S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 104-106.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 104-106.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

 

DUB. I.

 

DOUBT I

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine; quia cum praepositio de notet transitionem et ita diversitatem et1 distinctionem, videtur quod pari ratione et ab aequipollenti istae sunt verae:  Deus est alius a Deo, Deus distinguitur a Deo.

About the text in this part is asked of this which (the Nicene Creed) says:  God from God, Light from Light; because since the preposition “from” [de] notes transition and thus diversity and1 distinction, it seems that for an equal reason and from it being equivalent [ab aequipollenti] these are also true:  ‘There is another God than God’, ‘God is distinguished from God’.

RESPONDEO:   Dicendum, quod dupliciter est importare distinctionem sive diversitatem, scilicet ut modum2 vel ut rem, vel ut excercitam vel ut conceptam.  Quoniam igitur praepositiones important distinctionem ut exercitam, et distinctio est in divinis quantum ad supposita, de3 facit terminum stare pro diversis suppositis.  Quoniam ergo circa id ponit modum, circa quod exercet distinctionem, et tales sunt personae:  ideo est vera locutio.  Quia vero hoc nomen alius importat distinctionem ut conceptam, similiter hoc verbum distinguere:  ideo simpliciter ponit distinctionem circa terminum ratione suae formae; ideo sunt falsa.4

I RESPOND:   It must be said, that to introduce distinction or diversity is twofold, that is, as a manner (of being regarded)2 and/or as a thing, and/or as (something) exercised and/or as conceived.  Therefore since prepositions introduce distinction as (something) exercised, and distinction is among the divine as much as regards the Supposits, “from”3 causes a term to stand for diverse Supposits.  Therefore since it places a manner (of being regarded) about that, about which it exercises a distinction, and such are the Persons:  for that reason it is a true saying.  However because this noun “another” conveys a distinction as (something) conceived, similarly this verb “to distinguish”:  for that reason it simply posits a distinction about the term by reason of its form; for that reason (these sayings) are false.

 

DUB. II.

 

DOUBT II

Item quaeritur de responsione, quam ponit Magister, ibi:  Quod vero additur:  Ergo genuit se Deum etc., quia Magister solvit interimendo conclusionem et videtur non recte solvere. Cum enim idem et diversum sufficienter dividant ens,5 videtur necessario sequi:  genuit Deum:  ergo se, vel alium.

Likewise is asked concerning the response, which Master (Peter) puts, there:  However because there is added:  therefore He begot Himself God etc., because Master (Peter) solves the conclusion by interemption and he seems not to solve it rightly.  For since ‘the same’ and ‘the diverse’ sufficiently divide a being [ens],5 it seems that necessarily there follows:  ‘He begot God:   therefore Himself, and/or another’.

RESPONDEO:   Dicendum, quod Magister sustinendo primam et interimendo conclusionem innuit, conclusionem non sequi ex praemissis; et quod non sequatur, ostendit ferendo instantiam6 contra illud disiunctum.

I RESPOND:   It must be said, that Master (Peter) by sustaining the first and by denying [interimendo] the conclusion hints, that the conclusion does not follow from the premises; and that it does not follow, he shows by bringing forward [ferendo] an instance6 against that disjunction [disiunctum].

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt7 ens; dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo falsum est. Nam pars nec est eadem toti omnino nec simpliciter diversa. Habet tamen veritatem secundum idem. Unde:  « si non est idem alii, est diversum », verum est secundum illud, secundum quod non est idem.8 Filius autem non est idem Patri in persona, et ideo in persona alius; nec tamen sequitur:  alius Deus, quia significatur alietas in essentia.9

However to that which is objected, that ‘the same’ and ‘the diverse’ sufficiently divide7 being [ens]; it must be said, that simply speaking it is false.  For a part is neither entirely the same as the whole nor simply diverse.  It has, however, truth according to which (it is) the same. Whence:   « if it is not the same as the other, it is diverse », is true according to that (principle), according to which it is not the same.8  Moreover the Son is not the same as the Father in person, and for that reason in person (He is) Another; nor does there, however, follow:  ‘(He is) another God’, because (in this) there is signified anotherness in essence.9

 

DUB. III.

