S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 119-123.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 119-123.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

 

DOUBT I

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima dubitatio est de rationibus Magistri. Nam prima eius ratio ducit ad hoc inconveniens, scilicet quod, si essentia generaretur a Patre, essentia poneretur pro relativo; et haec ratio ponitur ibi:  Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam.  Sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens.  Si enim magis convenit essentia cum supposito, quam universale cum singulari; si non est inconveniens, quod universale ponatur7 pro singulari, nec est inconveniens, quod essentia ponatur pro relativo.

In that part of his (text) there occur [incidunt] doubts about the text, and the first doubt concerns Master (Peter's) reasons. For his first reason leads to this unfitting (conclusion), that is, that, if the Essence were generated by the Father, the Essence would be posited for a relative; and this reason is posited there (where he says):  For that reason it must not be said, that the Father begot the Divine Essence.  But this seems (to be) nothing unfitting [inconveniens].  For if the Essence convenes more with a Supposit, than a universal (does) with a singular; if it is not unfitting, that a universal be posited7 for a singular, neither is it unfitting, that the Essence be posited for a relative.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod si essentia poneretur pro relativo, esset inconveniens, non a parte / rei, . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that if the Essence were posited for a relative, it would be unfitting, not on the part / of the thing, . . .

7  Vat. cum cod. cc cum universale ponitur, sed minus bene et contra alios codd., quorum tamen aliqui, retenta particula quod, legunt ponitur loco ponatur.

7  The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads when a universal is posited [cum universale ponitur], but less well and contrary to the other codices, some of which, however, having retained the particle that [quod], read is posited [ponitur] in place of be posited [ponatur].

p. 120

rei, sed a parte expressionis fidei.  Tunc enim videretur et1 notaretur unitas essentiae in quadam distinctione.  Esset etiam inconveniens, quia quod ponitur pro relativo in quantum huius modi, non indicat essentiam. Si ergo2 essentia poneretur pro relativo, essentia aliquando non indicaret essentiam, quod est omni rationi contrarium.

of the thing, but on the part of the expression of the Faith.  For then there would seem (to be) and1 to be denoted the Unity of the Essence in a certain distinction.  It would also be unfitting [inconveniens], because what is posited for a relative inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, does not indicate an essence. Therefore2 if the Essence would be posited for a relative, the Essence would sometimes not indicate the Essence, which is contrary to every reckoning.

 

DUB. II.

 

DOUBT II

Item secundo dubitatur de secunda ratione, in qua ducit ad hoc inconveniens, quod eadem res gigneret se ipsam, et ponitur, ibi:  Item cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius quod ipse est, quia essentia dicit quid commune, sicut et hoc nomen Deus; sed si dicatur:  homo3 Petrus generat hominem, et ipse est homo:  ergo generat se, argumentum istud nihil valet. Similiter videtur hic:  Pater generat Deum:  ergo etc., pari ratione nec in proposito.

Likewise, second, there is a doubt [dubitatur] concerning (his) second reason, in which he leads (the reader) to this unfitting (conclusion), that the same thing would beget its very self, and (this) is posited, there (where he says):  Likewise since God the Father is the Divine Essence, if He were its begetter, He would certainly [utique] be the begetter of that which He Himself is, because “the Essence” means what (is) common, just as this noun “God” (does); but if there be said:  “the man3 Peter generates a man and he himself is the man:  therefore he generates himself”, that argument of his is worth [valet] nothing. Similarly does it seem here:  “the Father generates God:  therefore etc.”, for an equal reason neither (is it valid) in the proposed.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod commune dicitur quod est in multis; sed hoc potest esse tripliciter:  aut quod plurificatur in multis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad suppositum, ut hoc nomen homo; et tale habet unitatem rationis, quae admittit distinctionem et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum.4  Unde bene dicitur homo esse ab homine, et:  duos esse homines. Alio modo est commune quod plurificatur quantum ad suppositum, non quantum ad formam, ut hoc nomen Deus; et tale habet unitatem rei, secundum quod res nominat naturam cum multiplicatione suppositorum:  et ideo recipit distinctivum,5 quod importat distinctionem ut modum, non ut rem.  Unde conceditur:  Deus de Deo, sed non:  Deus est alius a Deo.  Est tertio modo commune secundum nomen, quod est in multis, nec tamen plurificatur quantum ad formam, quia est unum in multis, nec quantum ad supposita, quia pro illis non supponit, ut hoc nomen essentia.  De tali communi verum est dicere, quod non recipit distinctionem nec quantum ad modum, nec quantum ad rem; tunc enim notaretur idem distingui a se.  Et ita argumentum Magistri est bonum:  si Pater genuit essentiam, Pater genuit se; et6 loquitur de communi a parte vocis significantis, non a parte rei, quia a parte rei eadem communitas est in hoc quod est Deus et in hoc quod est essentia.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “the common” is said (to be that) which it is in many; but this can be in a threefold manner:  either because it is plurified in many, both as much as regards form and as much as regards supposit, as this noun “man” (is); and such has a unity of reckoning, which admits a distinction both as much as regards thing and as much as regards the manner (of being regarded).4  Whence a man is rightly said “to be from a man”, and:  (it is rightly said) “that there are two men”.  In another manner (something) is “common” because it is plurified as much as regards supposit, not as much as regards form, as this noun “God” (is); and such has a unity of thing, according to which the “thing” names “a nature with a multiplication of supposits”:  and for that reason it receives (something) distinctive,5 which conveys a distinction as a manner (of being regarded), not as a thing.  Whence there is conceded:  “God from God”, but not:  “God is an Other than God”.  In a third manner (something) is “common” according to (its) name, which is in many (things), and yet it is not plurified as much as regards form, because it is “the one in the many”, nor as much as regards (its) supposits, because it does not suppose on their behalf, as this noun “essence” (does).  Of such a common (thing) it is true to say, that it does not receive distinction neither as much as regards a manner (of being regarded), nor as much as regards thing; for then there would be noted that the same is distinguished by the itself.  And thus the argument of Master (Peter) is a good one:  “if the Father begot the Essence, the Father begot Himself”; and6 he speaks of the common on the part of the signifying word [vocis], not on the part of the thing, because on the part of the Thing the same commonality [communitas] is in This because It is “God” and in This because It is the “Essence”.

