COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 7, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII
De comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam.	On the comparison of the power of generating to the Person.
ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE SOLE Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 133-138. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 133-138. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Hic solet quaeri, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit etc.	Here one is accustomed to be asked, whether the Father could and/or willed etc..
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
In praesenti distinctione ponit Magister dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, utrum scilicet, sicut est in persona Patris, ita sit in persona Filii. Et habet haec pars duas: in prima Magister quaerit et determinat, utrum Filius possit generare; in secunda, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, ibi: Item, quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit etc.	In the present distinction Master (Peter) posits a doubt from the comparison of the power of generating to the Person, whether namely [scilicet], just as in the Person of the Father, it be thus in the Person of the Son. And this part has two (parts): in the first Master (Peter) asks and determines, whether the Son can generate; in the second, whether the power of generating be in the Son, there (where he says): Likewise, it is asked by certain (men) if the Father is by nature able etc..
Item prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima movet quaestionem, utrum posse et velle / generare similiter comparentur ad personam Patris et Filii.	Likewise the first part has four smaller parts. In the first (of these) he brings forward [movet] a question, whether to be able and to will / to generate are similarly compared to the Person of the Father and the Son.

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generare similiter comparentur ad personam Patris et Filii. Secundo, opponit contra solutionem per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: Sed vehementer nos movet, quod Augustinus etc. Tertio, opponit contra praedictam auctoritatem per rationem, ibi: Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam. Quarto, redit supra auctoritatem, exponens ipsam,¹ ibi: Quomodo ergo accipitur quod supra dictum est.	to generate are similarly compared to the Person of the Father and the Son. Second, he objects [opponit] against the solution through the authority of (St.) Augustine, there (where he says)d: But we are vehemently moved by what (St.) Augustine etc.. Third, he objects against the aforesaid authority by means of [per] reason, there (where he says): Moreover this does not seem to certain (men). Fourth, he returns to the above authority, expounding it,¹ there (where he says): Therefore in what manner is what has been said above to be accepted.
Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est² secunda pars huius distinctionis, in qua quaerit Magister, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, et haec pars habet duas particulas. Primo, quaerit et determinat hanc quaestionem, utrum aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio. Si enim Pater natura potens est generare Filium, et Filius non, patet etc. Et³ ad hanc quaestionem respondet Magister, quod omnino eadem est potentia in Patre et Filio. Sed quia hoc erat dubium, ideo opponit contra praedictam solutionem et determinat per distinctionem. Secundo, respondet ad primam quaestionem distinguendo, utrum scilicet Filius habeat potentiam generandi, ibi: Ita etiam cum dicitur, Filius non habet etc. Si enim intelligatur active, falsus est intellectus, scilicet quod Filius possit generare. Si vero intelligatur⁴ passive, scilicet quod habeat potentiam, qua possit generari, vera est. Et fundatur ista distinctio secundum aliquos super hoc, quod id generandi potest intelligi in significatione passiva, vel activa. Si in passiva, tunc vera est; et est sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est potentiam, qua generatur. Si⁵ in activa, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia potest esse gerundium verbi personalis, et tunc habet suppositum determinatum et est falsa; est enim sensus: Filius habet etc. id est, Filius habet potentiam, qua ipse Filius generat; vel impersonalis; et tunc non habet certum suppositum et est locutio vera; est enim sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est, habet potentiam, qua aliquis generat,⁶ tamen hunc sensum non ponit Magister.	Likewise it is asked by certain (men) if the Father etc.. This is² the second part of this distinction, in which Master (Peter) asks, whether the power of generating be in the Son, and this part has two smaller parts. First, he asks and determines this question, whether some power be in the Father, which is not in the Son. For if the Father by nature is able to generate the Son, and the Son not, it is clear etc.. And³ to this question Master (Peter) responds, that entirely the same is the power in the Father and the Son. But because there was doubt on this, for that reason he objected against the aforesaid solution and determined (it) through distinction. Second, he responds to the first question by distinguishing, whether, that is, the Son has a power of generating, there (where he says): Thus also when there is said, “the Son does not have” etc. For if it be understood actively, the understanding is false, that is, that the Son can generate. However if it be understood⁴ passively, that is, that He has a power, by which he can be generated, it is true. And that distinction of his is founded according to some upon this, that the Latin for “of generating” [generandi] can be understood in a passive signification, and/or as an active one. If in the passive, then it is true; and the sense is: ‘The Son has the power of being generated’, that is ‘a power, by which He is generated’. If⁵ in the active, this can be in a twofold manner, because it can be a gerund for a personal verb, and then it has a determinate subject [suppositum determinatum] and it is false; for the sense is: ‘the Son has’ etc., that is, ‘the Son has a power, by which the Son Himself generates’; and/or (for) a impersonal (verb); and then it does not have a certain subject [certum suppositum] and the saying is true; for the sense is: ‘the Son has a power of generating’, that is, ‘He has a power, by which someone generates’,⁶ however Master (Peter) does not posit this sense.
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad evidentiam eorum quae dicit Magister de potentia generandi, quatuor quaeruntur.	For a clear understanding [ad evidentiam] of those thing which Master (Peter) says concerning the power of generating, four (things) are asked.
Primo quaeritur, utrum posse generare in divinis dicat quid, vel ad aliquid.	First there is asked, whether among divine (things) “to be able to generate” means a what [quid], and/or a toward something [ad aliquid].
Secundo, utrum Pater communicet Filio⁷ potentiam generandi, id est, utrum in Filio sit potentia generandi.	Second, whether the Father communicates to the Son⁷ a power of generating, that is, whether in the Son there is a power of generating.
Tertio, utrum posse generare et creare sit unicum posse, vel non.	Third, whether “to be able to generate and to create” is a unique “to be able”, and/or (whether is) not.
Quarto, utrum posse generari et creari sit posse univocum.⁸	Fourth, whether “to be able to be generated and to be created” is an univocal “to be able”.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum, vel relativum.	QUESTION 1* Whether a "power of generation” means something absolute, and/or relative.
CIRCA PRIMUM, quod posse generare dicit quid, ostenditur:	ABOUT THE FIRST, that “to be able to generate” means a what, is shown:
1. Primo per auctoritatem Magistri in littera:⁹ « Pater non est potens nisi natura, eiusque potentia natura est vel essentia »; sed natura et potentia dicunt quid, non ad aliquid: ergo et potentia generandi.	1. First through the authority of Master (Peter) in the text:⁹ « The Father is not able except by nature, and His power is by nature and/or essence »; but nature and power mean a what, not a toward something: therefore also a power of generating.
