S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VI

De comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam.

On the comparison of the act of generating to the power.

 

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio I.

 

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 124-127.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 124-127.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate etc.

Moreover one is accustomed to be asked, whether the Father begot the Son by will etc.. 

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In parte ista ponit Magister dubitationes emergentes ex comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam.  Et quoniam contingit comparare1 actum generandi ad potentiam, et potentiam generandi ad suppositum, et ex utraque comparatione incidit dubitatio circa essentiae unitatem:  ideo primo ponit dubitationem ex comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam; secundo ponit dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, infra distinctione septima:  Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater etc.

In this part of his (text) Master (Peter) posits doubts emerging from a comparison of the act of generating to the power (of generating).  And since he happens to compare1 the act of generating to the power, and the power of generating to the Supposit, from each comparison there also occurs [incidit] a doubt about the Unity of the Essence:  for that reason first he posits a doubt from the comparison of the act of generating to the power; second he posits a doubt from the comparison of the power of generating to the Person, below in the seventh distinction:  Here one is accustomed to be asked by certain (men), whether the Father etc..

Item, prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet quatuor particulas. In prima Magister2 proponit quaestionem, utrum potentia vel virtus generandi sit producens necessitate, vel voluntate, et determinat veritatem huius questionis. Secundo ad istam quaestionem respondet ad hominem

Likewise, the first part, which contains the present distinction, has four smaller parts [particulas].  In the first Master (Peter)2 proposes the question, whether the power and/or virtue of generating is producing by necessity, and/or by will, and he determines the truth of this question. Second regarding that question of his he responds to the man

1 Vat. cum aliquibus mss. comparari.
2 Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Magister.

1 The Vatican edition together with some manuscripts reads it happens that the act of generating is compared [contingit comparari . . .].
2 From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied Master (Peter) [Magister].

p. 125

contra arguendo,1 ibi:  Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei.  Tertio vero opponit contra praedictam solutionem et respondet, ibi:  Sed contra hoc opponitur sic:  Voluntas Dei etc.  Quarto et ultimo redit ad explanationem primae solutionis, ibi:  Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est, ubi explanat solutionem praehabitam.

against the one arguing,1 there (where he says):  Therefore let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God.  Third, however, he objects [opponit] against the aforesaid solution and responds, there (where he says):  But against this it is thus opposed:  the Will of God etc..  Fourth and last he returns to an explanation of the first solution, there (where he says):  However the aforesaid words, by which it has been prudently said, where he explains the afore-had solution.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

 

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

De generatione Filii secundum suas conditionis.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

On the generation of the Son according to its conditions. 

Ad evidentiam huius partis tria principaliter quaeruntur.

For a clear indication [evidentiam] of this part, three (things) are principally asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum conditionem necessitatis.

First there is asked, whether the generation of the Son is according to a condition of necessity.

Secundo, utrum sit secundum rationem voluntatis.

Second, whether it is according to a reckoning of the will.

Tertio, utrum secundum conditionem exemplaritatis.

Third, whether (it is) according to a condition of exemplarity.

 

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the generation of the Son is according to a reckoning of necessity.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod generatio sit secundum conditionem necessitatis, sic ostenditur.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that generation is according to a condition of necessity, is shown thus:

1. Fecundior et actualior est natura in Patre ad producendum Filium, quam sit in luce ad producendum radium; sed lucem necesse est radium producere, ita quod productio in ipsa est secundum conditionem necessitatis:  ergo multo fortius in Patre respectu Filii.

1. More fecund and actual is the Nature in the Father to produce the Son, than is (the nature) in light to produce a ray; but it is necessary that (there is) light to produce a ray, so that production in it is according to a condition of necessity:  therefore much more strongly (is such a condition) in the Father in respect of the Son.

2. Item, omne quod emanat ab alio,2 emanat secundum conditionem necessitatis, aut contingentiae; ergo et Filius emanat altero istorum duorum modorum; sed non secundum conditionem contingentiae, quia tunc contingens esset Filium generari:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, everything which emanates from an other,2 emanates according to a condition of necessity, or of contingency; therefore even the Son emanates by one [altero] of those two manners; but not according to a condition of contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son is generated:  ergo etc..

3. Item, ab omnipotente detrahere maximum posse est impossibile; sed Deus Pater est omnipotens, cuius maximum posse est generare Filium:  ergo detrahere ei posse generare Filium est impossibile.  Sed in aeternis potentia est coniuncta actui:3  ergo pari ratione impossibile est auferre actum generationis:  ergo impossibile est non generare; sed impossibile non esse et necesse esse convertuntur:  ergo necesse est generare.