 

DUB. III.

 

DOUBT III

Item tertio obiicitur contra tertiam rationem:  si Pater genuit divinam essentiam, tunc genitum gignenti causa est, ut sit et Deus sit, et ponitur ibi:  Et si ita est, non genito gignens etc.  Sed haec ratio nihil videtur valere, quia ratio causae non cadit in divinis; « causa enim est cuius esse sequitur aliud »;7 sed in divinis non est aliud:  ergo etc.

Likewise, third, there is the objection [obiicitur] against (his) third reason:  if the Father begot the Divine Essence, then the Begotten is the cause for the One Begetting, to be and to be God, and (this) is posited there (where he says):  And if He is thus, the one begetting (is) not the cause etc..  But this reason seems to be worth nothing, because the reckoning of cause does not occur among the divine; « for a cause is (that) of which there follows another “being” »;7 but among the divine there is not another (“being”):  ergo etc..

Item, non sequitur:  Pater genuit sapientiam:  ergo est sapiens sapientia genita:  ergo pari ratione nec praedicta locutio8 valet.

Likewise, (this) does not follow:  “the Father begot Wisdom:  therefore He is wise by the Wisdom begotten”:  therefore for an equal reason neither is the aforesaid saying8 valid.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod, sumendo nomen causae proprie, non cadit in divinis,9 cadit tamen et recipitur ratio principiantis et ratio informantis, et pro his accipitur nomen causae.  Quoniam igitur ratio essendi significatur per hoc nomen essentia:  ideo essentia significat10 quodam modo in ratione causae respectu entis.  Si ergo essentia esset genita ab ente, significaretur in ratione effectus sive principiati, et idem esset tunc principium et principiatum respectu eiusdem, quod est impossibile; et in hoc fundatur ratio Magistri.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that, taking the name for a cause in a proper (sense), it does not occur among the divine,9 nevertheless [tamen] there does occur and there is received a reckoning of one beginning [principiantis] and a reckoning of one informing, and for these there is accepted the name of “cause”.  Therefore since a reckoning of being [essendi] is signified through this name “essence”:  for that reason “essence” signifies10 in a certain manner in the reckoning of a cause in respect of a being [entis].  Therefore if the Essence were begotten by a Being, It would signify in the reckoning of the effect or of One begun, and the Same would then be beginning and the begun in respect of the Same, which is impossible; and upon this (recognition) is founded (that) reason of Master (Peter).

Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia; dicendum, quod tactum est de ipsa in quaestionibus extra litteram,11 quia nomen ita abstractum, sicut essentia, non supponit pro relativo, sapientia bene supponit pro relativo; et ita est ibi accidens:  Pater est sapiens sapientia et genuit sapientiam:  ergo est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, vel sapientia genita. In nomine autem essentiae non est accidens, quoniam idem significat et supponit.

To that which is objected concerning Wisdom; it must be said, that this has been touched upon in questions outside of the text,11 because a name so abstract, as “essence” (is), does not suppose on behalf of a relative, (and) wisdom does suppose well on behalf of a relative; and thus there is a (fallacy of the) accident there (when it is argued):  “the Father is wise by Wisdom and He begot Wisdom:  therefore He is wise by the Wisdom which He begot, and/or by the begotten Wisdom”.  But in the name for an essence there is not an accident, since it signifies and supposes the same (thing).

1 Ed. 1 quod loco et; aliqui codd. ut G U dd connotaretur pro notaretur.
2  Meliorem lectionem damus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo ergo pro enim.
3  Vat. hoc modo pro homo, sed castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. Paulo infra Vat. contra multos codd. ut A C F G H I S T W etc. illud non loco istud nihil.
4  Supple:  se habendi. Vide supra d. 4. dub. 1.  —  Paulo post aliquid codd. ut A B D F G H K etc. cum Vat. ponunt homo est ab homine.  —  De communi in Deo et creturis cfr. infra d. 19. p. II. q. 2; d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 2.
5  Cod. T bene addit secundum; nonnulli codd. ut F G H K ee ff distinctionem loco distinctivum, in qua lectione quod cum cod. H sumendum esset pro quia.  Paulo infra mss. cum ed. 1 Deus esse alius pro Deus est alius; cod. O. post a Deo addit vel duo dii.
6  Vat. praeter fiem mss. et ed. 1 quia loco et.
7  In hac communiter recepta causae definitione, quae ex Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-38. (c. 3.), II. Metaph. text. 6. seq. (I. brevior. c. 2), V. Metaph. text. 2-4. (IV. c. 2.) colligi potest, Vat. hic et alibi contra codd. ac ed. 1 relativo cuius praefigit praepositionem ad.
8  Substituimus ex aniquioribus mss. et ed. 1 locutio pro solutio.
9  Cfr. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Paulo ante cod. K post causae addit de se.
10  Vat. contra multos codd. ut A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc. et ed. 1 modo passivo signatur.
11  Hic q. 1.  —  Plura de ista propositione:  sapiens sapientia genita, vide d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. ac 2.  —  Paulo infra ex cod. W adiecimus sapientia bene supponit pro relativo, quod certe supplendum et in aliis mss. forte omissum est propter huius et praecedentis propositionis communem desinentiam pro relativo; et mox ex eodem cod. W. addidimus ibi.