2. Item ratione ostenditur sic: generare est sibi simile in natura producere; sed secundum Philosophum¹⁰ « natura est vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans »: ergo vis generandi respicit ipsam naturam sive essentiam de se, non personam; sed omne tale dicit quid: ergo etc.	2. Likewise by reason it is thus shown: to generate is to produce a similar in nature to itself; but according to the Philosopher¹⁰ « nature is a force engrafted into things procreating similars out of similars »; therefore a force of generating respects the nature itself or the essence of itself [de se], not the person; but every such (term) means a what: ergo etc..
3. Item, « in perpetuis non differt esse et posse »: ergo multo fortius in aeternis; ergo idem / est esse et posse, . . .	3. Likewise, « in perpetuals to be and to be able do not differ »: therefore much more strongly in eternals; therefore the same / is “to be” and “to be able”, . . .
¹ Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ipsam. ² Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1, omittendo verba: Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est, mutat constructionem, quia postea eliminat verba et haec pars. Mox codd. cum ed. 1 tres loco duas, sed falso. ³ Ex mss. X Y bb et ed. 1 adiecimus Et, pro quo plurimi codd. non ita bene Sed; cod. Q vero Secundo et paulo infra tertio pro secundo, at falso, uti inspicienti textum Magistri et verba Bonaventurae patet. ⁴ Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus intelligatur pro intelligitur et mox habeat loco havet et paulo infra ista pro illa ac aliquos loco alios. ⁵ Vat. Sed, et paulo post omittit hoc contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1, qui et pro gerundium ponunt gerundivum. ⁶ Cod. O glossando addit: scilicet Pater, quia eadem est potentia in Patre et in Filio ad hoc ut generetur, nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod Filius generat, sed ex hoc sequitur, quod aliquis generat. ⁷ Ope mss. et ed. 1 restituimus omissum Filio. ⁸ Mendum Vat. fide mss. correximus substituendo univocum pro unicum. ⁹ Cap. 2. in initio. — Mox Vat. contra multos codd. ut A G H I S T V Y Z bb ff et ed. 1 quia eius pro eiusque et in propositione minore contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 et essentia loco et potentia. ¹⁰ Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 10. ait: Omnis natura eius est essentiae procreatrix, qualis ipsa est. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.). — Vat. (cui consentit Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.) contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 ponit Isaac (in eius libro de definitionibus haec non inveniuntur) pro Philosophus. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. et S. p. I. q. 30. m. 1. hanc definitionem attribuit Boethio, editores autem operum Henrici Ganda. Grammatico. Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 42. dicit: Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit.	¹ From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied it [ipsam]. ² The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, by omitting the words: Likewise there is asked by certain (men), if the Father etc.. This is changes the construction, because it afterwards eliminates the words and this part. Then the codices together with edition 1 have three [tres] in place of two [duas], but falsely. ³ From manuscripts X Y bb and edition 1 we have added And [Et], in place of which very many codices have not so well But [Sed]; codex Q, however, has Second [Secundo] and a little below this third [tertio] in place of second [secundo], but falsely, as is clear to the one inspecting the text of Master (Peter) and the words of (St.) Bonaventure. ⁴ From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the subjunctive is understood [intelligatur] for the indicative is understood [intelligitur] and then He has [habeat] for He has [habet] and a little below this that . . . of his [ista] in place of that [illa] and some [aliquos] in place of others [alios]. ⁵ The Vatican text reads But [Sed], and a little after this it omits this [hoc], contrary to the older codices and edition 1, which also put gerundive [gerundivum] in place of gerund [gerundium]. ⁶ Codex O by glossing adds: that is the Father, because the same power is in the Father and in the Son for this that He be generated, nor, however, does it follow from this, that the Son generates, but it follows from this, that someone generates. ⁷ With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the omitted to the Son [Filio]. ⁸ The fault of the Vatican text we have corrected, trusting in the manuscripts, by substituting univocal [univocum] for unique [unicum]. ⁹ Chapter 2, at the start. — The Vatican text, contrary to many codices as A G H I S T V Y Z bb and ff and edition 1, has because His [quia eius] for and His [eiusque] and in the minor proposition, contrary to all the codices and edition 1, it has and essence [et essentia] in place of and power [et potentia]. ¹⁰ Aristotle, Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 10, says: Every nature is a procreatrix of the essence of that, which it is. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 5 (Bk. IV, ch. 4). — The Vatican text (to which Richard of Middleton consents, here in q. 1), contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3 puts Isaac (though in his book on definitions these words are not found) in place of the Philosopher. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Sent., Bk. I, d. 4. a. 2, and Summa., p. I, a. 30, m. 1, attributes this definition to Boethius, but the editors of (his) works to Henry of Ghent's Grammar. The author of the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 42 says: Nature indeed is a certain force and power engrafted divinely into things to be created, which bestows upon each thing its own ‘being’ [esse].
	* [Trans. note: Here contrary to the usual form, there is in the Quaracchi Edition no heading for the Article Sole and its subtitle.]

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est esse et posse,¹ et potentia et essentia; sed esse et essentia in divinis dicunt quid, non ad aliquid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum adiuncto; unde essentia Patris dicit quid: ergo pari ratione potentia generandi.	is “to be” and “to be able”,¹ and power and essence; but “to be” and essence among the divine mean a what, not a toward something, whether one says (them) per se, or with an adjunct; whence the essence of the Father means a what: therefore for an equal reason (His) a “power” [potentia] of generating.
4. Item, in divinis idem est secundum rem posse scire et velle; sed non est in divinis scientia propria sive ad aliquid,² immo scientia dicit quid et est trium, similiter et voluntas: ergo potentia generandi dicit quid sive essentiam.	4. Likewise, among the divine it is the same according to thing ‘to be able to know’ [posse scire] and ‘(to be able) to will’; but among the divine there is not a proper knowledge [scientia] or a toward something,² nay rather “knowledge” (there) means a What and it belongs to Three, similarly also “will”: therefore the power of generating means a What or essence.
