COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III
PARS. II.	PART II
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 88-90. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 88-90. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De secunda assignatione imaginis.	ARTICLE II On the second impression of the image.
Consequenter est quaestio de secunda assignationis imaginis per mentem, notitiam et amorem. Et¹ circa hanc quaeruntur tria.	Consequently there is the question concerning the second impression of the image through mind, knowledge [notitia] and love [amorem]. And¹ about this there are asked three (things).
Primum est de istis absolute, utrum videlicet imago attendatur in istis ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in potentiis simul et habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus.	The first concerns these absolutely, namely, whether the image is attained in these as in the powers, or in the habits, or in the powers and habits simultaneously, or in the substance and in the habits.
Secundum est de istis in comparatione ad invicem.	The second concerns these in comparison to one another.
Tertium, utrum haec trinitas imaginis ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas.	The third, whether this trinity of image leads necessarily unto cognition of the Trinity as much as regards the Persons.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut ut in habitibus, aut in utrisque simul, aut secundum substantiam et habitus.	QUESTION 1 Whether the image is attained in mind, knowledge and love as in the powers, or as in the habits, or in both simultaneously, or according to substance and habits
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur.	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced in this manner:
1. Ostenditur primo, quod non in his ut in potentiis attendatur imago, quia praedicta assignatio² fuit in potentiis: ergo si haec etiam esset in potentiis, non esset nisi inculcatio verborum.	1. First it is shown, that the image is not attained in these as in the powers, because the aforesaid assignation² was in the powers: therefore if this would also be in the powers, it would be naught but a pressing of words [inculcatio verborum].
Praeterea, notitia et amor non dicunt potentiam, sed habitus, licet mens possit dicere potentiam: ergo praedicta tria non possunt poni sub ratione potentiarum.	Besides, “knowledge” and “love” do not mean a “power”, but a “habit”, though “mind” can mean a “power”: therefore the aforesaid three cannot be posited under a reckoning of powers.
2. Item ostenditur, quod non dicunt habitus, quia Augustinus³ dicit in imaginis assignatione et approbatione: « Mens novit se, diligit se »; sed nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare: ergo etc.	2. Likewise it is shown, that they do not mean habits, because (St.) Augustine³ says on the assignation and approbation of the image: « The mind knows [novit] itself, loves [diligit] itself »; but to no habit does it belong to know or love [amare] itself: ergo etc..
Item, si mens stat pro habitu, quaero, pro quo habitu? Si pro habitu memoriae, de quo magis videtur, quia non est alium dare; sed actus huius habitus est meminisse, non alius; sed Augustinus⁴ assignat menti hos actus, scilicet nosse et amare: ergo etc..	Likewise, if “mind” stands for “habit”, I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory, concerning which it rather seems, that there is not another to give (it to); but the act of this habit is to remember, (there is) no other; but (St.) Augustine⁴ assigns to the mind those acts, that is to know and to love: ergo etc..
3. Item ostenditur, quod non⁵ in potentiis et habitibus. Cum enim potentiae sint tres, et habitus tres, tunc non esset ternarius, sed senarius.	3. Likewise it is shown, that (it is) not⁵ in the powers and the habits. For since the powers are three, and the habits three, then there would not be a group of three [ternarius], but of six [senarius].
4. Item quaero, pro qua potentia stat ibi mens? aut enim stat pro omnibus, aut pro duabus, aut pro una. Si pro omnibus, tunc non est ibi trinitas; si pro duabus, tunc est ibi quaternitas, cum duo sint habitus; si pro una, non potest habere istos duos actus,⁶ nosse et amare: ergo non sumitur trinitas secundum habitus et potentias simul.	4. Likewise I ask, which power does “mind” stand for there? for either it stands for all (of them), or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since there are two habits; if for one, it can not have those two acts (of the soul),⁶ to know and to love: therefore trinity is taken according to the habits and the powers simultaneously.
