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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V |
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ARTICULUS II.
Quaestio I. |
ARTICLE II
Question 1 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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De comparatione generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini. |
ARTICLE II
On the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a term. |
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Consequenter circa secundum articulum huius quaestionis, qui est per comparationem generationis ad essentiam in ratione termini, duo quaeruntur. |
Consequently about the second article of this question, which is through the comparison of generation to essence in the reckoning of a term, two (questions) are asked. |
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Primo quaeritur, utrum substantia sive essentia generetur. Secundo, utrum per generationem communicetur. |
First there is asked, whether a substance or an essence is generated. Secondly, whether it is communicated through generation. |
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Utrum substantia sive essentia generetur. |
QUAESTIO 1
Whether a substance or an essence is generated. |
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QUOD AUTEM substantia generetur, sic obiicitur.4 |
MOREOVER THAT a substance is generated, is objected in this manner.4 |
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1. Generatio in inferioribus est motus ad substantiam;5 quod motus est, hoc est imperfectionis, quod ad substantiam est, hoc est perfectionis; si ergo quod est perfectionis est transferendum ad divina: ergo et generatio terminatur ad essentiam. |
1. Generation among inferiors is a movement [motus] towards substance;5 because what is movement, belongs to imperfection, what is towards substance, belongs to perfection; therefore if what belongs to perfection must be transferred to the divine: therefore even generation is terminated at an essence. |
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2. Item, generatio in divinis terminatur: aut ergo ad substantiam, aut ad accidens, quia omne ens est substantia, vel accidens;6 sed in divinis non terminatur ad accidens, cum non sit ibi: ergo ad substantiam. Si dicas, quod in divinis, quamvis non sit accidens, est tamen relatio, quae distinguitur ad substantia; tunc arguitur sic: aut generatio terminabitur ad substantiam, aut ad relationem; sed non ad relationem, quia in ad aliquid per se non est origo, nec terminatur productio:7 ergo terminatur ad substantiam: ergo substantia generatur. |
2. Likewise, generation among the divine is terminated: therefore either at a substance, or at an accident, because every being [ens] is a substance, and/or an accident;6 but among the divine it is not terminated at an accident, since (this) is not There: therefore at a substance. If you say, that among the divine, although there is not an accident, there is however a relation, which is distinguished regarding the Substance; then it is argued thus: either generation will be terminated at a substance, or at a relation, because at something per se is not an origin, nor is the production terminated:7 therefore it is terminated at a substance: therefore a substance is generated. |
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3. Item, sicut dicit Philosophus:8 « Motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt, et corruptis nobis, corrumpuntur ea quae in nobis sunt »; et hoc est, |
3. Likewise, as the Philosopher says:8 « With us moved, there are moved those things which are in us, and with us corrupted, there are corrupted those thing which are in us »; and this is, |
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4 Cod. H ostenditur. |
4 Codex H reads shown [ostenditur]. |
p. 117
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quia universale habet idem esse cum singulari: ergo cum multo magis sit eadem substantia cum persona, et substantia sit in persona, si persona generatur, et substantia. |
because a universal has to be the same with the singular: therefore since much more is the Substance the same with a Person, and the Substance is in a Person, if a Person is generated, (so) also the Substance. |
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4. Item, generare tam in divinis quam in creaturis est simile sibi producere;1 sed non est similitudo in persona, sed in substantia et in natura: ergo cum terminetur ad simile, in quantum est simile, ergo ad substantiam, secundum quam attenditur similitudo. |
4. Likewise, ‘to generate’ both among the divine and among creatures is ‘to produce a (something) similar to one's self’;1 but there is not similitude in person, but in substance and in nature: therefore since (generation) is terminated at (something) similar, inasmuch as it is (something) similar, therefore at a substance, according to which the similitude is attained. |
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CONTRA: 1. Omne quod generatur ab alio generatur, quia nihil se ipsum gignit;2 sed substantia divina non habet alium, nec aliud est in divinis: ergo non generatur. |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Everything which is generated is generated by an other, because nothing begets its very self;2 but the Divine Substance does not have an Other, nor is there an other (being) among the divine: therefore It is not generated. |
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2. Item, omne quod generatur habet principium a quo;3 sed omne quod habet principium, est principiatum; sed principium et principiatum distinguuntur: si ergo substantia generatur, distinguitur: aut ergo a substantia, aut a persona; sed utrumque est impossibile: ergo etc. |
2. Likewise, everything which is generated has a principle from which;3 but everything which has a beginning [principium], has been begun [est principiatum]; but the beginning and the begun are distinguished: therefore if a substance is generated, it is distinguished: therefore either (it is distinguished) from [a] the Substance, or from a Person; but each is impossible: ergo etc.. |
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3. Item, omne quod generatur est de substantia generantis;4 si ergo substantia generatur, substantia vel essentia est de substantia generantis; sed non est nisi una omnino substantia: ergo idem est de se ipso, quod est impossibile. |