SED CONTRA: 1. Magister dicit in littera, et habetur primo capitulo:³ Posse generare non est posse aliquid, ergo non dicit quid; et dicit quid vel ad aliquid: ergo etc.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Master (Peter) says in the text, and (as) it is had in the first chapter:³ To be able to generate is not some “to be able” [posse aliquid], therefore it does not mean a what; and he says (it is) a what and/or a toward something: ergo etc..
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: potentiae distinguuntur per actus:⁴ ergo si actus potentiae dicit quid et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc et potentia similiter. Sed constat quod generare in divinis non dicit quid, sed ad aliquid: ergo nec posse generare.	2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: powers are distinguished through acts:⁴ therefore if an act of a power means a what and a power; and if it means a toward something, then also power similarly. But it is established that to generate among the divine does not mean a what, but a toward something: therefore neither a to be able to generate.
3. Item, quamvis in creaturis differant virtus et operatio, tamen in Deo idem sunt, sicut vult Dionysius:⁵ ergo in Deo idem est posse generare et generare; sed generare in divinis dicit ad aliquid et non quid: ergo similiter posse.	3. Likewise, although in creatures virtue and operation differ, however in God they are the same, just as Dionysius (the Areopagite) would have it [vult]:⁵ therefore in God the same is to be able to generate and to generate; but to generate among the divine means a toward something and not a what: therefore similarly to be able.
4. Item, Pater generat et potest generare: aut ergo ideo potest, quia generat; aut ideo generat, quia potest. Constat quod non ideo potest generare, quia generat: ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare.⁶ Si ergo ratio proprii debet esse propria, ergo potentia generandi debet esse propria; et nihil est proprium in divinis, nisi quod dicit ad aliquid: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, the Father generates and can generate: therefore, either He can for the reason that [ideo . . . quia] He generates; or He generates for the reason that He can. It is established that He can generate not for the reason that He generates: therefore He generates for the reason that He can generate.⁶ Therefore if the reckoning of the proper ought to be proper; and nothing is proper among the divine, except what means a toward something: ergo etc..
5. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae inest creaturae, inest secundum aliquas conditiones sive⁷ proprietates, ut patet. Posse enim illuminare inest luminoso per lucem, posse calefacere calido per caliditatem. Quamvis autem potentia generandi non sit activa, tamen activae similis est: ergo cum insit Patri, inest per aliquam proprietatem; illa autem proprietas aut dicit quid, aut ad aliquid. Si quid: ergo⁸ inest omnibus personis, et ita posse generare, quod manifeste negat Magister: ergo dicit ad aliquid: ergo et potentia, quae inest secundum illam: ergo etc.	5. Likewise, every active power, which is within [inest] a creature, is within according to some conditions or⁷ properties, as is clear. For a ‘to be able to illumine’ is within the luminous through light, ‘to be able to warm’ in the warm through warmth. Moreover although the power of generating is not active, however it is similar to an active (power): therefore since it is within the Father, it is within through some property; moreover that property either means a what, or a toward something. If a what: therefore⁸ it is within every Person, and thus (is) a ‘to be able to generate’, which Master (Peter) manifestly denies: therefore it means a toward something: therefore also (does) the power, which is within according to it: ergo etc..
CONCLUSIO. Inter tres de hac re opiniones videtur probabilior ea quae asserit, potentiam generandi significare tam relationem quam substantiam, sed in recto relationem.	CONCLUSION Among the three opinions concerning this matter, that seems more probable which asserts, that the power of generating signifies as much a relation as a substance, but in right (speech) a relation.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod circa hoc problema tres fuerunt positiones.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that about this problem there were three positions.
Fuerunt⁹ quidam, qui distinxerunt potentiam generandi dicentes, quod potentia generandi potest dici potentia nuda, vel potentia disposita. Si dicatur potentia nuda, sic voluerunt¹⁰ dicere, quod dicit quid et in omnibus tribus personis est, quoniam haec potentia sic dicta consequitur naturam; unde cum natura sit in qualibet persona, similiter et potentia huiusmodi. Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam, quia non habet dispositionem nec convenientiam, ut exeat in actum generationis nisi in sola persona Patris, voluerunt dicere, quod dicit ad aliquid.	There were⁹ certain (authors), who distinguished the power of generating, saying, that the power of generating can be meant as a bare [nuda] power, and/or as a disposed power. If it is meant as a bare power, so they wanted¹⁰ to say, that it means a what and it is in all the Three Persons, since this power, said in this manner, is consequent to the Nature [consequitur naturam]; whence since the Nature is in each Person, similarly also this kind of power. Moreover according to which it means a disposed power, because it has not a disposition nor fittingness, to go forth into an act of generation except in the Person of the Father alone, the wanted to say, that it means a toward something.
Sed verba istius positionis non videntur vera nec sana. Non, inquam, vera, quoniam cuius potentia est nuda, nata est pariter esse disposita; si ergo trium¹¹ est potentia generandi, ut est potentia nuda, similiter et disposita; et ita quaelibet posset generare. Praeterea non videtur sana: ponere enim potentiam nudam, quae similiter se habet ad esse et non esse respectu generationis, quam omnino necessarium est esse, non videtur sane dictum esse sive proprie.	But the words of that position of theirs do not seem true nor sane. I say, not true, since whose power is bare, is bound to be equally disposed; therefore if to the Three¹¹ belongs the power of generating, as it is a nude power, similarly also (as) a disposed one; and thus each could generate. Moreover it does not seem sane; for to posit a bare power, which holds itself in the same manner regarding ‘being’ [ad esse] and ‘not being’ [non esse] in respect to a generation, which is entirely necessary to be [quam necessarium est esse], does not seem to be sanely or properly said to be.
Fuerunt etiam alii, qui dixerunt, quod cum in divinis sit idem posse et esse, et potentia et essentia, quod, quemadmodum potentia et essentia dicunt quid, similiter esse et posse. Et quemadmodum, cum dico essentiam Patris et essentiam Filii et Spiritus sancti, sive esse Patrem,¹² esse Filium, esse Spiritum sanctum, non dico aliam essentiam nec aliud esse, sed alterius et alterius; ita quando dico potentiam Patris, sive Patrem posse generare et Filium posse / gigni, . . .	There were also others, who said, that since among the divine the same is “to be able” and “to be”, (so) also the power and the essence, because, in accord with the manner power and essence mean a what, similarly “to be” and “to be able”. And in accord with the manner, when I say “essence of the Father” and “essence of the Son” and “essence of the Holy Spirit”, or “that the Father is”,¹² “that the Son is”, “that the Holy Spirit is”, I do not mean (that there is) another essence nor that there is an Other, but (the same is) of the one and of the other [alterius et alterius]; thus when I say (that there is) a power of the Father, or that the Father can generate and that the Son can / be begotten, . . .