1. Item ostenditur, quod non secundum animae substantiam et habitus.⁷ Cum enim habitus cognoscendi et amandi consequantur ipsam substantiam tempore, et substantia etiam possit esse sine his, ratio autem imaginis sit ipsi animae perpetua et inseparabilis et concreata: ergo non est in habitibus et substantia simul.	1. Likewise it is shown, that (it is) not according to the substance and habits of the soul.⁷ For since the habits of cognizing and loving follow immediately [consequantur] the substance itself in time, and (since) the substance can be without these, but the reckoning of the image is perpetual and inseparable and co-created [concreata] with the soul itself: therefore it is not in the habits and in the substance (of the soul) simultaneously.
2. Item, si substantia connumeratur habitibus, cum⁸ habitus sint tres, et substantia una: ergo erit / ibi quaternitas.	2. Likewise, if substance is numbered with the habits, since⁸ the habits are three, and the substance one: therefore there will be / a quaternity there.
¹ Vat. omittit Et, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra post Tertium ed. 1 addit est. ² Scilicet memoria, intellectus et voluntas, de qua supra in a. 1. — Mox substituimus ex mss. haec loco hic. ³ Textum Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Vat. paulo ante loco dicunt habitus ponit ut in habitibus, et paulo post omittit et approbatione, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. — Mox ex cod. X cum ed. 1 post est supplevimus, rei veritate exigente, se. ⁴ Verba Augustini inveniuntur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Paulo post meminisse auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 expunximus et, quod Vat. addit. ⁵ Vat., obnitentibus mss. et sex primis edd., addit ut. ⁶ Codd. X Y addunt scilicet. ⁷ Ita codd. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae habet Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul et paulo post sequantur pro consequantur. ⁸ Substituimus opse mss. et ed. 1 hic cum loco et ac paulo infra intelligentiae pro intellectivae.	¹ The Vatican edition omits And [Et], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below this after The third [Tertium] edition 1 adds is [est]. ² That is the memory, the intellect and the will, concerning which (see) above in a. 1. — Then we have substituted from the manuscripts this (assignation) [haec] in place of here (in the powers) [hic]. ³ See the text of (St.) Augustine above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3, about the middle. — The Vatican edition a little before this puts as in the habits [aut in habitibus] in place of do . . mean habits [dicunt habitus], and a little after this it omits and approbation, but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. — Then from codex X together with edition 1 we have supplied after does it belong [est], for the sake of exactness, itself [se]. ⁴ The words of (St.) Augustine are found above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 about the middle. — A little above this after to remember [meminisse], on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, we have expunged and [et], which the Vatican edition adds. ⁵ The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, adds as [ut]. ⁶ Codices X and Y add that is [scilicet]. ⁷ Thus the codices and the six first editions against the Vatican edition, which has On the Contrary. It is shown, that (it is) not in the substance and habits simultaneously [Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul] and a little after this it has follow in place of follow immediately [consequantur]. ⁸ We have substituted with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 at this point since [cum] in place of and [et] and a little below this (on p. 89) of intelligence [intelligentiae] in place of of the intellective (part) [intellectivae].

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ibi quaternitas. Si tu dicas, quod non differt notitia, secundum quod est habitus intelligentiae et memoriae; contra: habitus sunt dispositiones potentiarum; cum ergo sint tres potentiae, erunt tres habitus.	a quaternity there. If you say, that knowledge [notitia] does not differ, accord to which it is a habit of the intelligence and the memory; on the contrary: the habits are dispositions of the powers; therefore since there are three powers, there will be three habits.
3. Item, Magister dicit in littera,¹ quod mens accipitur non pro animae substantia, sed pro eo quod est in ea eminentius.	3. Likewise, Master (Peter) says in (his) text,¹ that “mind” is accepted not for the substance of the soul, but for that which is in it more eminently.
