S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

 

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 114-116.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus.

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 114-116.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum concedenda sit locutio, quod Filius generetur de substantia Patris.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether there is to be conceded the saying, that the Son is generated from the Substance of the Father.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum sit concedendum, quod aliquis generetur de substantia Patris, ut Filius. Et quod sic, videtur:

SECOND IT IS ASKED, whether it must be conceded, that Someone is generated from the Substance of the Father, such as the Son. And it seems, that it is so:

1. Per multas auctoritates in littera6 et maxime per illam:  Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura legitur:  Pater de sua substantia genuisse Filium;

1. Through the many authorities (quoted) in the text (of Master Peter)6 and most of all through that (which is said):  It is also said, and frequently in Scripture it is read:  that Father from His own Substance has begotten the Son;

6 Hic c. 1. post medium.

6 Here in ch. 1, in the second half.

 

p. 115

 

sed Scriptura non dicit nisi verum nec frequentat nisi proprium:  ergo praedictus sermo est verus et proprius.

but Scripture does not say except (what is) true nor does it do (anything) frequently [frequentat] except (what is) proper:  therefore the aforesaid discourse is true and proper.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic:  quicumque est ab aliquo1 et est ei consubstantialis, est de eius substantia; sed Filius est a Patre et est ei consubstantialis:  ergo est de eius substantia.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus:  whosoever is by [ab] someone1 and is consubstantial to him, is from [de] his substance; but the Son is by the Father and is consubstantial to Him:  therefore He is from His substance.

3. Item, Pater generat Filium:  aut ergo de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia tunc esset creatura:  ergo de aliquo;2 non de aliquo alio a se; ergo de sui substantia.

3. Likewise, the Father generates the Son:  therefore either from something [de aliquo], or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature:  therefore from something;2 not from something other than Himself; therefore from His own substance.

4. Item, in inferioribus filius, qui habet partem substantiae a patre, dicitur esse de substantia patris:  ergo multo fortius, qui habet totam substantiam, dicitur esse de substantia generantis:  ergo haec est vera:  Filius est de substantia Patris.

4. Likewise, among inferiors a son, who has part of (his) substance by the father, is said to be from the substance of the father:  therefore much more strongly, he who has the whole substance, is said to be from the substance of the one generating:  therefore this is true:  ‘the Son is from the Substance of the Father’.

CONTRA:  1. Praepositiones sunt transitivae,3 et ubi transitio, ibi est distinctio et diversitas:  ergo cum dicitur:  Filius de substantia Patris, haec praepositio de notat distinctionem inter substantiam Patris et Filium:  ergo cum nulla sit distinctio, quia Filus est substantia Patris, propositio praedicta est falsa.  Si dicas, quod haec praepositio de cadit a generali significato praepositionum, retinens speciale:  ergo est ibi soloecismus,4 sicut si dicatur sublime volat pro sublimiter, quod stultum est dicere.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Prepositions are transitive,3 and where (there is) transition, there is distinction and diversity:  therefore when there is said:  “the Son (is) from the Substance of the Father”, this preposition “from” [de] notes distinction between the Substance of the Father and the Son:  therefore since there is no distinction, because the Son is the Substance of the Father, the aforesaid proposition is false.  If you say, that this preposition “from” occurs from (that which is) generally signified by prepositions [significato praepositionum], being used in a special sense [retinens speciale]:  therefore it is there a soloecism,4 just as if one said “sublime does it fly” for “sublimely”, which is a stupid (thing) to say.

2. Item, obiicitur de significato speciali.  Haec praepositio de, prout accipitur specialiter, aliquando tenetur materialiter, ut cultellus de ferro; aliquando tenetur ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies, id est post mane; aliquando originaliter, ut si dicatur, radius de sole vel splendor de igne.  Sed quocumque istorum modorum accipiatur, falsa est locutio; si materialiter, est falsa, quia Filus caret materia; si ordinaliter, falsa, quia sensus est, quod Filius sit post Patrem sive post substantiam Patris; si originaliter, similiter falsa quia tunc est sensus, quod Filius habeat ortum a substantia Patris; sed ista non admittitur:  substantia Patris generat Filium:  ergo est omni modo5 falsa.  Si dicas, quod nullo istorum modorum, sed tenetur quarto modo substantialiter; quaeritur, unde ortum habeat haec significatio et ubi consimiliter accipiatur;6 et videtur quod hoc nihil sit, quia tunc haec esset vera:  Pater est de substantia Filii, quam nemo concedit.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning (that which is) specially signified.  This preposition “from” [de], insofar as it is accepted in a special manner, is sometimes had materially, as “a knife (made) from iron”; (and) is sometimes had ordinally, as “from morning midday is made”, that is “after morning”; sometimes originally, as if one said, “a ray from the sun” and/or “the splendor from the fire”. But in whatever of these manners it be accepted, the saying is false; if materially, it is false, because the Son lacks matter; if ordinally, (it is) false, because the sense is, that the Son is after the Father or after the substance of the Father; if originally, (it is) similarly false because then the sense is, that the Son has arisen away from [a] the Substance of the Father; but this (saying) is not admitted:  “the Substance of the Father generates the Son”:  therefore it is in every manner5 false.  If you say, that (it is held) in none of those manners, but rather it is held in a fourth manner substantially; it is asked, “Whence has arisen this signification and where is it accepted in a completely similar manner [consimiliter]?”;6 and it seems that this is nothing, because then this would be true:  “the Father is from the Substance of the Son”, which no one concedes.

