S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS. II.

PART II

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 91-92.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 91-92.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

  QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum mens, notitia et amor habeant ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

  QUESTION 2

 

Whether mind, knowledge and love have order, equality and consubstantiality.

SECUNDO quaeritur de istis in comparatione ad invicem, secundum triplicem comparationem, quam ponit Augustinus, videlicet ordinis, aequitalitas et consubstantialitatis, et Magister recitat in littera.1  Ordo est inter haec, quia mens est parens, notitia est proles, tertius est amor ab utroque procedens.  Aequalitas etiam est ibi, quia mens tantum se novit, quantum est, et tantum se2 diligit, quantum se novit. Consubstantialitas etiam; unde Augustinus nono de Trinitate:3  « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, substantialiter haec in anima existere, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, aut ulla qualitas aut quantitas; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit substantiam, in qua est.  Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare etiam aliud »; et ita vult, quod amor sit consubstantialis menti.

SECOND there is asked concerning these in comparison to each other, according to the threefold comparison, which (St.) Augustine posits, namely of order, equality and consubstantiality, and (which) Master (Peter) quotes [recitat] in the text.1  Order is among them, because the mind is a parent, knowledge is (its) offspring, the third is the love [amor] proceeding from both.  Equality is also there, because as much as it is, so much does the mind know itself, and as much as it knows itself, so much does it love [diligit] itself.2 Consubstantiality also; whence (St.) Augustine in the ninth (book) On the Trinity:3  « We are admonished, if we can in whatever manner see, that this exists substantially in the soul, not as in a subject, as color in a body, or (as) any quality or quantity; for whatever is such, does not exceed the substance, in which it is.  But the mind by the love [amore], by which it loves itself, can love also another »; and thus he would (have it), that love be consubstantial to the mind.

1. Sed obiicitur contra hoc: Primo videtur, quod in his non sit ordo nec4 origo.  Aut enim accipiuntur pro habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis.  Si pro innatis, nullus est ordo, quia simul sunt cum ipsa anima; si pro acquisitis, sic amor praecedit notitiam; nullus enim acquirit5 vel studet aliquid addiscere, nisi amet scire.  Unde Augustinus in fine noni de Trinitate:6  « Partum mentis antecedit appetitus, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles, quae est ipsa notitia ».  Aut ergo non est ordo, aut non est talis ordo.

1. But there is objected against this:  First it seems, that among these there is not an order nor4 an origin.  For either they are accepted as innate habits, or as acquired (ones).  If as innate (habits), there is no order, because they are simultaneously with the soul itself; if as acquired (habits), thus love precedes knowledge; for no one acquires5 and/or strives to learn anything, unless he love to know.  Whence (St.) Augustine at the end of the ninth (book) On the Trinity says:6  « Part of the mind goes before [antecedit] the appetite, from which that which we want to know by seeking and finding, there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself ».  Therefore either there is not an order, or there is not such an order.

2. Item, videtur quod non sit ibi aequalitas.  Aut enim notitia et amor accipiuntur per comparationem ad res inferiores, aut ad animam.  Si ad res inferiores, manifestum est, quod non est ibi aequalitas; multa enim novimus, quae non amamus; si in comparatione7 ad animam, aut est aequalitas quantum ad intensionem, aut quantum ad extensionem.  Quantum ad extensionem, non; illud constat, quia unum tantum8 est ibi: ergo quantum ad intensionem; sed quod hoc sit falsum, videtur, quia cum sciamus animam minorem Deo et maiorem corpore, contingit quandoque, quod eam amamus magis quam Deum, et minus quam corpus; et ita quantitas9 amoris non sequitur quantitatem notitiae.

2. Likewise, it seems that there is not an equality there.  For either knowledge and love are accepted through a comparison to inferior things, or to the soul.  If to inferior things, it is manifest, that there is not an equality there; for we know many (things), which we do not love; if in comparison7 to the soul, either there is equality as much as regards intensity [intensionem], or as much as regards extension.  As much as regards extension, not (so); it is established, that there is only8 one (thing) there: therefore as much as regards intensity; but it seems that this is false, because though we know [sciamus] that the soul (is) less than God and greater than the body, it happens sometimes, that we love it more than God, and less than the body; and thus the quantity9 of love does not follow the quantity of knowledge.