CONCLUSIO. In hac secunda assignatione imaginis, quae est mens, notitia, amor, trinitas attenditur quantum ad substantiam animae et quantum ad duos habitus notitiae et amoris.	CONCLUSION In this second impression of the image, which is mind, knowledge, (and) love, a trinity is attained as much as regards the substance of the soul and as much as regards the two habits of knowledge and love.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod differt secundum quosdam assignatio haec a praecedenti, quia prior fuit in potentiis, haec est in habitibus. Et respondent obiectionibus per distinctionem mentis. Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur. Dicitur enim uno modo a mene, quod est luna sive defectus: et sic dicitur de tota animae substantia propter transmutationes, quas habet.² Secundo modo dicitur a metiendo; et sic stat pro iudicativa vi, et sic accipit eam Damascenus,³ ponens ipsam in potentiis cognitivis. Tertio modo dicitur ab eminendo; et sic stat pro superiori parte rationis, et sic accipit eam Augustinus frequenter.⁴ Quarto modo dicitur a meminisse; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum.⁵ Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis mens stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptatione, cum dicit Augustinus:⁶ « Mens novit se et diligit », stat pro potentia memorandi.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that this impression does differ according to certain (aspects) from the preceding, because the prior was in the powers, this is in the habits. And (these) correspond to the objections through a distinction of “mind”. For “mind” [mens] is diversified according to a fourfold manner of being accepted. For it is said in one manner as a menis, which is a luna or defect; and thus it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the transmutations, which it has.² In a second manner it is said as one measuring [metiendo]; and thus it stands for the judicative strength, and thus does (St. John) Damascene accept it,³ placing it in the cognitive powers. In a third manner it is said as one outstanding [eminendo]; and thus it stands for the superior part of the reason, and thus does (St.) Augustine frequently accept it.⁴ In a fourth manner it is said as to remember [meminisse]; and thus it stands for the memory both as much as it regards an act and as much as it regards a habit.⁵ Therefore they say, that in the assignation of this trinity the mind stands for the habit of memory; but by adaptation [in adaptatione], when (St.) Augustine says:⁶ « The mind knows itself and loves », it stands for the power of calling to mind [memorandi].
Sed istud non videtur convenienter dictum, quia adaptatio debet respondere assignationi. Et praeterea, cum actus proprius mentis, ut stat pro memoria, sit meminisse, ille⁷ deberet tangi; sed Augustinus in hac assignatione nunquam facit mentionem nisi de duobus actibus, scilicet nosse et amare, qui non sunt memoriae, sed aliarum potentiarum.	But that does not seem to be fittingly said, because adaptation ought to correspond to impression. And moreover, since the proper act of the mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that⁷ ought to be touched upon; but (St.) Augustine in this assignation never makes mention except of two acts, that is to know and to love, which do not belong to the memory, but to the other powers.
Respondendum igitur, quod trinitas illa non est in potentiis; quia amor et notitia non dicunt potentias;⁸ nec in habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro habitu, cum ipsa accipiatur ut agens; nec potest esse in potentiis et habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro una potentia, cum assignentur ei actus duarum potentiarum; nec potest similiter⁹ stare pro pluribus potentiis, quia non esset trinitas. Restat ergo, quod necesse est ponere, quod trinitas ista attendatur quantum ad substantiam animae, ratione mentis se noscentis et amantis; et sic est trinitas, cum substantia sit una, et habitus sint duo.	Therefore it must be responded, that that trinity is not in the powers; because love and knowledge [amor et notitia] do not mean “powers”;⁸ nor in the habits, because “mind” cannot stand for a “habit”, when it is accepted as an agent; nor can it be in powers and habits, because “mind” cannot stand for one power, since to it are assigned the acts of two powers; nor can it similarly⁹ stand for more powers, because it would not be a trinity. Therefore it remains [restat], that it is necessary to posit, that that trinity is attained as much as regards the substance of the soul, by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself; and thus there is a trinity, since the substance is one, and the habits are two.