3. Item, hoc idem ostenditur sic:  differt haec praepositio de et a:  quia a proprie dicit habitudinem principii activi, sed haec praepositio de dicit habitudinem principii passivi; sed Deo et eius substantiae magis convenit ratio principii activi quam passivi:  ergo haec est magis vera:  Filius est a substantia Patris, quam de; sed haec non recipitur:  ergo nec alia debet recipi.

3. Likewise, this same is shown thus:  this preposition “from” [de] is different and (so is) “by” [a]:  because “by” properly means the habitude of an active principle, but this preposition “from” means the habitude of a passive principle; but to God and to His Substance the reckoning of an active principle it is more fitting [convenit] than of a passive one:   therefore this is more true:   “the Son is by the Substance of the Father”, than “from”; but this (saying) is not received:  therefore neither ought the other be received.

4. Item, de aut dicit identitatem aut diversitatem; si identitatem:  ergo cum summa identitas sit in essentia vel substantia, haec erit vera:  substantia7 de substantia, quam negat Magister; si diversitatem; sed non distinguitur substantia Patris a Filio, quia Filius est ipsa substantia Patris:  ergo omnino est falsa.

 

4. Likewise, “from” either means identity or diversity; if identity:  therefore since there is a most high identity in the Essence and/or Substance, this will be true:   “Substance7 from Substance”, which Master (Peter) denies; if (it means) a diversity; but the Substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the Substance itself of the Father:   therefore it is entirely false.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Concedendum est, Filium generari de substantia Patris.

CONCLUSION

 

It must be conceded, that the Son is generated from the Substance of the Father.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio est concedenda.

I RESPOND:  that it must be said, that the aforesaid saying is to be conceded.

Et ad intelligentiam praedictorum8 notandum, quod praeter praedictos tres modos, quibus haec praepositio de accipitur, quarto modo etiam potest accipi, scilicet substantialiter, ut dicat substantialem convenientiam inter extrema; sed hac nunquam pure dicit, cum sit praepositio et importet aliquam habitudinem et respectum ad extrema. Si enim tantum substantialiter teneretur;9 sicut dicitur:  filius de substantia patris, ita diceretur:  pater de substantia filii; quod absonum est.

And for an understanding of the aforesaid8 it must be noted, that besides the aforesaid three manners, by which this preposition “from” [de] is accepted, it can also be accepted in a fourth manner, that is substantially, to mean a substantial fittingness [convenientiam] between extremes; but it never purely means this, since it is a preposition and it conveys some habitude and regard [respectum] for extremes.  For if it were only held substantially;9 just as there is said:  “a son (is) from the substance of a father”, it would thus mean:  ‘a father of the substance of the son’; which sounds awry [absonum est].

Propterea notandum, quod substantialiter accipi consuevit tripliciter.  Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et partialiter, ut cum dicitur, quod partes sunt de toto sive de substantia totius, ut urceus vini de dolio.  Aliquando accipitur substantialiter et ordinaliter, ut cum dicitur:  de pane fit corpus Christi; ibi enim est ordo, quia substantia panis non manet in corpore Christi, sicut nec mane in meridie; sed ulterius substantialiter, quia substantia panis transit in substantiam corporis Christi.  Aliquando accipitur10 substantialiter et originaliter, ut cum dicitur:   Filius de substantia Patris; ratione ablativi tenetur substantialiter, ratione genitivi originaliter:  et ideo importat aliquam distinctionem Filli ad Patrem, non ad eius substantiam, et ita praepositio tenet ibi generale significatum et speciale.