3. Item, quod non sit ibi consubstantialitas, videtur, quia amor et notitia sunt habitus et sunt10 qualitates; ergo videtur, quod essentialiter differant ab ipsa mente.

3. Likewise, it seems that there is not a consubstantiality there, because love and knowledge are habits and they are10 qualities; therefore it seems, that essentially they differ from the mind itself.

4. Item, ratio Augustini11 est, quod non sint in anima sicut accidentia, quia se extendunt extra; sed hoc nihil est, quia accidentia se extendunt extra, ut calor calefaciendo et color immutando visum.  Praeterea, homo cognoscit aliqua cognoscibilia scientia acquisita, quae est accidens, et ita se extendit extra.

4. Likewise, (St.) Augustine's11 reason is, that they are not in the soul as accidents, because they extend themselves outside; but this is nothing, because accidents do extend themselves outside, as heat by a thing-that-heats [calefaciendo] and color by a that-which-alters a (thing) seen [immutando visum].  Moreover, man cognizes some cognizables by acquired knowledge [scientia acquisita], which is an accident, and thus extends itself outside.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Mens, notitia, amor habent ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

CONCLUSION

 

Mind, knowledge, (and) love have an order, an equality and a consubstantiality.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus12 assignat, in his est ordo, aequalitas et consubstantialitas.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that as (St.) Augustine12 assigns (them), there is among these an order, an equality and a consubstantiality

Ordo autem attenditur in his habitibus animae connaturalibus in comparatione ad actus, sicut ponitur ordo in fide,13 spe et caritate, licet simul infundantur.

But the order is attained among these connatural habits of the soul in comparison to acts, just as there is posited an order among faith,13 hope and charity, though they are infused simultaneously.

1. Et sic patet quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia non est ordo in ipsis habitibus absolute consideratis, sed per relationem ad actus.

1. And thus is clear what is objected in the Contrary, that there is not an order among the habits themselves considered absolutely, but through a relation to (their) acts.

Similiter est ibi aequalitas secundum conversionem animae supra se et praedictorum habitum perfectionem.  Unde dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinita- / -te, ...

Similarly there is an equality there according to the soul's conversion upon itself and the perfection of the aforesaid habits.  Whence (St.) Augustine says in the ninth (book) On the Trinity, . . .

1  Cap. 3. circa finem.  —  Mox Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post ordo addit autem et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponit quod loco quia ac ultimus pro tertius.
2  Fide codd. I aa adiecimus se certe supplendum.
3  Cap. 4. n. 5: Simul etiam admonemur, si utcuque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas.  Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum, in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis.  Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se.  —  In quo textu plurimi codd. falso habet utrumque loco utcumque et minus bene animo pro anima; Vat. autem ponit consistere loco existere.
4  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 incongrue vel pro nec.
5  Ita omnes codd. et edd.  Magis placeret inquirit, si haec lectio aliquo cod. culciretur.
6  Cap. 12. n. 18, in quo textu post appetitus originale addit quidam et in fine omittit verba quae est; Vat. autem post quo addit ad et ponit noscere loco nosse.
7  Vat. per comparationem, sed contra mss.  Mox codd. V X post animam addunt tunc, ed 1 et tunc.
8  Multi codd. ut A F T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt tantum.
9  Plures codd. ut A C L R S U aa bb cum ed. 1 minus apte qualitas; agitur siquidem de gradu intensionis.
10  Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sunt.
11  Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 4. n. 5; vide supra fundam. 1. huius q.  —  Paulo post Vat. praeter fidem mss. accidentia enim pro quia accidentia et in fine argumenti extendunt loco extendit.
12  Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18; vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem.
13  Ope mss. et ed. 1 sustulimus hic additum et.  Paulo ante plures codd. ut A C G K L S T bb cum ed. 1 crebro in loco ordo in.

