S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio IV.

 

ARTICLE I

 

Question 4

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 102-103.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 102-103.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO IV.

 

Utrum hoc nomen Deus pro persona supponat, vel pro natura.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether this name “God” supposes for a person, and/or for a nature.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur de suppositione huius nominis Deus. Et quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen Deus de se supponat personam, vel naturam. Et quod personam, videtur.

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked concerning the supposition of this name “God”. And it is asked, whether this name “God” of itself supposes a person, and/or a nature. And it seems, that (it does suppose) a person.

1. Per illud Ambrosii super:  Benedicat nos Deus, Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus.7  Ambrosius:  « Trina Dei confessio Trinitatem indicat personarum », ergo cum Deus sit ibi sine adiuncto, de se supponit personam.

1. By that (word) of (St.) Ambrose on (the verse):  May He bless us, God, Our God, may He bless us God.7  Ambrose (says):  « The triune confession of God indicates the Trinity of Persons », therefore since “God” is there without adjunct, it of itself [de se] supposes a person.

2. Item, ratione obiicitur sic:  Hoc nomen homo proprie8 supponit pro omni eo, cui inest humanitas:  ergo a simili et hoc nomen Deus pro omni / eo, cui inest Deitas; . . .

2. Likewise, by reason it is thus objected:  This noun “man” properly (speaking)8 supposes on behalf of every one, in whom there is humanity:  therefore by a similar (reason) this noun “God” also (supposes) on behalf of every / one, in whom the Deity is; . . .

7  Psalm. 66, 7. 8.  —  Verba, quae hic a S. Doctore attribuuntur S. Ambrosio, eidem etiam a Magistro supra d. II. c. 4. adscribuntur. Vide p. 48. nota 8.  —  In ipsis verbis Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 professio loco confessio.
8  Ex mss. ed. 1 ostenditur pro obiicitur. Mox post Deus Vat. contra codd. repetit supponit.

7  Psalm 66:  7, 8.  —  The words, which are here by the Seraphic Doctor attributed to St. Ambrose, are also ascribed by Master (Peter) above in d. 2, ch. 4, to the same (author). See p. 48, note 8 (of the present volume).  —  Within these words the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has profession [professio] in place of confession [confessio].
8  From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied properly (speaking) [proprie]. A little before this very many codices together with edition 1 have shown [ostenditur] in place of objected [obiicitur]. Then after God the Vatican edition repeats supposes [supponit], contrary to the codices.

 

p. 103

 

eo, cui inest Deitas; sed hoc est persona:  ergo etc.

one, in whom the Deity is; but this is a Person:  ergo etc..

3. Item, hoc nomen Deus significat deitatem in concretione; sed non nisi in concretione ad suppositum, quod est persona; sed terminus concretus proprie supponit pro eo, respectu cuius importat formam, ut album magis proprie supponit pro re alba quam pro forma:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, this noun “God” signifies deity in concretion; but (it signifies) naught unless in concretion towards a supposit, which is a Person; but a concrete term properly supposes on behalf of that, in respect of which it conveys a form, as “a white” [album] properly supposes on behalf of a white thing rather than on behalf of a form:  ergo etc..

SED CONTRA:  1. Pronomen refert rem pro proprio supposito;1 sed cum dicitur:  Benedicat nos Deus, et metuant eum, hoc pronomen eum refert naturam, non personam:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. A pronoun refers to a thing on behalf of its own supposit;1 but when there is said:  May He bless us, God, and let them fear Him, this pronoun “Him” refers to the Nature, not to a Person:  ergo etc..

2. Item, quia iste terminus homo proprie supponit pro individuo, ista est falsa:  homo est Socrates et Plato, quia idem individuum non recipit illam praedicationem; sed haec est vera:  Deus est Trinitas, vel:  Deus est Pater et Filius:  ergo cum illud praedicatum non conveniat uni personae, patet etc.

2. Likewise, because that term “man” properly supposes on behalf of an individual, that (saying) of his is false:  “man is Socrates and Plato”, because the same individual does not receive that predication; but this is true:  “God is the Trinity”, and/or:  “God is the Father and the Son”:  therefore since that predicate does not convene upon one Person, it is clear that etc..

3. Item, terminus, qui proprie supponit personam, addito sibi termino partitivo, stat solum pro uno, ut cum dicitur:  unus homo currit:  ergo similiter, cum dicitur unus Deus:  ergo haec est simpliciter falsa:  unus Deus est Pater et Filius.

