|
S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
|
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
|
PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VI. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VI |
|
ARTICULUS UNICUS.
Quaestio II. |
ARTICLE SOLE
Question 2 |
|
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
|
|
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum generatio in divinis sit secundum rationem voluntatis. |
QUAESTIO 2
Whether generation among the divine is according to a reckoning of will. |
|
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem voluntatis. Et quod non, ostenditur1 primo per auctoritates, secundo per rationes. |
SECONDLY THERE IS ASKED, whether the generation of the Son is according to a reckoning of will. And that (it is) not, is shown1 first through authorities, second through reasons. |
|
Primo ostenditur per auctoritatem Hilarii, qui dicit in libro de Synodis:2 « Omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit ». |
First it is shown through the authority of (St.) Hilary, who says in the book On Synods:2 « To all creatures the Will of God brings substance, but to the Son He gives according to Nature ». |
|
2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate3 reprehendit Eunomium, qui posuit Filium Dei esse Filium voluntatis: ergo si recte reprehendit, generatio Filii non est secundum conditionem voluntatis. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth (book) On the Trinity3 reprehends Eunomius, who posited that the Son of God is a Son of the Will: therefore if he rightly reprehended (him), (then) the generation of the Son is not according to the condition of the Will. |
|
3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: Generatio, quantum est de se, est exitus naturalis sive per modum naturae; sed iste4 est alius modus producendi quam per voluntatem: ergo etc. |
3. Likewise, by reasons it is thus shown: Generation, as much as it is from itself, is a natural going-forth [exitus] or (a going forth) through a manner of nature; but that (generation) of His4 is a manner of producing other than through will: therefore etc.. |
|
4. Item, Filius est sapientia Patris: ergo si procedit secundum rationem voluntatis, voluntas est prior sapientia; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia cognitio secundum naturalem ordinem5 intelligendi praecedit affectionem sive voluntatem: ergo etc. |
4. Likewise, the Son is the Wisdom of the Father: therefore if He proceeds according to a reckoning of the Will, the Will is prior to Wisdom; but this is unfitting, because cognition according to the natural order5 of understanding precedes affection or will: ergo etc.. |
|
SED CONTRA: 1. In omni natura ordinata potentia naturalis subiacet voluntati, vel saltem conformatur voluntati, sicut patet in primo homine; sed in Deo est natura ordinatissima: ergo nihil est a natura vel per naturam, quod non sit per voluntatem: ergo etc. |
BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In every nature the ordinate natural power is subject to the will, and/or is at least conformed to the will, as is clear in the first man; but in God there is a most ordinate Nature: therefore nothing is by the Nature and/or through the Nature, which is not through the Will: ergo etc.. |
|
2. Item, consimilis est modus procedendi in imagine6 creata et in Trinitate increata; sed in imagine notitia oritur mediate voluntate a mente: ergo et Filius a Patre mediante voluntate sive per voluntatem. Minor patet per Augustinum nono de Trinitate:7 « Partum mentis praecedit appetitus, quo, dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia ». |
2. Likewise, completely similar [consimilis] is the manner of proceeding in a created image6 and in the uncreated Trinity; but in the image knowledge [notitia] arises by means of the will by the mind: therefore also the Son by the Father by means of the Will or through the Will. The minor is clear through (St.) Augustine in the ninth (book) On the Trinity:7 « The mind's giving birth does the appetite precede, by which while we, (after) having sought it, are finding what we will to know [nosse], there is born the offspring, knowledge [notitia] itself ». |
|
3. Item, ubi est maior communicatio, ibi est liberalitas maior; sed Pater plus communicat Filio quam omnibus creaturis: ergo maior est ibi liberalitas: ergo cum creaturae procedant per modum liberalitatis, multo magis Filius, et sic etc. |
3. Likewise, where there is greater communication, there is greater liberality; but the Father communicates more to the Son than to all creatures: therefore there is a greater liberality There: therefore since creatures proceed through a manner of liberality, much more (does) the Son, and so etc.. |
|
4. Item, in creaturis8 in actu generationis simul movet natura et voluntas, et nihil ex hoc filio derogatur: ergo si Pater magis producit secundum se totum quam creatura: ergo multo fortius per naturam et voluntatem. |
4. Likewise, among creatures8 nature and will move simultaneously in the act of generation, and nothing of [ex] this derogates from a son: therefore if the Father produces a Whole more according to Himself than a creature (does): therefore much more strongly through the Nature and the Will. |
|
5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Hilarii in tertio de Trinitate:9 « Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impartiens »; si per caritatem: ergo per voluntatem. |
5. Likewise, in this regard [ad hoc] there is the authority of (St.) Hilary in the third (book) On The Trinity:9 « The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting all that is God through the charity of His nativity »; if through charity: therefore through Will. |
|
6. Item, Origenes loquens de mente divina dicit: « Germen proferens voluntatis fit Verbi Pater »:10 ergo videtur, quod Filius generetur a Patre per voluntatem et quod sit Filius voluntatis.
|
6. Likewise, Origen speaking of the Divine Mind says: « Proffering an offshoot [germen] of (His) Will He becomes Father of the Word »:10 therefore it seems, that the Son is generated by the Father through the Will and that He is a Son of the Will. |
|
CONCLUSIO.