 

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hac distinctione, quam ponit Magister de hoc praedicato Deus Pater, quod potest esse constructio appositiva et immediata, vel mediata.10  Primo enim videtur, quod ista distinctio non sit intelligibilis, quoniam quae ex eadem parte intrasitive construuntur, videntur solum immediate construi. Item videtur, quod non solvat, quia recta solutio est, cuius dantem oppositum non contingit solvere;11 sed ista distinctione remota, adhuc manet sophisma, si loco eius quod est Deus Pater, solum ponatur Pater:  ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this distinction, which Master (Peter) posits concerning this predicate “God the Father”, because it can be an appositive and an immediate construction, and/or a mediate one.10  For first it seems, that that distinction of his is not intelligible, since those which are intransitively constructed on the same side (of the copula), seem to be construed only immediately.  Likewise it seems, that he does not solve (the question), since the right solution belongs, to the proposed opposite [dantem oppositum] which he does not happen to solve;11 but that remote distinction of his, still remains a sophism, if in that place that which is “God the Father”, there placed only “the Father”:  ergo etc..

RESPONDEO:   Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri bona est et secundum artem.  Nam sicut vult Priscianus,12 inter adiectivum et substantivum intelligi- / -tur media copula ens vel quod est ens.

I RESPOND:   It must be said, that Master (Peter)'s distinction is good and according to the art (of grammar).  For as Priscian would have it [vult],12 between the adjective and the substantive there is understo- / -od the intermediate copula ‘being’ [ens] and/or that which is a being.

1  Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit Vat. hic ita.
2  Supple:  se habendi.  —  De hac distinctione vide infra d. 26. q. 1 et 2.
3  In mss. et edd. excidit particula de, quam contextus requirit.
4  Pro maiore intelligentia et explicatione huius dubii cfr. q. 1. et 2. huius distinctionis.  —  Quoad praepositionem de vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.
5  Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.):  Omne etenim, quoducmque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.
6  Vide Aristot., II. Prior. c. 26. (c. 28.) de Instantia.
7  Cod. S dividunt.
8  Codd. T aa bb satis bene addunt non, secundum illud secundum quod est idem, a quibus cod. A in eo tantum divergit, quod particulam non minus bene transponit post quod est.
9  De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. §. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 3.
10  Vat. post appositiva omittit et, quod tamen cum ed. 1 habent codd., quorum nonnulli deinde indebite omittunt vel mediata; codd. V X omittunt et immediata, quod tamen propter subnexa melius retinetur, licet, quod ad rem attinet, omitti possit, cum immediata hic idem sit cum appositiva; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3 ad 4. contructioni appositivae opponit mediatam.  —  Distinctio Magistri, de qua hic agitur, respicit istam propositionem:  Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Si haec verba Deus Pater immediate coniuncta intelliguntur, ita quidem ut terminus Pater, tanquam determinas alterum terminum Deus, sit terminus principalis, tunc propositio est vera. Sensus enim est:  Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, sed Deus Filius.  Si vero disiunctum intelliguntur, ita ut terminus principalis sit Deus, cui deinceps adiungitur, qui est Pater, sic erit falsa; sensus siquidem est:  Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus, et Deus Pater est.
11  Modus iste loquendi, qui occurrit etiam infra d. 15. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et d. 44. a. 2. q. unic. in corp., sumtus est ex Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. secundum translationem Booethii:  Nam si esset haec solutio, dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere. Secundum translationem autem ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot.) c. 22. sic habetur:  Nam si esset haec solutio, quam afferunt, qui contrarium daret solvere non posset.  —  Paulo infra cod. X maneret, cod. Z remaneret loco manet.
12  Libr. XVIII. c. 1. post medium:  Subauditur enim participium verbi substantivi ens, quod in usu nunc nobis non est, pro quo possumus qui est vel qui fuit dicere vel subaudire. Similiter, aliis casibus nominativum consequentibus, vel supradictum participium vel quae pro eo accipiuntur subaudire necesse est ad nominativum.  —  Hac Prisciani regula posita. S. Doctor eam applicat, ulteriore addita distinctione respectu ipsius copulae cum termino adiuncto. Nam appositio, si per participium ens sive per relativum (quod est, qui est) cum substantivo coniuncta est, respectu eiusdem potest teneri vel impliccative, vel non implicative sui in quadam distantia (sive relativum ut relativum). Si implicative, tunc est constructio appositiva et immediata, et dictio haec:  Deus, qui est Pater (Deus i. e. Pater) aequivalet huic:  Deus, qui est ipse Pater; si non implicative, tunc constructio habetur mediata, et dictio haec:  Deus, qui est Pater aequivalet huic:  Deus, et ille Deus est Pater, sive etiam:  Deus, qualis est Pater.

