S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

De comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem abstractum, qui est essentia.

On the comparison of generation to (its) essential abstract term, which is “essence”.

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

 

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 110-114.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 110-114.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

  Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit etc.

  After these there is asked, whether it must be conceded etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In praecedenti distinctione movit Magister quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem concretum, qualis est hoc nomen Deus.  In praesenti movet quaestionem de comparatione generationis ad terminum essentialem abstractum, qui est essentia.  Et dividitur haec pars in duas partes. In prima parte movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini, videlicet utrum essentia generetur; in secunda in ratione principii, utrum essentia generet etc., ibi:  Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium etc.

In the preceding distinction Master (Peter) moves a question concerning the comparison of generation to (its) essential concrete term, which is this noun “God”.  In the present one he brings forward a question concerning the comparison of generation to (its) essential abstract term, which is “essence”. And this part is divined into two parts.  In the first part he brings forward a question from the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a term, namely whether the Essence is generated; in the second in the reckoning of a principle, whether the Essence generates etc., there (where he says):  Thus there also must not be said, that the Divine Essence begot the Son etc..

 

p. 111

 

Item prima pars habet quatuor partes.  In prima parte proponit problemata, videlicet utrum essentia generet vel generetur.  In secunda adducit rationes tres probantes, quod essentia non generatur a Patre, ibi:  Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit etc.  In tertia adducit rationes in contrarium, ibi:  Huic autem videtur contrarium etc.  In quarta et ultima solvit et exponit, ibi:  Ad quod respondemus.

Likewise the first part has four parts.  In the first part he proposes the problem [problemata], namely whether the Essence generates and/or is generated.  In the second he adduces three reasons proving, that the Essence is not generated by the Father, there (where he says):  For that reason it must not be said, that the Father begot etc..  In the third he adduces reasons to the contrary, there (where he says):  Moreover to this there seems contrary etc..  In the fourth and last he solves and expounds, there (where he says):  To which we respond.

Ita etiam non est dicendum.1  Haec est secunda pars istius distinctionis, in qua Magister determinat secundam partem quaestionis, quae est de comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione principii, et habet haec pars tres partes.  In prima determinat istam quaestionem dicens, quod essentia non generat;2 et hoc confirmat per rationem ducentem ad impossibile. In secunda vero adducit auctoritates, quae sunt directe contrariae praedictae solutioni, ibi:  Praedictis videtur esse contrarium.  In tertia vero adducit auctoriates, ex quibus potest elici contrarietas, ibi:  Dicitur quoque, et frequenter etc.

Thus it also must not be said.1  This is the second part of that distinction of his, in which Master (Peter) determines the second part of the question, which concerns the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a principle, and this part has three parts.  In the first he determines that question saying, that the Essence does not generate;2 and this he confirms through a reckoning that leads to the impossible.  In the second, however, he adduces authorities, which are directly contrary to the aforesaid solution, there (where he says):  To the aforesaid there seems contrary.  In the third, however, he adduces authorities, from which there can be elicited contrarieties, there (where he says):  There is also said, and frequently etc..

Item3 secunda pars habet quatuor partes.  In prima parte adducit auctoritates Augustinis contrarias praedictae solutioni.  In secunda auctoritates adductas exponit, ibi:  Sed haec ita determinamus.  In tertia vero contra praedictas expositiones adducit auctoritates alias Hilarii, in quibus notatur expressior contrarietas, ibi:  Huic vero etiam contrarium videtur esse.  In quarta vero auctoritates praedictas explanat et explanationem4 suam per verba Hilarii confirmat, ibi:  Sed quia haec verba sane vult.

Likewise3 the second part has four parts.  In the first part he adduces the authorities of (St.) Augustine (which are) contrary to the aforesaid solution.  In the second he expounds the adduced authorities, there (where he says):  But these we thus determine.  In the third, however, against the aforesaid expositions he adduces the other authorities of (St.) Hilary, in which there are noted more expressly the contrarieties, there (where he says):  However to this there also seems that it is contrary.  In the fourth, however, he explains the aforesaid authorities and confirms his own explanation4 through the words of (St.) Hilary, there (where he says):  But because he wants these words to be sanely.

Dicitur quoque, et frequenter in sacra Scriptura legitur.  Haec est tertia pars, in qua obiicit contra solutionem per auctoritates, ex quibus elicitur praedictae solutionis contrarietas — quia5 in his non dicitur, quod essentia generet vel generetur, sed quod de essentia vel substantia Patris Filius generetur — et haec pars quatuor habet particulas. In prima adducit6 auctoritates in contrarium. In secunda vero adductas explanat, ibi:  His verbis praemissis innuitur; ubi resumit praedictam expositionem.  In tertia ex praedictorum opinione elicit quoddam corollarium, ibi:  Ostenditur quoque ex illis verbis etc.  In quarta et ultima redit ad propositum et ostendit, expositionem suam bonam esse, per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi:  Et hoc ita debere intelligi etc.

It is also said, and frequently in Sacred Scripture it is read.  This is the third part, in which he objects against the solution by the authorities, out of which there is elicited the aforesaid contrarieties to the solution — because5 among these there is not said, that the Essence generates and/or is generated, but that from the Essence and/or the Substance of the Father the Son is generated — and this part has four smaller parts.  In the first he adduces6 authorities to the contrary.  In the second, however, he explains the adduced (authorities), there (where he says):  By these aforesaid words there is hinted; where he resumes the aforesaid exposition.  In the third from the opinion of the aforesaid he elicits a certain corollary, there (where he says):  It is also shown from those words etc..  In the forth and last he returns to the proposed (question) and he shows, that his exposition is good, through the authority of (St.) Augustine, there (where he says):  And that this ought to be thus understood etc..

 TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

In parte ista ad intelligentiam duarum principalium partium huius distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

In this part for the understanding of the two principal parts of this distinction two (questions) are principally asked.