Generatio Filii est secundum voluntatem ut in ratione approbantis, non vero ut in ratione producentis, nisi quatenus voluntas est principium coniunctum naturae et quidem sic, ut natura producat principaliter, voluntate concomitante. |
CONCLUSION
The generation of the Son is according to the Will as in the reckoning of one approving, not however as in the reckoning of one producing, except to the extent that the Will is a principle conjoined to the Nature and indeed in this manner, that the Nature produces principally, with a concomitant Will. |
|
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod voluntas potest dupliciter considerari respectu voliti, scilicet ut in ratione approbantis et diligentis; et sic est respectu omnis boni, sive sit necessarium sive sit11 contingens, sive creatum sive increatum sive ab alio . . . |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that the will can be considered in a twofold manner in respect of the willed [voliti], that is, as in the reckoning of one approving and loving [diligentis]; and thus it is in respect of every good, whether it be necessary or whether it be11 contingent, whether created or uncreated or from an other . . . |
|
1 Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1
posuimus ostenditur loco videtur. |
1 Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition
1, we have put is shown [ostenditur] in place of is seen
[videtur]. |
p. 128
|
sive non ab alio, ut patet; haec enim vera est: Pater vult, se esse Deum.1 Alio modo consideratur ut in ratione producentis. Et hoc dupliciter: aut prout est principium distinctum contra naturam, secundum quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a2 natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est coniunctum. |
or not from an other, as is clear; for this is true: the Father wills, that He Himself is God.1 In another manner (the will) is considered as in the reckoning of one producing. And this in a twofold manner: either insofar as it is a principle distinguished [distinctum] against nature, according to which there is said, that some (things) are by2 nature, some by will; or insofar as it is conjoined (to nature). |
|
Si prout est principium distinctum, sic distinguitur voluntas dupliciter, sicilicet accedens et antecedens. Voluntas accedens est, qua aliquis de non volente fit volens; haec non est in Deo nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae.3 Deus enim non habet aliquam novam voluntatem nec respectu sui nec respectu alterius. Voluntas antecedens praecedit effectum causalitate et duratione; haec quidem est in Deo, sed non respectu Dei, sed respectu creaturae solum; omnes enim divinae personae sunt simul. |
If insofar as it is a distinguished principle, the will is distinguished in a twofold manner, that is, (as) one acceding and (as) one anteceding. An accedent will is (that), by which someone from not willing becomes willing; this is not in God, neither in respect of God nor in respect of a creature.3 For God does not have some new Will neither in respect of Himself nor in respect of the Other. An antecedent will precedes the effect by causality and duration; this indeed is in God, but not in respect of God, but solely in respect of the creature; for the Divine Persons are all simultaneous. |
|
Alio modo, prout voluntas consideratur ut principium coniunctum naturae, potest esse dupliciter; quia tunc natura et voluntas sunt principium; aut igitur natura est producens principaliter, voluntate concomitante,4 aut e converso; utrumque enim principaliter esse non potest. |
In another manner, insofar as the will is considered as a principle conjoined to nature, it can be in a twofold manner; because then nature and will are the principle; therefore either Nature is producing principally, with a concomitant Will,4 or conversely; for both cannot be (producing) principally. |
|
Si voluntas est principium, concomitante natura, sic est processio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit per modum amoris, tamen similis in natura. Si vero natura est primum5 principium, concomitante voluntate, sic est generatio Filii, qui producitur ut omnino similis et per modum naturae, nihilominus ut dilectus; et ideo dicitur, quod sibi in eo complacet Pater,6 et ad Colossenses primo dicitur Filius caritatis. |
If the Will is the principle with concomitant Nature, thus there is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through a manner of love [amoris], yet however [tamen] similar in nature. However if Nature is the first5 principle, with a concomitant Will, thus there is the generation of the Son, who is produces as One entirely similar and through a manner of nature, nevertheless as the Beloved [dilectus]; and for that reason it is said, that the Father thoroughly pleases6 Himself in Him, and at Colossians 1(:13) there is said: the Son of (His) charity. |
|
1. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod generatio est per modum voluntatis sive secundum rationem voluntatis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur aut de voluntate approbante, ut ostendunt duae auctoritates Hilarii et Origenis, aut de voluntate concomitante,7 ut ratio, quae posita est primo. |
1. 5. 6. To that which is objected in the contrary, that generation is through a manner of will or according to a reckoning of will; it must be said, that this is understood either of an approving will, as the two authority of (St.) Hilary and Origin show, or of a concomitant will,7 as the reason, which is posited first, (shows). |
|
2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de similitudine imaginis; dicendum, quod in hoc est dissimilis imago creata ipsi Trinitate,8 quia ibi non nascitur verbum per inquisitionem, sicut potest nasci in nobis; unde potius valet ad oppositum quam ad propositum. |
