COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV.
Questiones ex comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem concretum, ut nomen Deus.	Questions from the comparison of generation to an essential, concrete term, such as the name “God”.
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE I Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 96-99. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 96-99. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Hic oritur questio satis necessaria etc.	Here there arises a quite necessary question etc..
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
In praecedenti distinctione probavit Magister Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudines congruas et rationes. In praesenti distinctione ponitur secunda pars, in qua solvit incidentes dubitationes. Et incidit dubitatio ex hoc, quod in divinis est trinitas et unitas, et ita aliquid distinguens et distinctum, aliquid indistinctum, ut termini substantiales. Incidit ergo dubitatio ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad terminum substantialem. Habet autem haec pars duas. In prima movet dubitationem ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad substantiam vel essentiam; in secunda ad eius potentiam, infra distinctione sexta: Praeterea quaeri solet.	In the preceding distinction Master (Peter) proved the Trinity and Unity through congruous similitudes and reasons. In the present distinction there is posited a second part, in which he solves occurring doubts [incidentes dubitationes]. And a doubt occurs from this, that among the divine there is a Trinity and Unity, and thus something distinguishing and distinct, something else indistinct, such as [ut] the substantial terms. Therefore a doubt occurs from the comparison of the property of the one distinguishing to the substantial term. Moreover [autem] this part has two (parts). In the first he brings forth [movet] a doubt from a comparison of the property of the one distinguishing to the Substance and/or Essence; in the second to His power, below in the sixth distinction (where he says): Moreover one is accustomed to ask.
Item prima pars habet duas, quia substantia potest significari in concretione, ut per hoc nomen Deus, vel in abstractione, ut per hoc nomen essentia. Primo ergo movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad hoc nomen Deus, secundo, ad hoc nomen essentia, infra distinctione quinta: Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit etc.	Likewise the first part has two (parts), because the Substance can be signified in concretion, as through this name “God”, and/or in abstraction, as through this name “essence”. Therefore first he brings forth a question from the comparison of generation to this name “God”, second, to this name “essence”, below in the Fifth Distinction (where he says): After these there is asked, whether it must be conceded etc..
Haec autem distinctio habet quatuor particulas et hoc secundum quatuor, quae ibi tanguntur. In prima, supposito quod haec sit vera: Deus genuit Deum, quaeritur de hac: Genuit se vel alium, ad¹ quam solvit interimendo. In secunda quaerit de hac: Genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, vel qui non est Deus Pater, et ad hoc solvit distinguendo ex parte praedicati, et hoc ibi: Sed adhuc oppununt. In tertia quaerit de hac: Deus est Trinitas, et probat multis auctoritatibus, quod est vera, et hoc occasione praedictorum, ibi: Quidam tamen veritatis adversarii. In quarta ad suum propositum redit, scilicit ad primo quaesitum; ad primum videlicet² addens primae solutioni, quod quamvis non sit concedendum: Genuit se, vel alium divisim, tamen potest concedi coniunctim, ibi: Nunc ad praemissam quaestionem.	Moreover this distinction has four subparts and this according to the four, which are touched upon there. In the first, having supposed that these (words) are true: “God begot God”, there is asked concerning this: “He begot Himself and/or another”, regarding¹ which he solves by interemption. In the second there is asked concerning this: “He begot the God, who is God the Father, or who is not God the Father”, and regarding this he solves by distinguishing on the part of the predicate, and this there (where he says): But . . . still oppose. In the third he asks concerning this: “God is the Trinity”, and he proves by many authorities, that it is true, and this by the occasion of the aforesaid, there (where he says): However certain adversaries of the truth. In the fourth he returns to his proposal, that is to the thing first sought; regarding the first, namely², adding to the solution of the first, that although there must not be conceded: “He begot Himself, and/or another” disjunctively [divisim], however it can be conceded conjunctively, there (where he says): Now . . . to the aforementioned question.
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam eorum quae tangit Magister in praesenti distinctione, quatuor quaeruntur.	For an understanding of those (things) which Master (Peter) touches upon in the present distinction, four (questions) are asked.
Primo, utrum haec locutio sit concedenda in divinis: Deus genuit Deum.	First, whether this saying must be conceded among the divine: “God begot God”.
Secundo, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc locutionem: Deus genuit alium Deum, vel Deus est alius a Deo.	Second, whether the Unity of the Essence admits of this saying: “God begot another God, and/or there is a God other than God [alius a Deo] ”.