Primo quaeritur de comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione eiusdem ad essentiam in ratione termini.

First one is asked concerning the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the reckoning of a principle.

Second (the other) is asked concerning the comparison of the same to essence in the reckoning of a term.

Et duo quaeruntur quantum ad primam, duo vero quantum ad secundum.  Quantum ad primum quaeritur:

Two (questions) are also asked as much as regards the first (question), but two (also) as much as regards the second.  As much as regards the first there is asked:

Primo, utrum substantia vel essentia generet.

Secundo, utrum de substantia generetur aliquis.

First, whether the Substance and/or Essence generates.

Second, whether Someone is generated from the Substance.

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

De comparatione generationis ad substantiam sive essentiam in ratione principii.

ARTICLE I

 

On the comparison of generation to substance or essence in the reckoning of a principle.

Quaestio I.

 

Utrum substantia sive essentia generet.

Question 1

 

Whether the Substance or Essence generates.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod substantia non generet, ostenditur sic.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that the Substance does not generate, it is shown thus:

1. Generare dicit relationem:  ergo cui convenit generare, convenit et7 referri; sed essentiae non convenit referri:  ergo nec generare.

1. ‘To generate’ means (that there is) a relation:  therefore ‘to generate’ befits [convenit] the one to whom, ‘to be referred’ also7 befits; but it does not befit the Essence to be referred:  therefore neither to generate.

2. Item, generare important distinctionem:  ergo cui convenit generare, per consequens et8 distingui; sed essentia cum sit una, non distinguitur:  ergo etc.  Aut si generat, plures sunt essentiae.  Et ad haec duo inconvenientia ducit Magister.9

2. Likewise, to generate conveys a distinction:  therefore ‘to generate’ befits the one to whom, by consequence8 ‘to be distinguished’ also (befits); but the Essence, since it is one, is not distinguished:  ergo etc..  Or if It generates, there are more Essences.  And towards these two unfitting (conclusions) Master (Peter) leads (the reader).9

3. Item, generare dicit actionem personalem:  ergo de illo solo dicitur, quod significat personam / vel supponit personam; . . .

3. Likewise, ‘to generate’ means a personal action:  therefore of that alone it is said, that it signifies a Person / and/or supposes a Person; . . .

1  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omittendo Ita etiam non est dicendum, et variando constructionem praeponit verbo secunda particulam Similiter.  Item in fine propositionis legit principii, habet tres partes.  Idem recurrit infra pro tertia parte.  In medio propositionis habet in comparatione loco de comparatione, sed male.
2  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit hic sed.
3  Supllevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 Item, post quod emendavimus Vat. et mss. substituendo cum ed. 1 secunda loco prima, quod manifest est falsum.
4  Vat. expositionem, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
5  Haec parenthesis explicat, quare dicitur elicitur, scil. quia illae auctoritates non explicite continent contrarium assertionem.
6  Plures mss. cum ed. 1 inducit.
7  Vat., omisso non bene et, infine argumenti post nec repetit convenit, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.
8  Ita plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet et per consequens etiam.
9  Hic c. 1.

1  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, by omitting Thus it also must not be said [Ita etiam non est dicendum], and by varying the construction places the particle Similarly [Similiter] before the second.  Likewise at the end of the proposition it reads of a principle, has three parts [principii, habet tres partes].  The same recurs below for the third part.  In the middle of the proposition it has is in the comparison [est in comparatione] in place of concerns the comparison [est de comparatione], but badly.
2  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 adds but [sed] here [trans. note:  which renders the opening but this he also rather than and this he].
3  We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 Likewise [Item], after which we have emended the Vatican edition and the manuscripts by substituting together with edition 1 second [secunda] in place of first [prima], which is manifestly false.
4  The Vatican editions has exposition [expositionem], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
5  This parenthetical remark explains why there is elicited [elicitur] is said, namely because those authorities do not explicitly contain a contrary assertion.
6  Very many manuscripts together with edition 1 read he induces [inducit].
7  The Vatican edition, having omitted and [et] not well, at the end of the argument after neither repeats does it befit [convenit], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
8  Thus very many codices together with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, which has also by consequence [etiam per consequens].
9  Here in ch. 1.

 

p. 112

 

vel supponit personam; sed essentia non significat1 personam, cum sit communis, nec personam supponit, cum sit omnino abstractum:  ergo etc.

and/or supposes a Person; but the Essence does not signify1 a Person, since It is common (to Each), nor does it suppose a Person, since It is entirely abstract:  ergo etc..

4. Item, generare est proprietas personae, communicabilitas2 est essentiae:  ergo sicut se habet communicabilitas ad personam, ita proprietas personalis ad essentiam; sed communicabilitas nunquam est personae, quia haec est falsa:  Pater est communicabilis; ergo nec proprietas personalis erit essentiae:  ergo nec generare, cum sit personae.

4. Likewise, ‘to generate’ is a property of a Person, communicability2 is (a property) of the Essence:  therefore just as communicability is held [se habet] regarding a Person, so a personal property regarding the Essence; but communicability never belongs to a Person, because this is false:  ‘The Father is communicable’; therefore neither will a personal property belong to the Essence:  therefore neither ‘to generate’, since it belongs to a Person.