Differt ergo haec assignatio a praecedenti: quia praecedens fuit per uniformitatem in potentiis per comparationem ad habitus et¹⁰ actus, sed haec est in substantia et habitibus. Differt iterum in hoc, quia praecedens fuit per conversionem animae ad Deum, haec est per conversionem animae supra se; et pluribus modis non attenditur imago in homine, ut supra dictum fuit.¹¹ Differt etiam, quia praecedens assignatio imaginis magis est propria et conveniens quam haec. Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et¹² virtutibus theologicis. Unde Augustinus hanc assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam.¹³ Unde haec assignatio non est propria, sicut alia; unde Magister eam secundo ponit tanquam non principalem.	Therefore this impression differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through a uniformity in the powers through a comparison to habits and¹⁰ acts, but this one is in substance and habits. It differs again in this, that the preceding was through the conversion of the soul towards God, and this one is through conversion of the soul upon itself; and the image is not attained in man in more manners, as had been said above.¹¹ It differs also, because the preceding impression of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in a unity of essence and a trinity of powers, according to which (powers) the soul has been born to be sealed by the Most High Trinity with the image of similitude, which consists in grace and¹² the theological virtues. Whence (St.) Augustine first posits this assignation by investigating, so that through this (second assignation) he may arrive at That, in which finishes his speculation.¹³ Whence this (latter) impression is not proper, as the other; whence Master (Peter) places it second as (it is) not the principal one.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus non sunt coaevi etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est habitus. Quendam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab acquisitione, quendam ab innata dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositio- / -nem ut per virtutem;	1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the habits are not coeval etc.; it must be said, that habit is threefold. For the power of the soul has a certain habit from acquisition, a certain one from an innate disposition, a third it has from its very own origin. But this is clear, because the habit is (that) whereby a power is facile unto act; but in these three manners there is a facile habit, e. g., our affection [affectus] has a facility to love [diligendum] another good through an acquired disposition / as through a virtue; . . .
¹ Cap. 3 circa medium, quem tamen textum plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. hic mutarunt, pro anima ponendo animae substantia tota; codd. vero T X animae substantia, quos sequimur, quia eorum lectio correspondet sensui obiicientium. Cfr. Scholion. ² De hac mentis acceptione vide libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. ³ Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: « Vires in cognitione positae sunt mens, cogitatio, opinio, sensus ». Et singula perpendens de mente dicit quod verum est iudicat (considerat, discernit; sive, ut refert Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69 in princ.: mens a metiendo dicitur.). ⁴ Cfr. Ennaratio in Psalm. 3. n. 3; XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 11. Vide etiam libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. et 34. Consentit Isidor., XI. Etymolog. c. 1. ⁵ Cfr. Isidor. loc. cit. et libr. de Spiritu et anima, ch. 34. — De his quatuor etymologiis, quae ex more illius aetatis iudicari debent, vide Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. circa finem (in aliis edd. q. 55). ⁶ Codd. cunt inter se divisi; plures siquidem ut G O T bb habent Augustinus, quos sequimur, alii vero ut A C L S Z etc. ecce; omnes tamen cotra Vat. dicit loco dicitur. Ed. 1 dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens. ⁷ Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ibi pro ille. ⁸ Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus bene dicuntur potentiae. ⁹ Plures codd. ut A F G H K T Y bb simul pro similiter. ¹⁰ Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, repetit hic ad. Paulo infra post Differt ex pluribus codd. ut H P Q X Z ee posuimus iterum loco etiam. ¹¹ Hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp. ¹² Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 indebite omittit gratia et. Nam distinguitur gratia sanctificans a virtutibus. ¹³ Vide IX. de Trin. c. 2. n. 2. et X. c. 11. n. 17; XIV. ac XV. c. 3. n. 5 seqq. — Sub vocabulo hanc intellige secundam assignationem.	