1  Edition 1 reads it would seem that there would be [videretur quod]; other codices as G U and dd have connoted [connotaretur] in place of noted [notaretur].
2  We give the better reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, which put therefore [ergo] in place of for [enim].
3  The Vatican edition has in this manner [hoc modo] in place of man [homo], this has been corrected from the manuscripts and the six first editions.  A little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to many codices, such as A C F G H I S T W etc., has that . . . not [illud non] in place of that . . . of his . . . nothing [istud nihil].
4  Supply:  "of being regarded" [se habendi]. See above d. 4, doubt 1.  —  A little after this some codices, such as A B D F G H K etc., together with the Vatican edition have “a man is by a man” [homo est ab homine].  Concerning what is common in God and creatures, cf. below d. 19, p. II, q. 2; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 and a. 2, q. 2.
5  Codex T adds according to [secundum] well enough; not a few codices as F G H K ee and ff have distinction [distinctionem] in place of (something) distinctive [distinctivum], in which reading quod [trans. here as which] with codex H must be taken as that [quia:  here the Quaracchi editors understand distinctive apparently as (distinctive supposit)]. A little below this the manuscripts together with edition 1 read God to be an Other [Deus esse alius in place of “God is an Other” [Deus est alius]; codex O after than God [a Deo] adds and/or (is) two gods.
6  The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has because [quia] in place of and [et].
7 In this commonly received definition of a cause, which can be gathered from Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 28-38 (ch. 3), Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 6 ff. (Bk. I, of the shorter version, ch. 2), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 2-4 (Bk. IV, ch. 2), the Vatican edition here and elsewhere, contrary to the codices and edition 1, has for a cause is (that) to whose “being” another follows [causa enim est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud].
8  We have substituted from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 saying [locutio] in place of solution [solutio].
9  Cf. d. 29, a. 1, q. 1.  —  A little before this codex K after for a cause [causae] adds of itself [de se].
10  The Vatican edition, contrary to many codices, such as A C F G H K L O S T U Y etc., and edition 1 has the passive mood is signified [signatur].
11  Here in q. 1.  —  For more on this proposition of his:  “wise by the begotten Wisdom” [sapiens sapientia genita], see d. 32, a. 2, q. 1 and dubium 1 and 2.  —  A little below this from codex W we have inserted wisdom does suppose well on behalf of a relative, which certainly must be supplied and perhaps was omitted in the other manuscripts on account of the similar ending [communem desinentiam] of this and the preceding proposition on behalf of a relative [pro relativo]; and then from the same codex W we have added there [ibi].

p. 121

  DUB. IV.

  DOUBT IV

Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium.  Contra hoc obiicit Ioachim, tam contra positionem quam contra rationem.  Contra positionem, quia si essentia non generat nec generatur nec procedit:  ergo in divinis est res generans et genita et procedens, et res nec generans nec genita nec procedens; et ita est ibi1 quaternitas, si sunt quatuor res.

Thus there also must not be said, that the Divine Essence begot the Son.  Against this (Abbot) Joachim (of Fiore) objects, both against the position and against the reckoning.  Against the position, because if the Essence does not generate nor is generated nor proceeds:  therefore among the divine there is a Thing generating and begotten and proceeding, and a Thing not generating nor begotten nor proceeding; and thus there is There1 a quaternity, (as) if there are four things.

Item irridet rationem Magistri:  si essentia generat essentiam, et essentia est una res:  ergo una res generat se ipsam. Similiter, inquit Ioachim, potuisiti dicere, Petre:  Deus generat Deum, et2 unus est Deus:  ergo eadem res generat se ipsam.

Likewise he mocks Master (Peter's) reckoning:  ‘if the Essence generates an essence, and the Essence is one thing:  therefore one Thing generates Its very self’. Similarly, (Abbot) Joachim says, « You could have said, Peter:  “God generates God, and2 there is one God:  therefore the same Thing generates Its very self.” »

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Ioachim non recte arguit, et deficit sua ratio, quia res non accipitur uniformiter, quia cum dicitur res primo modo, ibi accipitur res pro re naturae; sed cum dicitur3 secundo modo, accipitur pro ipsa natura divina.  Praeterea, deficit ab insufficienti, quia non valet:  si aliquid dicitur de aliquo,4 et non dicitur de alio, quod propter hoc illa faciant numerum.   Unde non valet:  Petrus est individuum:  homo non est individuum:  ergo Petrus et homo sunt duo.  Habere enim proprietatem et non habere non sufficit ad distinguendum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that (Abbot) Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reckoning is deficient [deficit], because “thing” [res] is not accepted uniformly, because when “thing” is said in the first manner, there “thing” is accepted for “a thing of nature” [re naturae]; but when it is said3 in the second manner, it is accepted for the Divine Nature Itself.  Moreover, it is deficient by an insufficient (reckoning), because it is not valid (to argue thus):  ‘if anything is said of something,4 and is not said of an other, that on this account they make a number’.  Whence it is not valid (to argue thus):  ‘Peter is an individual:  man is not an individual:  therefore Peter and man are two (things)’.  For to have a property and not have (one) does not suffice to distinguish (two things).