CONTRA:  1. Quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est idem alii, et non habent diversas proprietates, quidquid dicitur de una, et de altero;3 sed persona et essentia sunt huiusmodi, quia persona est essentia, nec habent diversas proprietates, quia proprietas in divinis est relatio distinguens; sed si essentia haberet aliquam proprietatem, tunc distingueretur et referretur:  ergo etc.  Si dicas, quod quamvis persona et essentia non habeant diversas proprietates, tamen differunt per habere proprietatem et non habere; contra:  summa oppositio est contradictio;4 sed talis diversitas est per contradictionem:  ergo magis differunt essentia et persona quam persona et persona; sed persona non praedicatur de persona:  ergo nec persona de essentia; hoc autem est falsum:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Whatever are held [se habent] thus, because one is the same as the other [alii], and do not have diverse properties, whatever is said of one, (is) also (said) of the other;3 but “person” and “essence” are of this kind, because a person is an essence, nor do they have diverse properties, because property in the divine is a distinguishing relation; but if the Essence had some property, then it would be distinguished and referred:  ergo etc..  If you say, that although a Person and the Essence do not have diverse properties, however they differ through having a property and not having (one); on the contrary:  a most high opposition is contradiction;4 but such a diversity is through a contradiction:  therefore the Essence and a Person are more different than a Person and a Person; but a Person is not predicated of [de] a Person:  therefore neither a Person of the Essence; but this is false:  ergo etc..

2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum praedicatur de altero, unum supponit pro altero, quia subiectum vere subiicitur praedicato;5 sed essentia vere praedicatur de Patre; unde haec est vera:  Pater est essentia:  ergo et supponit:  ergo sicut Deus Pater generat, sic potest dici, essentia generat.

2. Likewise, whatever are held thus, because one is predicated of the other, one substitutes for the other, because a subject is truly subjected to a predicate;5 but the Essence is truly predicated of the Father; whence this is true:  “The Father is the Essence”:  therefore it also supposes:  therefore just as God the Father generates, so there can be said, “the Essence generates”.

3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria passio;6 sed generare est sicut propria passio Patris; sed haec est vera:  divina essentia est Pater:  ergo et haec similiter:  divina essentia generat.

3. Likewise, of whatever there is predicated a subject, (there is) also (predicated) a proper passion;6 but “‘to generate” is as [sicut] the proper passion of the Father; but this is true:  “the Divine Essence is the Father”:  therefore also this similarly:  “the Divine Essence generates”.

4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur definitum, et definitio;7 sed definitio patris est filii pater.  Cum igitur haec sit vera:  divina essentia est Pater, et haec erit vera:  divina essentia est Filii Pater:  ergo a convertibili:  Filius est Filius essentiae.

 

4. Likewise, of whatever there is predicated (something) definite, (there is) also (predicated its) definition;7 but the definition of “father” is ‘a father of a son’.  Therefore since this be true:  “the Divine Essence is the Father”, this also will be true:  “the Divine Essence is the Father of the Son”:  therefore by (what is) convertible:  “The Son is the Son of the Essence”.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Haec locutio:  divina essentia generat, est omnino impropria et neganda, vel saltem pie exponenda.

CONCLUSION

 

This saying:  “the Divine Essence generates”, is entirely improper and to be denied, and/or at least to be piously expounded.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod fides vera8 dicit quasi fundamentum, Deum esse trinum et unum, et ita trinum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita unum, quod unitas non multiplicatur.  Si ergo quod credimus oportuit significare, opportune inventa sunt nomina in divinis, immo a Deo nobis manifestata, quae significent trinitatem sub distinctione et unitatem sine omni multiplicatione.  Sicut igitur nomina imposita personis omnino sunt incommunicabilia et quantum ad suppositum et quantum ad significatum; unde haec oratio9 est falsa:  Pater est Filius, vel Pater est communicabilis; ita ex parte essentiae vel naturae oportuit nomina imponi, quae non distinguerentur nec quantum ad significatum nec quantum ad suppositum.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that the True Faith8 professes [dicit] a quasi-foundation, that God is Triune and One, and so triune, that the Trinity is not confounded [confunditur], and so one, that the Unity is not multiplied.  If, therefore, it was proper to signify what we believe, there have been opportunely found names among the divine, nay rather manifested to us by God, which signify the Trinity under a distinction and the Unity without any multiplication.  Therefore just as the names imposed upon a Person are entirely incommunicable both as much as regards the Supposit and as much as regards the signified; whence this statement [oratio]9 is false:  “the Father is the Son”, and/or “the Father is communicable”; thus on the part of the Essence and/or Nature it was proper to impose names, which were not distinguished neither as much as regards the signified nor as much as regards a Supposit.

Notandum autem, quod triplex est genus nominum significantium essentiam.  Quaedam enim significant in concretione, ut hoc nomen Deus; quaedam in omnimoda abstractione, ut hoc nomen essentia; quaedam medio modo, ut lumen, sapientia, voluntas et consimilia; et ista dicuntur medio modo significare, quia non concernunt suppositum per modum inhaerentiae, sed concernunt suppositum ratione eius, quod dicunt aliquam rationem actus vel originis, quae sunt ipsorum suppositorum.  Cum igitur tres sint nominum differentiae, nomen concretum supponit pro persona proprie; nomen medium supponit partim proprie, partim improprie; nomen abstractum et absolutum non supponit nisi omnino improprie.10

Moreover it must be noted, that threefold is the genus of Names signifying the Essence.  For certain ones signify in concretion, as (does) this noun God; certain ones in every manner of abstraction, as (does) this noun essence; certain ones in a middle manner, as (do) light, wisdom, will and those entirely similar [consimilia]; and those are said to signify in a middle manner, because they do not concern the Supposit through a manner of inherence, but rather they concern the supposit through the reckoning of this, that they mean some reckoning of act and/or origin, which belongs to the Supposits Themselves.  Therefore since there are three (kinds) of Names of difference, a concrete noun supposes on behalf of a Person properly; a middle noun supposes partly properly, partly improperly; an abstract and absolute noun does not suppose except entirely improperly.10

Unde haec est propria:  Deus generat, et in usum adducenda; haec autem:  sapientia generat11 de sapientia, partim propria, partim impropria; ideo est sustinenda, sed non extendenda; haec autem:  essentia generat, omnino impropria, et ideo neganda est, et si legatur alicubi, est exponenda. Sancti enim / quandoque ad confundendas haereses . . .