1  Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 the Vatican edition here repeats thus [ita].
2  Supply:  of being regarded.  —  On this distinction see below in d. 26, q. 1 [especially at n. 3 and in the Scholium, II, nn. 2 & 3] and 2.
3  The particle from [de] has been left out of the manuscripts and the editions, thought he context requires it.
4  For a greater understanding and explanation of this doubt cf. qq. 1 and 2 of this distinction.  —  In regard to this preposition from [de] see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
5  Aristotle, Metaphysics, text 12 (Bk. IX, ch. 3):  For indeed every whatever is a being, either the same or diverse.
6  See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 26 (ch. 28) On Instances.
7  Codex S has the subjunctive divide [dividant].
8  Codices T aa and bb add well enough not (so), according to that (principle), to the extent that it is the same, from which codex A diverges in this alone, that it transposes the particle not [non], not so well, after that it is [quod est].
9  Concerning this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50. m. 3, a. 2, §. 1; St. Thomas, here in q. 1. a. 3, at n. 3.
10  The Vatican edition after appositive omits and an [et], which the codices, however, have together with edition 1, of which not a few then unduly omit and/or a mediate one [vel mediata]; codices. V and X omit and an immediate [et immediata], which however on account of the subjoined is better retained, though, because it implies this [ad rem attinet], can be omitted, since here the immediate is the same with the appositive; St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3, at n. 4, opposes the mediate to the appositive construction.  —  The distinction of Master (Peter), which is dealt with here, respects that proposition:  Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater.  If these words Deus Pater are understood as immediately conjoined, indeed so that the term Pater, as determining the other term Deus, is the principal term, then the proposition is true.  For the sense is:  He begot the God, who is not God the Father, but rather God the Son.  However, if they are understood disjunctively, so that the principal term is Deus, to which there is then added, who is the Father, it will thus be false; for the sense is then:  He begot the God, who is not God, and God is the Father.
11  That manner of speaking, which occurs also below in d. 15, p. II, q. 1 in the body, and in d. 44, a. 2, q. sole in the body, has been taken from Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi, Bk. II, ch. 3, according to the translation of (St. Severinus) Boethius:  For if this would be the solution, it would not be possible to solve the objection being given. But according to the translation had in the Parisian Edition (Firmin-Didot.), ch. 22, thus:  For if this would be the solution, he who would give the contrary cannot solve that, which they bring forward.  —  A little below this codex X has would remain [maneret], codex Z would remain [remaneret] in place of remains [manet].
12  Grammer, Bk. XVIII, c. 1, in the second half:  For a participle [participium] of the substantive word being is understood, which is now not in use among us, in place of which we can say and/or understand that which is and/or that which was. Similarly, for the other cases following after the nominative, for the nominative it is necessary that there be understood the above said participle and/or those things which are accepted in its place.  —  After having posited this rule of Priscian, the Seraphic Doctor applies it, having added a further distinction in respect of that copula together with an adjoined term. For apposition, if it has been conjoined by the participle being or by the relative ("which is", "who is") with a substantive, it can, in respect of the same, be held implicatively and/or non implicatively or in a certain distance (or relative as a relative). If implicatively, then there is an appositive and an immediate construction, and this saying:  God, who is the Father (God, i. e. the Father) is equivalent to this:  the God, who is the Father Himself; if non implicatively, then it is had as a mediate construction, and this saying:  God, who is the Father is equivalent to this:  God, and that God is the Father, or even:  the God, the one which is the Father.