Ad instantiam eius dicendum, quod non recte instat; quia essentia est res una quantum ad suppositum et significatum; non enim supponit personas; sed Deus est res una quantum ad significatum, sed plures quantum ad suppositum.  Et ideo ignoranter Ioachim reprehendit Magistrum, et quia,5 cum esset simplex, non est reveritus Magistrum, ideo iusto Dei iudicio damnatus fuit libellus eius in Lateranensi Concilio, et positio Magistri approbata.6

Regarding his opposing argument [instantiam] it must be said, that he does not rightly argue against it [instat]; because the Essence is one thing as much as regards supposit and signified; for it does not suppose the Persons; but “God” is one thing as much as regards signified, but more as much as regards supposit.  And for that reason (Abbot) Joachim reprehends Master (Peter) in an ignorant manner, and because,5 since he was a simpleton [simplex], he did not revere Master (Peter), for that reason by the just judgment of God his work [libellus] was condemned in the (Fourth) Lateran Council, and the position of Master (Peter) approved.6

 

DUB. V.

 

DOUBT V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Hilarius:  Nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit.  Quaeritur ergo de hoc verbo accepit, utrum dicat substantiam vel relationem. Si substantiam:  ergo Pater similiter accepit; si relationem:  ergo7 cum essentiam acceperit Filius, essentia est accepta:  ergo essentia refertur.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) says:  The Son has nothing, but what He has accepted by being born.  Therefore there is asked concerning this word “He has accepted”, whether it means “(He accepted) a substance” and/or “a relation”. If a substance:  therefore the Father similarly accepted; if a relation:  therefore7 since the Son accepted the Essence, the Essence is accepted:  therefore the Essence is referred.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod accipere dicit duo, scilicet habere et esse ab alio; quantum ad habere respicit essentiam; sed quantum ad hoc quod est esse ab alio, respicit personam:  unde per verbum accipiendi significatur, quod essentia habetur a persona, quae est ab alio.8

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that ‘to accept’ means two (things), that is, ‘to have’ and ‘to be by an other’; as much as regards ‘to have’ it respects the Essence; as much as regards this which is ‘to be by another’, it respects a Person:  whence through the verb for being accepted [accipiendi] there is signified, that the Essence is had by a Person, who is from an Other.8

 

DUB. VI.

 

DOUBT VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Et ideo non refertur ad aliud, quod in uno subsistit ex uno, quia videtur falsum; quoniam Filius subsistit a Patre, tamen refertur ad Spiritum sanctum.9

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  And for that reason there is not referred to an other, what in One subsists out of One, because it seems (to be) false; since the Son subsists by the Father, (but) however He is referred to the Holy Spirit.9

RESPONDEO:  Hoc potest intelligi dupliciter:  uno modo, quod Filius non habet respectum nisi ad unam personam; et hoc intelligitur in quantum Filius, quia in quantum spirans est, refertur ad alium; vel quod persona Filii non habet respectum nisi ad unam naturam; et hoc verum est, quia Filius non habet in se nisi naturam Patris.

I RESPOND:  This can be understood in a twofold manner:  in one manner, that the Son does not have a looking-back [respectum] except to one Person; and this is understood inasmuch as the Son, because inasmuch as He is one spirating [spirans], is referred to an Other; and/or that the Person of the Son does not have a looking-back except to one Nature; and this is true, because the Son does not have (anything) in Himself except the Nature of the Father.

 

DUB. VII.

 

DOUBT VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus.  In divinis enim non est prius nec posterius, et ita nec praecedere nec sequi.  Si tu dicas, quod est secundum rationem intelligendi; hoc nihil est, quia Deus gignens nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum sequitur aliquid.10

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  Even His own Nature, as I thus call (it), does the unalterable God follow.  For among the divine there is not a prior nor a posterior, and thus neither a ‘to precede’ nor a ‘to follow’.  If you say, that there is (such) according to a reckoning of understanding; this is nothing, because God begetting, neither according to thing, nor according to the intellect, follows anything.10

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Hilarius improprie loquitur, et ideo addit determinationem:  ut ita dicam; et tantum vult dicere sequi, quantum inseparabiliter comitari11 et consociare et ab illo non recedere, et hoc patet per sequens.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that (St.) Hilary speaks improperly, and for that reason He adds a determination:  as I thus call (it); and he wants to say “to follow” only as much, as (it means) “to be inseparably accompanied”11 and “to thoroughly associate” [consociare] and “to not recede from him [illo]”, and this is clear through (what) follows.

 

DUB. VIII.

 

DOUBT VIII

Item quaeritur de auctoritatibus Augustini, primo de hoc quod dicit, quod Deus semel genuit Filium.  Videtur enim male dicere semel, quia semel dicit vicissitudinem; sed in generatione aeterna nulla cadit vicissitudo:  ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning the authorities of (St.) Augustine, first concerning this which he says, that God once begot the Son. For he seems badly to say once [semel], because once says (that there is) vicissitude; but in eternal generation vicissitude does not occur [non cadit]:  ergo etc..