Whence this is proper:  “God generates”, and is to be put [adducenda] to use; but this:  “Wisdom generates11 from Wisdom”, (is) partly proper, partly improper; for this reason it is to be sustained, but not to be extended; but this:  “the Essence generates”, (is) entirely improper, and for that reason it is to be denied, and if it is read anywhere, it is to be explained [exponenda]. For the Saints / speak more expressly to confound heresies . . .

1  Vat. cum cod. cc ordina inverso point hic supponit pro significat et mox significat pro supponit, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
2  Multi codd. ut A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc. ter communitas loco communicabilitas, sed minus bene.
3  Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1.  —  Mox post quia cod. O addit quidquid est.
4  Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 15. (IX. c. 4):  Horum (oppositorum) primum contradictio.
5  Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 7. (VI. c. 3.):  Subiectum autem est, de quo cetera dicuntur. Cfr. et libr. Praedicam. in princ.  —  Paulo ante post quod unum cod. Z adiungit vere et essentialiter; cod. O vero paulo infra post de altero addit essentialiter et in fine argumenti habet ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat.
6  Aristot., I. Topic. c. 7. (c. 6) ait:  Hoc enim erat proprium, quod conversim (de re sive subiecto) praedicatur.  —  Cod. M. addit hic illius subiecti. In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ergo et similiter illa est vera pro ergo et haec similiter.
7  Cfr. Aristot., VI. Topc. c. 1 (c. 3), ubi ostendi ad bonam definitionem requiri, quod ipsa conversim praedicari possit de definito; et Petr. Hispan., Summula tract. de Syllog. topico.  —  Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 definitio et definitum; sed propter formam argumenti minus bene. Codd. O Z addunt et e converso. Paulo infra multi codd. cum ed. 1 post et haec omittunt erit vera:; cod. H habet ergo et haec:  divina etc.
8  Ed. 1 nostra pro vera. Paulo infra codd. V W X et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas; lectio certe quoad sensum praeferenda. Mox cod. I cum ed. 1 post ergo addit hoc.
9  Codd. V X Z omnino pro oratio. Paulo infra cod. T (ab altera manu correctus) quibus non distingueretur loco quae non distinguerentur.
10  Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 transponit non ita bene non supponit omnino nisi improprie.
11  Codd. M Y Z hic addunt vel sapientia. Mox Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit sed non extendenda; cod. O ideo est distinguenda et non extendenda.

1  The Vatican edition together with codex cc, having inversed the order, puts suppose [supponit] here in place of signify [significat] and then signify in place of suppose, but the more ancient codices together with edition 1 withstand this.
2  Many codices, such as A C F G I K L O S T U W X etc., have community [communitas] in place of communicability [communicabilitas] three times, but less well.
3 Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1.  —  Then after because [quia] codex adds whatever is [quidquid est].
4  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 15 (Bk. IX, ch. 4):  Of these (opposites) the first (is) contradiction.
5  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 7 (Bk. VI, ch. 3):  Moreover it is the subject, of which the rest are said. Cf. also the book On Predicaments, at the beginning.  —  A little before this after because one [quod unum] codex Z adjoins truly and essentially [vere et essentialiter]; but codex O a little below this after of the other [de altero] adds essentially and at the end of the argument has therefore just as God generates, because the Father generates [ergo sicut Deus generat, quia Pater generat].
6  Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 7 (ch. 6) says:  For this was proper, because it is conversely predicated (of a thing or subject).  —  Codex M adds here of that subject [illius subiecti]. At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has therefore also similarly that is true [ergo et similiter illa est vera] in place of therefore also this similarly [ergo et haec similiter].
7  Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 1 (ch. 3), where he shows that for a good definition there is required, that it be able to be conversely predicated of the (thing) defined; and Peter of Spain, Summula., tract "de Syllog. topico".  The Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1 has a definition, (there is) also (predicated something) definite [definition et definitum]; but on account of the form of the argument (this reading is) less good. Codices O and Z add and conversely [et e converso].  A little below this the codices together with edition 1 after and this [et haec] omit will be true: [erit vera:]; codex H has therefore also this:  the Divine etc. [ergo et haec:  divina etc.].
8  Edition 1 reads our in place of the True [vera]. A little below this codices V W and X have and so one, that the Trinity is not confused, and so triune, that the Unity [et ita unum, quod trinitas non confunditur, et ita trinum, quod unitas]; a reading certainly to be preferred according to its sense. Then codex I together with edition 1 after therefore has this which [hoc quod] in place of what [quod].
9  Codices V X and Z have is entirely [omnino est] in place of statement is [oratio est]. A little below this codex T (corrected by the other hand) has by which one would not distinguish [quibus non distingueretur] in place of which were not distinguished [quae non distinguerentur].
10  The Vatican edition contrary to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 transposes this as does not suppose entirely except improperly [non supponit omnino nisi improprie], but not so well.
11  Codices M Y and Z here add and/or Wisdom [vel sapientiae]. Then the Vatican edition contrary to the older codices and edition 1 omits but not to be extended [sed non extendenda]; codex O has therefore it is to be distinguished and not extended [ideo est istinguenda et non extendenda].

 

p. 113

 

quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressius loquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.

speak more expressly to confound heresies whenever a peculiarity [quandoque . . . quam proprietas] of discourse supports (them).

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod essentia et persona non habent diversas proprietates; dicendum, quod diversitas rationis dupliciter1 est in divinis.  Uno modo per habere diversas proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; alio modo est per habere proprietatem et non habere; et illud non inducit distinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen, quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in Petro et homine:  Petrus est individuum, homo non; et tamen homo vere praedicatur de Petro.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected, that the Essence and a Person do not have diverse properties; it must be said, that there is a diversity of reckoning in a twofold manner1 among the divine.  In one manner through having diverse properties; and that induces a distinction, and thus they differ by a reckoning and are not predicated of the same (thing), as (are) the Father and the Son; in another manner (the diversity of reckoning) is through having and not having a property; and that does not induce a distinction nor causes (one), because one is not predicated of the other; it does, however, cause that something is said of one, which is not said of the other, as is clear in “Peter” and “man”:  Peter is an individual, man is not; and, nevertheless [tamen], “man” is truly predicated of “Peter”.