¹ Mutila Vat. et cod. cc lectio, in qua omittuntur verba ergo multo usque ad et potentia, restauratur ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. — De prima huius argumenti propositione vide supra d. 2. q. 1 argum. 1. ad opp. ² Vat. cum pluribus codd. ut H I K S U X Y Z bb ff et ed. 1 post propria addit vel voluntas propria et post sive Vat. sola adiungit scientia et voluntas; praeferimus tamen lectionem aliorum mss. ut A C F G L O R T etc., quae et contextu probatur, quia secuc superflue postea poneretur similiter et voluntas. ³ Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post initium loco et habetur primo capitulo. Mox Vat. male et contradicentibus mss. omittit et dicit quid vel; pauci codd. ut 1 cc pro et satis bene sed. ⁴ Communiter allegatur hac de re Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.): Priores enim potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; si autem sic, his adhuc priora opposita (i. e. obiecta). — Mox mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittitur et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc redintegramus ope ceterorum mss. et ed. 1. ⁵ Libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 1. ⁶ Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, pro sed e converso posuimus ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare. ⁷ Vat. cum cod. cc et loco sive, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1. ⁸ Ex vetusioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ergo. ⁹ Ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. addit enim. ¹⁰ Faventibus antiquis mss. et ed. 1, expunximus hic male additum aliqui moxque post omnibus adiecimus tribus. ¹¹ Cod. H satis bene addit personarum. ¹² Vat. hic et post Filium contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 adiicit sive et paulo infra contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit et alterius necnon post generare particulam et.	¹ The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, in which there are omitted the words therefore much up to and power [trans. note: which begin on p. 134], are restored from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1. — Concerning the first proposition of this argument see above d. 2, q. 1, argument n. 1 to the opposite. ² The Vatican text, together with very many codices as H I K S U X Y Z bb and ff and edition 1, after proper knowledge [propria] adds and/or a proper will and after or [sive] the Vatican text alone adjoins knowledge and will; we prefer, however, the reading of the other manuscripts as A C F G L O R T etc., which is also proved by the context, because otherwise afterwards there would be superfluously placed similarly also (does) the will. ³ The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has after the start in place of and it is had in the first chapter. Then the Vatican text badly, and contradicting the manuscripts, omits and he says (is is) a what and/or; a few codices as I and cc have well enough but [sed] in place of and. ⁴ Concerning this matter there is commonly cited [allegatur] Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 33 (ch. 4): For acts (are) prior to powers and operations are according to a reckoning; moreover if (they are) thus, to these the opposed (i.e. objects) are prior still.. Then the mutilated reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, in which there is omitted also (does) the power; and if it means a "toward something, then" we have reintegrated with the help of the rest of the manuscripts and edition 1. ⁵ The book On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 11, and On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 1. ⁶ Having questioned the manuscripts and edition 1, we have put therefore He generates for the reason that He can generate in place of but rather conversely. ⁷ The Vatican text together with codex cc has and in place of or [sive], but contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1. ⁸ From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied therefore [ergo]. ⁹ Edition 1 together with one or another of the codices adds therefore [ergo]. ¹⁰ With the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 in favor, we have expunged here the badly added some [aliqui] and then after all [omnibus] we have inserted the Three [tribus]. ¹¹ Codex H well enough adds Persons [personarum]. ¹² The Vatican text here and after Son [Filium], contrary to very many codices and edition 1, adds or [sive] and a little below this, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, it omits and (the same) of the one [et aliterius] and also the particle and [et] after generate [generare].

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gigni, non dico aliud et aliud posse, sed alterius. Et huius positionis fuit Magister, sicut evidenter apparet in littera.¹ Unde isti dicebant, quod posse generare dicit quid, sed secundum respectum ad aliquid, quia est essentiale tractum ad personam. Cum enim non sit omnimodae abstractionis, potest ad personam trahi.	be begotten, I do not say (that there is) another and that another is able, but (that) of one of the two (is). And to this position belonged Master (Peter), as evidently appears in the text.¹ Whence those of this (position) used to say, that a ‘to be able to generate’ means a what, but according to a looking-back a toward something, because it is (something) essential extended [tractum] towards a Person. For since it does not belong to every manner of abstraction, it can be extended toward a Person.
Et ista posito Magistri² satis est probabilis et satis bene videtur sustineri posse.	And that position of Master (Peter) is probably enough and seems to be able to be sustained well enough.
Fuerunt etiam tertii³ moderniores, qui dixerut, quod potentia generandi dicit ad aliquid in divinis de se. Et ratio eorum est, quoniam potentia dicit habitudinem originalis principii ad principiatum. Et quoniam habitudo potest esse personae ad personam, et tunc vere est habitudo; et essentiae ad creaturam, et tunc secundum modum dicendi sive intelligendi: hinc est, quod principium de sui ratione non tantum est essentiale⁴ appropriatum per additionem, immo etiam dicit proprium personae. Pari ratione, cum potentia dicat orginalem habitudinem, non tantum essentialem, non solum⁵ dicitur vel trahitur ad personam, ut dicat essentiam personaliter, immo dicit proprium, et ita ad aliquid de se.	There were also more modern (authors) of a third (opinion), who said, that a power of generating among the divine means of itself a toward something. And reason is on their side [ratio eorum est], since power means a habitude of an original beginning towards the (thing) begun. And since a habitude can be of a person toward a person, it is then truly also a habitude; and of an essence to a creature, and then (it is such) according to a manner of speaking or of understanding: hence it is, that a principle from its own reckoning is not only an essential⁴ appropriated through addition, nay rather it also means (what is) proper to a person. For an equal reason, since power means an original habit, not only an essential one, it is not said or extended [trahitur] solely⁵ toward a person, so that it means the essence essentially, nay rather it means (what is) proper, and thus of itself a toward something.