 

p. 105

 

intelligi- / -tur media copula ens vel quod est ens.1 Et quoniam hoc quod est ens sive quod est Pater potest teneri implicative; et sic restringitur et tenet locum appositivae constructionis et aequivalet uni termino:  ideo dicitur, quod potest teneri sive construi immediate; et sic Deus Pater non est aliud quam ipse et ita in quadam distantia; et tunc non restringitur, et sensus est:  Deus Pater, id est Deus, qui est Pater; quod tantum valet est Deus, et ille est Pater.

there is understo- / -od the intermediate copula ‘being’ [ens] and/or that which is being.1 And since this which is a being or which is the Father can be held implicatively; and in this manner it is restricted and holds the place of an appositive construction and is equivalent to one term:  for that reason there is said, that it can be held or construed immediately; and thus “God the Father” is not other than He Himself and thus in a certain distance; and then it is not restricted, and the sense is:  “God the Father”, that is “the God, who is the Father”; because it means [valet] only “He is God”, and “He is the Father”.

Haec autem solutio Magisteri solvit quidem2 sophisma quantum, ad unam deceptionem, et ideo est bona.  Sed rursus cadit ibi alia deceptio de relativo, et ideo adhuc oportet solvere, non ad illam deceptionem, sed ad aliam.  Ideo Praepositivus3 solvit ad hoc argumentum alio modo:  ergo Deum qui est Pater, vel qui non est Pater, et dicit, quod non sequitur, nec4 sunt contradictoriae, quia suppositio huius relativi non est eadem.  In affirmativa enim supponit pro Deo genito, quia non confunditur;5 in negativa vero simpliciter.  Unde sicut hae non contradicunt, sed ambae sunt falsae:  Nullus homo est Petrus, Ioannes est Petrus, ita dicit in proposito, quia negatio confundit. Unde istae dua ambae sunt falsae:  Deus Filius est Pater, Deus non est Pater.  —  Sed licet solutio Praepositivi locum habeat in proposito, quia non differt praeponere et postponere negationem huic termino Deus, tamen in aliis non habet locum.  Negatio enim postposita relativo ipsum non confundit.

Moreover this solution of Master (Peter) solves a certain2 sophism as much as regards one deception, and for that reason it is good.  But there again falls another deception concerning the relative, and for that reason one must [oportet] solve it still, not as regards that deception, but as regards another. For that reason Praepositivus3 solves it in another manner regarding this argument:  ‘therefore that (He is) the God who is the Father’, and/or ‘. . .who is not the Father’, and he says, that it does not follow, nor4 are they contradictories, because the supposition of this relative is not the same.  For in an affirmative (proposition) it supposes on behalf of the begotten God, because (in this manner alone the term) is not confounded;5 however in a negative (proposition it supposes) simply. Whence just as these do not contradict, but are both false:  ‘No man is Peter’, ‘John is Peter’, so he says in the proposed (text), that a negation does confound (the terms). Whence those two are both false:  ‘God the Son is the Father’, ‘God is not the Father’.  —  But though the solution of Praepositivus has a place in the proposition [proposito], because placing a negation before and after this term “God” does not differ, nevertheless [tamen] it has no place among other (propositions).  For a negation placed after a relative does not confound it.

Et ideo moderni aliter solvunt distinguendo, quod6 hoc relativum qui potest facere relationem simplicem vel personalem.  Si simplicem, affirmativa vera est, negativa falsa; si personalem, e converso negativa vera, affirmativa falsa.  Quod patet, quia haec est falsa:  persona Filii est Pater, et haec est vera:  « persona Filii non est Pater ».7

And for that reason the moderns solve it in another manner by distinguishing, that6 this relative “who” can cause a simple and/or a personal relation. If a simple, the affirmative is true, the negative false; if a personal, conversely the negative (is) true, the affirmative false.  Which is clear, because this is false:  ‘the Person of the Son is the Father’, and this is true:  « the Person of the Son is not the Father ».7

 

DUB. IV.

 

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod unus Deus est tres personae.  Sed contra:  Quaecumque praedicantur de uno et eodem, praedicantur de se invicem:  ergo si unus Deus est Pater et Filius:  ergo Pater est Filius.  Si tu dicas, quod verum est, quando praedicantur de uno singulari, sed non est verum, quando praedicantur de uno communi; contra:  nihil subiicitur duobus in unica8 suppositione, quamvis sit commune ad illa.  Unde haec est falsa:  homo est Socrates et Plato:  ergo similiter in proposito.