3. Likewise, everything which is generated is from the substance of the one generating;4 therefore if a substance is generated, the substance and/or essence is from the substance of the one generating; but there is not but entirely one Substance: therefore the Same is from its very Self, which is impossible. |
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4. Item, generatio est productio;5 sed productio est quaedam actio, et omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad singularia: ergo cum generatio sit quaedam actio, in divinis terminabitur ad singulare sive suppositum; sed tale non est substantia: ergo non terminabitur ad ipsam. |
4. Likewise, generation is a production;5 but production is a certain action, and every action of a creature is terminated at singulars: therefore since generation is a certain action, in divine (things) it will be terminated at a singular or at a supposit; but such is not the Substance; therefore it will not be terminated at It. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Cum in divinis generatio terminetur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, non ad substantiam secundam sive essentiam, minime recipitur, quod substantia generetur. |
CONCLUSION
Since generation among the divine is terminated solely at the first substance, which is a Person, not at a second substance or essence, it is not in the least [minime] received, that a substance is generated. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod generatio de sua communi ratione ad substantiam terminatur. Sed attendendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter: prima, quae est individuum et hypostasis sive persona, et secunda, quae est commune.6 Dico ergo, quod est loqui de termino generantis dupliciter: aut quantum ad productionem, aut quantum ad intentionem. Quantum ad productionem, cum sit circa singulare, terminatur ad substantiam primam, et7 quantum ad intentionem ad naturam communem, quia natura producens hunc hominem intendit formam communem dare ei. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that generation from its own common reckoning is terminated at a substance. But it must be attended to, that “substance” is said in a twofold manner: the first, (that substance) which is an individual and a hypostasis or person, and the second, (that) which is (something) common.6 Therefore I say, that it is to be said of the terminus of one generating in a twofold manner: either as much as regards the production, or as much as regards the intention. As much as regards the production, since it is about a singular, it is terminated at the first substance, and7 as much as regards the intention (it is terminated) at a common nature, because the nature producing this man intends to give him a common form. |
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Sed quoniam in creaturis forma communis numeratur in suppositis, ideo in illis forma communis producitur et corrumpitur; et ideo in creaturis generatio non tantum secundum intentionem, sed etiam secundum productionem ad substantiam communem terminatur; et ideo universale in singulari generatur, quia numeratur.8 Sed quoniam in divinis substantia non numeratur nec advenit ei novum esse: ideo generatio secundum productionem terminatur solum ad substantiam primam, quae est persona, quia persona secundum Boethium9 « est rationalis naturae individua substantia ». Et quoniam illud solum dicitur proprie generari, ad quod terminatur generatio secundum rationem producendi: ideo persona generatur, non substantia vel essentia. Et ideo haec non recipitur: essentia generatur. |
But since among creatures the common form is numbered among supposits, for that reason among those a common form is produced and corrupted; and for that reason among creatures generation not only according to intention, but also according to production, is terminated at a common substance; and for that reason a universal is generated in the singular, because it is numbered.8 But since in the Divine Substance there is not numbered nor does something new come upon it [advenit ei novum esse]: for that reason generation according to production is terminated solely at the first substance, which is a Person, because “a person” according to (St. Severinus) Boethius9 « is an individual substance of a rational nature ». And since that alone is said properly to be generated, generation according to a reckoning of producing is terminated at that. And for that reason this is not received: “an essence is generated”. |
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Et sic patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem; procedunt enim10 diversis viis. |
And thus is clear all the objections on each side; for they proceed10 by diverse ways. |
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3. Patet etiam, quare in divinis non sequitur, quod, generata persona, generetur substantia, sicut in creaturis. Posset tamen aliter dici, quod non generetur commune nisi in hoc;11 et non tantum in creaturis hoc verum est, sed etiam in divinis. Commune autem ut in hoc non significatur in abstractione, sed in concretione; et ideo, quia hoc nomen Deus significat substantiam in concretione,12 Deus generatur et Deus generat Deum. Quia vero substantia vel essentia significat in abstractione, ideo nec generat nec generatur; et ita procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas. |
3. It is also clear, why among the divine it does not follow, that, with a Person generated, a substance is generated, just as among creatures. However it can be otherwise said, that (something) common is not generated except in this one;11 and not only among creatures is this true, but also among the divine. Moreover (something) common as “in this one” is not signified in abstraction, but in concretion; and for that reason, because this noun “God” signifies a substance in concretion,12 “God is generated” and “God generates God”. However because “substance” and/or “essence” signifies in abstraction, for that reason it neither generates nor is generated; and thus proceed the reasons on the opposite sides. |
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1 Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text.