Et positio ista sine praeiudicio videtur probabilior. Nam potentia generandi non videtur dicere nisi fecunditatem ad actum generationis; et illa est proprium personae, unde similiter et potentia.⁶ Nec est simile de posse et esse nisi uno modo. Hoc enim verbum est aliquando per se praedicatur, aliquando est tertium adiacens. Quando per se dicitur, tunc dicit actum absolutum, quia dicit actum entis ratione essentiae; et tunc oportet, quod dicatur absolute et quod dicat quid. Quando vero est tertim adiacens, ut cum dicitur Pater est Deus,⁷ Pater est Pater, tunc hoc verbum est dicit habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum. Et quoniam potest dicere habitudinem ad praedicatum essentiale vel personale, ideo potest dicere esse essentiale et modum essendi personalem. Posse autem de sui ratione propria dicit habitudinem secundum originem; et hinc est, quod specificatur per adiunctum, ut dicat conditionem principii essentialis, vel personalis. Hanc ergo positionem sustinendo respondeo⁸ argumentis probantibus, quod dicit quid.	And that position of theirs without prejudice seems more probable. For a power of generating seems to mean naught but a fecundity for an act of generation; and that is proper to a person, whence similarly also (is) the power.⁶ Nor is it similar concerning to be able and to be except in one manner. For this verb is sometimes is predicated per se, (and) sometimes is a third adjacent. When it is said per se, then it means an absolute act, because it means an act of a being by reason of essence [actum entis ratione essentiae]; and then it is proper, that it be said absolutely and that it mean a what. However when it is a third adjacent, as when there is said “the Father is God”,⁷ the Father is the Father, (and) then this verb “is” means a habitude of the predicate toward the subject. And since this can mean a habitude toward an essential and/or personal predicate, for that reason it can mean an essential “to be” [esse essentiale] and a personal manner of being [modum essendi personalem]. Moreover “to be able” [posse] from its own proper reckoning means a habitude according to an origin; and hence it is, that it is specified through an adjunct, so that it means a condition of the essential principle, and/or of the personal one. Therefore sustaining this position I respond⁸ to the arguments proving, that it means a what.
1. Quod enim primum obiicitur, patet: concedo enim, Magistrum fuisse huius positionis. Unde dixerunt, quod eadem potentia potest Filius gigni, qua Pater potest gignere; quod non esset,⁹ nisi potentia diceret quid. Unde dixit, quod potentia generandi est in Filio, sed non ad generare, sed ad generari. Haec autem positio¹⁰ dicit, quod est in solo Patre, quia non tantum respicit naturam, sed proprietatem personae.	1. For what is first objected, it is clear: for I concede, that Master (Peter) was of this position. Whence they said, that the Son can be begotten by the same power, by which the Father can beget; which would not be,⁹ unless power meant a what. Whence he said, that the power of generating is in the Son, but not for generating, but for being generated. Moreover this position¹⁰ means, that it is in the Father alone, because it does not respect the Nature, but a property of a Person.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod¹¹ generare consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod in divinis non consequitur naturam simpiliciter, sed naturam ut in persona; quia non in qualibet persona est natura fecunda, sed solum in persona Patris, et hoc est per aliquam proprietatem, quae est solius illius personae; non sic est in inferioribus, sicut iam patebit:¹² ideo patet quod illud non valet.	2. To that which is objected, that¹¹ to generate is consequent to nature; it must be said, that among the divine it is not consequent to the Nature simply, but to the Nature as in a Person; because not in every Person is the Nature fecund, but only in the Person of the Father, and this is through some property, which belongs to that Person alone; not so it is among inferior (things), just will now be clear:¹² for that reason it is clear that that (argument) is not valid.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aeternis est idem esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen argumentum nihil¹³ valet. Quamvis enim omnino sit idem in divinis esse et esse Patrem, non tamen sequitur, quod si esse Patrem est proprium, quod esse sit proprium. Similiter nec si esse sit commune, quod propter hoc esse Patrem.¹⁴ Similiter dicendum in proposito.	3. To that which is objected, that in eternals the same is to be and to be able; it must be said, that it is true; but, nevertheless [tamen], the argument is worth nothing.¹³ For although it is entirely the same among the divine to be and to be the Father, it does not, however, follow, that if to be the Father is proper, that to be is proper. Similarly neither if to be is common, that on this account to be the Father (is common).¹⁴ Similarly it must be said in the proposed (objection).
4. Ad illud quod obiciitur de scientia, quod dicit quid, sive per se dicatur, sive cum alio; dicendum, quod non est simile de scientia et potentia. Scientia enim, quantum est de se, dicit qualitatem absolutam, et ideo, quantum est de se, semper dicit quid, nisi trahatur; sed potentia dicit / habitudinem ad originem, . . .	4. To that which is objected concerning knowledge, that it means a what, whether it be said per se, or with an other; it must be said, that it is not similar concerning knowledge and power. For knowledge, as much as it is of itself, means an absolute quality, and for that reason, as much as it is of itself, it always means a what, unless it be extended [trahatur]; but power means / a habitude toward an origin, . . .