Ad illud, quod summa oppositio est affirmationis et negationis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi negatio nihil ponit, sicut inter aliquid et nihil; sed ubi ponit extrema, minima potest esse et surgit ex quantulacumque parva differentia sive rei sive rationis; unde non sufficit ad distinguendum.

To that, that a most high opposition belongs to affirmation and negation; it must be said, that it is true, where negation posits nothing, just as (it is) among something and nothing; but where it posits an extreme (opposition), there can be a minimum (opposition) and (this) rises from howsoever small the difference is small whether of the thing or of the reckoning; whence (the difference) is not sufficient to be distinguished.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod praedicatum supponit pro subiecto; dici potest uno modo, quod — sicut in inferioribus est praedicatio secundum substantiam, ut homo est animal, et est praedicatio secundum rationem, ut animal est genus; et praedicatum2 supponit pro eo de quo praedicatur secundum substantiam, sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem, quae est secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; unde non sequitur:  animal est genus, homo est animal, ergo homo est genus — similiter dicunt in divinis, quod cum sint ibi res et ratio, est ibi praedicatio secundum substantiam; et illa salvata, quidquid dicitur de praedicato, et de subiecto; sed mutata praedicatione secundum substantiam in praedicationem secundum rationem, est ibi accidens; et talis est hic:3 Pater generat; sed divina essentia est Pater:  ergo divina essentia generat.

2. To that which objected second, that a predicate substitutes for a subject; it can be said in one manner, that — just as among inferiors there is predication according to substance, as “man is an animal”, there is also predication according to reckoning, as “animal is a genus”; and a predicate2 supposes on behalf of that of which it is predicated according to substance, but with a predication according to substance changed into a predication, which is according to reckoning, there (the predicate) is an accident; whence it does not follow:  ‘animal is a genus, man is an animal, therefore man is a genus’ — similarly they say among divine (things), that since there is thing and reckoning There, there is predication according to substance There; and so long as that (predication) remains [illa salvata], whatever is said of the predicate, (is) also (said) of the subject; but with a predication according to substance changed into a predication according to reckoning, there (the predicate) is an accident; and such is in this:3  The Father generates; but the Divine Essence is the Father:  therefore the Divine Essence generates’.

Sed ista similitudo non videtur conveniens, quia in divinis ratio4 praedicatur de essentia, unde haec est vera:  essentia est paternitas et generatio; quod quidem in inferioribus non reperitur.  Et5 propterea aliter dicendum, quod in divinis est duplex modus praedicandi:  per identitatem et per inhaerentiam. Per identitatem, ut cum dicitur:  essentia est Pater; per inhaerentiam sive denominationem, sicut faciunt adiectiva et verba.6  Praedicatio per identitatem est in divinis ratione summae simplicitatis, quae non patitur personam minus esse simplicem quam essentiam; quae quia non est in creaturis, ideo in eis non reperitur praedicatio per identitatem omnimodam nisi idem enuntietur de se, ut cum dicitur:  humanitas est humanitas; sed omnis propria praedicatio est7 per inhaerentiam, quia nihil est omnino simplix; unde haec est falsa:  humanitas est animalitas.  In praedicatione vero per inhaerentiam terminus8 aliud significat et aliud supponit, quia significat formam communem et supponit pro inferiori, et in tali verum est, quod illud quod praedicatur de altero, supponit pro illo.  Sed in praedicatione per identitatem idem significat et supponit.  Unde tunc est sensus, quod significatum per hunc terminum Pater est idem, quod significatum per hunc terminum essentia, et ideo paternitas est essentia; et quia hoc nomen essentia non significat personam, ideo pro ispa non supponit, cum nullo modo de ipsa praedicetur nisi praedicatione per identitatem.

But that similitude does not seem fitting [conveniens], because among the divine a reckoning4 is predicated of the Essence, whence this is true:  ‘the Essence is the Paternity and the generation’; which indeed is not discovered among inferiors.  And5 on this account it otherwise must be said, that among the divine there is a twofold manner of predicating:  through identity and through inherence.  Through identity, as when there is said:  “the Essence is the Father”; through inherence or denomination, just as adjectives and verbs do [faciunt].6  Predication through identity is in divine (things) by reason of the most high Simplicity, which does not suffer a Person to be less simple than the Essence; which because is not in creatures, for that reason among them there is not discovered a predication through an omnimodal identity unless the same is enunciated of itself, as when there is said:  “humanity is humanity”; but every proper predication is7 through inherence, because nothing is entirely simple; whence this is false:  “humanity is animality”.  However in predication through inherence a term8 signifies one thing and supposes another, because it signifies a common form and supposes on behalf of an inferior, and in such (a case) it is true, that it supposeson behalf of that, which is predicated of the other.  But in predication through identity it signifies and supposes the same (thing).  Whence the sense then is, that which (has) been signified through this term Father is the same, (as) that which (has) been signified through this term essence, and for that reason the Paternity is the Essence; and because this noun “essence” does not signify a Person, for that reason it does not suppose on behalf of it, since in no manner is it predicated of it except by a predication through identity.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de passione et subiecto et consimilibus, dicendum, quod quaedam sunt vocabula in divinis substantialia, quae claudunt intra se rem, circa quam ponunt formam importatam per ipsa, ut hoc nomen Pater; et talia possunt praedicari per identitatem, ut cum dicitur:  essentia est Pater, id est, ille qui est Pater.  Quaedam sunt, quae sunt omnino in adiacentia, sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta,9 ut generat et genitus et natus; et talia ponunt rem suam circa ea, de quibus praedicantur, ideo tantum per inhaerentiam praedicantur.  Et ideo generare ponit distinctionem, quam importat, circa essentiam, cum de ea dicitur; et ideo haec est falsa:  essentia generat; haec tamen vera:  essentia est generatio.  Et quando a praedicatione per identitatem itur10 ad praedicationem per inhaerentiam, potest esse ibi accidens.  Quod ergo dicitur; de quocumque praedicatur subiectum, et propria / passio, . . .

