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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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PRIMI LIBRI |
BOOK ONE |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, |
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista circa litteram dubitatur de ratione Augustini ad Orosium, quod nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est etc. Videtur enim sufficiens8 divisio. Omne enim quod Deus facit, aut facit naturaliter, et sic necessario, aut voluntarie: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod ipse respondet ad intellectum haeretici, et haereticus intelligit de voluntate antecedente et necessitate inevitabilitatis; obiicitur, quod oratio nihilominus in se est multiplex. Sed qui respondet orationi multiplici simpliciter affirmando / vel negando, . . . |
In that part of his (text) there is a doubt about the text concerning the reason of (St.) Augustine To Orosius, that neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God etc.. For the division seems (to be) sufficient8. For everything which God makes, He either makes naturally, and thus necessarily, or voluntarily: ergo etc.. If you say, that (the reason) itself responds to the heretic's understanding, and the heretic understand (it) of an antecedent will and of a necessity of inevitability; it is objected, that nevertheless the statement is in itself manifold. But he who responds to a manifold statement by simply affirming / and or denying, . . . |
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8 Multi codd. ut D F K S T V W etc. cum sex primis edd. insufficiens, cuius lectionis sensus potest esse: videtur, quod divisio in responsione Augustini (ad bimembrem quaestionem Orosii): Voluntate genuit vel necessitate contenta, in qua scilicet tertium membrum additur nec necessitate nec voluntate, sit insufficiens, i. e. non bona, quia divisio Orosii est sufficiens i. e. adaequata. |
8 Many codices, such as D F K S T V W etc., together with the six first editions have insufficient [insufficiens], of which reading the sense can be: it seems, that the division contained in the response of (St.) Augustine (to the two-fold question of St. Paulus Orosius): Did He beget by will and/or by necessity?, in which, that is, there is added a third part, neither by necessity nor by will, is insufficient, i. e., not a good one, because (St. Paulus) Orosius' division is sufficient, i. e. adequate. |
p. 131
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vel negando, male respondet, secundum quod dicit Philosophus:1 ergo, etc. |
and/or by denying, responds badly, according to what the Philosopher says:1 ergo, etc.. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Augustinus rspondet secundum intellectum haeretici. Quamvis autem oratio in se sit multiplex, quia tamen haereticus in uno sensu eam accipit, iam multiplicitas illa non faceret2 ad solvendum, quia non procedit secundum illam. Sed distinctio propositionis multiplicis, quando secundum illam multiplicitatem non cadit deceptio, magis est ad ostentationem quam ad veram responsionem. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that (St.) Augustine responds according to the heretic's understanding. Moreover, although the statement in itself is manifold, because the heretic, nevertheless [tamen], accepts it in one sense, still that multiplicity would not cause [faceret]2 it to be solved, because he does not proceed according to it. But the distinction of a manifold proposition, when deception according to that multiplicity does not occur [cadit], is rather for show [ostentationem] than for a true response. |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Dicamus Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate. Videtur enim bene dicere, quia Pater alio est Deus, alio est Pater, quia deitate est Deus, et paternitate est Pater, ut dicit Augustinus.3 Sed Filius est Deus natura deitatis: ergo hac non dicetur Filius, sed ipsa filiatione. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which is said: let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will. For he seems to speak well, because by the one the Father is God, by the other He is the Father, because by the Deity He is God, and by the Paternity He is the Father, as (St.) Augustine says.3 But the Son is God by the Nature of the Deity: therefore the Son will not meant by this, but by the filiation itself. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter; et sic falsa est, quia formaliter alio est Deus, scilicet natura, et alio Filius.4 Potest iterum construi originaliter et in ratione principii; et sic vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius ortum habet a Patre naturaliter. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that that ablative can be construed formally; and in this manner it is false, because formally by the one He is God, that is by nature, and by the other (He is) the Son.4 Again it can be construed originally and in the reckoning of a principle; and in this manner it is true, and the sense is, that the Son has arisen by [a] the Father naturally. |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Acute sane quidam respondit, quia Augustinus commendat istam solutionem, quae non est commendanda, quia multiplicare inconveniens non est solvere.5 |