Likewise there is asked concerning this which he says, that the one God is the Three Persons.  But on the contrary:  Whatever are predicated of one and the same, are predicated of each other:  therefore if the one God is the Father and the Son:  therefore the Father is the Son.  If you say, that it is true, when they are predicates of one singular, but it is not true, when they are predicates of one common; on the contrary:  nothing is subjected to two in a unique8 supposition, even though it be common to them.  Whence this is false:  ‘a man is Socrates and Plato’:  therefore similarly in the proposition [proposito].

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod sicut patet, de suppositione huius nominis Deus secus est quam de suppositione alicuius alterius termini.  Quia enim9 habet naturam termini communis et discreti, ideo simul stat pro pluribus, sicut pro uno:  et ideo non sequitur:  Deus est Pater et Filius:  ergo Deus Pater est Filius, vel e converso.10  Similiter nec licet inferre ex hoc, quod Pater sit Filius. Et notandum, quod talis praedicatio est per identitatem:11 ideo suppositum de termino formali vere praedicatur.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that it concerns the supposition of this noun “God” differently than (it does) the supposition of any other term. For9 because it has the nature of a common and a discrete term, for that reason it stands simultaneously for more, as for one:  and for that reason there does not follow:  “God is the Father and the Son”:  therefore “God the Father is the Son”, and/or conversely.10  Similarly neither is it licit to infer from this, that the Father is the Son. And it must be noted, that such predication is through identity:11  for that reason a supposit is truly predicated of [de] a formal term.

 

DUB. V.

 

DOUBT V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Magister dicit:  Unum solum Deum verum esse Trinitatem; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicit inferius,12 scilicet quod trinitas est nomen collectivum, unus et solus nomen partitivum et discretivum:  ergo sicut haec est falsa:  unus solus homo est omnis homo, ita et haec.

Likewise is asked concerning this which Master (Peter) says:  that the One Only True God is the Trinity; because it seems to be contrary to that which he says further down,12 that is, that trinity is a collective noun, “one” and “only” [unus et solus] a partitive and discretive [discretivum] noun:  therefore just as this is false:  ‘the one only man is every man’, so also this.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod hoc nomen trinitas est13 collectivum personarum; unus autem et solus, addita huic termino Deus, non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliis. Unde unus / solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that this noun “trinity” is a collective13 of the Persons; moreover “one” and “only”, added to this term “God”, do not mean the discretion [discretionem] of a Person, but of the Nature from others. Whence the one / only God is said (to be) the one only Nature.

1  Ens videtur hic esse superfluum iuxta verba Prisciani.  —  Mox ex codd. F T etc. addidimus Et.  Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut H I P Q cum ed. 1 et tunc loco et sic.
2  Substituimus fide multorum codd. ut A F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1 quidem loco quoddam; lectio certe melior.
3  Natione Italus, ab an. 1206 Cancellarius Universitatis Patrisiensis, scripsit Summam theologicam ex dictis SS. Patrum, a S. Bonav. et S. Thom. non raro allegatam et adhuc ineditam. De Sermonibus eiudem cfr. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge p. 80.  —  Mox Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit ad. Paulo post codd. ergo Deus, sed minus conforme textui Magistri.
4  Vat. praeter fiem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 et quod non pro nec.  Mox cod. Z contradictorie opposita loco contradictoriae. Paulo infra post relativi supple:  qui.  —  Mox codd. O Z post eadem satis bene addunt in affirmativa et negativa, supple:  propositione.
5  Hoc est, non supponit confuse et indiscriminatim pro tribus personis, sed determinate solum pro persona Filii; e contra in negativa supponit simipliciter i. e. indiscriminatim et confuse pro personis et etiam pro essentia.  Cfr. hic q. 4.  Hinc patet, quid sibi velit paulo infra negatio confundit (codd. confunditur), scil. negatio efficit, ut relativum qui supponere possit tam pro tribus personis quam pro essentia.
6  Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus apte transponit quod post relativum qui. Paulo post plures codd. distinctionem pro relationem; ed. 1 vero distinctionem vel relationem.  Retinuimus relationem, utpote quod supra dicits q. 1. in corp. magis correspondet. Ibidem et divisio relationis in simplicem et personalem occurit.
7  De solutione huius dubii vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad. 4. et S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 5.  —  Biel, hic q. 1.
8  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 una.
9  Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 cum pro enim.
10  Codd. inter se non conveniunt; cod. T quoad sensum cum Vat. convenit ponendo vel Filius est Pater loco e converso.  Plures codd. ut A G N S V W aa bb ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter; alii ut C O ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter; alii aliter corrupte; sed nihil immutandum duximus.
11  De praedicatione per identitatem vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2.  —  De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4. et Scot., hic q. 2.
12  Dist. XXII. c. 3. et dd. XXIV, et XXV.
13  Cod. T addit nomen.