¹ Cap. 1. circa initium. — Vat. contra plurimos mss. et ed. 1 huiusmodi loco huius, et paulo infra post generare, obnitentibus ocdd. et ed. 1, male addit non tantum. Mox et cod. T et ed. 1 post sed posuimus secundum loco etiam; alii codd. omittunt vel sed vel secundum (omissio haec facillima erat, eo quod sed et secundum fere eodem modo abbreviata scribuntur), sed minus bene. Cod. R dicit quid et respectum sive ad aliquid. ² Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Magistri. Paulo ante nonnulli codd. ut K S Z ff ita loco ista, cod. X ideo. ³ Aliqui codd. ut V X Y addunt et. ⁴ Aliqui codd. ut G aa bb addiciunt commune. ⁵ Omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 essentialem pro essentialiter, quod Vat., mutata interpuncione, refert ad ea quae sequuntur; sed falso, quia opponitur verbo originalem. Ex mss F H P Q T Y ee adiecimus non solum, quod alii codd. cum Vat. omittunt; ed. 1 non hic, sed paulo infra post dicat addit non tantum. ⁶ Cod. bb addit generandi. ⁷ Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Pater est Deus, quod Vat. cum cod. cc omittit. — De tertio adiacente vide Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1. et Comment. S. Thomae in hunc locum (Lect. 2.), ubi et eadem distinctio de verbo est proponitur et explicatur: Et non dicitur esse tertium, quia sit tertium praedicatum; sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enuntiatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum. ⁸ Vat. respondetur, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. ⁹ Cod. X addit verum. Cfr. lit. Magistri, ch. 2. ¹⁰ Scilicet tertia opinio. — Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. loco positio habent potentia, cuius lectionis sensus est: haec autem potentia, scilicet generandi, iuxta praedicta dicit seu nominat illud quod est in solo Patre, nempe fecunditatem ad actum generationis. Melius legeretur: haec autem posito dicit, quod potentia est in solo Patre. ¹¹ Antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc quod pro quomodo. ¹² Hic q. 2. praesertim ad 6. et dub. 4. — Paulo ante codd. aa bb post proprietatem addunt scilicet innascibilitatem. ¹³ Vat., obnitentibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, non loco nihil. ¹⁴ Supple: sit commune. — Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittuntur verba Similiter usque Patrem, restauravimus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.	¹ Chapter 1, near the beginning. — The Vatican text, contrary to very many manuscripts and edition 1, has to a position of this kind [huiusmodi positionis] in place of to this position [huius positionis], and a little below this after to generate [generare], disagreeing with the codices and edition 1, it badly adds not only [non tantum]. Then from codex T and edition 1 after but [sed] we have put according to [secundum] in place of also [etiam]; the other codices omit but and/or according to (this omission was very easy, for the reason that sed and secundum are abbreviated in nearly the same manner), but less well. Codex R reads means a "what" and a looking-back or towards something. ² From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied of Master (Peter). A little befor this not a few codices as K S Z ff have thus the [ita] in place of this [ista], codex X has for that reason [ideo]. ³ Some codices as V X and Y add and [et]. ⁴ Some codices as G aa and bb add common [commune]. ⁵ All the codices together with editions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 have an essential one [essentialem] instead of the essentially [essentialiter], which the Vatican text, with changed punctuation, refers to those things which follow; but falsely, because it is contrasted with to the word original. From manuscripts F H P Q T Y and ee we have inserted not . . . solely [non solum]. ⁶ Codex bb adds of generating [generandi]. ⁷ From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied "the Father is God", which the Vatican text together with codex cc omits. Concerning the third adjacent see Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 1, and the Commentary of St. Thomas on this passage (Lect. 2), where the same distinction concerning the word is is also proposed and explained: And it is not said to be a third, because it is third predicate; but because it is a saying placed third in enunciation, which simultaneously with predicate noun makes one predicate. ⁸ The Vatican text has one responds [respondetur], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. ⁹ Codex X adds true [verum]. — Cf. the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2. ¹⁰ That is, the third opinion. — Very many codices together with the six first editions have power [potentia] in place of position [positio], the sense of which reading is: moreover this power, that is of generating, in accord with the aforesaid means or names that which is in the Father alone, namely a fecundity for an act of generation. It would read better (as): moreover this position means, that the power is in the Father alone. ¹¹ The more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, contrary to the Vatican text and codex cc, have in what manner [quomodo] in place of that [quod]. ¹² Here in q. 2, especially at n. 6 and dubium 4. — A little before this codices aa nd bb after property add ,that is, innascibility, [scilicet innascibilitatem]. ¹³ The Vatican text, disagreeing with very many manuscripts and edition 1, has is not valid [non valet] in place of is worth nothing [nihil valet]. ¹⁴ Supply: is common [sit commune]. — The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, in which there are omitted the words Similarly up to the Father, we have restored with the help of the other manuscripts and edition 1.

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habitudinem ad¹ originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et peronsae ad personam. Unde illud simile Magistri non valet secundum hanc positionem, quod,² sicut una est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater et non vult esse Filius, et e converso, similiter una est potentia, ut videtur.	a habitude toward¹ an origin, and for that reason it can mean a proper habitude and of a person toward a person. Whence that similar (opinion) of Master (Peter) is not valid according to this position, which (says that),² “just as one is the Will, by which the Father wills to be the Father and does not will to be the Son, and conversely, similarly one is the power”, as is seen (at the end of his second chapter).
Si quis autem vult sustinere positionem Magistri, de facili potest ad omnes rationes in oppositum respondere.	If anyone, moreover, wants to sustain the position of Master (Peter), he can in an easy manner [de facili] respond to all the reasons to the opposite.
1. Nam nulla ratio probat, quod potentia de se dicat proprium, sed quod potentia generandi active dicta sive posse generare dicat ex adiuncto respectum ad personam, et ita dicit ad aliquid; sed hoc est solum ratione additi. Unde³ notandum quod quatuor sunt genera nominum in divinis. Quaedam enim essentialia sunt dicta essentialiter, ut deitas et maiestas; quaedam essentialia personaliter dicta, ut potentia generandi; quaedam personalia dicta personaliter, ut generans et genitus; quaedam personalia dicta essentialier, ut missus, incarnatus et huiusmodi,⁴ quae dicunt respectum ad personam, et ideo personalia, et effectum in creatura, et ideo essentialiter sunt dicta.	1. For no reason proves, that power of itself means (something) proper, but (it does prove) that a power of generating said actively or a ‘to be able to generate’ means from [ex] its adjunct a respect toward a person, and thus it means a toward something; and this is solely by reason of the added. Whence³ it must be noted that there are four genera of names among the divine. For are certain essentials said essentially, as the Deity and the Majesty; certain essentials said personally, as the “Power of generating”; certain personals said personally, as “the One generating” and “the One begotten”; certain personals said essentially, as “the One sent” and “the One incarnate” and (names) of this kind,⁴ which means a looking-back toward a Person, and for that reason (they are) personals, and a effect in a creature, and for that reason they are said essentially.