Likewise is asked concerning this which is said: Indeed he in an acutely sane manner responds, because (St.) Augustine commends that solution of his, which is not to be commended, because to multiply (something) unfitting is not to solve (it).5 |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod est solutio ad hominem et est solutio ad orationem;6 et aliquando melius et utilius est solvere ad hominem quam ad orationem, ut puta, quando respondens est discolus et non vult intelligere veritatem, et quando assistentes sunt simplices et non possunt capere veritatem et substilitatem. Ideo quia haereticus veritatem respuebat et adversabatur, idcirco adversanti erat adversandum, et tali modo, quo magis privaretur gloria et assistentes fallacia. Ideo commendat istam responsionem Augustinus, quia7 manifest opponentem sua quaestione ligavit. Hunc modum respondendi docuit Dominus Matthaei vigesimo primo,8 ubi dixit: Baptismus Iannis de caelo erat, an ex hominibus etc. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is a solution to the man [ad hominem] and there is a solution to the statement [ad orationem];6 and sometimes it is better and more useful to give a solution [solvere] to the man than to the statement, as for example [ut puta], when the one responding is a debater [discolus] and does not want to understand the truth, and when the listeners [attendentes] are simpletons [simplices] and cannot grasp truth and subtlety. For that reason because the heretic was rejecting [respuebat] the truth and was adverse to it [adversabatur], on that account one had to be adverse to the adversary [adversanti erat adversandum], and in such a manner, by which he would be more deprived [privaretur] of glory and the listeners of fallacy. For that reason (St.) Augustine commends that response of (the catholic), because7 he manifestly bound (his) opponent by his question. The manner of responding does the Lord teach in the twenty-first (chapter) of (St.) Matthew,8 where he said: Was the baptism of John from [de] heaven, or from [ex] men? etc.. |
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Item quaeritur, cum non sit responsum ad orationem, quomodo respondendum sit. Videndum enim,9 quod divisio haeretici sit per immediata, quia velle et nolle opponuntur contradictorie, inter quae non cadit medium. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod haereticus quaerit hoc de voluntate accedente sive de antecedente; et tunc neutra pars est vera, nec sunt membra opposita contradictorie, sed contrarie. Nolle enim et velle dicunt actus voluntatis contrarios, inter quos cadit medium. Aliquid enim est, respectu cuius voluntas nec10 habet rationem causae nec repugnantiae; et ita patet illud. |
Likewise it is asked, since it is not a response to the statement, how must one respond (to it)? For9 it must seem that the heretic's division be through an immediate (reckoning), because to want and to not want are opposed in a contradictory manner, between which there does not fall a middle-ground [medium]. And for this it must be said, that the heretic asks this of the accedent will or of the antecedent; and then neither part is true, nor are the members opposed in a contradictory manner, but rather in a contrary one. For to not will and to will mean contrary acts of the will, between which there does fall a middle-ground. For there is something, in respect of which the will neither10 has a reckoning of cause nor of repugnance; and thus that is clear. |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de solutione Magistri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, cum dicit: Scientia Dei et praescientia de bonis et malis est. Dicit enim Glossa super illud Psalmi:11 Quae ignorabam, interrogabant me etc.: « Ars nescit vitium »; sed in Deo est ars artium, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod nescit per modum practicum, sed scit per modum speculationis;12 contra: solum illud scit hoc modo, quod in eo relucet; sed in Deo non relucent mala: ergo etc. |
Likewise is asked concerning the solution of Master (Peter). For he seems to speak a falsehood [falsum], when he says: the knowledge and foreknowledge of God (is) of (things) good and evil. For the Gloss says on that (verse) of the Psalm (,which is):11 Those whom I knew not, were interrogating Me etc.: « Art does not know of vices »; but in God there is the Art of arts, ergo etc.. If you say, that He does not know through a practical manner, but knows through a manner of speculation;12 on the contrary: solely that does He know in this manner, which glitters in Him; but in God evils do not glitter: ergo etc.. |
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Item, non videtur Magister solvere ad argumentum; multiplicare enim inconveniens non est solvere. |
Likewise, Master (Peter) does not seem to give a solution [solvere] to the argument; for to multiply (something) unfitting it not to solve (it). |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut infra dicetur,13 Deus cognoscit mala per se ipsum, sicut rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra; nec oportet, quod in Deo luceat malum, sed sufficit, quod luceat in eo mali oppositum. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that, just as will be said below,13 God cognizes evils through His very self, just as the straight decides what is slanted and light what is darkness [rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra]; nor is it proper, that evil shine in God, but it does suffice, that there shine in Him the opposite of evil. |
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1 Libr. II. Elench. c. 2. (c. 17.)