1  Being [ens] here seems to be superfluous in accord with the words of Priscian.  —  Then from codices F T etc. we have added And [et].  A little after this not a few codices as H I P Q together with edition 1 have and then [et tunc] in place of and in this manner [et sic].
2  Trusting in many codices as A F G H I R S T etc. and edition 1 we have substituted the masculine a certain [quidem] in place of the neuter a certain [quoddam]; a reading certainly better.
3  Italian by nation, Chancellor of the University of Paris from the year 1206, he wrote A Theological Summa of the sayings of the Holy Fathers, not rarely quoted by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and as yet unedited. On the Sermons of the same, cf. Lecoy, La chaire Française au moyen âge, p. 80.  —  Then the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits for [ad].  A little after this the codices have therefore God [ergo Deus], but this is less conformable to the text of Master (Peter).
4  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 has and that they are not [et quod non sunt] in place of and they are not [nec sunt].  Then codex Z has have they been opposed in a contradictory manner [sunt contradictorie opposita] in place of are they contradictories [sunt contradictoriae]. A little below this after relative supply:  "who" [qui].  —  Then codices O and Z after the same [eadem] add, well enough, in an affirmative and negative, supply:  proposition.
5  That is, it does not suppose in a confused manner nor indiscriminately for the Three Persons, but determinately only for the person of the Son; and contrarily in a negative (proposition) it supposes simply, i. e. indiscriminately and in a confused manner for the Persons and also for the Essence.  Cf. here q. 4.  Hence it is clear, what he wants a little below a negation does confound (the terms) (the codices have is confounded), that is, a negation causes [efficit ut] the relative who to be able to substitute as much for the Three Persons as for the Essence.
6  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, less aptly has this relative “who” which) [hoc relativum qui quod].  A little after this very many codices have distinction in place of relation; however edition 1 has distinction and/or relation [distinctionem vel relationem].  We have retained relation [relationem], as it corresponds more with what is said above in q. 1 in the body (of the question).  In the same place the division of the relation into the simple and the personal also occurs.
7  Concerning the solution of this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3, at n. 4, and Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 5.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.
8  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has one [una].
9  The Vatican edition, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, has When [cum] in place of For [enim].

10  The codices do not agree among themselves; codex T in regard to the sense agrees with the Vatican edition by putting and/or the Son is the Father in place of conversely [e converso]. Very many codices as A G N S V W aa bb have therefore God the Father and/or the Son is the Father and/or the Son. Similarly; others as C and O have therefore He is God the Father and/or He is the Son. Similarly; the others are otherwise corrupt; but we judge nothing to be changed.
11  Concerning predication by identity see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2; d. 33, q. 3 and d. 34, q. 2.  —  Concerning this doubt cf. above q. 4 and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2.
12  Distinction XXII, ch. 3 and dd. XXIV and XXV.
13  Codex T adds name [nomen]. [Trans. note:  Regarding discretion, cf. the “Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin terms” in the Introduction to this English translation.]

 

p. 106

 

Unde unus / solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; et quoniam in divinis est idem natura et res naturae sive suppositum, ideo praedicatione per identitatem Trinitas de Deo1 praedicatur. Nec est simile de hoc quod est omnis homo et unus solus homo. Nam iste terminus homo est terminus, qui potest confundi et multiplicari, et ideo haec est vera:  omnis homo est homo, nec stat simul pro pluribus,2 nisi confundatur; et ideo haec est falsa:  homo est omnis homo, quia nec ratione supponendi est vera, nec per identitatem, nec est idem in homine natura et res naturae.3

Whence the One / Only God is said (to be) the one only Nature; and since among the divine the same is nature and the thing of the Nature or the Supposit, for that reason by an identity in predication “the Trinity” is predicated of God.1  Nor is it similar from this that every man is also one man only. For that term “man” is a term, which can be confounded and multiplied, and for that reason this is true:  “every man is a man”, nor does it stand simultaneously for more (men),2 unless it be confounded; and for that reason this is false:  “man is every man”, because (this proposition) is neither true according to (its) reckoning of supposing, nor by an identity (in predication), nor is nature and the thing of the nature the same in man.3

 

DUB. VI.