3. To that which is objected third concerning passion and subject and things completely similar, it must be said, that certain words [vocabula] among divine (things) are substantial, which enclose within themselves a thing, about which they posit the form conveyed by themselves, as this noun “Father” (does); and such can be predicated through identity, as when there is said:  “the Essence is the Father”, that is, “that One who is the Father”.  There are certain (words), which are entirely for [in] the (words) adjacent (to them), just as verbs and names used as adjectives [adiective retenta],9 as (are) “generates” and “begotten” and “born”; and such posit their own meaning [rem suam] about those, of which they are predicated, for that reason they are predicated only through inherence.  And for that reason “to generate” places a distinction, which it conveys, about the Essence, when it speaks of these; and for that reason this is false:  “the Essence generates”; this, however, true:  “the Essence is the generation”. And when from a predication through identity one passes [itur]10 to a predication through inherence, there it can be an accident.  That which is therefore said:  “of whatever there is predicated a subject, (there is) also (predicated) a proper / passion”, . . .

1  Nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum ed. 1 duplex, et paulo infra multi codd. ut A C G K L R S T V X etc. post et addunt per, sed minus apte. Deinde sensu non mutato codd. D T nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater.  Cfr. de hoc d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. Cod. X post eodem legit glossando unde ait est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius.
2  Plures codd. ut A B C L R S U X bb cum ed. 1 falso praedicatio loco praedicatum, et paulo infra post praedicatione omittunt multi codd. ut A F G I K T aa etc. cum ed. 1 non bene secundum substantiam.
3  Vat. et codd. cc contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 non bene haec; cod. X ibi.
4  Cod. Y relatio. Ratio hic stat pro relatio, cfr. supra p. 58, nota 1.
5  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit Et.
6  Codd. I X addunt sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat.  —  De duplici ratione praedicandi vide infra d. 34. q. 2.
7  Cod. W hic addit lla quae est superioris respectu inferioris; codd. aa bb vero superioris de inferiore est; cod. H tandem in creaturis.
8  Codd. L O addunt communis. Paulo infra post pro illo cod. T continuat constructionem sed non in praedicatione per identitatem ubi idem. Quoad doctrinae explicationem cfr. supra d. 4. q. 2. et 4.
9  Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A E Q V X post omnino omittunt in, in qua lectione adiacentia adiective sumitur.
10  Cod. R infertur, cod. W proceditur.

1  Not a few codices, such as T V and Y, together with edition 1 read twofold diversity of reckoning [diversitas rationis duplex], and a little below this many codices, such as A C G K L R S T V X etc.,after and [et] add through [per], but less aptly.  Then with the sense unchanged codices D and T read nor is one predicated of the other, as (are) Father [nec praedicatur unum de altero, ut Pater].  Cf. on this d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, at n. 2. Codex X after the same (thing), by glossing, read whence the one is the Person of the Father, the other (that) of the Son, the other (that) of the Holy Spirit; for that reason one is not predicated of the other, as “the Father is the Son” [unde ait est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; ideo una non praedicatur de alia, ut Pater est Filius.]
2  Very many codices, such as A B C L R S U X and bb, together with edition 1 falsely have the predication [praedicatio] in place of the predicate [praedicatum], and a little below this after with a predication [praedicatione] many codices, such as A F G I K T aa etc., together with edition 1 omit according to substance [secundum substantiam], but not well.
3  The Vatican edition and the codex cc, contrary to the ancient codices and edition 1 have this [haec]; codex X has here [ibi].
4  Codex Y reads relation [relatio]. A reckoning [Ratio] here stands for relation, cf. above (d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, near the end of the body of the response), p. 58, fn. 1.
5  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits And [Et].
6  Codices I and X add just as “God is just”, just as “the Father generates” [sicut Deus est iustus, sicut Pater generat].  —  Concerning the twofold relation of predicating see above d. 34, q. 2.
7  Codex W here adds that which is of the superior in respect of the inferior [illa quae est superioris respectu inferioris]; codices aa and bb, however, read of the superior concerns the inferior [superioris de inferiore est]; codex H at the end adds among creatures [in creaturis].
8  Codices L and O have a common term [terminus communis].  A little below this after for the other [pro altero] codex T continues the construction with but not in predication through identity where (they are) the same [sed non in praedicatione per identiatem ubi idem].  In regard to the explanation of the doctrine cf. above d. 4, q. 2 and 4.
9  The Vatican edition not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 omits just as verbs and nouns used as adjectives [sicut verba et nomina adiective retenta].  A little before this very many codices such as A E Q V and X after entirely [omnino] omit for [in], in which reading adjacent [adjacentia] is taken as a predicate adjective.
10  Codex R has one infers [infertur], codex W has one proceeds [proceditur].

 

p. 114

 

passio,1 istud habet instantiam, ubi proprietas est extranea ei, de quo praedicatur subiectum, ut haec intentio species, quamvis sit proprietas hominis, et homo dicatur de Petro, non tamen dicitur de eo hoc quod est species.

 . . .also (predicated) a proper / passion”,1 that (principle) of his does have an instance, where a property is extraneous to that, of which the subject is predicated, as (is) this intention ‘species’, although it be a property of man, and man is said of Peter, however there is not said of him this, that he is a “species”.