iuxta translationem Boethii: Manifestum, quoniam nulli eorum quae
aequivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter. |
1 Elench., Bk. II, ch. 2 (ch.
17) according to the translation of (St. Severinus) Boethius: It
is manifest, since to none of those which are equivocal, it is fitting to
simply respond. |
p. 132
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Ad illud quod obiicitur de solutione Magistri, dicendum, quod solutionem non ponit, sed innuit contra arguendo, quasi dicat: ex illo unum1 non potest inferri ex altero, quia quamvis sint idem in essentia, tamen diversa sunt connotata. |
To that which is objected concerning the solution of Master (Peter), it must be said, that he does not posit a solution, but nods his head [innuit] against the one arguing, as if to say: From that, the one1 cannot be inferred from the other, because although they are the same in essence, yet diverse (things) are connoted. |
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DUB. V. |
DOUBT V |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit2 in notula: quod sancta Ecclesia anathematizat eos qui dicut, Deum non generasse consilio. Videtur enim contradicere Damasceno3 dicenti, quod in Deo non est consilium, quia consilium est ignorantis naturae. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says2 in the Brief Note [notula]: that the Holy Church anathematizes those who say, that God has not generated by counsel. For he seems to contradict (St. John) Damascene3 who says [dicenti], that counsel is not in God, because counsel belongs to an ignorant nature. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod consilium4 dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur consulere accipere consilium; et sic dicit ignorantiam et similiter consilium, dictum ab hoc: alio modo consulere dicitur dare consilium, et hoc modo dicit scientiam, et hoc5 potest transferri ad divina. Deus enim nullo modo accipit consilium aliunde. Unde notandum, quod in consilio duo sunt: est ibi cognitio rei occultae, et est ibi dispositio firma. Quoniam ergo in Deo est verissima cognitio occultorum et invariabilitas, ideo recte dicitur, in ipso esse consilium. Unde Gregorius:6 « Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium ». |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that counsel4 is said in a twofold manner: in one manner by to counsel [consulere] there is meant to accept counsel; and thus it means ignorance and similarly (does) counsel, (when) said in this sense [dictum ab hoc]: in another manner by to counsel there is meant to give counsel, and in this manner it means knowledge [scientiam], and in this (sense)5 it can be transferred to the divine. For God in no manner accepts counsel from elsewhere. Whence it must be noted, that in counsel there are two (things): there is cognition of the hidden thing, and there is a firm disposition. Therefore since in God there is a most true cognition of (things) hidden and an invariability, for that reason it is rightly said, that in Him there is counsel. Whence (St.) Gregory (the Great says):6 « God changes a sentence, but not a counsel ». |
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1 Lectio confusa Vat. quasi dicat ex
eo quod est ex illo, idem restauratur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3. |
1 The confused reading of the Vatican edition, as if he says from this what is from that, the same, is restored
with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3. |
The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.