1  Chapter 3, near the end.  —  Then the Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1, at Order add But [autem] and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 it puts because [quod] in place of because [quia] and the last [ultimus] in place of the third [tertius].
2  Trusting in codices I and aa we have inserted itself [se] which must certainly be supplied.
3  Chapter 4, n. 5:  We are also at the same time admonished, if we can in any manner see, that these exist in the soul and as things involuted they are ex-voluted, to be judged [sentiantur] and counted substantially, and/or, as I say, essentially, not as in a subject, as color or figure in a body or any other quality or quantity.  For whatever is such, does not exceed the subject, in which it is.  For that color or figure of this body cannot be also of another body.  But the mind by the love, by which it loves itself, can love also another besides itself.  —  In which text very many codices falsely have each [utrumque] in place of in any manner [utcumque] and the less well spirit [animo] in place of soul [anima]; but the Vatican edition puts consist [consistere] in place of exist [existere].
4  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has incongruously and/or [vel] in place of nor [nec].
5  Thus all the codices and editions.  Here inquires into [inquirit] would be more pleasing, if this reading were supported by any codex.
6  Chapter 12, n. 18, in which text at appetite [appetitus] the original adds a certain [quidam] and at the end omits the words which is; but the Vatican edition after from which [quo] adds for [ad] and it puts to know [noscere] in place of to know [nosse].
7  The Vatican edition has through a comparison [per comparationem], but contrary to the manuscripts.  Then codices V and X after soul add then [tunc], edition 1 adds and then [et tunc].
8  Many codices as A F T V X Y etc. together with edition 1 omit only [tantum].
9  Very many codices as A C L R S U aa bb together with edition 1 have less aptly the quality [qualitas]; since it deals with a grade of intensity.
10  From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted they are [sunt].
11  On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 4. n. 5; see above in the 1st fundament of this question.  —  A little after this the Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts has for accidents [accidentia enim] in place of because accidents [quia accidentia] and at the end of the argument do they extend themselves [se extendunt] in place of extends [se extendit].
12  On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 12, n. 18; see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 near the end.
13  With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed here the added and [et].  A little before this very many codices as A C G K L S T and bb together with edition 1 have often among [crebro in] in place of an order among.


p. 92

 

Trinita- / -te,1, quod non est in his habitibus aequalitas, nisi secundum quod perfecti sunt.

the Trinity,1 that there is not among these habits an equality, except according to which they have been perfected.

2. Et sic patet solutio ad illud quod de amore obiicitur,2 quia ille amor non est perfectus amor, sed libidinosus et inordinatus.  —  Vel dicendum, quod aequales sunt, secundum quod sunt connaturales; quantum enim est quis habilis vel facilis ad cognoscendum se, tantum ad se amandum; de habitibus vero acquisitis, malis vel bonis, non est verum; et de his non intelligitur.

2. And thus is clear the solution to that which is objected concerning love,2 because that love is not a perfect love, but a libidinous and inordinate (one).  —  And/or it must be said, that they are equal, according to which they are connatural; for as much as any are handy [habilis] and/or facile to cognize themselves, so much (are they) to love themselves; but concerning acquired habits, evil and/or good, it is not true; and of these it is not understood (in this manner).

Similiter est ibi tertium, scilicet consubstantialitas, quia secundum quod dictum est supra,3 amor et notitia animae connaturales sunt, secundum quod supra se convertitur; et sic nihil omnino addunt super ipsas potentias.  Per hoc enim, quod anima sibi praesens est, habet notitiam; per hoc, quod est unum sibi, habet habitum amoris; et ideo, sicut potentiae sunt consubstantiales animae, ut supra4 visum est, ita et huiusmodi habitus. Unde etsi videantur dicere modum habitus vel qualitatis, realiter tamen nihil supra potentias addunt.

Similarly there is a third there, that is a consubstantiality, because according to what has been said above,3 love and knowledge [notitia] are connatural to the soul, according to which it is converted upon itself; and thus they add nothing entirely upon the powers themselves.  For through this, that the soul it present to itself, it has knowledge; through this, that it is a one to itself [unum sibi], it has the habit of love; and for that reason, just as the powers are consubstantial to the soul, as has been seen above,4 so also habits of this kind. Whence even if they seem to mean a manner of habit and/or of quality, however they really add nothing upon the powers.