¹ Chapter 3, about the middle, which text, however, very many manuscripts together with the six first editions change here, by putting soul [animae] in place of whole substance of the soul [animae substantia tota]; but codices T and X substance of the soul [animae substantiae], which we follow, because their reading corresponds to the sense of the objections. Cf. Scholium. ² On this acceptation of "mind" see the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 11. ³ On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 22: « The strengths [vires] placed in cognition are mind, thinking [cogitatio], opinion, (and) sense ». And pondering singulars, he says concerning the mind: what is true, it judges (considers, discerns; or, as Alexander of Hales reports, Summa., p. II. q. 69 in princ.: “mind” is said as one measuring [a metiendo].). ⁴ Cf. Exposition on the Psalms, Ps. 3, n. 3; On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 7, n. 11. See also the book On the Spirit and the soul, chs. 11 and 34. (St.) Isidore agrees, Etymologies, Bk. XI, ch. 1. ⁵ Cf. (St.) Isidore, loc. cit., and the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 34. — Concerning these four etymologies, which ought to be judged by the custom of that age, see Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2, near the end (in other editions, q. 55). ⁶ The codices are divided among themselves; very many indeed as G O T and bb have (St.) Augustine [Augustinus], which we follow, but others as A C L S Z etc. have instead behold [ecce]; however all, contrary to the Vatican edition, have says [dicit] in place of it is said [dicitur]. Edition 1 has Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine (say) behold the mind [dicit Magister et Augustinus: esse mens]. ⁷ The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has there (it) [ibi] in place of that [ille]. ⁸ The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has less well are . . . meant (as) powers. ⁹ Very many codices as A F G H K T Y bb have simultaneously [simul] for similarly [similiter]. ¹⁰ The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, here repeats to [ad]. A little below this at it differs [Differt] from very many codices as H P Q X Z and ee we have put Again [iterum] in place of Also [etiam]. ¹¹ Here in a. 1, q. 2 in the body. ¹² The Vatican edition without the authority of any manuscript nor of edition 1 unduly omits grace and. For sanctifying grace is distinguished from the virtues. ¹³ See On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 2, n. 2 and Bk. X, ch. 11, n. 17; Bks. XIV and XV, ch. 3, n. 5 ff.. — Understand by the word this [hanc] the second assignation.

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dispositio- / -nem ut per virtutem; ad diligendum vero bonum suum¹ per innatam dispositionem; et ad diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem. Cum enim sit sibi indistanter unitus, semper est habilis ad se amandum. Similiter, cum intellectus noster semper sit sibi praesens, semper est habilis sibi ad se cognoscendum. Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur de coaevitate; nam quoad tales habitus est bene coaevitas.	disposition / as through a virtue; but to love [diligendum] its own¹ good through an innate disposition; and to love its own self through its own natural origin. For since it is united to itself without separation [indistanter], it is always handy [habilis] to love itself. Similarly, since our intellect is always present to itself, it is always handy for itself to cognize itself. And thus is clear that which is objected concerning coevity [coevitate]; for in regard to such habits there is rightly a coevity.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tres debent² esse habitus secundum tres potentias; dicendum, quod in hac trinitate non cadit nec habet locum habitus memoriae, quia attenditur³ in ipsa anima secundum quod convertitur supra se: et ideo ipsa animae substantia tenet locum memoriae, et ipsa praesentia et oblatio, qua anima offert se semper suae intelligentiae, tenet locum habitus et actus memoriae. Et ita patet, quod ibi cadunt tantum habitus duarum potentiarum; et ideo est ibi trinitas.	2. To that which is objected, that the habits ought² to be three according to the three powers; it must be said, that in this trinity the habit of memory neither falls nor has a place, because (a trinity)³ is attained in the soul itself according to which it is converted upon itself: and for that reason the substance itself of the soul holds a place for the memory, and the presence itself and the oblation, by which the soul always offers itself to its own intelligence, hold a place for the habit and act of memory. And thus it is clear, that there only the habits of the two powers fall; and for that reason there is a trinity there.
3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de verbo Magistri; dicendum, quod intelligitur non pro animae substantia tota;⁴ quod si aliter intelligatur, non habet veritatem verbum Magisteri. Quod patet per Augustinum, qui occasione huius imaginis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam habere cognitionem sui innatam, quae est cognitio⁵ suae substantiae. Et praeterea, nihil unum in anima cognoscit et diligit nisi substantia: ergo si mens staret pro una potentia, non haberet illos duos actus, scilicet nosse et amare.	3. To that which is last objected concerning the word of Master (Peter); it must be said, that it is understood not for the whole substance of the soul;⁴ because if it is otherwise understood, the word of Master (Peter) has not truth. Because it is clear through (St.) Augustine, who on the occasion of this image shows throughout almost the whole tenth (book of) On the Trinity, that the soul has an innate cognition of itself, which is the cognition⁵ of its substance. And moreover, no one thing [nihil unum] in the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] except the substance: therefore if “mind” would stand for one power, it would not have those two acts, that is “to know” and “to love” [nosse et amare].