 

DOUBT VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Satis est christiano rerum creatarum causam etc.  Videtur enim dicere falsum, quoniam aut dicit satis quantum ad fidem; et sic est falsum, quia multa alia oportet credere; aut satis quantum ad scientiam; et illud similiter est falsum, quia nunquam scitur ex hoc causa rei sufficienter.

Likewise is asked of this which he says:  It is enough for the Christian . . . the cause of created things etc..  For it seems that he says (something) false, since either he says “enough” [satis] as much as regards faith; and thus it is false, because it is proper to believe many other (things); or “enough” according to science; and that similarly is false, because nothing is known sufficiently from this cause of a thing.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod intelligitur satis quantum ad scientiam, non quamlibet, sed necessariam ad salutem.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “enough” is understood as much as regards knowledge [scientia], not any (kind), but (that which is) necessary for salvation.

 

DUB. VII.

 

DOUBT VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater genuit alterum se.  Videtur enim male coniungere illa duo, quia se dicit omnimodam identitatem, et alterum diversitatem, et ita sunt opposita, et ita4 opposita implicantur.  Si dicas, quod unum diminuit de altero, quaero:  quid et de quo?

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that the Father begot the other-Himself [alterum se].  For it seems that those two are badly conjoined, because “himself” [se] means every manner of identity, and “the other” [alterum] a diversity, and thus they are opposites, and thus4 they imply opposites.  If you say, that he diminished one from the other, I ask:  what (is diminished) and from what (is it diminished)?

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod oppositio directa intelligitur semper circa idem.  Quoniam ergo in divinis simul est identitas in natura et alietas in supposito, et hoc sine oppositione; ideo nomen identitatis et alietatis in sermone5 uniuntur sine oppositione, immo ad singularis modi expressionem.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that direct opposition is always understood about the same (thing).  Therefore since among the divine there is simultaneously identity in nature and anotherness in supposit, and this without opposition; for that reason the name for identity and for anotherness in discourse [sermone] are united5 without opposition, nay rather for the expression of the singular manner (of Being).

 

DUB. VIII.

 

DOUBT VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Pater ut haberet Filium, non minuit se, quia videtur dicere falsum; quia illud argumentum valet:  quicumque generat unum filium, ut non possit amplius generare, minuitur eius potentia; sed sic est in Patre:  ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  The Father to have a Son, did not lessen Himself, because it seems that he says (something) false; because that argument means [valet]:  ‘whoever generates one son, so that he is not able to generate more, is lessened in his potency’; but so it is in the Father:  ergo etc..

RESPONDEO:  Quod illud verum est, si generare alterum sit potentiae; sed quod, uno genito, possit alterum generare, dicit imperfectionem potentiae in generando, quia ex hoc ostenditur, quod non totum dedit uni.6

I RESPOND:  That that is true, if ‘to generate the other’ belongs to potency; but that, ‘one having begotten one, can generate the other’, means an imperfection of power in generating, because from this there is shown, that he has not given (his) whole (being) to one.

 

DUB. IX.

 

DOUBT IX

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  De se alterum se genuit, sed non alterum deum, sed alteram personam, utrum dicatur magis proprie alterum, vel alium; et7 videtur quod alterum, quia minorem dicit diversitatem, quia Socrates dicitur alter a se; sed in divinis minima est diversitas. Sed contra:  differentiae accidentales faciunt dici alterum;8 sed in divinis nullum est accidens:  ergo non debet dici alterum.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  From Himself He begot the other (than) Himself, but not the other God, but (rather) the other Person, whether one says more properly “the other” [alterum], and/or “an other” [alium]; and7 it seems that “the other” (is more proper), because it means less diversity, because “Socrates” means ‘the other than [a] himself’; but among the divine there is the least diversity.  But on the contrary:  accidental differences cause “the other” to be said;8 but among the divine there is no accident:  therefore there ought not be said “the other”.