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod semel potest dicere nunc temporis, vel nunc aeternitatis.  Et si dicat nunc temporis, cum tempus habeat diversa nunc,

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “once” [semel] can mean the now of time, and/or the now of eternity. And if he means the now of time, since time has diverse nows,

1  Vat. refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit ibi post si sunt.
2  Restituimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.
3  Substituimus fide nonnullorum codd. V X Y et ed. 1 dicitur pro accipitur.
4  Vat. minus bene et contra antiquos mss. ac ed. 1 altero pro aliquo.
5  Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic omittit quia, et paulo infra pro ideo ponit et sic.
6  Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. Scholion.
7  Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ergo, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.
8  De eisdem Hilarii verbis cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 1. ad 8.
9  Fide mss. addidimus sanctum.
10  Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 aliud, et paulo infra contra eosdem omittit dicendum.
11  Vat. communicare et consonare; plurimi Codd. communicari et consonari. Haec autem verba in codd. ob abbreviatam scripturam saepe vel sunt dubiae lecitonis vel cum verbis in textum nostrum receptis confunduntur. Verbum comitari recepimus ex. ed. 1 et consociare ex cod. Z. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. et per hoc patet sequens, sed minus bene.

1  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes There [ibi] after if there are [si sunt].
2  We have restores from the older manuscripts and edition 1 the particle and [et].
3  We have substituted, on the testimony of not a few codices, V X  and Y, and edition 1, it is said [dicitur] in place of is is accepted [accipitur].
4  The Vatican edition less well and contrary to the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 has the other [altero] in place of something [aliquo].
5  The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, here omits because [quia], and a little below this in place of for that reason [ideo] it puts and so [et sic].
6  See above a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium.
7  We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 therefore [ergo], which the Vatican omits less well.
8  Concerning these words of (St.) Hilary, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 1, at n. 8.
9  Trusting in the manuscripts we have added Holy [sanctum].
10  The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, has an other [aliud], and a little below this, contrary to the same, omits It must be said [dicendum].
11  The Vatican edition has to communicate and to harmonize [communicare et consonare]; very many of the codices have to be communicated and to harmonize [communicari et consonare]. But these words, on account of having been written in an abbreviated form in the codices are often doubtful in reading and/or confounded with words received in our text. The verb to be accompanied [comitari] we have received from edition edition 1 and to thoroughly associate [consociare] from codex Z. Then the Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions has and through this the following is clear [et per hoc patet sequens], but less well.

p. 122

notat intercisionem; si autem nunc aeternitatis, et1 illud nunc semper est et invariabile et unum, semel dicit omnimodam invariabilitatem, perfectionem et unitatem.

he notes a cut-off [intercisionem]; but if (he means) the now of eternity, and1 that now always is both invariable and one, (then) “once” means an omnimodal invariability, perfection and unity.

 

DUB. IX.

 

DOUBT IX

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Filii caritatis suae, utrum caritas accipiatur ibi essentialiter, aut notionaliter.  Si essentialiter:  ergo Christus Filius est essentiae, quod non conceditur.  Si tu dicas, quod est impropria locutio, et est sensus:  Filii essentiae, id est, qui est essentia; tunc nullus videtur sensus, et pro nihilo additum2 hoc quod est caritatis.  Et rursus Augustinus exponit, Filii caritatis, id est Filii dilecti; sed Pater diligit Filium Spiritu sancto:  ergo etc.  Si propter hoc dicas, quod tenetur notionaliter; tunc ergo Filius Dei est Filius Spiritus sancti, quod absurdum est omnino.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says:  of the Son of His charity, whether “charity” is accepted there essentially, or notionally.  If essentially:  therefore Christ is the Son of the Essence, which is not conceded. If you say, that the saying is improper, and the sense is:  “of the Son, the Essence”, that is, “of Him who is the Essence”; then it seems (to be) nonsense [nullus sensus], and for nothing (that there has) been added2 this (word) which is “of charity”.  And again (St.) Augustine expounds, “of the Son of (His) charity”, that is “of (His) beloved Son” [Filii dilecti]; but the Father loves [diligit] the Son by the Holy Spirit:  ergo etc..  If on account of this you say, that it is held notionally; then the Son of God is therefore the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is entirely absurd.

RESPONDEO:  Ad3 hoc dicut aliqui, quod ille genitivus nec proprie essentialiter nec proprie notionaliter, sed medio modo tenetur, id est appropriate.  Licet enim caritas sit omnibus communis et proprium Spiritus sancti, uno tamen modo appropriate convenit Patri, quia caritas est amor gratuitus; et sic dicit Richardus, quia amor gratuitus est, qui tantum dat et nihil accipit,4 et hoc est in persona Patris, ideo appropriatur Patri.  Alio modo dici potest, quod caritas ibi tenetur essentialiter, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod5 nihil aliud est dicere Filii caritatis quam Filii substantiae; sed genetivus non construitur in ratione principii, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae,6 et est sensus:  Filii caritatis id est Filii cari; et Filii substantiae vel naturae, hoc est Filii consubstantialis et naturalis.

I RESPOND:  Regarding3 this some say, that that genitive is held neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in a middle manner, that is appropriately.  For though charity be common to All and proper to the Holy Spirit, however in one manner it appropriately befits the Father, because charity is gratuitous Love [amor gratuitus]; and thus Richard (of St. Victor) says, that gratuitous love is, “that which only gives and accepts nothing”,4 and this is in the Person of the Father, for that reason it is appropriated to the Father.  In another manner it can be said, that “charity” there is held essentially, just as (St.) Augustine says, that5 to say “of the Son of (His) charity” is nothing other than (to say) “of the Son of (His) Substance”; but the genitive is not construed in the reckoning of a principle, but from [ex] the force of the declaration of an essence,6 and (thus) the sense is:  “of the Son of (His) charity”, that is “of His dear Son”; and “of the Son of (His) Substance and/or Nature”, this is (to say) “of (His) consubstantial and natural Son”.