3. Et sic patet responsio ad obiectum, quod5 non sunt qualitates isto modo.

3. And thus is clear the response to the objection [objectum], that5 they are not qualities in that manner.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Augustini, dicendum, quod illa ratio non concludit principaliter, quod amor vel notitia sint substantialiter in anima; et hoc est,6 quia tunc pari ratione posset dici et obiici de omni amore; sed concludit ex consequenti, quod patet sic.  Cum enim amor extenditur extra suum subiectum alium amando, hoc est per virtutem substantiae, sicut per se non est, nisi7 per substantiam.  Si ergo amor et notitia extenduntur per virtutem substantialem, et hae sunt intelligentia et voluntas; et amor, quo anima amat se, est idem cum ipsa voluntate; et similiter8 notitia, qua cognoscit, non est aliud quam intelligentia: restat ergo, quod amor et notitia respectu sui sunt ipsi menti consubstantiales.

4. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Augustine's reason, it must be said, that that reason does not conclude from a principle [principaliter], that love and/or knowledge are in the soul substantially; and this is,6 because then for an equal reason it could be said and objected concerning every love; but it concludes from the consequence [ex consequenti], that it is thus clear.  For when love is extended outside its own subject by loving another, this is through the virtue of the substance, just as it is not through itself, except7 through the substance.  If therefore love and knowledge are extended through substantial virtue, and these are the intelligence and the will; and love, by which the soul loves itself, is the same with the will itself; and similarly8 knowledge, by which it cognizes (itself), is not other than the intelligence: it therefore remains, that love and knowledge in respect to themselves are consubstantial to the mind itself.

SCHOLION. 

SCHOLIUM 

I. Pro faciliore intelligentia triplicis conclusionis notandum, quod ratio ordinis, quem habent mens et amor, non intelligitur, quatenus ista tria absolute et in se considerantur, sed in respectu ad suos actus.  Similiter aequalitas non attenditur quoad aequalitatem in entitate, sed quoad actus super animam reflexos, dum anima intelligit se totam et se diligit, quantum se cognoscit. Quoad solutionem argumenti contra aequalitatem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7.  Denique consubstantialitas non intelligitur absoluta cum exclusione cuiusvis distinctionis, sed in sensu in praecedenti quaestione explicato.  —  Insuper notandum, quod consubstantialitas, quam notitia et amor habent cum mente, non accipitur proprie, quatenus sunt actus (quia actus secundi et accidentia non possunt esse realiter idem cum substantia animae), sed quatenus sunt habitus concreati.  In hoc sensu dicit Scot. (hic q. 9.):  « Ista tria ex parte animae, ut sunt sub tribus actibus suis, in istis, inquam, tribus est consubstantialitas ».

I. For a easier understanding of the threefold conclusion it must be noted, that the reason for the order, which mind and love have, is not to be understood, to the extent that those three are to be considered absolutely and in themselves, but in respect to their own acts.  Similarly equality it not attained in regard to an equality in entity, but in regard to the acts reflected upon [super] the soul, while the soul understands its whole self and loves [diligit] itself, as much as it cognizes itself.  In regard to the solution to the argument against equality cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7.  Next consubstantiality is not to be understood as absolute with the exclusion of any distinction, but in the sense explained in the preceding question.  —  Besides it must be noted, that the consubstantiality, which knowledge and love have with the mind, is not to be accepted properly, to the extent that they are acts (because second acts and accidents cannot be really the same with the substance of the soul), but to the extent they are co-created habits. In this sense (Bl. John Duns) Scotus says (here in q. 9):  « Those three on the part of the soul, as they are under their own three acts, in those three, I say, there is a consubstantiality ».