Et si obiicias, quod2 in divinis non cadit ratio extranei, quia non cadit ibi accidens; dicendum, quod etsi non sit extraneitas nec diversitas quantum ad rem, est tamen quoad rationem sive quoad modum praedicandi, qui triplex est in divinis, sicut infra patebit.3  Unde sicut hic est accidens:  essentia est persona; sed persona distinguitur:  ergo et essentia; ita et in proposito.

And if you object, that2 there does not occur among the divine a reckoning of the extraneous, because an accident does not occur There; it must be said, that even if there is not an extraneousness nor a diversity as much as regards thing, there is, however, in regard to reckoning or in regard to the manner of predicating, which is threefold among the divine, as will be clear below.3  Whence just as here there is (a fallacy of the) accident:  ‘the Essence is a Person; but a Person is distinguished:  therefore also the Essence’; thus it is in the proposed (objection).

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de hac:  essentia4 est Pater Filii; distinguitur a Praepositivo, quod Pater potest ponere suam rem sive respectum per ipsum importatum circa ipsum subiectum, quod est essentia; et tunc est locutio falsa; est enim sensus, quod essentia refertur ad Filium. Vel potest claudere intra se5 rem sui substantivi, ut sit sensus:  essentia est Pater Filii, id est, essentia est ille qui refertur ad Filium; et hoc modo vera est locutio, et non valet argumentum:  ergo Filius est Filius essentiae, immo est ibi accidens. Sicut enim non sequitur:  Filius refertur ad illum qui est Pater, et ille est essentia:  ergo refertur vel distinguitur ab essentia; sic et in proposito.

4. To that which is last objected concerning this:  ‘the Essence4 is the Father of the Son’; there is distinguished by Praepositivus, that “the Father” can posit its own thing or the looking-back, conveyed through it, about the subject itself, which is the Essence; and then the saying is false; for the sense is, that ‘the Essence is referred to the Son’.  And/or it can close within it5 the thing of its own substantive, so that the sense is:  ‘the Essence is the Father of the Son’, that is, ‘the Essence is that One who is referred to the Son’; and in this manner the saying is true, and the argument is not valid:  ‘therefore the Son is the Son of the Essence’, nay rather there is (a fallacy of the) accident there. For just as there does not follow:  ‘the Son is referred to That which is the Father, and this One is the Essence:  therefore He is referred and/or distinguished by the Essence’:  so (it is) also in the proposed (objection).

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Quaestio haec est circa principium quod divinarum productionum, quod secundum fidem catholicam ipsae sunt divinae personae producentes. Conclusiones huius et primae quaestionis sequentis articuli sunt contra abbatem Iachim, cuius doctrina censurata est in Concilio Lateranensi IV. can. de Fide catholica, cap. Damnamus:  « Nos autem, S. approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro (Lombardo), quod una quaedam res est incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis . . . et illa res non est generans nec genita nec procedens ».  —  Hanc doctrinam catholicam Seraphicus gravissimis argumentis confirmat.

I. This question is about the principle which [principium quod] of the divine productions, which according to the Catholic Faith are themselves the Divine Persons producing. The conclusions of this and of the first question of the following article are against Abbot Joachim (di Fiore), whose doctrine was censured in the Fourth Lateran Council, in the canon On the Catholic Faith, chapter “We damn”:  « Moreover We, with the Sacred Council approving, believe and confess with Peter (Lombard), that one certain Thing is indeed the incomprehensible and ineffable . . . and that Thing is not generating nor begotten nor proceeding ».  —  This Catholic Doctrine the Seraphic (Doctor) confirms with the most grave arguments.

II. In solut. ad 1 distinguit S. Doctor duplicem diversitatem rationis in divinis secundum differentiam, quae est inter habere diversas proprietates et habere vel non habere unam eandemque proprietatem, de quo cfr. hic dub. 4. et infra dist. 19. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.  Affirmat etiam, alteram inducere distinctionem realem, alteram non.  Tres enim sunt in divinis proprietates personales, scil. paternitas, filiatio et spiratio passiva, et habere distinctas has proprietates inducit realem personarum distinctionem; unde etiam una nequit predicari de alia.  Sed diversitas rationis, quae exsurgit ex habere aliquam proprietatem et eandem non habere, non importat realem distinctionem.  Essentia enim divina non habet proprietatem generandi, quam habet Pater; nihilominus paternitas et essentia divina non distinguitur realiter et possunt de se praedicari.  Nec valet argumentatio (1. ad opp.), quod habere proprietatem et non habere sint contradictorie opposita, et quod exinde maiorem differentiam inducant inter personam et essentiam, quam quae est inter personas ad invicem.  Nam bene distinguit S. Doctor inter contradictionem, cuius unum extremum nihil ponit (ut inter aliquid et nihil) et illam contradictionem, cuius extrema aliquid ponunt.  Si unum extremum nihil ponit, non potest verificari de aliquo termino positivo, bene tamen, si aliquid ponit.  Insuper minima rationis distinctio sufficit ad hoc, ut contradictoria de distinctis dicantur.  Sic terminus incommunicabilis verificatur de paternitate et praedicatur de ipsa, non de essentia, licet haec non realiter distinguatur a paternitate.  Cfr. infr dist. 26. Q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 1 per totam et d. 33. q. 2. et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1.

