [differant].

p. 88

 quae est in convenientia in natura et specie, aliam similitudinem duplicem distinguit S. Doctor, scil. similitudinem secundum rationem, qua aliqua sunt similia in ratione quadam essentiali, ut splendor respectu lucis, et similitudinem secundum intentionis, quae est inter aliqua, quorum unum est factum ad imitationem alterius.  Ex hoc patet, quod splendor, qui est similitudo lucis, licet exeat a luce, tamen non recedit ab ea, manens in eodem genere lucis.

which is in fittingness in nature and species, the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes another twofold similitude, that is the similitude according to reckoning, by which some are similar in a certain essential reckoning, as brilliance (is) in respect to light, and the similitude according to intention, which is among some, one of which has been made for the imitation of the other.  From this it is clear, that brilliance, which is a similitude of light, though it goes forth from light, does not however recede from it, remaining in the same genus of light.

III. In solut. ad 1. et 2. distinguit S. Doctor triplicem praedicationem. Praedicatio per essentiam tunc fit, quando pradicatum est de intrinseca ratione subiecti. Haec est iterum duplex, nempe secundum duplicem sensum vocabuli essentialis, a S. Doctore hic distinctum.  Etenim tum essentia metaphysica, quam moderni vocant (scil. genus et differentia), tum partes constitutivae physicae (scil. forma et materia) sunt de essentia rei et de subiecto essentialiter praedicantur.  Huic opponitur praedicatio accidentalis, quando praedicatum subiecto tantum accidentaliter convenit, ut, homo est sapiens.  —  Circa tertiam praedicationem, quae hic distinguitur, notandum est, quod aliud est « esse de essentia alicuius rei », aliud « esse idem in essentia cum aliquo ».  « Proprium enim alicuius rei non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens » (S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.).  Etiam potentiae animae non sunt de essentiae animae, nec praedicantur de ea in primo dicendi modo per se, sicut genus pradicatur de specie. Nihilominus participant potentiae eandem naturam cum essentia animae, sive sunt « idem in essentia cum ipsa ». De quo cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 2. et B. Albert., hic q. 34.

III. In the solution to nn. 1 and 2 the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes a threefold predication.  A predication by essence [per essentiam] is made, when the predicate concerns the intrinsic reckoning of the subject.  Again this is twofold, namely according to a twofold sense of the word “essential”, here distinguished by the Seraphic Doctor.  For even both the metaphysical essence, as the moderns call it (that is the genus and difference), and the constitutive physical parts (that is the form and matter) concern the essence of the thing and are predicated essentially of the subject.  To this is opposed accidental predication, when the predicate only accidentally convenes with the subject, as, the man is wise.  —  About the third predication, which is here distinguished, it must be noted, that one is « to be from the essence of any thing », another « to be the same in essence with something ». « For what belongs [proprium] to any thing does not concern the essence of the thing, but is caused from the essential principles of the species, whence there is a medium between essence and accident » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 5).  Even the powers of the soul do not concern the essence of the soul, nor are they predicated of it in the first manner of meaning per se, as genus is predicated of species.  Nevertheless the powers do participate in the same nature with the essence of the soul, or are « the same in essence with it ». Concerning which cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 18, m. 2 and Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in q. 34.

Notatu digna est doctrina Seraphici in solut. ad 4. de potentia materiae. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. Cfr. Scot., libr. I. Physicor. a. 20; de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 2; I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 12. q. 10.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2 ad 4.  —  B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 6. ad 8.

It is worth noting the doctrine of the Seraphic (Doctor) in the solution to n. 4 on the power of matter. Alexander of Hales teaches the same thing, Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1. Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Physics, Bk. I, a. 20; On the First Principle of Things, q. 8, a. 2; Sent., Bk. I, d. 12, q. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. II, d. 12, q. 10.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 4, q. 2, at n. 4.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 26, a. 6, at n. 8.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.