Item videtur, quod neutrum bene dicatur. Si enim differentiae substantiales faciunt dici aliud, et accidentales alterum, cum neutrum cadat in divinis, neutrum videtur esse dicendum.

Likewise it seems, that neither is said well.  For if substantial differences cause “an other (thing)” [aliud] to be said, and accidental ones “the other (one)” [alterum], since neither occurs [cadat] among the divine, it seems that neither is to be said.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod quia Pater differt a Filio et in supposito et in proprietate, ideo potest dici alius, et potest dici alter. Sed quoniam proprietas illa non accidit personae, ideo magis proprie dicitur alius. Et quia alius respicit suppositum, aliud essentiam:  ideo, etsi recipiatur9 ibi alius in masculino, non tamen aliud in neutro.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that because the Father differs from the Son both in supposit and in property, for that reason there can be said “an other (one)” [alius], and there can be said “the other (one)” [alter]. But since that property does not accede to the Person, for that reason there is more properly said “an other (one)” [alius]. And because “an other (one)” respects a supposit, “an other (thing)” [aliud] an essence:  for that reason, even if there were received9 there “an other (one)” in the masculine, nevertheless [tamen] (there ought not be) “an other (thing)” in the neuter.

1  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 eo pro Deus.
2  Cod. W omnibus. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut F H T Y cc cum edd. 2, 3 suppositi loco supponendi.
3  De re naturae sive supposito vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 34. q. 1.  —  Quoad ipsam solutionem cfr. infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 7.  —  S. Thom., S . I. q. 39. a. 6.
4  Vat. contra fere omnes mss. et ed. 1 illa pro ita, quod unus vel aliter codex omittit.
5  Fide mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum uno et paulo post ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus immo, loco cuius edd. 2, 3 in uno .  —  De hoc dubio cfr. hic q. 2.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 3.  —  S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 4.
6  Cfr. supra d. 2. q. 3. ad ult.
7  Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.
8  Cfr. Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.
9  Licet plurimi codd. et ed. 1 habeant si, praeferimus tamen cum codd. L R etc. etsi. Codd. cit. et ed. 1 deinde legunt recipiatur (multi codd. falso respiciatur) pro recipitur. De solutione huius dubii cfr. hic q. 2. et infra d. 9. dub. 1.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. ad ult. et a. 4.  —  S. Thom., S. I. q. 31. a. 2. ac S. III. q. 17. a. 1 ad 7, ubi de differentia inter alium et alterum eadem sententia profertur.

1  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 has Him [eo] in place of Deo [God].
2  Codex W has all [omnibus]. A little below this not a few codices as F H T Y cc together with editions 2 and 3 have reckoning of the supposit [ratione suppositi] in place of reckoning of supposing [ratione supponendi].
3  Concerning the “thing of nature” [res naturae] or the supposit, see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 34, q. 1.  —  In regard to this solution cf below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1.  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 7.  —  St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 6.
4  The Vatican edition contrary to nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 has those opposites [illa opposita] in place of thus . . . opposites [ita opposita], which one and/or the other codices omit.
5  Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, 2, and 3 we have expunged the here added in one (term) [uno] and a little after this from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied nay rather [immo], in place of which editions 2 and 3 have in one (term) [in uno].  —  On this doubt cf. here in q. 2.  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 3.  —  St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 39, a. 4, at n. 4.
6  Cf. above d. 2, q. 3, at the last n..
7  We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the particle and [et].
8  Cf. Porphyry, On Predicables, ch. “On Difference”.
9  Though very many codices and edition 1 have if [si], we prefer, however, the reading of codices L R etc. even if [etsi]. The codices cited and edition 1 then read there were received [recipiatur] (many codices falsely have were respected [respiciatur]) in place of (sic) there is received [recipitur]. Concerning the solution of this doubt cf. here q. 2, and below d. 9, doubt 1.  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2, at the last n., and a. 4.  —  St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 31, a. 2, and III, q. 17, a. 1, at n. 7, where concerning the difference between an other (thing) [alium] and the other (one) [alterum] the same opinion is proffered.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.