 

DUB. X.

 

DOUBT X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius est de substantia Patris homoousion quia  —  cum filius naturalis partem substantiae trahat a patre, partem a matre in his inferioribus, et in Deo totam substantiam trahat a Patre  —  videtur quod Pater non tantum deberet dici pater, sed etiam mater, et multo fortius mater, quia mater plus dat quam pater.  Item, Filius Dei vocat se sapientiam et sapientiam, quae concipitur et parturitur, Proverbiorum octavo.7 Ergo cum hoc proprium sit matris, videtur quod Pater proprius deberet dici mater quam pater.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that the Son is from the Substance of the Father, homousion because  —  since among these inferior (creatures), a natural son draws part of (his) substance from [a] (his) father, part from (his) mother, and in God draws (His) whole Substance from the Father  —  it seems that the Father ought not only be called “a father”, but also “a mother”, and much more strongly “a mother”, because a mother gives more than a father.  Likewise, the Son of God calls Himself “Wisdom”, and a “Wisdom”, which “is conceived” and “given birth” [parturitur], (as is written in) the eighth (chapter) of Proverbs.7   Therefore since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father more properly ought to be called “a mother” than “a father”.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod nomen matris non transfertur ad divina. Et unam rationem assignat Anselmus in Monologio:8 quia principium maternum praeexigit aliud principium prius.  Et ratio huius est, quia mater est principium passivum, et omne tale movetur ab alio:  ergo ante ipsum est principium aliud.  Quoniam igitur principium generationis Filii est primum et est pure actuale, ideo nullo modo transfertur maternum principium; transfertur tamen actus maternus, ut concipere et parturire, pro eo quod ibi agit unum principium quod9 hic duo.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the name of “mother” is not transferred to the divine.  And (St.) Anselm assigns one reason (for this) in (his) Monologion:8  because a maternal principle demands before it [praeexigit] an other prior principle.  And the reason for this is, that a mother is a passive principle, and every such (principle) is moved by an other:  therefore before it there is an other principle.  Therefore since the Principle of the generation of the Son is the First and is purely actual, for that reason in no manner is a maternal principle transferred (into the divine); however there is transferred the maternal act, such as “to conceive” and “to give birth”, for the reason that there one Principle acts, whereas [quod]9 here two (do).

 

DUB. XI.

 

DOUBT XI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus non est de nihilo.  Videtur enim falsum, quia illud quod de nulla praeiacente materia est, de nihilo est; sed Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt huiusmodi:  ergo etc.  Si tu dicas, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt de aliquo, ut de Patre; quaeritur tunc, utrum Pater sit ex nihilo; et videtur quod sic, quia non aliquid et nihil convertuntur; sed Pater non est ex10 aliquo:  ergo est ex nihilo.  Item, quia Pater non habet principium effectivum, ideo dicitur esse a nullo:  ergo11 cum non habeat materiam, debet dici de nihilo.  Si conceditur de Patre; contra:  omne quod habet esse de nihilo, est creatum:12 ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that the Son and the Holy Spirit is not from nothing.  For it seems (to be) false, because that which is from no prejacent [praeiacente] matter, is from [de] nothing; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are of this kind:  ergo etc..  If you say, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from someone, as from the Father; then it is asked, whether the Father is out of nothing; and it seems that (He is) so, because not anything and nothing are convertible [convertuntur]; but the Father is not out of10 something:  therefore He is out of nothing.  Likewise, because the Father does not have an effective principle, for that reason He is said to be by none [esse a nullo]:  therefore11 since He does not have a matter, He ought to be said (to be) from nothing.  If (this) is conceded concerning the Father; on the contrary:  everything which has (its) “to be” from nothing, has been created:12 ergo etc..

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid esse de nihilo, secundum Anselmum in Monologio13 tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut / nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative vel negative, . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that when anything is said to be from nothing, according to (St.) Anselm in the Monologion13 (this) can be understood in a threefold manner. In one manner, so that / “nothing” is accepted simply privatively and/or negatively, . . .

1  Vat. clarius cum, cui lectioni obstant omnes codd. et ed. 1 ac forma indicativi in verbo est. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 verbo invariabile praefixum est expunximus, et fide antiquiorum mss. ac ed. 1 substituimus invariabilitatem pro invarietatem; lectio mss. certe praeferenda.
2  Vat. adiungit est, sed contra antiquiores codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3. Codd. R X additur. Paulo infra post id est Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus codd., omittit Filii. Verba August., XV. de Trin. c. 19. n. 37. sunt:  Filii caritatis suae, nihil aliud intelligitur, quam Filii sui dilecti.
3  Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 quod propter pro Ad.
4  Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc post caritas omittit est ac din et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus; demum pro nihil ponit non.  —  Textum Richardi vide supra d. 2. q. 4.
5  Vat. cum cod. cc quia pro quod, sed obstant antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.
6  De significatione genitivi vide supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3.  —  Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post sensus addit et ac post vel adiicit etiam, quae particulae absunt a vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1.
7  Vers. 24. 25.  —  Paulo ante Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 sapientia est, quae pro sapientiam, quae.
8  Cap. 42:  quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit:  nimis est incongruum, ut illi parenti adaptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit.  —  De proxime sequenti ratione vide Aristot., I. de Generat. animal. c. 19. 20. et ibid. II. c. 4.  —  Nonnulli codd. post principium omittunt prius, et Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit et, quod fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 voci ratio praefiximus.
9  Vat. cum cod. cc et loco quod, sed minus bene et contra antiquiores codd. Sub ibi intellige:  in generatione Filii.
10  Aliqui codd. ut aa bb dd ff cum ed. 1 hic et immediate post de loco ex.
11  Vat. cum cod. cc simili modo pro ergo, quod tamen alii codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent.
12  Ex. mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatam loco creatura. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit tale argumentum Item quod est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum ergo etc.