Tertio quaeritur de consignificatione³ huius nominis Deus, utrum videlicet grammatice possimus dicere plures deos.	Third there is asked concerning the consignification³ of this name “God”, whether, namely, we can say grammatically (that there are) more gods.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de suppositione istius nominis Deus, utrum supponat pro persona vel pro essentia.	Fourth and last there is asked concerning the supposition of this His name “God”, whether it supposes for a Person and/or for an Essence.
¹ Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit ad. ² Codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. addunt ad primum videlicet. ³ Auctoritate plurimorum mss. ut A F G K T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus consignificatione pro significatione et Deus loco Dii ac mox istius pro illius.	¹ The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits regarding [ad]. ² The codices and edition 1, contrary to the Vatican edition, add regarding the first, namely [ad primum videlicet]. ³ On the authority of very many manuscripts, such as A F G K T etc., and edition 1 we have substituted consignification for signification and God in place of Gods and then of this, His [istius] in place of of that [illius].

p. 97

ARTICULUS UNICUS. De comparatione nominis Deus ad generationem et de eius consignificatione et suppositione.	ARTICLE SOLE On the comparison of the name “God” to generation and on its consignification and supposition.
Quaestio I. Utrum haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda.	Question 1 Whether this saying: “God begot God”, must be conceded.
CIRCA PRIMUM, quod haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda,	ABOUT THE FIRST, that this saying: “God begot God”, must be conceded,
1. Videtur per hoc quod dicitur in Symbolo: Deum de Deo; sed hoc non est nisi per generationem:¹ ergo Deus generatur de Deo: ergo ista locutio est concedenda: Deus genuit Deum.	1. Seems through that which is said in the Creed [in Symbolo]: “God from God” [Deum de Deo]; but this is naught but through generation:¹ therefore God is generated from God: therefore that saying of his must be conceded: “God begot God”.
2. Item, generatio est respectu similis in natura, unde « homo generat hominem »;² unde si in divinis est generatio, producitur similis in natura: ergo cum Pater sit Deus, non generat nisi Deum: ergo haec est vera: Deus generat Deum.	2. Likewise, generation is in respect of one similar in nature, whence « man generates man »;² whence if among the divine there is generation, one Similar in nature is produced: therefore since the Father is God, He generates naught but God: therefore this (saying) is true: “God generates God”.
3. Item, quidquid habet Filius, aut habet a se, aut ab alio; sed habet deitatem, et non a se, quia sic esset ingenitus: ergo habet ab alio; sed non habet nisi per generationem, et³ non habet deitatem nisi ab habente deitatem, et habens deitatem est Deus: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He either has from Himself, or from an other; but He has deity, and not from Himself, because He would thus be unbegotten: therefore He has it from an other; but He has naught but through generation, and³ He does not have deity except from One having deity, and the One having deity is God: ergo etc..
CONTRA: 1. Hoc nomen Deus significat essentiam sive substantiam, cum sit terminus substantialis;⁴ sed haec non conceditur, immo est falsa: essentia generat essentiam: ergo similiter et ista: Deus genuit Deum.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. This name “God” signifies an essence or substance, since it is a substantial term;⁴ but this is not conceded, nay rather it is false: “the Essence generates an essence”: therefore similarly also that (saying) of his: “God begot God”.
2. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro omni persona, aut determinate pro aliqua. Si determinate pro aliqua: ergo restringitur eius significatio⁵ ab aliquo, nec est dare, quod ab alio nisi ab hoc verbo genuit vel generat. Sed regula est, quod terminus, positus in praedicato, non restringit terminum a parte subiecti ratione significationis: ergo stat pro omni persona. Non ergo videtur locutio vera, secundum quod accipitur pro persona Filii: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, this name “God” either supposes [supponit] for every Person, or determinately for some one (Person). If determinately for Someone: therefore its signification⁵ is restricted by Someone, nor is it to be granted, that (it is) by an Other except by this word “begot” and/or “generates”. But the rule is, that the term, posited in the predicate, does not restrict the term on the part of the subject according to a reckoning of signification: therefore it stands for every Person. Therefore the saying does not seem true, according to which it is accepted for the Person of the Son: ergo etc..
3. Item, iste terminus Deus, quantum est de se, aeque bene supponit pro Filio, sicut⁶ pro Patre: ergo cum Filii sit non generare, sicut et Patris est generare, si haec est vera: Deus generat, pro Patre, eadem ratione et haec: Deus non generat, pro Filio; si ergo haec non conceditur, nec prima.	3. Likewise, that term “God”, as much as it concerns itself, supposes equally well for “the Son”, as⁶ for “the Father”: therefore since it belongs to the Son not to generate, just as it belongs to the Father to generate, if this is true: ‘God generates’, for the Father, by the same reason also (is) this: ‘God does not generate’, for the Son; if therefore this is not conceded, neither (is) the first.
4. Item, contradictorie opposita sunt vera de quolibet sub distinctione, quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio:⁷ ergo si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater. Si Deum qui est Pater, ergo genitus est generans; si Deum qui non est Pater; sed quod implicatur contingit simpliciter inferri, ut si dicatur: homo qui non currit, disputat: ergo homo non currit: ergo similiter, si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, Deus non est Pater; sed si non est Pater, non generat: ergo etc.⁸	4. Likewise, in a contradictory manner opposites are true of anything [quolibet] under a distinction, because of anything (there can be) an affirmation and/or a negation:⁷ therefore if “God begot God”, either (the latter is) the God who is the Father, or a God who is not the Father. If the God who is the Father, therefore, the One generating has been begotten; if the God who is not the Father; but what is implied happens to be inferred simply, as if there is said: “the man, who does not run”, one reckons [disputat]: ‘therefore, the man does not run’: therefore, similarly, if He begot a God who is not the Father, God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: ergo etc..⁸
¹ Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus generationem loco gignitionem. ² Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. 8.): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur . . . homo namque hominem generat. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.). ³ Multi codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum sex primis edd. sed loco et. Cod. R hanc propositionem ita exhibet: per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens. ⁴ De significatione et suppositione huius hominis Deus, in quibus haec et seqq. obiectiones fundantur, vide infra q. 4. — In fine argumenti plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum ed. 1 generat pro genuit. ⁵ Codd. D K O (T ff in marg.) suppositio, quod et infra in responsione ad hanc obiectionem fere omnes codd. et sex primae edd. habent pro significatio; cod. I significatio vel suppositio. Sed vide regulam paulo infra ex Petr. Hisp. allatam. Mox multi codd. et ed. 1 non loco nec; cod. R sed non. Dein post significationis cod. X addit sed consignificationis, quod concordat cum regulae istius explicatione proposita a Petro Hispano, Summula, tract. de Restrictione: Nihil positum a parte pradicati potest restringere terminum communem positum a parte subiecti quoad principalem eius significationem, ut homo est albus . . . Dico autem, quoad principalem eius significationem, quia praedictatum restringit subiectum quoad consignificationem, quae est genus v. g. masculinum. ⁶ Aliqui codd. ut T Z cum ed. 1 addunt et. Paulo infra post sicut codd. H Y omittunt et. Mox cod. Y ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima. Codd. aa bb circa finem argumenti: sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima; ed. 1 nec prima debet concedi; cod. Z si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre. — Plures codd. ut A C G I L M R S U ff hoc tertium argumentum oimittunt, sed indebite, sicut patet ex responsione infra posita; cod. O vero illud praecedenti argumento circa finem post omni persona interserit sub hac forma: Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo etc. Eadem fere verba exhibet cod. Z in fine huius tertii argumenti. ⁷ Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 6. et II. c. 3, ubi agit de affirmatione, negatione et contradictione; et VI. Topic. c. 3. circa medium (c. 6.), ubi dicit: Nam de omni aut affirmatio, aut negatio vera est; et tandem IV. Metaph. text. 15. (III. 4.): De omni affirmatio, aut negatio. Ultimum textum et II. Periherm. c. 3. videnter codd. cum ed. 1 respexisse, omittendo vera est, quod Vat. adiungit. Paulo infra in Vat. desiderantur verba si Deum usque ad sed quod, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habentur. ⁸ Cod. O hic addit novum argumentum: Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii.	¹ From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have put generation [generationem] in place of begetting [gignitionem]. ² Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 28 (Bk. VI, n. 8): For even in certain things it is also manifest, that such as is the one generating, so that which is generated . . . for man generates man. Cf. On the Soul, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4). ³ Many codices as A F G I K T etc. together with the six first editions have but [sed] in place of and [et]. Codex R exhibits this proposition thus: through generation and/or by One having deity, but One having [per generationem vela b habente deitatem, sed habens] ⁴ On the signification and substitution of this name “God” [Deus], in which this and the following objections are founded, see below q. 4. — At the end of the argument very many codices as A F G I K T etc. together with edition 1 have generates [generat] in place of begot [genuit] ⁵ Codices D H O (T and ff in the margin) have supposition [suppositio], which also below in the response to this objection nearly all the codices and the six first editions have in place of signification [significationis]; cod. I reads signification and/or supposition [signification vel suppositio]. But see the rule a little below taken from Peter of Spain. Then many codices and edition 1 have not [non] in place of nor [nec]; codex R has but not [sed non]. Then after of the signification [significationis] codex X adds but of the consignification [sed consignificationis], which agrees with the explanation of that rule proposed by Peter of Spain, Summula, tract on Restriction: Nothing posited on the part of the predicate can restrict a common term posited on part of the subject in regard to its principal signification, such as “man is white” . . . Moreover I say, in regard to its principal signification, that the predicate restricts the subject in regard to the consignification, which is the gender, v. g. the masculine. ⁶ Some codices as T and Z together with edition 1 add also [et]. A little below this after just as [sicut] codices Y and Y omit also [et]. Then codex Y reads therefore if this is true for the Father, so shall it be true for the Son, that is "God does not generate"; if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, neither (is) the first [ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima.]. Codices aa and bb near the end of the argument read: but this is not conceded, therefore neither (is) the first [sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima]; edition 1 has neither ought the first be conceded [nec prima debet concedi]; codex Z reads if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, equally neither is that conceded for the Father [si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre.]. — Very many codices, such as A C G I L M R S U and ff, omit this third argument, but unduly, as is clear from the response put below; however codex O near the end of the preceding argument after every person [omni persona] inserts it under this form: Likewise, if this is true: "God generates God", for the person of the Father, much more strongly will there be true: "God does not generate God", for the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; therefore by the destruction of the consequents, if this in no manner must be conceded, neither (is) that one. Therefore the saying etc. [Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo]. Codex Z exhibits nearly the same words at the end of this third argument. ⁷ Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 6 and Bk. II, ch. 3, where he deals with affirmation, negation and contradiction; and Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 3 near the middle (ch. 6), where he says: For of everything either the affirmation, or the negation, is true [Nam de omni aut affirmation, aut negation vera est]; and also Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 15 (Bk. III, n. 4): Of everything the affirmation, or negation [Deo omni affirmation, aut negatio]. The codices and edition 1 seem to refer to this last text and to On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 3, though omitting is true [vera est], which the Vatican edition adjoins. A little below this the Vatican edition is lacking the words If the God up to but because [si Deum . . . sed quod], which, however, are had in the manuscripts and edition 1. ⁸ Codex O here adds a new argument: Likewise, if God generates God, God is begotten by God: therefore God is distinct from God; therefore there are two gods [Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii].

p. 98

CONCLUSIO. Recte dicitur: Deum genuisse Deum, quod quatuor regulis probatur.	CONCLUSION It is rightly said: that God begot God, which is proven by the four rules.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, salva essentiae unitate, recipitur tam a magistris quam a Sanctis. Ad cuius intelligentiam quatuor regulae sunt notandae.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that the aforesaid saying, saving the unity of the Essence, is received as much as by the masters (of theology) as by the Saints. For the understanding of which, four rules must be noted.
Prima est, quod nomen abstractum imponitur formae et a forma, ut albedo imponitur ipsi albedini¹ et a forma albedinis; nomen vero concretum imponitur a forma, sed non formae, sed supposito: ut album imponitur a forma albedinis, sed non formae, sed supposito, ut alicui rei albae, homini vel cygno.	The first is, that an abstract name is imposed upon a form and by a form, as whiteness is imposed upon whiteness itself¹ and by the form of whiteness; however a concrete name is imposed by a form, but not upon a form, rather [sed] upon a supposit: as white is imposed by the form of whiteness, but not upon a form, rather upon a supposit, as upon any white thing, man and/or swan.
Secunda regula est, quod terminus habens multitudinem suppositorum, sine distributione acceptus, stat pro illo, pro quo reddit locutionem veram, ut cum dicitur: homo currit, vera est locutio pro currente, si aliquis sit currens.	The second rule is, that a term having a multitude of supposits, (and) accepted without distribution, stands for that, for which it renders the saying true, as when there is said: “man runs”, the saying is true for the one running, if there is anyone running.
Tertia regula est, quod termino habenti formam non multiplicabilem non differt praeponere et postponere negationem. Unde non differt dicere: Petrus non currit, et, non Petrus currit.	The third rule is, that placing a negation before and after a term having a non-multipliable form, makes no difference [non differt]. Whence it makes no difference to say: “Peter does not run”, and “not Peter runs”.
Quarta regula est ista, quod relativum refert antecedens sub eodem modo supponendi, sub quo antecedens praecessit ipsum relativum, nisi faciat relationem simplicem.²	The fourth rule is this, that a relative refers to an antecedent under the same manner of supposing, under which the antecedent precedes the relative itself, unless it forms [faciat] a simple relation.
1. Ex prima regula patet responsio ad primum. Cum enim iste terminus Deus sit concretus, etsi³ imponatur a forma essentiali, scilicet deitate, tamen imponitur personae sive supposito, sicut album imponitur ab albedine rei albae; et ideo supponit et reddit locutionem veram pro persona, non pro forma. Hoc autem nomen essentia vel deitas est abstractum, et ideo imponitur formae et a forma, sicut albedo, et ideo essentiam significat et supponit. Et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat essentiam, quia generatio non est formae, sed suppositi;⁴ sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, pro persona.	1. From the first rule the response to the first is clear. For since that term “God” is concrete, even if³ it was imposed by an essential form, that is by deity, it is, however, imposed upon a Person or Supposit, as white is imposed by whiteness upon a white thing; and for that reason it supposes (on behalf of one or the other) and renders the saying true for a Person, not for a form. Moreover, this name “essence” and/or “deity” is abstract, and for that reason it is imposed upon a form and by a form, as whiteness (is), and for that reason it signifies the Essence and supposes (for It). And for that reason this is false: “the Essence generates an essence”, because generation does not belong to a form, but to a supposit;⁴ but this is true: “God begot God”, (because “God” supposes) for a Person.
2. Ex secunda regula patet responsio ad secundum. Quamvis enim significatio termini non arctetur, tamen pro illo stat, pro quo est locutio vera, ut homo currit, pro Petro vel Ianne, si pro illo, est locutio vera; nec tamen ad illum restringitur. Et hoc patet, quia si addatur distributio, confundet⁵ illum terminum pro omnibus; sed si esset restrictus, non confunderet nisi pro illis, ad quos se extenderet restrictio. Unde aliud est terminum restringi ad unum, aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro uno.	2. From the second rule the response to the second is clear. For although the signification of the term is not constrained [arctetur], however, it stands for that, for which the saying is true; nor, yet, is it restricted to that. And this is clear, because if there is added a distribution, it will confound⁵ that term for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those, to which the restriction would extend itself. Whence that the term is restricted to one is one thing, that it renders the saying true for one is another.
3. Ex tertia regula patet solutio⁶ ad tertium. Licet enim haec sit vera pro Patre: Deus generat Deum, tamen haec: Deus non generat Deum, non est vera pro Filio. Cum enim iste terminus Deus dicat formam immultiplicabilem, non differt ei praeponere negationem et postponere; et ideo cum negatio praeposita⁷ omnino a subiecto removeat praedicatum, sic et negatio postposita removet totaliter praediatum ab hoc termino Deus, cum dicitur: Deus non generat, quia removet a quolibet supposito. Et ideo alium modum habet supponendi in affirmativa quam in negativa, quia in affirmativa erat locutio vera pro Patre; in negativa vero non potest esse veritas, quia negatio removet totaliter praedicatum illud.	3. From the third rule the solution⁶ to the third is clear. For though this be true for the Father: “God generates God”, however this: “God does not generate God”, is not true for the Son. For since that term “God” means an unmultipliable form, it makes no difference to place a negation before or [et] after it; and for that reason since a negation placed before (it)⁷ entirely removes the predicate from the subject, so also a negation placed after (it) totally removes the predicate from this term “God”, since there is said: “God does not generate”, because it removes it from any Supposit. And for this reason it has another manner of supposing in the affirmative than in the negative, because in the affirmative the saying is true for the Father; however in the negative there cannot be truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.
4. Ex quarta regula patet quartum. Cum enim relativum omnino habeat suppositionem antecedentis, et iste terminus Deus⁸ in praedicato supponat pro Deo genito, relativum refert pro illo. Et ita sensus est: Deus genuit Deum, qui Deus genitus est Pater, vel non est Pater; et haec est vera pro negativa, nec licet inferre: ergo Deus non est Pater; quia mutatur suppositio, immo est ibi figura dictionis.⁹	4. From the fourth rule the fourth (solution) is clear. For since an entirely relative (term) is had as a substitute for the antecedent, and that term “God”⁸ in the predicate supposes for “the begotten God”, (and as) a relative refers to Him [pro illo]. And thus the sense is: “God begot the God, which begotten God is the Father, and/or is not the Father”; and this is true for the negative (part), nor is it licit to infer: “therefore God is not the Father”; because the supposition is changed, nay rather there it is a figure of speech.⁹
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. In gratiam lectorum, qui in antiqua logica minus sunt exercitati, iuvat hic ponere explicationem aliquorum terminorum, quae in hac quaestione et alibi in hoc opere saepe occurrunt. Sumtae sunt hae et aliae multae alibi in notis positae explicationes magna ex parte ex Summulis Petri Hispani, quae tempore S. Bonaventurae in manibus scholarium erant. Postquam Petrus multa de rebus philosophicis et medicina scripsit, a. 1275 electus est in Summum Pontificem et assumsit nomen Ioannis XXI. Mortuus est 16. Maii 1277. Plura videri possunt in quovis libro de logica scholastica tractante.	I. For the sake of the readers, who are less exercised in the ancient logic, it helps here to put an explanation of the ancient terms, which in this question and elsewhere in this work often occur. These and many others elsewhere in the notes are explanations taken mostly from the Summulae of Peter of Spain, which in the time of St. Bonaventure were in the hands of scholars. Afterwards Peter (Giuliano) wrote much concerning things philosophical and medical, (and) in the year 1275 was elected as Supreme Pontiff and assumed the name John XXI. He died on May 16th, 1277. More (information on these matters) can be seen in any book treating of scholastic logic.