Moreover it must be noted, that substantially is accustomed to be accepted in a threefold manner.  Sometimes it is accepted substantially and partially, as when it is said, that parts are from the whole or from the substance of the whole, as “a jug of wine from the cask”.  Sometimes it is accepted substantially and ordinally, as when there is said:  “from bread the Body of Christ is made” for in this [ibi] there is an order, because the substance of the bread does not remain [manet] in the Body of Christ, just as neither the morning in the midday; but furthermore substantially, because the substance of the bread passes over into the substance of the Body of Christ.   Sometimes it is accepted10 substantially and originally, as when there is said:  “the Son from the Substance of the Father”; by reason of the ablative it is held substantially, by reason of the genitive originally:  and for that reason it conveys [importat] some distinction of the Son towards the Father, not towards His Substance, and thus the preposition holds there a general and special significance [significatum].

1. 2. Et sic patet responsio ad primum argumentum et secundum. Tamen quod dicitur, quod / praepositiones sunt transitivae, . . .

1. 2. And thus is clear the response to the first and second argument. However because it is said, that / prepositions are transitive, . . .

1  Ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 substituimus aliquo pro alio.
2  Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit et, pro quo cod. A melius habet sed.
3  [trans. nota:  Hic textus criticalis legit Propositiones, tamen ex nn. 1 et 2 responsionis atque I. Scholionis, magis debet legere Praepositiones; quidem hic legitur, ut propositio maior istius argumenti sit, sed minor est haec praepositio, ergo etc.] Cfr. Priscian, XIV Grammat. c. 1. et seqq.   — Mox post ibi Vat. habet etiam est loco et. Paulo infra ed. 1 verbo nulla praemittit satis bene in substantia.
4  Priscian., XV. Grammat. c. 1:  Nam si (ordinatio partium orationis) incongrua sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus.
5  Plures codd. ut A F H K T Y etc. cum ed. 1 omni modo, Vat. omnino.   — Similia habet Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 29. (IV. 24.) de praepositione ex.   — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut K V W X post modorum addunt tenetur.
6  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 similiter accipitur.
7  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit est.  Textum Magistri vide in lit. c. 1 et 2. circa finem.
8  Aliqui codd. ut T V addunt est.
9  Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene tenetur.
10  Substituimus ex codd. et ed. 1 accipitur pro dicitur.  Paulo infra post Filius cod. V addit est.

1  From nearly all the codices and edition 1 we have substituted something [aliquo] for an other [alio].
2  The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, adds and [et], in place of which codex A has the better but [sed].
3  [trans. note:  Here the Quaracchi text has The propositions [Propositiones], however it appears here from nn. 1 & 2 of the response, as well as from I. of the Scholium, that it should rather be read as Prepositions [Praepositiones]; indeed as it reads, it is the major proposition of the argument, the minor of which is this preposition:  ergo etc..] Cf. Priscian, Grammer, Bk. XIV, ch. 1 ff..   —  Then after there [ibi] the Vatican edition has also is in place of and [et]. A little below this edition 1 prefaces the word no [nulla] with in the Substance [in substantia], well enough.
4  Priscian, Grammar, ch. 1:  For if (the ordering of the parts of an oration) be incongruous, it causes a solecism, as if the elements of the oration were arranged [coeuntibus] in an awkward manner.
5  Very many codices, such as A F H K T Y etc., together with edition 1 have in every manner [omni modo], the Vatican edition has entirely [omnino].   —  Aristotle has similar (sayings), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 29 (Bk. IV, 24) concerning the preposition out of [ex].   —  A little below this not a few codices, such as K V W and X, after manners [modorum] add is it held [tenetur].
6 The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has is it accepted in a similar manner [similiter accipitur].
7  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 adds is [est].  See the text of Master (Peter) above in ch. 1 and 2, near the end.
8  Some codices such as T and V have explicitly it must be noted [est notandum] for it must be noted [notandum].

9  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has the less well is held [tenetur].
10  We have substituted from the codices and edition 1 it is accepted [accipitur] for it is said [dicitur].  A little below this after the Son [Filius] codex V adds is [est].

 

p. 116

 

praepositiones sunt transitivae, non intelligitur, quod notent ex hoc diversitatem necessario; sed sicut dicitur, quod obliqui1 sunt transitivi quantum ad modum; quia transitive construuntur cum verbis, ut, video me; similiter hoc de praepositionibus dicitur, quae2 cum obliquis construuntur.

prepositions are transitive, it is not understood, that from this they necessarily note a diversity; but just as it is said, that oblique (cases)1 are transitive as much as regards manner; because they are transitively constructed with words, as, “I see myself”; similarly this is said of prepositions, which2 are constructed with oblique (cases).