13  Cap. 8.

1  The Vatican edition reads more clearly since [cum], which reading do all the codices and edition 1 withstand, as the form of the indicative (is employed) in the verb is [est]. A little below this, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have expunged the is [est] prefixed to invariable [invariabile], and trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted invariability [invariabilitatem] for invariety [invarietate]; the reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be prefered.
2  The Vatican edition adjoins there has [est], but contrary to the more ancient codices and editions 1, 2 and 3 [trans. note:  which however the English syntax requires for clarity]. Codices R and X read there is added [additur]. A little below this after that is [id est] the Vatican edition, contradicting the older codices, omits Son [Filii]. The words of (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 19, n. 27, are:  of "of the Son of His charity", nothing other is understood, than "of His beloved Son".
3  The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, has that on account of [quod propter] in place of Regarding [Ad].
4  Thus the ancient codices together with edition 1, while the Vatican edition together with the more recent codex cc after charity [caritas] omits is [est] and then reads and, as Richard (of St. Victor) says, because gratuitous love [et sic dicit Richardus quia amor gratuitus]; finally it reads and does not accept [et non accipit].  —  See the text of Richard above in d. 2, q. 4.
5  The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads that [quia] instead of that [quod], but the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 are opposed.
6  Concerning the signification of the genitive, see above d. 3, p. II. doubt 3.  —  Then the Vatican edition together with codex cc after the sense is [est sensus] adds both [et] and after and/or [vel] it inserts even [etiam], which particles are absent from the older manuscripts and edition 1.
7  Verses 24-25.  —  A little before this the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has He is the Wisdom, which [sapientia est, quae] in place of a Wisdom, which [sapientiam, quae].
8  Chapter 42:  Because the first and principal cause of an offspring is in the father. For if in any manner the paternal cause always precedes the maternal:  it is exceedingly incongruous, that there be adapted to that parent the name of “mother”, with which to beget an offspring no other cause either associates nor does it precede.  —  Concerning the next following reason see Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. I, chs. 19 & 20 and Bk. II, ch. 4.  —  Not a few codices after an other [aliud] omit prior [prius], and the the Vatican edition together with not a few manuscripts omits And, which we, trusting in many of the manuscripts and edition 1, have prefixed to the word the reason [ratio].
9  The Vatican edition together with codex cc has and [et] in place of whereas [quod], but less well and contrary to the more ancient codices. For there understand:  “in the generation of the Son”.
10  Some codices, such as aa bb dd and ff, together with edition 1, here and immediately afterward, read from [de] in place of out of [ex].
11  The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads in a similar manner [simili modo] in place of ergo [therefore], which, however, the other codices together with edition 1 exhibit.
12  From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted has been created [est creatum] for is a creature [est creatura]. The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 adjoins such an argument:  Likewise what is out of nothing, is vertible into nothing, ergo etc. [Item quod est ex nihilo, est vertibile in nihilum ergo etc.].
13  Chapter 8.

p. 123

nihil accipiatur simpliciter privative vel negative, ut cum dicitur de tacente:  iste loquitur de nihilo; alio modo positive, ut si ita dicatur vel1 intelligatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, sicut cultellus de ferro; tertio modo partim positive, partim privative, ut si dicatur aliquid fieri ex2 nihilo, quia post nihil est aliquid, sicut dicitur:  de paupere fit dives.

“nothing” is accepted simply privatively and/or negatively, as when there is said of one being silent:  “that one speaks of nothing”; in another manner positively, as if thus there be said and/or1 understood that something is made out of nothing, as “a knife from (formless) iron”; in a third manner partly positively, partly privatively, as if it be said that anything is made out of2 nothing, (so) that after nothing there is something, just as it is said:  “from a poor man he became a rich man”.

Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis est haec.  Nam primo distinguendum est, quod3 negatio eius quod est nihil, potest sistere intra, vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri.  Si feratur ad verbum, tunc fieri de nihilo hoc est4 non fieri de aliquo, sicut loqui de nihilo, id est de nulla re.  Si autem non feratur ad verbum, tunc affirmatur fieri; et tunc duplex est, quia de potest intelligi materialiter; et tunc significatur, quod nihil sit materia alicuius, et habetur secundus sensus.  Item, potest teneri ordinaliter, et tunc est5 tertius sensus, sicut creatura dicitur fieri de nihilo.

Moreover the reason for this multiplicity is this.  For first it must be distinguished, that3 the negation of that which is “nothing”, can stand still within (this word), and/or be borne to this verb “to be made”.  If it be borne to the verb, then “to be made from nothing” is this4 “not to be made from something”, just as “to speak of nothing”, on that account is “(to speak) of no thing”.  But if it be not borne to the verb, then the “to be made” is affirmed; and then (the sense) is twofold, because “from” [de] can be understood materially; and then there is signified, that “the matter of something is nothing”, and (in this manner) is had the second sense.  Likewise, it can be held in an ordered manner, and then there is5 a third sense, just as a creature is said “to be made from nothing”.