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. De hac quaestione audiendus est ipse S. Doctor, qui in anecdoto primo Prologo ad II. Sententiarum (cuius initium iam dedimus in Prolegomenis c. 1. § 2.) dicit: « Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magisteri Sententiarium maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod cum Magister parte secunda distinctionis tertiae in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat d. 7., quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse proper relationem. Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.), iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est agere, sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint omnino consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipitur pro tota anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi ».	I. On this question must be heard the Seraphic Doctor, who in the unpublished Prologue to the Second Book of Sentences (the beginning of which we have already published in the Prolegomenon, ch. 1, § 2) says first: « But perhaps it will seem to someone, that I have departed from the positions of the Master of Sentences most of all on two (points): that is in this, that when Master (Peter) in the second part of the third distinction, on the second impression of the Trinity, which he says consists in mind, knowledge and love, says, that mind is to be accepted not for the “soul”, but for the superior portion (of it), one discovers what was said by myself, that “mind” there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, when Master (Peter) says in d. 7, that the power of generating is common to the three Persons, as [utpote] a name signifying the essence, I adhered more to that opinion, which says, that the power of generating is said on account of relation. But if anyone rightly inspects (the matter), in neither of the aforesaid shall he find me (standing) or that I have departed from the position of Master (Peter) or from the foot-path of truth. For when I said, that in that assignation of a trinity “mind” is accepted for the substance of the soul by reason of (its) superior part, for that reason this was said, because, if “mind” stood there fore the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and (since) it does not belong to one power to know and to love, as is seen below (cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1), there would not be a trinity there, but a quaternity. Again, to act does not belong properly to a power, but to a substance through a power; and for that reason, if (St.) Augustine is speaking properly and truly, when he says, the mind knows etc., mind there supposes the substance of the soul. And this again does (St.) Augustine hint at [innuit], when after the occasion of this trinity he shows throughout almost the whole tenth (book of) On the Trinity, that the soul knows its very self. Finally, since those habits of knowledge and love are entirely consubstantial, they do not add a new essence upon (their) power, but are by themselves [se ipsis] handy for power, and thus they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves nor to the superior part of the reason. And moreover Master (Peter) does not deny, that “mind” is accepted for the soul itself, but (he denies) that it is accepted for the whole (soul), that is, for the soul according to all (its) powers, but (it is thus accepted) for the substance (of the soul) itself by reason of (its) superior portion. In this, therefore, I have not contradicted Master (Peter), but rather have explained his word in accord with the rule of truth, as I estimate it. ».
II. Verba in 2. fund., quod « nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare », sic intelliguntur: se intelligere et amare non sunt actus alicuius habitus acquisiti, sed potentiae animae concreatae et consubstantialis, licet ad hos actus etiam habitus dispositive concurrere possint. Unde etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 36.) de eodem textu Augustini dicit: « Habitus non est nosse se et amare se, sed potius habentis habitum secundum ipsum habitum vel per ipsum habitum est nosse se et amare se ». Item Petr. a Tar. (hic. q. 7. a. 1.) ait: « Ad cognoscendum vero se ipsam mens nullo habitu utitur ». Cfr. etiam Bonav. hic. q. 2 ad 4.	II. The words in the second fundament, that « to no habit does it belong to know or love itself », are thus to be understood: to understand and love oneself are not acts of any acquired habit, but co-created and consubstantial powers of the soul, though for those acts even habits can dispositively concur. Whence even Bl. (now St.) Albertus (here in a. 36) concerning the same text of (St.) Augustine says: « It does not belong to a habit to know itself and love itself, but rather it belongs to the one having the habit to know oneself and to love oneself according to the habit itself and/or through the habit itself ». Likewise (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 7, a. 1) says: « But to cognized its very self the mind uses no habit ». Cf. also (St.) Bonaventure, here in a. 2, at n. 4.