In the solution to n. 1 the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes a twofold diversity of reckoning in divine (things) according to the difference, which there is between having diverse properties and having and/or not having one same property, concerning which cf. here, doubt 4 and below distinction 19, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, at n. 4.  He also affirms, that one of the two induces a real distinction, the other does not.  For among the divine there are three personal properties, that is, the paternity, the filiation and the passive spiration, and having these distinct properties induces a real distinction of persons; whence even one cannot be predicated of the other.  But the diversity of reckoning, which rises forth from having some property and not having the same one, does not introduce a real distinction.  For the Divine Essence does not have the property of generating, which the Father has; nevertheless the paternity and the Divine Essence are not really distinguished and they can be predicated of themselves.  Neither is the argument (1. ad opp.) valid, that to have a property and to not have are contradictorily opposed, and that from this [exinde] they induce a greater difference between a Person and the Essence, than which is between each of the Persons themselves.  For the Seraphic Doctor well distinguishes between contradiction, one extreme of which posits nothing (as among something and nothing) and that contradiction, the extreme of which posits something.  If one extreme posits nothing, it cannot be verified of some positive term, however it can be [bene tamen], if it posits something.  In addition the least distinction of reckoning is sufficient for this, that contradictories be said of distinct (things).  Thus an incommunicable term is verified of the paternity and predicated of it, not of the Essence, though this is not really distinguished from the paternity.  Cf. below distinction 26, q. 1, at n. 2, and d. 34, q. 1 throughout and d. 33, q. 2, and St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1.

III. Prima opinio in solut. ad 2. posita, quae distinguit inter praedicationem secundum substantiam et secundum rationem, Praepositivi fuisse dicitur. Secunda opinio distinguit inter praedicationem per identitatem et per inhaerentiam, sive denominationem, quae a Scoto dicitur praedicatio formalis.  De hac distinctione cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2. Praedicatio identica fit per abstracta; praedicatio per inhaerentiam fit semper in concreto et ratione suppositi.  Differunt hae praedicationes, tum quia abstractum eandem rem significat et supponit, concretum vero saepe aliam significat et pro alia supponit (supra, d. 4. q. 1); tum quia abstractum nomen imponitur formae et a forma denominatur, concretum vero non imponitur formae, sed supposito; tum quia identica omnimodam identitatem complectitur, praedicatio vero per inhaerentiam aliquam diversitatem.  Unde falsa est ratiocinatio, quae transit a praedicatione identica ad alteram et ab abstracto ad concretum; et in hoc erravit abbas Ioachim, teste S. Thom. (S. I. q. 39. a. 5.).  —  In creatis locum non habere praedicationem identicam in proprio sensu, est sententia communis, si excipias Franciscum Mayronis.

III. The first opinion posited in the solution to n. 2, which distinguishes between predication according to substance and according to reckoning, is said to have belonged to Praepositivus. The second opinion distinguishes between the predication through identity and through inherence, or denomination, which is called “formal predication” by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus. Concerning this distinction cf. below d. 33, q. 3 and d. 34, q. 2. Identical predication comes about [fit] through abstract (terms); predication through inherence comes about always in a concrete (term) and by reason of a supposit. These predications differ, both because an abstract (term) signifies and supposes the same thing, but the concrete (term) often signifies one (thing) and substitutes for an other (see above d. 4, q. 1); and because an abstract noun is imposed upon a form and is denominated by a form, but a concrete (noun) is not imposed upon a form, but upon a supposit; and also because identical (predication) comprises every manner of identity, but predication through inherence (comprises) some diversity.  Whence false is the reasoning, which passes from identical predication to the other and from an abstract (term) to a concrete one; and in this Abbot Joachim (of Fiore) erred, as St. Thomas testifies, (Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5).  —  That identical predication does not have a place among created things in a proper sense, is the common sentence, if you except Francis Mayer.

IV. Quoad ipsam conclusionem cfr. supra d. 4. a. 1. in corp.  —  Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 49. m. 1. a. 4. (where he removes and solves 25 contrary arguments); q. 42. m. 3. a. 1.  —  Scot., hic q. 1.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 39. a. 5.  —  B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. ad 1. quaesit.; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. a. 1. et 2.  —  Henr. Gand., S. a. 39. q. 3. n. 13; q. 4. n. 12. et a. 54. q. 3. n. 21 28.  —  Durand., hic q. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.  —  Biel, hic q. 1.

IV. In regard to the conclusion itself, cf. above d. 4, a. 1, in the body (of the question).  —  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 49, m. 1, a. 4 (where he removes and solves 25 contrary arguments); and q. 42, m. 3, a. 1.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Ma gnus), Sent., Bk I, d. 4, a. 2, at the first question; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here 1, princ., q. 2, a. 1 and 2.  —  Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 39, q. 3, n. 13; q. 4, n. 12, and a. 54, q. 3, nn. 21 & 28.  —  Durandus, here in q. 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

1  Codd. O Z addunt illud tamen habet veritatem, ubi subiectum praedicatur per inhaerentiam, non ubi praedicatur per identitatem. Illud.
2  Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 quod, et paulo infra substituimus etsi pro si. Cod. V dein post non sit adiungit ibi.
3  Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. Triplex ille dicendi modus est:  essentialis, personalis, notionalis.  —  Paulo infra post ita supplevimus fide mss. et ed. 1 non bene omissum et.
4  Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 addit divina. Paulo infra codd. T aa bb suam relationem loco suam rem; ed. 1 autem suam rem, id est suam relationem sive.
5 Plures antiqui codd. ut A I T aa bb cum ed. 1 omittunt se.

1  Codices O and Z add that (principle), however, is true, where a subject is predicated through inherence, not where it is predicated through identity. That (principle) etc. [illud tamen habet veritatem, ubi subiectum praedicatur per inhaerentiam, non ubi praedicatur per identitatem. Illud].

2  We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 that [quod], and a little below this we have substituted even if [etsi] in place of si [if]. Then codex V inserts There [ibi] before there is not [non sit].
3  Distinction 26, a. 1, q. 1 in the body.  That threefold manner of speaking is:  the essential, the personal, the notional.  —  A little below this after thus [ita], trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied the not well omitted also [et].
4  The Vatican edition contrary to the codices and edition 1 has the Divine Essence [essentia divina]. A little below this codices T and aa and bb have His relation [suam relationem] in place of His thing [suam rem]; but edition 1 has His thing, that is His relation and/or [suam rem, id est suam relationem sive].
5  Very many ancient codices such as A I T aa and bb together with edition 1 omit Himself [se].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.