2. To that, however, which is objected concerning the similitude of the image; it must be said that in this the created image is dissimilar to the Trinity Itself,8 because There there is not born a word through a search [inquisitionem], as it can be born in us; whence it is rather valid for the opposite than for the proposed. |
|
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est communicatio in generatione Filii etc.; dicendum, quod maior communicatio vel minor non facit modum emanandi esse secundum liberalitatem vel secundum modum voluntatis, sed modus sive ratio communicandi. Et quia Pater communicat creaturis per voluntatem, ita quod voluntas eius est causa producens, Filio9 per fecunditatem naturae: ideo non sic dicitur Filius produci per voluntatem, sicut creaturae. |
3. To that which is objected, that greater is the communication in the generation of the Son etc.; it must be said, that a greater and/or lesser communication does not cause [facit] a manner of emanating to be according to liberality and/or according to a manner of will, but a manner or reason for communicating (does). And because the Father communicates to creatures through Will, so that His will is the producing cause, (He communicates) to the Son9 through a fecundity of Nature: for that reason the Son is not said to be produced through the Will in the same manner, as creatures (are). |
|
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur,10 quod in generatione hominis simul movet natura et voluntas; dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum magis quam propter complementum; quia pater per se non potest generare, sed ex coniunctione cum alio distante, quod fit ad imperium voluntatis; Deus autem alio adiuvante non indiget; et ideo non est simile. |
4. To that which is objected,10 that in the generation of man nature and will move simultaneously; it must be said, that this is on account of a defect rather than on account of a complement; because a father by himself [per se] cannot generate, but (he can) out of conjunction with a different other [alio distante], which comes to be at the command [imperium] of the will; but God does not need another helping (Him); and for that reason it is not similar. |
|
SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM |
|
I. De diversis modis volendi, qui hic tanguntur, Seraphicus in anecdota quaestione disputata: utrum stent simul Trinitas et summa necessitas, haec habet: « Est voluntas accedens, i. e. de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo, nec respectu sui nec respectu creati propter Dei immutabilitatem et necessitatem. Est iterum voluntas antecedens; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit (supple ipse) natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas concomitans et acceptans; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium. Tripliciter ergo dicta necessitate et voluntate, tertius modus utriusque competit Trinitati summae, scilicet voluntas acceptabilis et necessitas immutabilitatis: voluntas, inquam, acceptans propter summam caritatem in producente et summam bonitatem in producto, quae duo necessario claudunt in se voluntatem complacentiae » etc. |
I. Concerning the diverse manners of willing, which are here touched upon, the Seraphic (Doctor) in the unpublished, disputed question: Whether the Trinity and Most High Necessity stand together, has this (to say): « There is an accedent will, i. e. arriving from (something) new; and this is not in God, neither in respect of Himself nor in respect of (something) created, on account of the immutability and necessity of God. Again there is an antecedent will; and this is in God, but not in respect to Himself, but in respect to the created, which He (Himself) antecedes by Nature and eternity. Third, there is a concomitant and accepting will; and this is in God in respect of Himself and in respect of the created; for the Divine Will approves and accepts every good whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary. Therefore having spoken of necessity and will in a threefold manner, the each third manner is suitable [competit] to the Most High Trinity, namely an acceptable will and a necessity of immutability: I say an acceptable will on account of the most high clarity in the One producing and a most high goodness in the One produced, which two (qualities) necessarily close (with) in themselves a will of complacence » etc. |
|
II. Quoad processionem Spiritus sancti secundum rationem voluntatis cfr. infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. Circa differentiam inter generationem et spirationem cfr. infra d. 26, q. 1. et ibi Scholion. |
II. In regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit according to a reckoning of will, cf. below d. 10, a. 1, q. 1. About the difference among generation and spiration, cf. below d. 26, q. 1, and there in the Scholium. |
|
III. In conclusione doctores consentiunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1; et q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 1. 2. S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. Durand., hic q. 2. |
III. In the conclusion the doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1; and q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1; Reportatio., here at q. 1 and 2. St. Thomas, here in q. 2; Summa., I, q. 41, a. 2. Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1 and 3. (Bl) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 2. Richard of Middleton, here in q. 2. Giles the Roman, here in the 2nd principle of q. 2. Durandus, here in q. 2. |
|
1 Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et trium
primarum edd. vult esse Deus. |
1 The Vatican edition without the authority of
the manuscripts and of the three first editions reads God the Father wills
to be [Pater vult esse Deus]. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.