III. In solut. ad 1. triplex habitus distinguitur, scil. ab acquisitione, ab innata dispositione, a sui ipsius origine. Differentia secundi et tertii in hoc consistit, quod secundus habitus non est proprie animae concreatus et coaevus, licet dispositio ad hunc habitum sit concreata et coaeva. Sic anima cognoscit et diligit ex innata dispositione proprium bonum (commodum). Tertius vero habitus, quo anima se ipsam cognoscit et diligit, est proprie ibi concreatus, cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In eadem solut. tangitur quaestio, quo sensu intellectus noster semper se intelligat. Doctrina Seraphici de hoc omnino concordat cum S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.) et Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 2.). Hi negant, animam actualem sui intellectionem habere, praesertim talem qua se discernat ab aliis; concedunt tamen, quod propter praesentiam obiecti « nihil deficit actui primo . . .ad quem debet sequi actus secundus, qui est intellectio. Et forte propter hoc dicit frequenter Augustinus, quod anima novit semper se, propter istam propinquitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo. Hoc autem modo anima non semper novit lapidem » etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Alii tamen doctores, ut Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 3.) et Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 7) docent, animam semper se nosse et amare, non tantum habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter, quin tamen advertat hos intimos actus. Cfr. etiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 12.), qui in hac quaestione anceps haeret.	II. In the solution to n. 1 a threefold habit is distinguished, that is as an acquisition, as an innate disposition, as its own very origin. The difference of the second and the third consists in this, that the second “habit” is not properly co-created and coeval to the soul, though a disposition to this habit is co-created and coeval. Thus the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] from an innate disposition (its) proper (suitable) good. But the third habit, whereby the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] its very self, has been co-created in it properly, cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — In the same solution is touched upon the question, by which sense our intellect always understands itself. The doctrine of the Seraphic (Doctor) concerning this concords entirely with St. Thomas (here in q. 4, q. 5; Summa., I, q. 93, a. 7, at n. 4), with (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 3. q. 8, n. 13) and with Richard of Middleton (here at q. 2. q. 2). These deny, that the soul has an actual intellection of itself, especially such as whereby it discerns itself from others; however they do concede, that on account of the presence of the object « nothing is lacking to the first act . . . to which there ought to follow the second act, which is intellection. And perhaps on account of this does (St.) Augustine frequently say, that the soul always knows itself, on account of that nearness (of the soul) to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in the first act. But in this manner the soul does not always know the stone » etc. (Scotus loc. cit.). However other doctors, as (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 5. a. 3) and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, 4, q. 7) teach, that the soul always knows and loves itself, not only habitually, but even actually, but, however, that it does not advert to those most interior acts. Cf. also (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian (here in q. 12), who on this question clings to a twofold (position).
IV. De ipsa conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 36; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1 et q. 7 a. unic. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, hic. q. 10.	IV. Concerning the conclusion itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6, § 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9; Reportatio, q. 7. — St. Thomas, here in q. 5; Summa., I, q. 93, q. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 36; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, q. 2, p. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 1 and q. 7, a. sole. — Giles the Roman, here in princ. 2 of q. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 10.
¹ Codd. I O summum loco suum; sed non bene. Mox cod. T post sibi addit ispi et paulo infra incongrue cum aliis omittit intellectus noster. ² Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus debent pro dicuntur. ³ Supple: trinitas. ⁴ Cod. Z addit sed parte superiori scilicet, ed. 1 autem: sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum. ⁵ Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 agnitio; et immediate post propterea loco praeterea, sed falso, quia revera novum / habetur argumentum ex ratoine, non ex auctoritate petitum. Mox auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 post anima expunximus particulam et. Cod. O post nihil addit aliud.	¹ Codices I and O have the most high [summum] in place of its own [suum]; but not well. Then codex T at to itself [sibi] inserts very [sibi ipsi] and a little below this it omits incongruously our intellect [intellectus noster]. ² With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted there ought [debent] in place of there are said [dicuntur]. ³ Supply: a trinity. ⁴ Codex Z adds but for (its) superior part, that is [sed parte superiori scilicet], but edition 1: but supply for the conversion of the soul toward God and/or the reflection regarding the consideration of itself toward God [sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum]. ⁵ The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has acknowledging [agnitio]; and immediately after this on account of (this) [propterea] in place of besides [praeterea], but falsely, because in truth a new argument is had, sought from reason, not from authority. Then on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 after in the soul we have expunged both [et]. Codex O after no [nihil] adds other [aliud].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III