II. In solutione ad 4. supponitur, quod nullum accidens se possit extendere ad extra virtute propria, sed tantum virtute alicuius substantialis, uti iam diximus in Scholio ad q. 3 articuli praecedentis.  Hoc substantiale est ipsa duplex potentia intellectus et voluntatis; et hoc est verum de actu quocumque, sive tendat ad extra, sive super se reflectatur.  Si autem actus harum potentiarum ad ipsam mentem ut cognitam et amatam referuntur, non sunt in anima sicut accidens in subiecto, sed substantialiter.  —  Eodem modo etiam S. Thomas hac sententiam S. Augustini explicat, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. et ad 5.

II. In the solution to n. 4 it is supposed, that no accident can extend itself ad extra on its own virtue, but only by virtue of something substantial, as we have already said in the Scholium to q. 3 of the preceding article.  This substantial is itself the twofold power of the intellect and of the will; and this is true of any act, either as it tends ad extra, or as it is reflected upon itself.  But if the acts of these powers are referred to the mind itself as a thing cognized and loved, they are not in the soul, as an accident (is) in a subject, but substantially.  —  In the same manner also does St. Thomas explain this sentence of St. Augustine, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 1 and at n. 5.

III. Hanc quaestionem explicite tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7.  —  Scot., hic q. 9.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 37. et seq.; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. ad 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 11.

III. This question is explicitly treated by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 37 and ff.; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, at n. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in the 3rd principle of q. 2, a. 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 11.

1  Cap. 4. n. 4:  Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.
2  Cod. Z addit quod non valet.  Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G I T cc post solutio ponunt punctum, deinde cod. cc post obiicitur adiungit dicendum; nihil tamen inmmutandum duximus.
3  Hic a. 2. a. 1 ad. 1.
4  Art. 1. q. 3.
5  Supple: mens, notitia et amor.  —  Mox. codd. inter se non conveniunt, alii ut A G H K T etc. cum Vat. legunt qualitas, alii vero ut B D E F H I X Z cum ed. 1 qualitates, quos sequimur.
6  Mendum Vat. ex hoc pro et hoc est, et paulo post conclusit pro concludit castigatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
7  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 sed loco nisi.  Paulo ante codd. P Q ultra pro extra; deinde nonnulli codd. ut D E F H K Y aliud, cod. T alterum, codd. L O aliquid loco alium.  Codd. Q (T in margine) post substantiae addunt quia per se non agit; lectio non spernenda.
8  Ita codd. Q T cum ed. 1; multi codd. ut A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. et sic, Vat. sic, quae et paulo infra post intelligentia ponit punctum, quo posito argumentum, quod explicatur in Scholio, pertubatur.  In fine Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 substantiales.

1  Chapter 4, n. 4:  Therefore we have rightly said, that these three, when they have been perfected, are consequently equals.
2  Codex Z adds that it is not valid [quod non valet].  A little before this very many codices as A G I T and cc after solution [solutio] put a period, then codex cc after to that which is objected concerning love [obiicitur] adds it must be said [dicendum]; we have judged that nothing it to be altered.
3  Here in a. 2, q. 1, at n. 1.
4  Article 1, q. 3.
5  Supply: mind, knowledge and love.  —  Then the codices do not agree among themselves, some as A G H K T etc. together with the Vatican edition read a quality [qualitas], but others as B D E G H I X Z together with edition 1 read qualities [qualitates], which we follow.
6  The error of the Vatican edition of putting from this [ex hoc] in place of and this it [et hoc est], and a little after this concluded [conclusit] in place of concludes [concludit] is corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6.
7  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has but [sed] in place of except [nisi].  A little before this codices P and Q have beyond [ultra] in place of outside [extra]; then not a few codices as D E F H K Y have another (thing) [aliud], codex T the other [alterum], codices L and O anything [aliquid] in place of another (subject) [alium].  Codices Q (T in the margin) after of the substance [substantiae] add because by itself it does not act [quia per se non agit]; a reading not to be spurned.
8  Thus codices Q and T together with edition 1; many codices as A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. have and so [et sic], the Vatican edition so [sic], which also a little below this after the intelligence [intelligentia] puts a period, by which the argument, which is explained in the Scholium, is disturbed.  At the end the Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, has substantial [substantiales].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.