2. Duabus rationibus sequentibus facile est respondere, quia illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando actus complectitur totam potentiam;⁵ non sic est in potentia Dei, quia eadem est potentia gignere et gigni in Deo.	2. To the two following reasons it is easy to respond, because that does not have truth, except when the act embraces the whole power;⁵ not so is it in the Power of God, because in God the power to beget and to be begotten is the same.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est posse generare et generare; dicendum, quod non valet. Quamvis enim idem sit⁶ Pater et substantia, non tamen sequitur, quod si Pater dicitur ad aliquid, quod et substantia, sicut melius patebit infra.⁷	3. To that which is objected, that ‘to be able to generate’ and ‘to generate’ is the same; it must be said, that it is not valid. For although the same is⁶ the Father and the Substance, it does not however follow, that if the Father is said toward something, that the Substance (is) also, as will be clear in a better manner below.⁷
4. 5. Duabus ultimis rationibus difficile est bene respondere; tamen potest quis dicere, quod rationes illae non concludunt, quod potentia dicat ad aliquid de se, sed solum ratione adiuncti, quod est generare; et sic patent cetera.⁸	4. 5. To the last two reasons it is difficult to respond well; however one can say, that those reasons do not conclude, that power means a toward something of itself , but solely by reason of the adjoined, which is “to generate”; and thus the rest are clear.⁸
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. In productione divinarum emanationem distinguitur principium quod et principium quo. Ipsae personae producentes sunt principium quod, cum actiones sint suppositorum. Principium quo (sive ratio, qua suppositum agit) divinarum productionum communiter asseritur esse potentiam generandi et spirandi. Sed disputatur, quid est haec potentia, et ciraca hoc inquirit hic S. Bonaventura. Aliis verbis haec quaestio sic exprimitur: utrum potentia generandi dicat quid absolutum (essentiam), an relativum sive relationem. Eadem difficultas est circa potentiam spirandi, quae communis est Patri et Filio, de qua infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. Quaestio utraque est potius de modo loquendi quam de gravi aliqua differentia in re. — Si autem quaeritur de principio quo utriusque emanationis, quid sit in se, et quomodo alterum ab altero differat, communiter nunc respondetur, esse duplicem fecunditatem, scilicet per modum naturae sive intellectus et per modum voluntatis; de quo vide infra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion. — Quoad quaestionem hoc loco tractatam recte observat Scotus (Report., hic. q. 1.), quod « diversae sententiae forte possunt conciliari nec videntur contrariari nisi verbis ». Quia tamen contrarii modi loquendi, quos doctores in hac quaestione adhibent, non parum influunt in solutiones aliarum de Trinitate quaestionum, quae infra tractantur, iuvat hic aliqua de variis solutionibus huius quaestionis dicere. — S. Thom. (S. I. q. 41. a. 5.) secundae opinioni hic in corp. positae favens asserit, quod potentia generandi significat « in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relatione », et in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 1.) cum B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) afirmat, eam « esse quasi mediam inter essentiale et personale ». Hanc opinionem S. Bonav. dicit esse « satis probabilem, et satis bene videtur sustineri posse », immo ipse in fine solutionis obiectorum argumenta contra eam allata nititur solvere. — Huic positioni directe opponitur sententia Gulielmi Altissiodorensis (vel melius Autissiodorensis, quia nomen Latinum civitatis Auxerre est Austissiodorum vel Autessiodorum) et Durand. (hic q. 1.), qui volunt, hanc potentiam dicere solam relationem. Dionys. Carth. eandem hanc sententiam attribuit S. Bonaventurae ipsamque approbat his verbis: « Videtur verior, quod potentia generativa dicatur pure ad aliquid . . . cum enim dicitur generativa potentia, complexum hoc sumitur in virtute unius dictionis aut nominis; ideo quantumcumque potentia secundum se diceretur absolute, tamen ex tali limitatione et contractione sumitur respective ». Sed qui attente ponderat verba S. Doctoris, hic et in dubiis circa litteram 5. 6. 7. scripta, iam perspiciet, ipsum mediam quandam viam eligere. Haec eius sententia clarius apparet ex anecdoto Prologo Seraphici ad II. Sent., ex quo supra. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. a. 1. in Schol., iam aliquid exscripsimus, et nunc prosequimur: « Similiter nec in alio, scil. in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister d. VII. innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum substantiam, et quod alii dicut, esse dictam secundum relationem et esse proprium, non est controversia, immmo utruque verum est, si quis attendat. Nam si divisim loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec duo nomina, sic, cum nomen potentiae de se sit essentiale et nomen virtutis generativae sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona. Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod connectantur in unius vocabuli intellectum, tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentia generandi quam fecunditats potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio potentia generandi vel posse generare dicitur secundum relationem. Et sic patet quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, nec una repugnat alteri. Sed hanc sententiam magis appro- / -bavi, . . . »	I. In the production of the Divine Emanations one distinguishes the principle which [principium quod] and the principle by which [principium quo]. The Persons producing are themselves the principle which, since the actions belong to the supposits. The principle by which (or reason, by which the supposits act) of the Divine Productions is commonly asserted to be the power of generating and spirating. But what this power is is disputed, and about this St. Bonaventure here inquires. In other words this question is thus expressed: whether the power of generating means and absolute "what" (an essence), or a relative one or relation. There is the same difficulty about the power of spirating, which is common to the Father and the Son, concerning which see below d. 29, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. Each question concerns a manner of speaking rather than some weighty difference on the matter. — Moreover if one asks concerning the principle by which of each emanation, what it is in itself, and who the one differs from the other, it is now commonly responded, that there is a twofold fecundity, that is through a manner of nature or intellect and through a manner of will; concerning which see below d. 13, q. 3 and the Scholium. — In regard to the question treated in this passage (Bl. John Duns) Scotus rightly observes (Reportatio, here in q. 1), that « the diverse sentences perhaps can be reconciled, nor do they seem to be contrary except in words ». However because the contrary manners of speaking, which the doctors employ in this question, do not a little flow into the solutions of the other questions concerning the Trinity, which are treated below, it helps here to say something concerning the various solutions of this question. — St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 41, a. 5) favoring the second opinion posited here in the body (of the question) asserts, that the power of generating signifies « in right (speech) the Divine Nature, but in oblique (speech) a relation », and in his Commentary on the Book of Sentences (here on q. 1) he affirms together with Bl. (now St.) Albert (here in a. 2), that it « is a quasi-middle (power) between the essential and the personal ». This opinion St. Bonaventure says is « probable enough, and seems to be able to be sustained well enough », nay rather he himself at the send of the solution of the objections strives to solve the arguments against it. — To this position is directly opposed the sentence of William of Auxerre, whose name in Latin is more correctly Autissiodorensis than Altissiodorensis, since the Latin name for Auxerre is Autissiodorum and/or Autessiodorum, and that of Durandus (here in q. 1), who would have, this power mean a relation alone. (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian attributes this same sentence to St. Bonaventure and approves