3. Likewise, a term, which properly supposes a person, having a partitive term added to it, stands solely for one, as when there is said:  “one man runs”:  therefore similarly, when there is said “one God”:  therefore this is simply false:  “one God is the Father and the Son”.

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Nomen Deus, cum habeat naturam et termini communis et termini singularis, potest proprie supponere tam pro natura quam pro persona.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The noun "God", since it has the nature both of a common term and a singular term, can properly suppose both on behalf of a Nature as on behalf of a Person.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod hic consuevit esse duplex opinio.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that here there is accustomed to be a twofold opinion.

Una quidem est, quod hoc nomen Deus significat proprie naturam et supponit personam, aliquando unam, ut cum dicitur:  Deus spirat, aliquando tres, ut cum dicitur:  Deus est Trinitas. Et ratio huius est, ut dicunt, quia cum habeat multa supposita, habet naturam termini communis; terminus autem communis proprie supponit pro individuo, pro natura vero vel pro forma non supponit proprie,2 nisi trahatur, ut si dicatur:  homo est species. Sic dicunt in proposito.  Ulterius dicunt, quod quia supposita omnia sunt in illo unica3 suppositione, ideo simul potest supponere pro multis personis, licet illud non possit iste terminus homo, vel alius terminus communis; et sic solvunt obiecta.

One indeed is, that this noun “God” signifies properly a nature and supposes a person, sometimes one, as when there is said:  “God breathes”, sometimes three, as when there is said:  “God is the Trinity”. And the reason for this is, as they say, that since (“God”) has many supposits, it has the nature of a common term; moreover a common term properly supposes on behalf of an individual, however on behalf of a nature and/or a form it does not suppose properly,2 unless it be (logically) extended [trahatur], as if there is said:  “man is a species”.  In this manner they speak in the proposed (objection). Furthermore they say, that because all (the Persons) have been supposed in that (term) by a unique3 supposition, for that reason it can simultaneously suppose on behalf of many Persons, though that term man, and/or an other common term could not (do) that; and thus they solve the objections.

Alia opinio est, quod proprie supponit naturam, sicut significat, et non supponit personam, nisi trahatur ab alio, ut cum dicitur:  Deus generat; et hi dicunt, quod cum dicitur:  Deus est Trinitas, ibi stat pro natura, non pro persona; et4 una natura est tres personae:  ideo vera est locutio.  Et ratio huius positionis est, quia hoc nomen Deus habet naturam termini discreti, cum non habeat plurale; ideo idem significat et supponit proprie; cum ergo significet naturam, illam proprie supponit.

An other opinion is, that it properly supposes a nature, just as it signifies, and does not suppose a person, unless it be (logically) extended by an other, as when there is said:  “God generates”; and these say, that when there is said:  “God is the Trinity”, it stands there for the Nature, not for a Person; and4 “the one Nature is the Three Persons”:  for that reason the saying is true.  And the reason for this position is, that this noun “God” has the nature of a discrete term, since it does not have a plural; for that reason it signifies and properly supposes the same (thing); therefore since it signifies a nature, it properly supposes that.

Sed melius est dicere utrumque — quia habet naturam termini communis et termini discreti:  termini communis propter pluralitatem suppositorum, termini discreti ratione formae immultiplicabilis — quod5 proprie supponit tam naturam quam personam. Tamen rationes ad utramque partem concludunt verum suo modo. Hoc autem non potest in alio termino invenire, et ideo nec consimilis modus supponendi.

But it is better to say (that it supposes) each — because it has the nature of a common term and of a discrete term:  of a common term on account of a plurality of supposits, of a discrete term by reason of an non-multipliable form — that5 it properly supposes as much a Nature as a Person. However the reasons for each part conclude truly in their own manner. Moreover this (use) cannot be found in any other term, and for that reason neither (can there be found) a exactly similar [consimilis] manner of supposing.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. De differentia inter significationem et suppositionem cfr. Scholion hic ad q. 1.  Terminus discretus, de quo loquitur S. Bonav., idem est ac terminus singularis et significat aliquod incommunicabile.  Unde « terminus singularis idem significat et supponit »(S. Thom. S. I. q. 39. a. 4.).  Terminus vero communis non oportet semper supponere pro eo quod per se significat, v. g. in propositione:  homo currit, non supponit homo pro natura communi humana, sed pro aliquo indeterminato individuo.

I. Concerning the difference between signification and supposition cf. Scholium here at q. 1.  The discrete term, of which St. Bonaventure speaks, is the same as the singular term and it signifies something incommunicable.  Whence « a singular term signifies and supposes the same (thing) » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4).  However a common term is not required [non oportet] to suppose on behalf of that which it signifies per se, v. q. in the proposition:  “a man runs”,  “man” does not suppose on behalf of the common human nature, but on behalf of some indeterminate individual.