3. Likewise, to detract from an omnipotent the maximum ‘to be able’ [posse] is impossible; but God the Father is the Omnipotent, whose maximum ‘to be able’ is to generate the Son:  therefore to detract from him a ‘to be able to generate the Son’ is impossible.  But among eternals potency [potentia] has been conjoined to act:3  therefore for an equal reason it is impossible to bear away an act of generation:  therefore it is impossible that He not generate; but the ‘impossible not to be’ and the ‘to be necessary’ are convertible [convertuntur]:  therefore it is necessary that He generate.

CONTRA:  1. Augustinus ad Orosium, et Magister dicit in littera:4 « Nec voluntate nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium, quia necessitas in Deo non est »:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Augustine (says) To Orosius, and (as) Master (Peter) says in the text:4 « Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God »:  ergo etc..

2. Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis:5 « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »:  ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis nec necessitas alia, ut videtur; ergo etc.

2. Likewise, (St.) Hilary in the book On Synods:5 « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »:  therefore there was not There a the natural necessity nor an other necessity, as there seems (in the fundament); ergo etc..

3. Item, nobilius producens est illud quod dominatur suae actioni, quam quod subiacet actioni; sed agens secundum rationem necessitatis subiacet actioni, quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere:  ergo si6 Pater, qui est nobilissimum agens, nobilissimo modo producit Filium, non igitur secundum conditionem necessitatis.

3. Likewise, more nobly producing is that which dominates its own action, than that which is subject [subiacet] to the action; but one acting according to a reason of necessity is subject to the action, because whether it wants to or not, it must do it [quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere]:  therefore if6 the Father, who is the Most Noble Agent, in a most noble manner produces the Son, therefore not according to a condition of necessity.

4. Item, hoc idem potest ostendi sic:  quod gratis datur, non de necessitate datur; sed Richardus7 dicit, quod in Patre est amor gratuitus, quia dat esse Filio et Spiritui sancto:  si ergo gratis dat, non necessario.

 

4. Likewise, this same can be shown thus:  that what is given gratis, is not given from necessity; but Richard (of St. Victor)7 says, that in the Father there is a gratuitous love, because He gives ‘Being’ [esse] to the Son and to the Holy Spirit:  if therefore He gives gratis, (then) not in a necessary manner.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Generatio in divinis necessaria est necessitate immutabilitatis, non tamen alia specie necessitatis.

CONCLUSION

 

Generation among the divine is necessary by a necessity of immutability, not however by an other species of necessity.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est necessitas.  Quaedam enim est necessitas proveniens ex principio disconveniente, quaedam ex principio deficiente, quaedam ex principio conveniente et sufficiente.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that necessity is multiple.  For a certain necessity comes forth [est proveniens] out of a unfitting principle, a certain one (is) out of a deficient principle, a certain one out of a fitting and sufficient principle.

Illa5 quae provenit ex principio disconveniente,

That5 which comes forth out of a unfitting principle,

1  Vat. respondet ad haereticum hominem arguendo, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
2  Nonnulli codd. ut K W X Y ee aliquo pro alio.
3  Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.):  Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis.  —  Paulo infra post auferre cod. O addit ei.  —  De conversione harum propositionum modalium impossibilie non esse et necesse esse cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3. (c. 13.) et de relatione inter omnipotentiam et potentiam generandi vide infra d. 7. q. 4.
4  In principio huius distinctionis.
5  Num. 58 XXVV:  Non enim nolente Patre, coactus Pater vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium.
6  Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 simpliciter pro si. Paulo ante post actioni cod. O adiungit suae.
7  Libr. V. de Trin. c. 17-19, in quorum primo capite ait:  Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit, qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis suae abundantiam tam largiter, quam libenter et gratis impendit.  —  Et in ultimo capite dicta recolligens ait:  Constat namque, quia in uno ex tribus (divinis personis) est amor summus et solum gratuitus; in altero vero sic summus etc.  —  Vat. mox quo pro quia, sed contra mss. et ed. 1 et in fine argumenti post non repetit dat.
8  In Vat. et cod. cc additur autem.

1  The Vatican edition reads he responds to the heretical man by arguing [ad haereticum hominum arguendo], but the manuscripts and edition 1 are opposed.
2 Not a few codices as K W X Y and ee have something [aliquo] in place of an other [alio].
3  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 32 (ch. 4):  For “to be able” differs nothing from “to be by itself” among perpetuals.  —  A little below this after to bear away [auferre] codex O adds from it [ei].  —  Concerning the conversion of these propositions regarding the manners “impossible not to be” and “to be necessary” cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 13) and concerning the relation among omnipotence and the power of generating see below d. 7, q. 14.
4  At the beginning of this distinction.
5  Number 58, XXV:  For not with the Father non-willing, did the Father, driven and/or lead by natural necessity, since He was not willing, beget the Son.
6  The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has simply [simpliciter] in place of if [si]. A little before this at action [actioni] codex O adjoins its own [suae].
7  On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 17-19, in which under the first heading he says:  Moreover He shows that He regards Himself as gratuitous love, who to Those proceeding from Himself He pays out [impendit] an abundance of His plenitude broadly as much as liberally and gratis.  —  And under the last heading summarizing what has been said, he says:  For it is established, that in One of the Three (Divine Persons) there is a most high and only gratuitous love; however in the Other a most high etc..  —  The Vatican edition next has whereby [quo] in place of because [quia], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, and at the end of the argument at (then) not [non] it reads (then) he does not give [non dat].
8  In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is added Moreover [autem].

p. 126

est duplex:  aut enim est ex ipso movente contra naturam, et haec est necessitas violentiae; aut contra voluntatem, et ista necessitas est coactionis;1 et de istis duobus modis quaerit haereticus, qui sunt valde usitati.

is twofold:  for either (the necessity) is out of (a principle) moving contrary to nature, and this is the necessity of violence; or contrary to the will, and that is the necessity of coaction (i.e. compulsion);1 and concerning those two manners, which are very usual, the heretic asks.

Illa similiter, quae est ex principio deficiente, est duplex:  aut enim est respectu eius, quo res est nata compleri; et haec est necessitas indigentiae, ut cibi et potus; de hac dicitur primae Ioannis tertio:2  Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem etc.; aut respectu eius, quod incurrit ex ipso defectu; et haec est necessitas inevitabilitatis, qualis est in morte et in primis motibus; hanc necessitatem incurrit homo ex carentia originalis iustitiae, Psalmus:3  De necessitatibus meis erue me.

Similarly that, which is out of a deficient principle, is two fold:  for either it is in respect of that, by which a thing is bound [est nata] to be completed; and this is the necessity of indigence, as (is) food and drink; concerning this there is said in the third (chapter) of the First (Letter) of (St.) John:2  He who sees his brother suffering a necessity etc.; or in respect of that, which it incurs out of the defect itself; and this is the necessity of inevitability, which is in death and in first movements [primis motibus]; a man incurs this necessity out of a lack of original justice, (as) the Psalm (says):3  From my necessities snatch me.

Tertia similiter, quae est ex principio sufficiente et conveniente, est duplex:  aut enim est ex principio sufficiente in disponendo, et haec est necessitas materiae dispositae, quae potest dici necessitas exigentiae; aut in complendo, et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis.4

Similarly the third, which is out of a sufficient and fitting principle, is twofold:  for either it is out of a principle sufficient in disposing, and this is the necessity of disposed matter, which can be called the necessity of exigency; or in completing, and this is the necessity of immutability.4

Et haec ultima5 necessitas cadit in Deo, et principaliter in Deo, quia ipse solus est qui sibi omnino sufficit et qui secum omnino convenit.  Haec autem necessitas non repugnat libertati voluntatis, sed solum vertibilitati, qualis non est in Deo.

And this last5 necessity occurs [cadit] in God, and principally in God, because He Himself alone is (the One) who is entirely sufficient for Himself and who entirely convenes with Himself.  Moreover this necessity is not repugnant to liberty of the will, but only to the vertibility, of the kind that is not in God.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de littera, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessitate coactionis, quae nullo modo cadit in Deo,6 et de hac quaerebat haereticus.

1. To that which is objected concerning the text, it must be said, that that is understood of the necessity of coaction, which in no manner occurs [cadit] in God,6 and concerning this the heretic was asking.

2. Similiter et Hilarius intelligit de hac eadem, unde et subdit7 in littera:  non naturali necessitate, cum nollet; tunc enim ibi esset coactio, dum regunaret voluntas.

2. Similarly (St.) Hilary also understands concerning this same (necessity), whence he also adds [subdit]7 in (his) text:  not by a natural necessity, since He is not willing; for then there would be coaction There, so long as the will is repugnant (to it).