34. (c. 4.), ubi dicit, quod naturalissimum operum viventium est facere
quale ipsum, id est generare; et text. 49: Finis est generare quale
ipsum, id est simile. — Mox plerique codd. ut A C F G H I T etc.
cum ed 1. ad similem loco ad simile ac dein similis pro simile. |
1 Cf. Aristotle, On the Son, Bk. II, text 34
(ch. 4), where he says, that the most natural of the works of living (things)
is to make a “such as itself” [facere quale ipsum], that is to
generate; and text 49: The end is to generate a “such as itself”, that
is a similar. — Then very many codices, such as A C F G H I T
etc., together with edition 1 have at a similar one [ad similem] in
place of at (something) similar [ad simile] and then one is similar
[est similis] in place of it is (something) similar [est simile]. |
p. 118
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SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM |
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I. Haec conclusio est iterum contra abbatem Ioachim (cfr. Schol. hic a. 4. q. 1.). Ut recte intelligatur conclusio, notandum, quod non est sermo de subiecto generationis, quod in generatione creaturarum est materia prima, quae praesupponitur generationi, sed de termino generationis, qui incipit esse. |
I. Again, this conclusion is against Abbot Joachim (cf. the Scholium, here at a. 4, q. 1). To understand the conclusion rightly, it must be noted, that it is not a discourse concerning the subject of generation, which in the generation of creatures is the prime matter, which is presupposed to generation, but rather concerning the terminus of generation, which begins to be. |
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Perfecta generatio terminatur ad substantiam, non ad accidens; sed S. Doctor cum communi sententia distinguit duplicem substantiam: altera dicitur substantia prima, quae est omne individuum in genere substantiae; altera vero secunda, quae est aliquid « commune » in genere substantiae. Substantia prima est terminus totalis generationis quantum ad productionem; substantia vero secunda est terminus formalis (at partialis) quantum ad intentionem. In creaturis uterque terminus incipit esse de novo, non vero in Deo. « Unde generatio divina terminatur ad primam substantiam, non ad essentiam, neque ad relatione, in quantum est relatio, sed in quantum est persona subsistens. ». Ita hic Richard. a Med. |
Perfect generation is terminated at a substance, not at an accident; but the Seraphic Doctor with the common sentence distinguished a twofold substance: one of the two is called the first substance, which is every individual in the genus of substance; but the other of the two is the second (substance), which is anything « common » in the genus of substance. The first substance is the total terminus of the generation as much as regards production; but the second substance is the formal (but partial) terminus as much as regards intention. Among creatures each term begins to be from (something) new, but not (so) in God. « Whence divine generation is terminated at the first substance, not at an essence, nor at a relation, inasmuch as it is a relation, but rather as much as it is a subsistent Person ». Thus Richard of Middleton on this distinction. |
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II. In conclusione et principalibus argumentis doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1; p. IV. q. 10. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3; S. I. q. 39. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. secundae quaest. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 59. q. 1. n. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1. |
II. In the conclusion and the principle arguments the doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1; p. IV, q. 10, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 3; Summa., I, q. 39, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 3, a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the 1st princ. of q. 2, second quaest.. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 59, q. 1, n. 4. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.