3. Patet etiam tertium, quod de non tantum dicit habitudinem principii passivi nec tantum habitudinem principii activi, sed habitudinem consubstantialem cum habitudine originis; quod non facit haec praepositio a; et ideo non est simile.

3. Clear also is the third, because “from” not only means the habitude of a passive principle nor only the habitude of an active principle, but rather a consubstantial habitude together with the habitude of an origin; which this preposition “by” [a] does not do; and for that reason it is not similar.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, patet responsio, quia de3 non dicit ibi penitus identitatem nec diversitatem, sed consubstantialitatem cum habitudine originis.

 

4. To that which is objected last, the response is clear, because “from”3 does not mean that (there is) a thorough [penitus] identity There and not a diversity, but rather a consubstantiality with a habitude of an origin.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Pro intelligentia aliquorum terminorum in solut. ad 1. et alibi occurentium haec ex antiquis grammaticis notamus.

I. For an understanding of some of the terms occurring in the solution to n. 1 and elsewhere, we note these (points) of ancient grammar.

1. Duplex distinguebatur constructio transitiva, scil. tum actuum tum personarum.  In prima constructibile dependens per modum actus significat, ut in verbis transitivis, v. g. lego librum; secunda vero est, in qua constructibile dependens per modum substantiae significat.  Haec fit vel per casus obliquos ( v. g. filius Socratis; similis Ciceroni) vel etiam per praepositiones, quae inde vocantur transitivae.  Vide Scotum, Grammatica speculativa c. 46. usque 51., de hoc subtiliter disputantem.

1. A twofold transitive construction used to be distinguished, that is both of acts as well as of persons.  In the first the dependent constructible signifies through a manner of acting, as in transitive words, e. g. “I read a book”; but the second is, in which the dependent constructible signifies through a manner of substance.  This is accomplished through oblique cases (e.g. “the son of Socrates”; “a similar to Cicero”) and/or even through prepositions, which are thence called transitive. See (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Speculative Grammar, ch. 46-51, who disputes this point subtly.

2. Constructio transitiva secundum antiquam definitionem est illa, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa; intransitiva vero est ea, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel saltem ad idem videntur pertinere.

2. A transitive construction according to the ancient definition is that, in which the constructibles pertain to diverse (things) and/or seem to pertain to diverse (things); but an intransitive (construction) is that, in which the constructibles pertain to the same (thing) and/or at least seem to pertain to the same (thing).

3. Quomodo casus grammaticales sint transitivi quantum ad modum significandi, late Scot. explicat ibid. c. 19.

3. In what manner grammatical cases are transitive as much as regards (their) manner of signifying, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus explains at length, ibid., ch. 19.

4. Ipse S. Bonav. infra d. 37. p. I. dub. 2. docet, quod praepositiones non notent necessario diversitatem.

4. St. Bonaventure himself below in d. 37, p. I, doubt 2, teaches, that prepositions do not necessarily note a diversity.

Ampliorem expositionem et applicationem huius solutionis exhibent Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 4. a. 2. ad 3, et Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. ad 1.

A more ample exposition and application of this solution is exhibited by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 4, a. 2, at n. 3, and by Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3, at n. 1.

II. In conclusione doctores conveniunt. Cfr. Alex. et Richard. locc. citt.  — Scot., hic q. 2.  — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 3.  — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. ad 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. p. 3.  — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1.  — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1.  — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 53. seqq.  — Durand., hic q. 2.  — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.  — Biel, hic q. 2.

II. The doctors agree on the conclusion. Cf. Alexander and Richard locc. citt..  — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2.  — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 41, a. 3.   — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 4. a. 2, at n. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, p. 3.  — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1.  — Giles the Roman, here in the 2nd princ. of q. 1.  — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 53 ff..  — Durandus, here in q. 2.  — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.  — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.

1  Supple:  casus.  — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 videt me pro video me, sed non bene.
2  Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungit etiam. Cod. H quia loco quae.
3  Vat. ponit quod loco quia et omittit de, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

1  Supply:  cases.  — A little below this very many codices, such as A C F G H K L O R S V X etc. ,together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 read “he sees me” in place of “I see myself”, but not well.
2  The Vatican edition not trusting the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 adjoins also [etiam]. Codex H has because they [quia] in place of which [quae].
3  The Vatican edition puts that [quod] in place of because [quia] and omits from [de], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.