it with these words: « It seems more true, that a generative power means purely toward something . . . for when “generative power” is said, this complex is taken in virtue of one saying or name; for that reason howsoever much a power according to itself would be said absolutely, however from such a limitation and contraction it is taken respectively ». But the one who has attentively pondered the words of the Seraphic Doctor, written here and in the doubts 5, 6 and 7 about the text, will already see throughout, that he has chosen the a certain middle way. This, his sentence, appears more clearly from the Seraphic (Doctor's) unpublished prologue to the Second Book of Sentences, some of which we have already quoted above in d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 in the Scholium, and now continue: « Similarly neither in the other, that in the power of generating, have I disagreed with him. Because the same Master (Peter) hints in d. VII, that the power of generating is said according to substance, and that other say, that it is said according to a relation and is (something) proper, there is no controversy, nay rather each is true, if one attends (to the matter). For if we speak in a divided manner [divisim] of the power of generating, according to which it is signified by these two nouns, so, though the noun for power of itself is essential and the noun for generative virtue is personal, it means an essence and/or nature as in a person. Moreover if we speak of that which is signified by those two words, to that they are connected in the understanding of one word, then, since the power of generating is nothing other than a fecundity of power, and a fecundity in producing any person is entirely said according to relation as is not (something) common, but proper, thus without doubt a power of generating and/or to be able to generate is said according to a relation. And thus it is clear that each of those opinions of theirs is true, nor is one repugnant to the other. But this sentence I have rather appro- / -ved . . . »
¹ Fide mss. et ed. 1 pro et substituimus ad, quod perfect correspondet dictis in fine corp. ² Reliquimus cum Vat. quod, licet plurimi codd. habeant quia, sed minus bene. ³ Vat. cum cod. cc Item, et paulo infra post essentialiter ut addit divinitas, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1. ⁴ Plures codd. ut A I S T V Y aa omittunt incarnatus et huiusmodi. ⁵Cod. I addit quando scilicet potentia se habet determinate ad unum actum, ita quod non ad alium. ⁶ Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit et. ⁷ Dist. 9. q. 2, imprimis ad 3. 6. et d. 26. q. 1. 3. ⁸ Codd. P Q omnia pro cetera; cod. V patet solutio ad omnia obiecta.	¹ Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted toward for and [et], which perfectly corresponds to what is said at the end of the body (of the question). ² With the Vatican text we have left which (says that) [quod], though very many codices have because [quia], but less well. ³ The Vatican text together with codex cc has Likewise [Item], and a little below this after essentially, as [essentialiter, ut] it adds the Divinity, but contrary to the other codices and edition 1. ⁴ Very many codices as A I S T V Y and aa omit the One incarnate and (names) of this kind. ⁵ Codex I adds when, that is, the power holds itself determinately toward one act, so that (it is) not toward another. ⁶ The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, adds both [et]. ⁷ Distinction 9, q. 2, first of all at n. 3 and 6, and distinction 26, q. 1 and 3. ⁸ Codices P and Q have all [omnia] in place of the rest [cetera]; codex V has is clear the solution to all the objections.

p. 138

appro- / -bavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere. In his igitur et aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens debita servata reverentia [desunt aliqua verba] et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem ingenii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potero, sustinere, his tantum exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium. Haec autem sunt octo, ita quod in quolibet libro sunt duo » etc.	approv- / -ed, because it attains more to the truth of the matter, though for a full expression of the truth it is proper to sustain each (opinion). Therefore adhering to these and the other words of Master (Peter), having observed the reverence due {the other words are lacking} I both have proposed and do propose, in accord with the thinness of (my) genius and the poverty of (my) science in these (things), in which I shall be able, to sustain, with these things only excepted, in which more commonly are not sustained, nay rather the common opinion holds the contrary. Moreover these are eight, so that in each book there are two » etc..
Secundum hanc explicationem essentia et proprietas personae constituunt principium quod productionum totale, et quidem sic, ut essentia sit quasi fundamentum et initium, proprietas vero ratio completiva et quasi formalis, sive ut Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1.) dicit: « Potentia generandi in divinis dicit quid et ad aliquid, formalius tamen ad aliquid videtur significare ». Consentiunt Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.), Alex. Hal., (S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. ad ult.) Nec Henr. Gand. (S. a. 54. q. 8. n. 27. et Quodl. 3. q. 14.) et ipse Scotus aliter sentire videntur, licet hic sub aliis distinctionibus respondeat. Et cum etiam S. Thom. doceat, potentiam generandi importare tum essentiam tum relationem, liquet, eos non dissentire nisi in questione, quid per prius intelligi debeat. Ceterum solutio S. Bonaventurae cohaeret cum principiis, quae infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. diffuse defendit.	According to this explanation the Essence and property of a Person constitute the total principle which of the Productions, and indeed in this manner, that the Essence is a quasi-fundament and start, but the property a completive and a quasi-formal reason, or as Richard of Middleton (here in q. 1) says: « The power of generating among the divine means a what and a toward something, however it seems to signify more formally a toward something ». (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 1, a. 2) and Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 2, at the last n., agree. Nor does Henry of Ghent (Summa., a. 54, q. 8, n. 27, and Quodlibetals, 3, q. 14) and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus seem to think otherwise, though the latter makes a response under other distinctions. And since even St. Thomas teaches, that a power of generating conveys both an essence and a relation, let it be allowed, that the others do not dissent except in the question, “what ought to be understood through (a consideration of what is) prior”. St. Bonaventure's solution of the rest (of the objections) is coherent with the principles, which he defends at length below in d. 27, p. I, q. 2.
II. Valde notabilis est doctrina Seraphici (ad 1.) de quadruplici genere divinorum nominorum. Haec sumta sunt ex Alex. (loc. cit. a. 1.).	II. Very notable is the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor (at n. 1) concerning the fourfold genus of divine names. These have been taken from Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., a. 1).
III. In solutione argumentorum a solito ordine receditur. Ut nempe opinionem Magistri defendat. S. Doctor argumenta pro propria sua sententia secundo loco adducta solvere nititur. Ordinem solutione indicant postillae marginales. Auctoribus iam laudatis addantur: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q., S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 4. — Aegid R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1. 2.	III. In the solution of the arguments there is a departure from the usually order. Namely (St. Bonaventure) defends the opinion of Master (Peter). The Seraphic Doctor strives to solve the arguments adduced for his own sentence in the second place. The marginal notes (of the printed edition) indicate the order of the solution. To the authors already praised there are adds: Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), on this and the following question, Summa., p. I, tr. 7, q. 30, m. 4. — Giles the Roman, here in the 1st principle of q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1 and 2.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII