S.  Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S.  R.  E.  Episc.  Card.  Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St.  Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc.  Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio III.

 

ARTICLE I

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S.  Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp.  101-102.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S.  Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol.  1, pp.  101-102.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO III.

 

Utrum congrue iuxta regulas grammaticae dici possit:  plures dii.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether congruously in accord with the rules of grammar there can be said:  “many gods”

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum hoc nomen Deus grammatice significet pluralem numerum, sive utrum congrue possit dici:  plures dii.  Et quod sic, videtur:

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether this name “God” grammatically signifies a plural number, or whether congruously there can be said:  “many gods” [plures dii].  And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Quia secundum Philosophum4 intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, quamvis voces sint diversae; sed modi significandi consequuntur modos intelligendi:  ergo cum apud Hebraeos congrue dicatur Heloim, quod aequipollet ei quod est dii, ergo et apud nos.

1. Because according to the Philosopher4 the understandings (of words) are the same among all, although (their) sounds [voces] are diverse; but manners of signifying are consequent to manners of understanding:  therefore when among the Hebrews there is congruously said Eloim, which is equivalent to that (word) which (in our tongue) is “Gods”, therefore also among us.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus,5 verum supponit congruum; unde « Catonis est, vel non est, nec verum nec falsum significat »; sed haec vera est:  non sunt plures dii:  ergo congrua:  ergo et haec congrua:  plures sunt dii, quia negatio non removet incongruitatem.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher would have it [vult],5 the true supposes the congruous; whence « ‘It belongs to Cato, and/or it does not belong’, signifies neither the true nor the false »; but this is true:  ‘there are not many gods’:  therefore (so is) the congruous (equivalent):  therefore also this congruous (equivalent):  ‘there are many gods’, because negation does not remove the incongruity.

3. Item, sicut Deus convenit uni soli, ita principium6 creaturarum uni soli; sed quamvis falso dicantur plura principia, tamen dicuntur congrue:  ergo pari ratione possumus dicere:  plures dii.

3. Likewise, as “God” convenes with One alone, thus “the principle6 of creatures” (with) One alone; but although falsely there are said (to be) many principles, yet congruously they are said (to be):  therefore by an equal reason we can say:  “many gods”.

4. Item, hoc nomen phoenix non habet nisi unicum suppositum;7 tamen congrue dicitur:  plures phoenices.  Si tu dicas, quod suppositum plurificatur per successionem temporis; obiicio tibi de hoc nomine sol, quod nullo tempore plurificatur; et tamen congrue dicitur:  plures soles:  ergo et plures dii.

4. Likewise, this name phoenix has naught but one supposit;7 however there is congruously said:  “more phoenixes”.  If you say, that the supposit is plurified through a succession of time; I object to you concerning this name “Sun”, which at no time is plurified; and, however, there is congruously said:  “many suns”:  therefore also “many gods”.

CONTRA:  1.  Omne nomen, quod habet plurale, est nomen appellativum; propria enim nomina non plurificantur, non enim dicitur:  plures Petri vel Ioannes;8 sed hoc nomen Deus non est nomen applellativum, quia non significat formam multiplicabilem:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1.  Every noun [nomen], which has a plural, is an appellative noun; for proper nouns are not plurified, for there is not said:  “many Peters and/or Johns”;8 but this noun “God” is not an appellative noun, because it does not signify a multipliable form:  ergo etc..

2.  Item, hoc nomen Deus est proprie9 proprium divinae naturae; sed nullum tale multiplicatur:  ergo etc.

2.  Likewise, this noun “God” is properly (speaking)9 proper to the Divine Nature; but nothing such is multiplied:  ergo etc..