1. Aliud est significatio, aliud suppositio alicuius termini. Significatio est repraesentatio rei per vocem et convenit omnibus vocabulis tam substantivis quam reliquis, sive in propositione, sive extra propositionem.	1. Signification is one thing, the supposition of any term, another. Signification is the representation of a thing through the voice and it befits all words both substantive and otherwise, whether in a proposition, or outside a proposition.
Suppositio, ut vult Petrus Hisp., tract de suppositione, « est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo », intellige, de quo / vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur.	Supposition, as Peter of Spain would have it in his “Tract on Supposition”, « is the acceptance of a substantive term on behalf of something », concerning which . . .
¹ Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt ipsi albedini et, sed male, uti ex contextu patet. ² Praedictarum regularum prima insinuatur ab Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 21. et 27. ac IX. Metaph. text. 12. (VI. c. 6. 8. et VII. c. 7.); secunda habetur in Petri Hisp. Summula, tract. de Suppos. et Distrib.; terita in opusculo, quod etiam Petro Hisp. attribuitur, scil. Parvorum Logicalium, tract. de Negat. et Affirm. c. 4; quarta in eius dem Summula, tract. de Relativis. ³ Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus etsi loco et. Mox cod. X post deitate habet non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae. ⁴ Ex illo generali principio: Actiones sunt suppositorum. ⁵ Id est, facit supponere. — Paulo ante Cod. R subiectum pro illum. ⁶ Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus responsio in solutio et paulo post non multiplicabilem in immultiplicabilem. ⁷ Vat. contra antiquirores codd. et ed. 1 addit totaliter et. ⁸ Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 Deus. Paulo ante cod. K modo negativo relativum non habeat suppositionem aliam a sui antecedente. ⁹ Cod. K addit sicut hic: Deus genitus non est Pater: ergo Deus non est Pater.	¹ Very many codices together with the six first editions omit whiteness itself and [ipsi albedini est], but badly, as is clear from the context. ² The first of the aforesaid rules is hinted at by Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, texts 21 and 27, and Bk. IX, text 12 (Bk. VI, ch. 6 and 8, and Bk. VIII, ch. 7); the second is had in Peter of Spain's, Summula, Tract on Supposition and Distribution; the third in the smaller work, which is also attributed to Peter of Spain, namely, Parvorum Logicalium, Tract on Negation and Affirmation, ch. 4; the fourth in the Summula, Tract on Relatives. ³ From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted even if [etsi] in place of et [and]. Then codex X after deity [deitate] has it is not, however, imposed upon a form, but rather upon a person [non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae]. ⁴ From that general principle: Actions belong to supposits. ⁵ That is, it causes it to suppose for. — A little before this Codex R has subject [subiectum] in place of that [illum]. ⁶ From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have changed response [responsio] into solution [solutio] and a little after this non multipliable [non multipclicabilem] into unmultipliable [immultiplicabilem]. ⁷ The Vatican edition against the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds here totally and [totatliter et]. ⁸ We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 God [Deus]. A little before this codex K in a negative manner has the relative may have a supposition other than its antecedent [relativum non habeat suppositionem aliam a sui antecedente] ⁹ Codex K adds such as here: "The begotten God is not the Father: therefore God is not the Father” [sicut hic: Deus genitus non est Pater: ergo Deus non est Pater].