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens per necessitatem subiacet suae actioni; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi sit necessitas repugnans voluntati.  Cum enim est necessitas repugnans, necesse est voluntatem subiici, quia non potest praevalere.  Sed quando est necessitas summe consonans, non potens discordare a voluntate, tunc nullam inducit subiectionem, sicut patet. Deus enim8 necessario est beatus et necessario vult esse beatus; et sicut necessarium est, ipsum esse beatum, ita et velle; sic intelligendum est in generatione Filii.

3. To that which is objected, that one acting through necessity is subject to its own action; it must be said, that it is false, unless there is a necessity repugnant to the will.  For when there is a repugnant necessity, it is necessary that the will be subjected, because it cannot prevail.  But when there is a necessity most highly consonant, unable of being in discord [non potens discordare] from the will, then it induces no subjection, as is clear.  For8 God necessarily is blessed and necessarily wants to be blessed; and just as it is a necessary, that He Himself be blessed, so also that He want (to be such); so must it be understood in the generation of the Son.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo9 obiicitur de amore gratuito, dicendum, quod duo sunt in gratuito amore:  unum est, quod dat ex mera liberalitate, ita quod nulla est exigentia sive debitum meriti vel naturae; aliud, quod10 dat sine retributione, et quantum ad hoc secundum dicitur amor gratuitus in Patre, non quantum ad primum.  Naturalis enim fecunditas Patris necessario est ratio communicandi naturam alii.

4. To that which is last9 objected concerning gratuitous love, it must be said, that there are two in gratuitous love:  the one is, which gives out of undiluted [mera] liberality, so that there is no exigency or debit of merit and/or of nature; the other, which10 gives without retribution, and as much it regards this the second is called gratuitous love in the Father, not as much as regards the first.  For the natural fecundity of the Father necessarily is the reason for communicating the Nature to an Other.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Quoad ipsam generationem in divinis cfr. infra d. 9 per totam.  —  Easdem distinctiones necessitatis, paulo alio modo explicatas, S. Doctor habet in quadam quaestione disputate hucusque anecdota:  utrum divinum esse sit summe necessarium, ex qua haec inserimus. « Triplex est necessitas:  quaedam omnino extrinseca, quaedam partim extrinseca, partim intrinseca, et quaedam omnino intrinseca.  Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo; et haec dupliciter habet esse, vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu operum voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, sicilicet violentiae et coactionis.  Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est, quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet inevitabilitatis et indigentiae.  Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis et independentiae, et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia.  Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa.  Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso » etc.

I. In regard to generation itself among the divine cf. below d. 9 throughout.  —  (These) same distinctions of necessity, explained in a little different [alio] manner, the Seraphic Doctor has in a certain disputed question, hitherto unpublished:  Whether the Divine ‘Being’ is the most highly Necessary, from which we insert this the following [haec].  « Threefold is necessity:  a certain one entirely extrinsic, a certain one partly extrinsic, partly intrinsic, and a certain one entirely intrinsic.  A necessity entirely extrinsic is that which has arisen from a principle, which is outside, allowing no cooperating patient [nihil cooperante passo]; and this has ‘being’ in a twofold manner, either in respect of natural works, and/or in respect of voluntary works; and thus there is a twofold necessity, that is of violence and of coaction (i.e. compulsion).  However the necessity partly within [intra], partly outside [extra] is, that which in some manner is by an intrinsic principle regarding [respiciente] something outside and/or through a manner of a moving principle, and/or through the manner of terminus of one resting; and thus a twofold necessity is said (to be), that is of inevitability and of indigence.  However there is a certain necessity entirely intrinsic, which is in a thing out of its own nature; and this is the necessity of immutability and of independence, and such a necessity is discovered in a creature to a certain extent [secundum quid], but simply (speaking) it cannot be discovered except in the creating Essence. For It alone is, that which does not admit any dependence; but all the rest, since they have been created, necessarily depend from [ab] It. Moreover this necessity necessarily is posited in the Divine ‘Being’ [in esse divino], because It is in Its very self and by Its very self » etc..

