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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III |
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PARS. II. |
PART II |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM PARTIS II. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF PART II* |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Imago Dei permanet. CONTRA: Psalmus:7 Domine in civitate imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges. |
In this part is asked about the text (of Master Peter) concerning this which he says: The image of God . . . remains throughout [permanet]. ON THE CONTRARY: The Psalm (says):7 Lord in the city Thou doest reduce their image to nothing. |
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RESPONDEO: Imago dicitur dupliciter: quantum ad substantiale esse; et haec8 respicit trinitatem potentiarum et ordinem et aequalitatem, et sic semper permanet; alio modo prout supra esse addit bene esse, ut decorem et honorem; et haec potest perdi, quia homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit.9 |
I RESPOND: An “image” is said in a twofold manner: as much as regards substantial being [substantiale esse]; and this8 respects the trinity of powers and (their) order and equality, and thus it always remains throughout; in another manner insofar as upon being [supra esse] one adds well being [bene esse], as decor and honor; and this can be lost, because man, when he would be in honor, has not understood.9 |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid etc.; ergo memoria,10 intelligentia et voluntas sunt in praedicamento relationis. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: But “memory” is said regarding something etc.; therefore memory,10 intelligence and will are in the predicament of relation. |
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Item quaeritur, quare mens dicitur magis ad se quam memoria vel intelligentia? |
Likewise it is asked, why mind is said more regarding itself than memory and/or intelligence? |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod dici ad aliquid est11 dupliciter: vel proprie et per se, sicut pater et filius, vel ratione alicuius annexi, quia habet respectum annexum et inclinationem; et sic memoria dicitur ad aliquid, quia innatum habet respectum ad memoriale, similiter intelligentia ad intel- / -ligibile et voluntas ad volibile; |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that to be said regarding something is11 in a twofold manner: properly and per se, as a father and a son, and/or by reason of something annexed, because it has an annexed regard [respectum] and inclination; and thus “memory” is said regarding something, because it has an innate regard for the memorable [ad memoriale], and similarly “intelligence” for the intel- / -ligible and “will” for the willable [volibile]; |
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7 72, 20, ubi Vulgata post civitate
addit tua et loco ipsorum cum Vat. habet eorum. |
7 Psalm 72:20, where the Vulgate at city [civitate]
adds Thy [tua] and in place of their [ipsorum] has together
with the Vatican edition their [eorum]. |
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* [Trans. note: supply of Master Peter] |
p. 94
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intel- / -ligibile et voluntas ad volibile; et haec obiecta ad invicem habent respectum.1 Et sic patet obiectio. |
the intel- / -ligible and the will for the willable [volibile]; and these objects have a regard for one another. |
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Ad illud quod quaeritur de mente, dicendum, quod mens dicitur ab actu essentiali. Propterea est intelligendum, quod quo est2 dat animae esse generalissimum, et sic dicitur essentia; vel inquantum dat esse generale, et sic dicitur vita, quia anima est in genere viventium; aut3 inquantum dat esse spirituale, et sic mens. Mens enim non dicitur nisi quod vivit vita intellectiva. — Vel anima in se dicitur essentia, ut actus corporis vita, ut perfectibilis a Deo mens. |
To that which is asked concerning the mind, it must be said, that “mind” is said from an essential act. On that account it must be understood, that (the essential act) whereby it is2 gives to the soul a most general being [esse generalissimum], and in this manner “essence” is meant; and/or inasmuch as it gives a general being [esse generale], and in this manner “life” is meant, because the soul is in the genus of living (things); or3 inasmuch as it gives a spiritual being [esse spirituale], and in this manner “the mind” (is meant). For “mind” is not said unless a thing [quod] lives by an intellective life. — And/or the soul in itself is said (to be) an essence, as life (is said to be) an act of a body, (and) as the mind (is said to be) perfectible by God. |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod tres personae non sunt unius Dei; quia videtur dicere falsum, quia, si sunt unius essentiae; sed essentia est4 Deus; ergo sunt unius Dei. Si dicas, quod non sequitur; ego quaero, quare non conceditur, quod tres personae sunt unius Dei? Si5 propter hoc, quod obliquus notat diversitatem; ergo cum essentia non sit diversa a persona, non potest dici: tres personae sunt unius essentiae. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that the Three Persons are not of the One God; because it seems to say (something) false [falsum], because, if They are of the one Essence; but the Essence is4 God; therefore They are of the One God. If you say, that this does not follow; I ask, why it is not conceded, that the three Persons are of the One God? If5 on account of this, that the oblique denotes [notat] diversity; therefore since the Essence is not diverse from the Person, there cannot be said: “the Three Persons are of the One Essence”. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod genitivus6 aliquando construitur in ratione possessionis, ut si dicatur: bos Petri vel Ioannis; aliquando ex vi declarationis essentiae, ut mulier egregiae formae; aliquando intransitive, ut creatura salis. Intransitive contruitur generale cum speciali; et sic potest dici: subtantia vel persona Dei; ex vi delcarationis essentiae, nomen7 importans formam per modum formae; et sic dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae. Quia ergo, quando dicitur: tres personae sunt unius Dei, Deus non significat8 nec per modum formae nec per modum specificantis, ideo intelligitur per modum possidentis vel principiantis: et ideo simpliciter est falsa. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that the genitive (case)6 sometimes is construed in the reckoning of possession, as if there is said: “the bull of Peter and/or of John”; sometimes out of the force of a declaration of essence, as “a woman of egregious form”; sometimes intransitively, as “a creature of salt”. Intransitively the general is construed together with the special; and so there can be said: “the Substance and/or Person of God”; out of the force of declaration of essence, a name7 conveying a form through the manner of a form; and so the Three Persons are said (to be) of the One Essence. Therefore because, when there is said: “the Three Persons are of the One God”, “God” does not signify8 through the manner of a form nor through the manner of one specifying, for that reason it is understood through a manner of one possessing or of one beginning [principiantis]: and for that reason it is simply false. |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ex maxima parte est dissimilis. Videtur enim falsum, quia imago est similitudo expressa: ergo si maxime est dissimilis, non est imago. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that for the most part it is dissimilar. For it seems false, because an image is an express similitude: therefore if it is mostly dissimilar, it is not an image. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod est expressio9 simpliciter, vel in genere. Si ergo loquamur de expressione simpliciter, sic dico, quod anima rationalis non est valde similis Deo; si autem loquamur in genere creaturae, quia tantum accedit,10 quantum potest natura creata, sic dicitur valde similis et expressa similitudo Dei. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is expression9 simply (speaking), and/or in a genus [in genere]. Therefore if we speak of an expression simply, I thus say, that the rational soul is not very [valde] similar to God; but if we speak in the genus of the creature, because it approaches10 (Him) as much as a created nature can, thus (the soul) is said (to be) a very much similar and express similitude of God. |
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DUB. V. |
DOUBT V |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia secundum viam istam monstrari posset, quod non sit nisi una persona. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: If there were two, each would be insufficient, and/or one of the two would be superfluous; because according to that way it could be demonstrated, that there is not but one Person. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod in personis non potest esse superfluitas, quia in eis est una sufficientia; unde si una esset superflua, et omnes. Sed11 non potest ibi esse aliqua insufficientia, quia nihil plus habent tres quam una. Sed si essent duae essentiae, duae essent sufficientiae, si12 quaelibet per se esset sufficiens; si autem altera cum altera, quaelibet esset insufficiens: et ita patet, quod non est simile de duabus essentiis, sicut de duabus personis.12 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that among the Persons there cannot be a superfluity, because among Them there is one sufficiency; whence if One were superfluous, (so) also All. But11 there cannot be There any insufficiency, because the Three have nothing more than the One (has). But if there were two essences, the two would be sufficient, if12 any were sufficient by themselves; but if one of the two (were insufficient) with the other, any would be insufficient: and thus it is clear, that it is not the same concerning two essences, as concerning two Persons. |
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DUB. VI. |
DOUBT VI |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod intellexit, Deum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est, quia intellexit, eum non esse rem fatuam; ergo videtur secundum hoc, quod Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that (the mind) understood, that God has a wisdom, which has been begotten from Himself, because it understood, that He is not a foolish thing [res fatua]; therefore it seems according to this, that the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ista consequentia non est intelligenda immediate, scilicet; quia non est res fatua, ergo habet sapientiam genitam. Sed hoc intelligendum est sic: Deus est substantia spiritualis: ergo est nata cognoscere: ergo si non habet sapientiam, est res fatua; sed non est res fatua: ergo habet sapientiam; sed non est sapientia sine verbo, et non est verbum, nisi procedat a mente et ita generetur: ergo a primo,14 si habet sapientiam, necesse est, sapientiam esse genitam. Et omnes istas consequentias oportet intelligere immediate.15 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that that consequence is not to be understood immediately, that is; that He is not a foolish thing, therefore He has a begotten wisdom. But this is to be understood in this manner: God is a spiritual substance: therefore He is bound to cognize: therefore if He does not have a wisdom, He is a foolish thing; but He is not a foolish thing: therefore He has a wisdom; but there is no wisdom without a word, and there is no word, unless it proceeds from a mind and is thus generated: therefore from the first,14 if He has a wisdom, it is necessary, that the wisdom be begotten. And it is proper that all those consequences of his be understood immediately.15 |
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1 De hac duplici specie relationum vide
infra d. 30. q. 3. |
1 Concerning this twofold species of relation see below
d. 30. q. 3. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.