II. Licet antiqui doctores de hac questione diversis modis loquantur, in re tamen parum dissentire videtur.   S. Bonav. praefert tertiam sententiam, quae mediam viam tenet, scil. quod Deus proprie supponat tum pro natura tum pro persona.  S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) sententiam primo loco positam docere videtur, secundam vero ibi et in Summa penitus reiicit. Illam vero primam opinionem in Summa (I. q. 39. a. 4.) ita explicat, ut cum tertia et media sententia S. Bonaventurae conveniat.  Hoc patet, si sententia S. Bonaventurae distinctis propositionibus proponitur. Propositio 1:  Nomini Deus convenit haec proprietas, ut partim sit terminus communis, partim singularis.  Ratio est, quia significat simul tum formam non multiplicabilem, tum naturam communicabilem.  Idem docet S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. ad. 2.). Propositio 2:  Hinc est, quod Deus aliquando supponit pro natura, aliquando pro persona.  Hoc idem asserunt S. Thom. et Alex. Hal.; tamen Angelicus addit, quod « per se supponit pro natura communi » (ad 3.), sed « ex modo significandi » habet, ut proprie possit supponere pro persona (in corp.).

II. Though the ancient doctors speak of this question in diverse manners, however they seem to dissent very little in the matter.  St. Bonaventure prefers the third sentence, which holds a middle way, that is that “God” properly supposes as much for a Nature as for a Person.  St. Thomas in his Commentary (here at q. 1, a. 2) seems to teach the sentence posited in the first place, however he rejects the second one completely there and in the Summa.  However he so explains that first opinion in the Summa (I, q. 39, a. 4), that it agrees with the third and middle-sentence of St. Bonaventure.  This is clear, if the sentence of St. Bonaventure is proposed in distinct propositions. Proposition 1:  ‘To the noun “God” there convenes this property, that it is partly a common term, partly a singular one.  The reason is, that it signifies simultaneously as much a non multipliable form, as a communicable nature’.  St. Thomas teaches the same (Summa., loc. cit., at n. 2). Proposition 2:  ‘Hence it is, that “God” sometimes supposes on behalf of a nature, other times for a person’.  St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales assert this same (teaching); however the Angelic (Doctor) adds, that « per se it supposes on behalf of the common nature » (at n. 3), but « from a manner of signifying » it has the ability [habet ut possit] to properly suppose on behalf of a person (cf. in the body of the question).

III. Circa ipsam quaestionem cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 1. 2.  —  S. Thom., locis citt.  —  Scot., hic q. 2. in fine.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 5. 6 et d. 32. a. 8.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.  —  Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 40.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic a. 2. in princ.  —  Biel, hic q. 2.

III. About the question itself cf. St. Bonaventure, below in d. 29, a. 1, q. 2; Sent., Bk. III, d. 7, a. 1, q. 1.  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 1 and 2.  —  St. Thomas, locis citt..  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2 at the end.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnuus), here in a. 5 and 6 and d. 32, a. 8.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 40.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in a. 2 in princ.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

1  Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 2:  Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat.
2  Vat. hic omittit proprie et paulo post habet dicamus loco dicatur, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
3  Plerique codd. ut A C F G I K L O R X Z una. Pauloo infra Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1. solverunt, aliqui tamen codd. ut K P Q X legunt solvuntur.
4  Cod. H addit quia.
5  Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed 1, in quorum lectione quod refertur ad paulo supra positum dicere utrumque. Vat. loco quod ponit ideo, cuius lectionis sensus explicatur codice Z et ideo dico quod proprie. Paulo infra codd. O bb Unde pro Tamen.

1  Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVII, ch. 2:  For a pronoun put in the place of a noun signifies a substance and it indicates a congruous person with a word adjoined to it.
2  The Vatican edition here omits properly [proprie] and a little after this it has we say [dicamus] in place of there is said [dicatur], but the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this.
3  Very many codices as A C F G I K L O R X Z have one [una]. A little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has they solved [solverunt], however the other codices as K P Q X read there are solved [solvuntur].
4  Codex H adds because [quia].
5  Thus nearly all the codices together with edition 1, in which reading that [quod] is referred to what is posited a little above this to say (that it supposes) each [dicere utrumque]. The Vatican edition in place of because [quod] puts for that reason [ideo], the sense of which reading is explained by codex Z and for that reason I say that properly [et ideo dico quod proprie]. A little below this codices O and bb have Whence [Unde] in place of However [Tamen].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.