Ultima illa species necessitatis, quam S. Doctor in corp. vocat necessitatem immutabilitatis, intelligenda est in sensu absoluto, ita ut eius oppositum simpliciter sit impossibile.  Hoc ideo notandum fuit, quia aliqui doctores necessitatem immutabilitatis aliter accipiunt, nempe pro ea qua aliquid ita habet esse, ut oppositum etiam possit esse, sed non simul cum sui opposito (cfr. Brulifer ad hunc locum).  —  De variis divisionibus necessitatis cfr. S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; et ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp.; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

That last species of necessity, which the Seraphic Doctor calls the necessity of immutability, is to be understood in the absolute sense, so that its opposite is simply impossible.  This must have been said for this reason, because some doctors accept the necessity of immutability in another manner, namely for that by which something thus has to be, so that the opposite also can be, but not simultaneously with its own opposite (cf. Brulifer on this passage).  —  Concerning the various divisions of necessity cf. St. Bonaventure, Sent., Bk. II, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at n. 3; and ibid., d. 25, p. II, q. 2 in the body; Sent ., Bk. III, d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at n. 5.

II. Quoad conclusionem ipsam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1.  —  Scot., hic q. 1, et Report., hic q. 3.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2.  —  B. Albert., hic

II. In regard to the conclusion itself cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1, and Reportatio, here in q. 3.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 2.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here

1  De duplici hac necessitate cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1 et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 11-16. (c. 12-17).  —  Paulo ante ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ista.  —  De haeretico, quem S. Doctor hoc loco introducit, vide hic lit. Magisteri.
2  Vers. 17, in quo textu Vulgata pro patientiam legit habere.
3  24, 17.
4  Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi agit de materiae naturali appetitu respectu formae; et V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.), ubi praeter necessitatem immutabilitatis alias proponit necessitatis species, quae in praecedentibus tactae sunt.
5  Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, Et hoc ultimo modo, et paulo infra post est qui minus apte repetit principaliter.  In fine corp. cod. T cum pluribus aliis post qualis omittit non, quae lectio explicatur lectione cod. R quare est in Deo.
6  Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 Deum.
7  Substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 et subdit loco subiungit.  —  Textum Hilarii supra in argum. 2. ad opp. integre exhibuimus.
8  Fide mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus enim.
9  Vat. cum cod. cc. hic omittit ultimo, et paulo infra post dat omittit ex, sed obstant codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1.
10  Ex plurimus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quod loco quia.  Circa finem solutionis Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit naturalis et in fine alii.  Edd 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 cum cod. cc naturae pro naturalis, omittunt etiam in fine alii.

1  Concerning this twofold necessity cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 1 and Of the Great Morals, Bk. I, ch. 11-16 (ch. 12-17).  —  A little before this from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied that [ista].  —  Concerning the heretic, whom the Seraphic Doctor introduces at this point, see the text of Master (Peter) at this point.
2  Verse 17, in which text the Vulgate in place of suffering [patientem] reads that your brother has a necessity [fratrem suum necessitatem habere].
3  Ps. 24:17.
4  Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9), where he deals with the natural appetite for matter in respect of form; and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 6 (Bk. IV, ch. 5), where besides the necessity of immutability he proposes the other species of necessity, which have been touched upon in the preceding (points).
5  The Vatican edition together with codex cc, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, reads And in this last manner [Et hoc ultimo modo], and a little below this after is (the One) who [est qui] less aptly repeats principally [principaliter].  At the end of the body (of the response) codex T together with very many others after of the kind that [qualis] omits not [non], which reading is explained by thre reading of codex R wherefore (this necessity) it is in God [quare est in Deo].
6  The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has unto God [in Deum].
7  We have substituted from the manuscripts and edition 1 he also adds [et subdit] in place of he subjoins [subiungit].  —  The text of (St.) Hilary has been exhibited in its entirety above in the 2nd argument of the Contrary.
8  Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted For [enim].
9  The Vatican edition together with codex cc omits last [ultimo] here, and a little below this after gives [dat] has by undiluted liberality [mera liberalitate], but the more ancient codices together with edition 1 are opposed.
10  From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted which [quod] in place of because [quia].  Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition, not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, omits natural [Naturalis], and at the end to the Other [alii].  Editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, together with codex cc read For the fecundity of the Father's Nature [Naturae enim fecunditas Patris], and also omit to the Other [alii] at the end.

p. 127

a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2.  —  Petr. Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2.  —  Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 45. seqq.  —  Durand., hic q. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., de hac et se. hic q. 1.  —  Biel, de hac et seq. hic q. 1.

in a. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, a. 30, m. 3, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1.  —  Giles of Rome, here in the 1st princ. of q. 1 and 2.  —  Henry of Ghent, on this and the following q., Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 45 ff..  —  Durandus, here in q. 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionyius the Carthusian, on this and the following, here in q. 1.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following, here in q. 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.