4  Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1:  Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem sunt, ita nec voces omnibus eaedem:  quorum tamen haec signa primo sunt, ea omnibus sunt eaedem passiones animae.
5  Libr. I. Periherm. c. 2, iuxta translationem Boethii:  « Nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est; nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum »; in quo textu ceterae translationes Philosnis pro Catonis ponunt.  Ad quem locum auctor libri Auctoritatum Aristot. etc. (a. 1500) addit:  « Ex quo communiter tahitur, quod verum et falsum praesupponunt congruum ».  Incongruitas huius dictionis consistit in discohaerentia accidentium, ut infra in solutione dicitur; dees enim subiectum genitivi.
6  Cod. S addit omnium.  Codd. cum ed. 1 in fine argumenti deos loco dii.
7  S.  Doctor loquitur secundum anitquam opinionem fabulosam, quod haec avis in uno solo individuo existat, ex cuius cinveribus resurgat alius.  Item exemplum adducit Boeth., I. de Categoriis Aristot. c. de Denominativis.
8  Cfr. Priscian., II.  Grammat. c. 5.
9  Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, addidimus proprie.  Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut H ff post mulitiplicatur adiiciunt vel plurificatur; ed. 1 nec plurificatur. 

4  On Interpretation, Bk. 1, ch. 1:  And in accord with the manner that letters are neither the same for all (peoples), so also are spoken words [voces] not the same for all (men):  to whom, however, these signs (i. e. letters) belong first, because of this [ea] the passions of the soul are the same for all.
5  On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 2, according to the translation of (St. Severinus) Boethius:  « However, “It is always the name of Cato, and/or it is not”; for it does not yet say anything true or false »; in which text the rest of the translations put to Philo [Philonis] in place of to Cato [Catonis].  Regarding which passage the author of the book Auctoritatum Aristotelis etc.  (1500 A.  D.) adds:  « From which there is commonly drawn, that the true and the false presuppose the congruous ».  The incongruity of this saying consists in a discoherence of accidents, as is said below in the solution; for the subject of the genitive is lacking.
6  Codex S adds of all [omnium].  The codices together with edition 1 at the end of the argument have that (there are) many gods [plures deos] in place of many gods [plures dii].
7  The Seraphic Doctor speaks of the fabulous opinion of the ancients, that this bird exists in only one individual, from whose ashes there arises another.  (St. Severinus) Boethius adduces the same example, On the Categories of Aristotle, Bk. I, ch. "On Denominatives".
8  Cf.  Priscian, Grammar, Bk. II, ch.  5.
9  Having examined the manuscripts and edition 1, we have added properly (speaking) [proprie].  A little below this some codices as H and ff after is multiplied [multiplicatur] add and/or plurified [vel plurificatur]; edition 1 has nor is it plurified [nec plurificatur]. 

 

p.  102

 

CONCLUSIO.

Nomen Deus, proprie loquendo, non habet plurale.

CONCLUSION

The noun "God”, properly speaking, does not have a plural.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hoc nomen Deus dicitur tripliciter, scilicet nuncupative, adoptive et naturaliter.  Primis duobus modis plurificatur; unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios octavo:1  Si quidem sunt dii multi, et domini multi; sed tertio modo non, quia sic hoc nomen Deus significat divinam naturam cum conditionibus, quarum collectiones impossibile est in alio reperire; et ideo sicut nomen proprium non habet plurale, secundum artem loquendo, sic nec hoc2 nomen Deus.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid there must be noted, that this noun “God” is said in a threefold manner, that is as a name [nuncupative], adoptively and naturally.  In the first two manners it is plurified; whence the Apostle in the eight (chapter) of the First (Letter) to the Corinthians (says):1  If indeed there are many gods, and many lords; but in the third manner not (so), because as this noun “God” signifies the Divine Nature with (its) conditions, the collection of which is impossible to be discovered in an other; and for that reason just as a proper noun does not have a plural, according to the art of speaking [artem loquendo], so neither this2 noun “God”.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod apud Hebraeos habet plurale quod est Heloim; dicendum, quod modi significandi non tantum sequuntur3 diversos modos intelligendi generales, sed etiam modos exprimendi.  Et quoniam ipsi habent articulos et modos exprimendi diversos, quos nos non habemus, ideo illi possunt habere, sed nos non.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that among the Hebrews there is had a plural which is Eloim; it must be said that manners of signifying do not only follow3 diverse, general manners of understanding, but also manners of expressing.  And since they have articles and diverse manners of expressing, which we do not have (in Latin), for that reason they can have (the plural), but we (can) not.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum supponit congruum; dicendum, quod duplex est incongruitas:  una est ex discohaerentia accidentium,4 ut Catonis est; alia ex discohaerentia intellectuum, ut cum dicitur:  plures Petri.  Prima incongruitas tollit veritatem et falsitatem; secunda vero incongruitas habet falsitatem coniunctam:  et ideo, quia per negationem removetur falsitas, et Sancti malunt loqui vere, quam proprietatem sermonis servare et loqui minus vere, ideo negant plures deos.  Posset5 tamen dici, quod quamvis haec vox dii non sit vox significativa secundum artem et impositionem, tamen est vox significativa ex accommodatione usus, ut olli pro illi:  et ideo generat falsum intellectum affirmativa, et negativa verum, quamvis non grammatice.