p. 99

vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur. Sic terminus homo potest supponere vel pro homine in communi, ut in propositione: homo est species; vel pro suis inferioribus sub hac specie comprehensis, v. g. homo currit. Suppositionum alia est communis, alia discreta; illa fit per terminum communem, ut homo est mortalis; haec per terminum discretum (concretum), ut Socrates, vel per communem, sed determinatum per pronomen demonstrativum, ut iste homo.	and/or which (things) a term of this kind in any proposition is verified. Thus the term “man” can substitute [supponere] for man in common, as in the proposition: “man is a species”; and/or for his inferiors comprehended under this species, v. g. “a man runs”. Of suppositions one is common, the other discrete; the former is done through a common term, such as “man is mortal”; the latter is through a discrete (concrete) term, such as “Socrates”, and/or through a common one, but determined through the demonstrative pronoun, as (in) “that man” [iste homo].
Aliae divisiones suppositionis apud S. Bonav. occurrentes sunt: suppositio simplex et personalis. Illa est acceptatio termini communem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species; animal est genus. Tunc terminus homo supponit pro homine in communi, et non pro quolibet inferiore; unde non licet facere decensum, uti dicut, sic arguendo: homo est species: ergo aliquis homo est species. Personalis vero suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut cum dicitur: homo currit; hic iste terminus homo supponit pro suis inferioribus. — Personalium suppositionum alia est determinata, alia est confusa. Determinata est acceptio termini communis indefinite sumti, vel cum signo particulari, ut homo currit, vel aliquis homo currit; et dicitur determinata, quia licet in utraque istarum propositionum ille terminus homo supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente, propositio est vera; et quia aliud est supponere et aliud locutionem veram vel falsam esse pro aliquo, igitur in praedictis iste terminus homo supponit pro omni homine currente et non currente, licet reddat locutionem veram pro uno solo currente . . . Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus, mediante signo universali, ut cum dicitur: omnis homo est animal; quia supponit terminus homo pro quolibet suo supposito. Ita Petrus Hisp.; alii quoad confusam et determinatam suppositionem rem paulo aliter explicant.	The other divisions of supposition occurring in St. Bonaventure's (writings) are: simple and personal (i.e. as a hypostasis). The former is the common acceptation of a term, as when there is said: “man is a species”; “animal is a genus”. Here the term “man” substitutes for man in common, and for any inferior; whence it is not licit to make a descent, as one says, by arguing thus: ‘man is a species: therefore some man is a species’. However personal supposition is the acceptance of a common term for its inferiors, as when there is said: “man runs”; here that term “man” substitutes for its inferiors. — Of personal suppositions one is determinate, the other is confused. Determinate (substitution) is the acceptance of a common term taken indefinitely, and/or with a particular sign, such as “a man runs”, and/or “some man runs”; and it is called determinate, because though in each of those propositions that term “man” substitutes for every man, both the one running and the one not running, however when only one man is running, the proposition is true; and because it is one thing to substitute and another that a saying is true and/or false for something, therefore in the aforesaid that term “man” substitutes for “every man running and not running”, though it renders the saying true for only one running . . . A confused supposition is the acceptance of a common term for very many, by means of a universal sign, as when there is said: “every man is an animal”; because the term “man” substitutes for any of its supposits. Thus Peter of Spain; others in regard to confused and determinate supposition explain the matter a little otherwise.
2. Distributio est acceptio termini communis pro suis significatis, sive est multiplicatio termini communis virtute alicuius signi universalis, v. g. in propositione: omnis homo currit, terminus homo distribuitur (sive confunditur) pro omnibus hominibus virtue illius vocabuli omnis, quod signum distributivum appellatur.	2. Distribution is the acceptance of a common term for those it signifies, or it is the multiplication of a common term by virtue of any universal sign, v. g. in the proposition: “every man runs”, the term “man” is distributed (or confounded) for every man by virtue of that word every which is called a distributive sign.
3. Restrictio est coarctatio termini communis a maiore suppositione sive extensione ad minorem; sic homo albus non significat omnes homines, sed partem eorum.	3. Restriction is the constraining [coarctatio] of a common term by a greater substitution or extension to a lesser; as “white man” does not signify all men, but a portion of them.
4. Reddere locutionem veram significat, quod in propositione, in qua subiectum supponit pro pluribus disiunctive, sensus redditur verus per hoc, quod in uno saltem supposito verificatur; v. g. propositio: homo currit, redditur vera, currente uno qualicumque. Unde reddere locutionem veram differt a restrictione termini ad unum, ut bene dicit S. Bonav., hic ad 2.	4. “To render a saying true” signifies, that in a proposition, in which the subject substitutes disjunctively for very many, the sense is rendered true through this, that in at least one supposit it is verified; v. g. the proposition: “man runs”, is rendered true, with any one (man) running. Whence “to render a saying true” differs from the restriction of the term to one, as St. Bonaventure well says, here at n. 2.