Dicendum ergo, quod secundum primum sensum Deus potest dici de nihilo esse, sive Pater sive divina essentia; tamen hic modus non est usitatus.  Quantum ad secundum modum, omnino nihil fit ex nihilo, quia nihil nullius est materia.6  Quantum ad tertium modum, secundum quem loquitur Augustinus,7 quod sola creatura fit de nihilo sive est de nihilo, quia de notat ibi ordinem, ut habeat esse post non esse, hoc quod est de nihilo privat materiam praeiacentem.  Quamvis ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non habeant materiam praeiacentem, quia tamen non habent esse post non esse, ideo non dicuntur esse ex nihilo:  et ideo non valet primum argumentum, quia procedit ab insufficienti.

Therefore it must be said, that according to the first sense God can be said “to be from nothing”, whether as the Father or as the Divine Essence; however this manner (of speaking) is not usual [usitatus].  As much as regards the second manner, entirely nothing is made out of nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing.6  As much as regards the third manner, according to which (manner) (St.) Augustine speaks,7 because a creature alone is made from nothing or is from nothing, because there “from” [de] notes an order, so that it has a “to be” after a “not to be”, for this (reason) that which is “from nothing” lacks [privat] a prejacent matter.  Therefore although the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have a prejacent matter, nevertheless [tamen] because they do not have a “to be” after a “not to be”, for that reason they are not said “to be out of nothing”:  and for that reason the first argument is not valid, because it proceeds by an insufficient (reckoning).

Secundum vero et tertium argumentum, de Patre factum, procedit, secundum quod negatio eius quod est nihil, fertur extra ad verbum et facit orationem negativam — aliter enim non aequipollet non esse8 de aliquo et esse de nihilo — et secundum hunc sensum, sicut conceditur, quod Pater a nullo sit, ita de nihilo. Tamen, sicut dictum est, sensus iste non est usitatus; communiter enim utimur hac locutione, secundum quod negatio de nihilo sistit intra, et hoc quod est de accipitur ibi ordinaliter.9

However the second and third argument, made concerning the Father, proceeds, according to which the negation of that which is nothing, is borne outside to the verb and makes a negative statement [orationem] — for otherwise “not to be8 from something” does not even equal “to be from nothing” — and according to this sense, just as it is conceded, that “the Father be by none”, thus (is He) “from nothing”.  However, just as has been said, that sense is not usual; for commonly we use this saying, according to which the negation “from nothing” stands still within (the verb), and that which is “from” is accepted there ordinally.9

1  Vat. cum cod. cc aut, sed obstant anitquiores codd. cum ed. 1.
2  Nonnulli codd. ut aa bb cum ed. 1 de.
3  Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quod loc quia.  Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc vel extra ad verbum ferri pro vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri, sed contra ed. 1 et ceteros codd., qui in eo tantum dissident inter se, quod pro ferri alii ut C L S U V aa bb ponunt foras, alii vero ut A W extra, cod. O foras ferri, alii tandem ut G H I K R T X Z dd ee ff cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.
4  Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hoc est loco est, quod habet Vat.
5  Vat., repugnantibus mss. et ed. 1, habetur pro est. Mox plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 sicut pro et sic in Vat. posito.
6  In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur haec verba quia nihil nullius est materia, quae tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.
7  Libr. II. contra Maximen. c. 14. n. 2. et II. Actis cum Felice Manichaeo, c. 18. et de Natura boni advers. Manich. c. 26.
8  Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, transponit esse ante non, et paulo post contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 post et omittit esse.  Mox post ita claritatis gratia addit sola Vat. quod sit.
9  Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ibi.  —  Plura de hac re vide supra a. 1. q. 2.  —  Eandem doctrinam habet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 4. a. 1.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 2. q. 2; et S. I. q. 41. a. 3.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 10.  —  Petr. de Tar., hic a. 3. a. 2.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.

1  The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads or [aut], but the more ancient codices together with edition one oppose this.
2  Not a few codices such as aa and bb together with edition 1 have from [de].
3  From the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted that [quod] in place of that [quia].  A little below this the Vatican edition together with codex cc has and/or be borne outside to the verb [vel extra ad verbum ferri] in place of an/or be borne to this verb “to be made” [vel ferri ad hoc verbum fieri], but contrary to edition 1 and the rest of the codices, which only disagree among themselves in this, that in place of be borne [ferri] some, such as C L S U V aa and pp, put outdoors [foras], but others as A and W have outside [extra], codex O has be borne outdoors [foras ferri], finally others, such as G H I K R T X Z dd ee and ff, together with edition 1 exhibit our text.
4  Very many codices together with edition 1 have is this [hoc est] in place of is [est], which the Vatican edition has.
5  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has there is had [habetur] in place of there is [est]. Then very many codices together with edition 1 have just as [sicut] in place of the and thus [et sic] of the Vatican edition.
6  In the Vatican edition and in codex cc there is wanting these words, because nothing is the matter of nothing [quia nihil nullius est materia], which are however had in the other manuscripts and edition 1.
7  Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 14, n. 2, and On Acts with Felix the Manichaean, Bk. II, ch. 18 and On the Nature of the Good against the Manicheans, ch. 26.
8  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, transposes to be [esse] before not [non], and a little after this, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, after even [et] omits to be.  Then after thus [ita], the Vatican edition alone adds, for the sake of clarity, (also) that He be [quod sit].
9  We have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 there [ibi].  —  For more concerning this matter see above a. 1, q. 2.  —  The same doctrine has Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 4. a. 1.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2; and Summa., I, q. 41, a. 3.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 10.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2, at the end.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.