2. To that which is objected, that the true supposes the congruous; it must be said, that there is a twofold incongruity:  one is from a discoherence of accidents,4 as “It belongs to Cato”; the other is from a discoherence of understandings, as when there is said:  “many Peters”.  The first incongruity takes away truth and falsity; however the second incongruity has a falsity conjoined:  and for that reason, because through a negation falsity is removed, and the Saints preferred to speak in a true manner, (rather) than observe the propriety of speech and speak less truly, for that reason they denied that (there are) many gods.  It could,5 however, be said, that although this sound [vox] “gods” is not a significative sound according to the art (of speaking) and (its) imposition, however it is a significative sound from an accommodation of use, as “those” [olli] for “those” [illi]:  and for that reason an affirmative generates a false understanding, and a negative a true one, although not grammatically.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principium uni soli convenit, similiter et pheonix; dicendum, quod convenire uni soli est tripliciter.  Aut enim est, quia imponitur nomen a forma immultiplicablili, ut in propriis nominibus; et sic tollit pluralitatem re et consignificatione.  Aut imponitur a forma, quae nata est communicari, quamvis non communicetur propter determinationem, ut cum6 dicitur:  principium creaturarum.  Aut propter defectum materiae, ut phoenix; et tale tollit pluralitatem secundum rem non secundum consignificationem, quia potest consignificari talis forma, ut potest multiplicari per supposita.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that a principle convenes with one alone, similarly also the phoenix; it must be said, that to convene with one alone is (said) in a threefold manner.  For either it is, because a noun is imposed by a non-multipliable form, as in proper nouns; and thus it takes away plurality in thing and in consignification.  Or it is imposed by a form, which is bound to be communicated, although it is not communicated on account of a determination, as when6 there is said:  “the principle of creatures”.  Or on account of a defect of matter, as the phoenix; and such takes away a plurality according to thing, not according to consignification, because such a form can be consignified, as it can be multiplied through supposits.

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I. Non est hic quaestio de illo fundamentali dogmate, quod Deus sit unus (quod probatum est supra, d. 2. q. 1), sed de hoc:  utrum nomen Deus ratione trium personarum possit pluraliter inflecti.  De hoc argumento S. Doctor bis disputat, scil.  hic quoad modum dicendi; infra vero, d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.  iterum quoad rem sive veritatem interisecam.  Quaestio hic discussa, quae spectat potius ad grammaticam, inde orta videtur, quod apud Hebraeos in voce Heloim pluralis adhibetur (cfr. 1. arg. ad oppositum).  Hoc explicandum esse ex propria indole Hebraicae linguae asserit S. Bonav., cui consentit S. Thom. S. I. q. 39. a. 3. ad 2.

I. The question here does not concern the fundamental dogma, that God is one (which has been proved above, in d. 2, q. 1), but rather this:  whether the noun “God” [Deus] by reason of the Three Persons can be inflected in the plural.  Concerning this argument the Seraphic Doctor twice disputes, that is here in regard to the manner of speaking; again below, in d.  23, a.  2, q.  3 in regard to the thing or intrinsic truth.  The question discussed here, which regards rather grammar, from which it seems to have arisen, that among the Hebrews in the sound “Eloim” a plural is employed (cf. 1 argument to the opposite).  That this must be explained from the proper inherent quality [indole] of the Hebraic tongue St.  Bonaventure so asserts, to which St.  Thomas, Summa., I. q. 39, q. 3, at n. 2, consents.

II.  Idem docent:  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 2; sed triplicem distinctionem hic in corp.  positam habet ibid. m. 1.  — Scot., hic q. 1. 2.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; S. I. q. 13. a.  9.  —  B.  Albert., I. Sent.  d. 2. a. 22.  —  Petrus a Tar., hic q. 4.  a. 2.  —  Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. q. 2. n. 28.

II. (The following) teach the same (opinion):  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I. q. 50, m. 2; but the triple distinction posited here in the body (of the question) is had in m. 1.  —  (Bl.  John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1 and 2.  —  St.  Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, at n.  3; Summa., I, q. 13, q. 2.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a.  4, q. 2, n. 28.

1  Vers. 5.
2  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte sic nec nomen Dei.
3  Ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. substituimus sequuntur loco requirunt; alii codd. ut I U ff cum ed.  1 consequuntur.  Lectio mss.  certe praeferenda lectioni Vat. Paulo infra Vat.  contra plurimos codd.  ut A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. et ed. 1 quoniam ergo pro Et quoniam.  Demum circa finem argumenti, obnitentibus mss.  et ed. 1, ponit Vat. dicere loco habere; in lectione mss.  supple:  plurale.
4  Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 1. (de Constructione):  Nam si incongrua (ratio contextus) sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus, quo modo inconcinnitas litterarum vel syllabarum vel eis accidentium in singulis dictionibus facit barbarismum.  —  Vat.  sola adiacentium loco accidentium, quae et paulo supra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 habet praesupponit pro supponit.
5  Vat.  potest, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.  Circa finem huius responsionis aliqui codd.  ut A C L O R S V Y ex intellectu pro intellectum.
6  Supplevimus ex mss. et primis sex edd. cum.  In fine responsionis antiquiores codd.  cum ed. 1 significari pro consignificari, et cod. Q (in margine) potens loco potest.

1  Verse 5.
2  The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has less aptly so neither the name of God [sic nec nomen Dei].
3  From very many manuscripts as A C G G J M N R S T V X Y Z etc. we have substituted follow [sequuntur] in place of require [requirunt]; other codices as I U ff together with edition 1 have follow after [consequuntur].  The reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred to the reading of the Vatican text.  A little below this the Vatican text contrary to very many codices as A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. and edition 1 has therefore since [quoniam ergo] in place of And since [Et quoniam].  Finally near the end of the argument, by disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text puts say [dicere] in place of have [habere]; in reading the manuscripts supple:  plural.
4  Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVII, ch. 1 (On Construction):  For if (the reason for the context) is incongruous, it will cause a solecism, as if by an awkward concourse of the elements of discourse [quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus], in the manner that the awkwardness of letters and/or of syllables and/or of the accidents in their individual pronunciation [singulis dictionibus] cause a barbarism.  —  The Vatican text alone has adjacents [adiacentium] in place of accidents [accidentium], which text also a little above this, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, has presupposes [praesupponit] in place of supposes [supponit].
5  The Vatican text has it can, but the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this.  Near the end of this response some codices as A C L O R S V Y have from the understanding [ex intellectu] in place of understanding [intellectum].
6  We have supplied from the manuscripts and the first six editions when [cum].  At the end of the response the more ancient codices together with edition 1 have be signified [significari] in place of be consignified [consignificari], and codex Q (in the margin) has able [potens] in place of can [potest]. 

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author.  The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition.  The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text.  Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.  Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.