II. His suppositis, quatuor regulae logicales in corp. positae earumque applicatio in solutione obiectorum facile intelliguntur. Sic verba (ad 2.): « quia si addatur distributio, confundet illum terminum pro omnibus », hunc sensum habent: si additur signum omnis termino homo, tunc confundet i. e. distribuet illum terminum, ita ut verificetur de omnibus hominibus; si vero terminus homo restringitur per albus, tunc non « confunderet nisi pro albis hominibus ». — Pro intelligentia applicationis quartae regulae est notandum, quod est duplex relatio pronominis relativi ad suum nomen, scil. relatio simplex vel personalis. Per relationem simplicem pronomen relativum (qui, quae, quod) non refertur ad idem numero antecedens sive ad idem suppositum, bene vero per relationem personalem. Exemplum: « Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit »; hic relativum quae habet relationem simplicem, non personalem, quia alia mulierum persona damnavit, nempe Eva, alia salvavit, scil. Ss. Virgo Maria. Unde S. Doctor recte concludit, quod in illata obiectione est figura dictionis i. e. fallacia figurae dictionis, quia terminus sumitur sub diversa suppositione. De hoc plura vide dub. 3. huius dist., Alex. Hal., p. I. . 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 4. Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.	II. With these things supposed, the four logical rules posited in the body and their application in the solution of the objections are easily understood. Thus the words (at n. 2): « because if there is added a distribution, it will confound that term for all », has this sense: if there is added the sign “every” to the term “man”, then it will confound, i. e. distribute, that term, so that it shall be verified for all men; however if the term “man” is restricted by “white”, then it will not « confound except for white men ». — For an understanding of the application of the fourth rule it must be noted, that there is a twofold relation of a relative pronoun to its noun, that is a simple and/or personal relation. Through a simple relation the relative pronoun (“who”, “which”, “what”) is not referred to the same antecedent in number or to the same supposit, however (it is) rightly (referred) through the personal relation. An example: « She has damned us, who has saved us: a woman! » [Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit]; this relative who [quae] has a simple relation, not a personal one, because one person among women damned, namely Eve, an other saved, that is the Most Holy Virgin Mary. Whence the Seraphic Doctor rightly concludes, that in the objection brought forth there is a figure of speech, i. e. a fallacy of a figure of speech, because the term is taken under a diverse supposition. Concerning this see the very many (things said) in dubium 3 of this distinction, (and) in Alexander of Hales’, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, q. 2, §. 4, (and) in Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1.
III. Contra applicationem tertiae regulae ad Deum moverunt subtilem difficultatem Durand. (hic q. 2.), Aureol., Brulifer (hoc loco) aliique posteriores Scholastici. Negant enim, quod Deus sit proprie terminus singularis, cum aliquod modo sit etiam terminus communis, quod etiam S. Bonav. (infra q. 4.) concedit. Inde concludunt, propositionem: Deus non generat Deum, posse concedi. Probatiores vero theologi, ut S. Thomas (S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 3.), Richard. (hic q. 1.) aliique cum nostro Seraphico (hic a. 3.) locutionem hanc recte improbant. Cfr. Caietanus ad loc. S. Thomae. cit.	III. Against the application of the third rule to “God”, Durandus (here in q. 2), Aureolus, Brülifer (at this point) and other later Scholastics bring forward a subtle difficulty. For they deny that “God” is properly a singular term, since in some manner it may also be a common term, which even St. Bonaventure (below in q. 4) concedes. Hence they conclude, that the proposition: “God does not generate God”, can be conceded. However more approved theologians, such as St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 3), Richard (here in q. 1) and others together with our Seraphic Doctor (here in q. 3) disapprove rightly of this saying. Cf. Cajetan's commentary on this passage of St. Thomas.
IV. Quoad quaestionis solutionem omnes antiqui conveniunt. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 9. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 1. 4. — Scot., hic q. 1. ad 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7.; de hac et seqq. qq., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 51. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. qq., S. a. 54. q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. aa. hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.	IV. In regard to the solution of the question all the ancients agree. Cf. St. Bonaventure, below in d. 9, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, §. 1. 4. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1, at n. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1 & 2; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6 & 7.; on this and the following qq., Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 51. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1 and 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1. — Giles the Roman, on this and the following q. here in the 2. princ. of the sole question. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following qq., Summa., a. 54, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following qq. here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following aa. here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following question, here in q. 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV.