COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 7, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII
ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE SOLE Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 138-140. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 138-140. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Quaestio II. Utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio.	Question 2 Whether the power of generating is in the Son.
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio; et quod sic, videtur auctoritatibus et rationibus.	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the power of generating is in the Son; and that (it is) so, seems from authorities and reasons.
1. Primo sic: Hilarius nono de Trinitate¹ dicit: « Filius habet in se naturaliter naturam gignentem »: ergo natura in Filio est nata generare.	1. First thus: (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) in the ninth (book) On the Trinity¹ says: « The Son has in Himself naturally a Nature being begotten »: therefore the Nature in the Son has been born to generate.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum:² « Neque enim non potuit Filius generare », sed duae negationes aequivalent uni affirmationi: ergo potuit generare.	2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the book Against Maximinus (says):² « For neither could the Son not generate », but two negations are equivalent to one affirmation: therefore He could generate.
3. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: plus ordinatur generare ad generandi potentiam, quam ad potentiam spirandi; sed Pater generans Filium communicat ei³ potentiam spirandi: ergo multo fortius potentiam generandi.	3. Likewise, by reasons it is shown thus: “to generate” is ordained more to the power of generating, than to the power of spirating; but the Father generating the Son communicates to Him³ the power of spirating: therefore much more the power of generating.
4. Item, Filius est expressissima imago Patris: ergo tantum imitatur Patrem, quod non potest cogitari similior; sed si Filius cogitatur ut generans, magis cogitatur imitari: ergo si imitatur amplius, quam possit quis cogitare, ergo et in actu generandi.	4. Likewise, the Son is the most express image of the Father: therefore He only imitates the Father, because He cannot be thought (to be) more similar; but if the Son is thought to (be) generating, He is thought to imitate (Him) more: therefore if He imitates (Him) more amply, than one can think, therefore also in the act of generating.
5. Item, per simile videtur sic: maior communicatio et diffusio est in luce aeterna quam in luce creata; sed lux creata dat splendori potentiam producendi alium, et sic procedendo; et⁴ si esset infinitae virtutis, produceret infinitos splendores: ergo etc..	5. Likewise, through (what is) similar it seems thus: a greater communication and diffusion is in the eternal Light than in the created light; but created light gives to splendor a power of producing an other, and thus to (what is) to proceed (from it); and⁴ if it were of an infinite virtue, it would produce infinite splendors: ergo etc..
6. Item, in generatione carnali pater non dicitur perfectum filium generare, nisi det ei potentiam generandi: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortius,⁵ non erit Filius perfectus, nisi habeat potentiam ad id, ad quod Pater potest: ergo ad generandum. Aut si non est ita in divinis, tunc ergo quaero rationem, quare de perfectione generationis aeternae non sic est communicatio potentiae generandi, sicut in generatione creata.	6. Likewise, in carnal generation a father is not said to generate a perfect son, unless he gives him the power of generating: therefore for an equal reason, nay rather much more strongly,⁵ the Son will not be perfect, unless He has the power for that, for which the Father can (act): therefore to generate. Or if it is not thus among the divine, then, therefore, I ask for the reason, why concerning the perfection of eternal generation there is not in this manner a communication of the power of generating, as (there is) in created generation.
SED CONTRA: 1. Augustinus contra Maximinum⁶ dicit, « quod non oportuit Filium generare »; sed si non fuit opportunum, nec conveniens; ergo impossibile fuit, Filium generare: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi, quia omni potentia est potens ille qui habet eam: ergo etc.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine (in his book) Against Maximinus⁶ says, « that it was not proper [non oportuit] that the Son generate »; but if it was not proper [opportunum], neither (was it) fitting [conveniens]; therefore it was impossible that the Son generate: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating, because by every power is able the one who has it: ergo etc..
2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio:⁸ « Qui potest quod sibi non convenit, quanto magis illud potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in eum »: ergo cum Filio non conveniat generare, si posset, potentia illa esset in eo miseria; sed nullam habet miseriam: ergo nec potentiam generandi.	2. Likewise, (St.) Anselm in the Proslogion⁸ (says): « He who can (do) what is not fitting for him (to do), as much as that is more able (to be done), so much more can there be adversity and perversity in him »: therefore since it is not fitting for [cum] the Son to generate, if He could, that power would be a misery in Him; but He has no misery: therefore neither (does He have) a power of generating.
3. Item, ratione probatur hoc idem sic:⁹ omne illud, in quo aliqua duo necessario distinguuntur, si necessario convenit uni, impossibile est unquam convenire alii, sicut patet: si Petrus et Ioannes necessario differunt in albedine, et albedo convenit Petro, impossibile est, quod Ioanni conveniat; sed Pater et Filius sunt personaliter distincti, ita quod necesse est esse distinctos, et non est dare in quo / distinguantur . . .	3. Likewise by reason this same is proved thus:⁹ every that, in which two somethings are necessarily distinguished, if it befits one necessarily, it is impossible that it ever befit the other, as is clear: if Peter and John necessarily differ in whiteness, and whiteness is fitting to Peter, it is impossible, that it be fitting to John; but the Father and the Son are personally distinct, so that it is necessary that They be distinct, and there is naught to be granted (in that) in which / they are distinguished . . .
¹ Num. 51: Neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam. ² Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium; in quo textu aliqui codd. non pro neque, alii non potuit Filius non generare. ³ Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 ei, quod Vat. cum cod. cc minus bene omittit. ⁴ Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit et. ⁵ Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 fortiori, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post ad id omittit ad. Mox pauci codd. ut 1 ff cum ed. 1 habet pro potest. ⁶ Libr. II. c. 12. n. 3; vide supra lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium. ⁷ Cfr. d. 2. q. 1. ad. 1. ⁸ Cap. 7: Nam qui haec potest, quod sibi non expedit, et quod non debet, potest, quae quanto magis potest, tanto magis adversitas et perversitas possunt in illum. — Sub nomine adversitas intelligitur hic non tribulatio (utpote quae sanctis est bonum), sed nocivum. — Vat. contra antiquos codd. et ed. 1 hoc potest pro illud potest. ⁹ Confusam Vat. et cod. cc lectione, emendavimus ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1 ponendo sic loco sicut, et paulo infra sicut patet pro ut patet sic. Plures codd. aliqui loco aliqua.	¹ Number 51: Nor, again, do we preach that the Father (is) in the Son by a corporal insinuation, but that He had a Nature, naturally begetting in Itself a Nature begotten out of Him of the same genus. ² Book II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter) above, ch. 1, near the middle; in which text some codices have not [non] in place of neither [neque], others Not (that) the Son could not generate. ³ We have supplied from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 to Him [ei], which the Vatican text together with codex cc less well omits. ⁴ The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits and [et]. ⁵ The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has for a much stronger (reason) [multo fortiori], and a little below this, contrary to very many manuscripts and edition 1, after for that [ad id] it omits for [ad]. Then a few codices as I and ff together with edition 1 have has [habet] in place of can [potest]. ⁶ Book II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter) above, near the middle. ⁷ Cf. d. 2, q. 1, at n. 1. ⁸ Chapter 7: For he who can (do) this, which is not expedient for him (to do), and which he ought not (do), can (do), what as much as he can more, so much more can adversity and perversity (be) in him. — Under the noun adversity is here understood not ‘tribulation’ (which, as it is, is a good to the Saints), but ‘the harmful’ [nocivum]. — The Vatican text, contrary to the ancient codices and edition 1, has this is . . .able [hoc potest] in place of that is . . . able [illud potest]. ⁹ The confused reading of the Vatican text and codex cc, we have emended with the help of the other codices and edition 1, by putting thus [sic] in place of just as [sicut], and a little below this just as is clear [sicut patet] in place of as is thus clear [ut patet sic]. Very many codices have someones [aliqui] in place of somethings [aliqua].

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distinguantur¹ nisi in hoc, quod ille est generans, iste genitus: ergo cum generare conveniat Patri, impossibile est, quod conveniat Filio: ergo Filius non potest generare: ergo non habet potentiam generandi.	they are distinguished¹ except in this, that the former is the Generating, that of His (is) the Begotten: therefore since “to generate” befits the Father, it is impossible, that it befit the Son: therefore the Son cannot generate: therefore He does not have the power of generating.
4. Item, generatio Filii a Patre similis est expresse ipsi² generationi verbi a mente; sed verbum genitum non habet potentiam generandi aliud verbum, immo oportet, quod omne verbum immediate sit a mente: ergo si recte simile est Verbum increatum, non habet potentiam generandi, sed generandi potentia est in solo Patre.	4. Likewise, the generation of the Son from [a] the Father is expressly similar to the very² generation of a word from a mind; but the word begotten does not have the power of generating another word, nay rather it is proper, that every word be immediately from [a] the mind: therefore if the uncreated Word is rightly similar, He does not have a power of generating, but the power of generating is in the Father alone.
5. Item, fiat argumentatio Augustini³ ducens ad impossibile. Si Filius habet potentiam sive posse generandi, ponatur quod generet; quaero de secundo similiter; et si non est stare in primo, oportet ponere infinitos filios, quia qua ratione non statur in primo, ergo nec in aliquo: ergo si est stare — quia hoc⁴ repugnat divinae completioni — sed qua ratione statur in aliquo, statur in primo: ergo primus non habet potentiam generandi.	5. Likewise, let (St.) Augustine's³ argument leading to the impossible be (supposed). If the Son has a power or a ‘to be able’ to generate [posse generandi], it is posited that He would generate; I ask concerning the second (son) similarly; and if there is not a standing still [stare] in the first, it is proper to posit infinite sons, because for the reason for which it is not caused to stand still [statur] in the first, therefore neither in any: therefore if there is a standing still — because this (lack of stability)⁴ is repugnant to divine completion — but for the reason for which it is caused to stand still in any (son), it is caused to stand still in the first: therefore the first (Son) does not have the power of generating.
6. Item, fiat argumentatio Richardi:⁵ si generaret Filius alium filium: ergo cum filius genitus magis attineat patri quam avo, secundum hoc non esset ibi summa et aequalis connexio: ergo nec summa et aequalis dilectio:⁶ ergo nec perfecta beatitudo: quae omnia tanquam summe impossibilia respuit pia fides.	6. Likewise, let Richard (of St. Victor)'s argument be (supposed):⁵ if the Son would generate another son; therefore since a begotten son attains to the father more than to the grandfather, according to this there would not be There a most high and equal connection: therefore neither a most high and equal dilection:⁶ therefore neither a perfect beatitude: all of which a pious faith rejects [respuit] as most highly impossible.
CONCLUSIO. Pater potentiam generandi non communicat Filio, quod duabus rationibus probatur.	CONCLUSION The Father does not communicate the power of generating to the Son, which is proven by two reasons.
RESPONDEO: Opinio aliquorum est, quod in Filio est potentia generandi, sed non generat. Hoc autem non est, quia non potest, sed quia non convenit ei.⁷ Et ponunt simile in creaturarum productione sive creatione. Deus potest infinitas creaturas producere; sed quod non producit, hoc non est ex impotentia, sed quia non convenit ei; sic et in proposito.	I RESPOND: The opinion of some is, that in the Son there is a power of generating, but He does not generate. Moreover this is not, because He cannot, but because it is not fitting for Him.⁷ And they posit a similar in the production of creatures or (in) creation. God can produce infinite creatures; but that He does not produce (them), this is not out of impotency, but because it is not fitting for Him; thus also in the proposed (objection).
SED CONTRA: Ponatur tunc, quod illa potentia, quae est in Filio ad generandum, ducatur in actum; constat quod Filius generabit Deum aeternum: ergo aliquid poterit⁸ incipere habere esse et esse aeternum; hoc autem est impossibile et non intelligibile.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: Let it be then posited, that that power, which is in the Son to generate, is led into act; it is established that the Son will generate an eternal God: therefore something could⁸ begin [incipere] to have ‘being’ and to be eternal; but this is impossible and non-intelligible.
Propterea⁹ dicendum, quod Pater non communicat Filio posse generare propter duo. Unum est, quia non potest, aliud, quia non debet.	On that account⁹ it must be said, that the Father does not communicate to the Son a ‘to be able to generate’ on account of two (reasons). One is, that He can not, the other, that He ought not.
Ratio autem, quare non potest, haec est: quia fecunditas ad generandum est in Patre, quia principium, et ideo principium, quia primum. Impossibile autem est, quod primum¹⁰ communicet alii primitatem. Nam hic est oppositio in adiecto, quod persona producta sit prima. Quia ergo fecunditas ad generandum ex primitate Patri inerat, ideo non potest eam communicare Filio; et hanc credo propriam esse rationem huius, sicut infra patebit distinctione vigesima septima,¹¹ ubi agetur, quare Pater generat.	Moreover the reason, why He can not, is this: because the fecundity to generate is in the Father, because (He is) the principle, and the principle for the reason that (He is) the first. Moreover it is impossible, that the first¹⁰ communicate primacy to an other. For this is oppositio in adiecto, that a person produced be first. Therefore because the fecundity to generate was in the Father from [ex] a primacy, for that reason He cannot communicate it to the Son; and this I believe to be His own reason, just as shall be clear below in the twenty-seventh distinction,¹¹ where one deals with, why the Father generates.
Similiter non debet communicare, quoniam¹² in emanatione divinarum personarum debet attendi originalis distinctio et plenissima communicatio: originalis distinctio, quia necesse est, ea quae communicant in natura distingui vel per materiam,¹³ vel per originem. Per materiam distingui personas est impossibile; quia ubi est talis modus distinguendi, est compositio et variatio et formae multiplicatio, quae omnia Deo repugnant, qui est simplex et invariabilis et vere unum. Et ideo necesse est distingui per originem sive habitudinem: ergo per generare et generari: ergo si Filius potest generare, potest etiam non distingui. Si tu dicas, quod adhuc est distinctio, quia unus tantum Pater, alius tantum Filius, alius Pater et Filius; tunc ego oppono tibi, quod secundus filius posset generare eadem ratione, qua primus; et tunc duo essent, quorum uterque esset pater et filius.	Similarly He ought not communicate, since¹² in the emanation of the Divine Persons there ought to be attained an original distinction and a most full communication: an original distinction, because it is necessary, that those which communicate in nature be distinguished through matter,¹³ and/or through origin. Through matter it is impossible to distinguish the Persons; because where there is such a manner of distinguishing, there is composition and variation and the multiplication of form, which are all repugnant to God, who is simple and invariable and truly one. And for that reason it is necessary that They be distinguished through origin or habitude: therefore through generating and being generated: therefore if the Son can generate, He also cannot be distinguished. If you say, that there is still a distinction, because one (is) only the Father, another only the Son, another the Father and the Son; then I oppose you, because a second son could generate for the same reason, for which the first (does); and then there would be two, each of which would be father and son.
Similiter propter plenissimam communicatio- / -em . . .	Similarly on account of a most full communication . . .
¹ Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 substituimus distinguantur pro distinguuntur. ² Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit ipsi. ³ Libr. II. contra Maximin. c. 12. n. 3; vide in lit. Magistri c. 1. circa medium. — Paulo infra plures codd. ut A F G H I K W Y etc. cum ed. 1 quaeram loco quaero. ⁴ Locus difficilis et fortasse corruptus. Subintellige: ponere infinitos filios, sive potius: non stare in aliquo; ideoque particula quia in hac sua positione non directam rationem, sed potius praesuppositionem respectu propositionis conditionalis si est stare indicat, quod hac melior positione apparet: ergo — quia hoc repugnat divinae completioni — si est stare. — Cod. Z ergo necesse est stare. Paulo infra post completioni ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sed. ⁵ Libr. V. de Trin. c. 10. seqq. et VI. c. 2. seqq. — Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, post Richardi, addit ut et paulo infra praeter fidem antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 nec non operum Richardi (IV. de Trin. c. 6.) loco patri quam avo ponit ad patrem quam alius. ⁶ Sequimur cod. O, dum alii codd. et edd. legunt distinctio, quod nec contextui nec argumentationi Richardi correspondere videtur. ⁷ Plerique codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt ei, quod tamen, sibi ipsis non constantes, paulo infra, ubi eadem propositio recurrit, apponunt. Mox ed. 1 cum uno alterover cod. producat loco producit. ⁸ Vat. cum cod. cc poterat, sed obstant antiquiores mss. cum ed. 1. ⁹ Substituimus Propterea loco Propter hoc fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, aliqui tamen mss. deinde addunt vel hoc vel ad hoc. Mox auctoritate eorundum mss. et ed. 1 posse generare posuimus loco potentiam generandi. ¹⁰ ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc, qui habent principium pro primum, sed minus concinne. Mox codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut F G H I K cc ee legunt nam haec est, alii ut P Q cum edd. 4, 5 nam hoc est, alii demum cum Vat. et ed. 1 nam hic est. ¹¹ Parte I. a. 1. q. 2. ¹² Faventibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus quoniam pro quia. Cod. R post Similiter addit propter emanationem. ¹³ Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et immediate infra naturam loco materiam, sed falso, ut ex contextu patet.	¹ From very many codices and edition 1 we have substituted (the subjunctive) they are distinguished [distinguantur] for (the indicative) they are distinguished [distinguuntur]. ² The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits the very [ipsi]. ³ Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 12, n. 3; see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1, about the middle. — A little below this very many codices as A F G H I K W Y etc. together with edition 1 have I will ask [quaeram] in place of I ask [quaero]. ⁴ A difficult and perhaps corrupt passage. Understand: "to posit infinite sons", or rather: "not to stand still in any (son)"; and for that reason the particle because [quia] in this position does not indicate a direct reason, but rather a presupposition in respect of the conditional proposition, if there is a standing still, which appears better in this position: "therefore — because this is repugnant to divine completion — if there is a standing still". — Codex Z reads therefore it is necessary that it stand still [ergo necesse est stare]. A little below this after completion, we have added from the manuscripts and edition 1 but [trans. note: sed, in opposition to the parenthetical comment]. ⁵ On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 10 ff., and Bk. VI, ch. 2 ff.. — The Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, after be (supposed), adds that [ut] and a little below this, not trusting in the more ancient codices and edition 1, but in the works of Richard (On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 6) in place of to a father, than to a grandfather it puts toward a father than (anyone) else. ⁶ We follow codex O, while the other codices and editions read distinction [distinctio], which seems to correspond neither to the context nor to Richard's argument. ⁷ Very many codices together with edition 1 omit for Him [ei], which they, however, do include, inconsistently, a little below, where the same proposition recurs. Then edition 1 with one or another codex has (the subjunctive) produce [producat] in place of (the indicative) produce [producit]. ⁸ The Vatican text together with codex cc has (the indicative) could have undertook [poterat incipere], but the more ancient manuscripts together with edition 1 withstand this. ⁹ We have substituted On this account [Propterea] in place of On account of this [Propter hoc], trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, however other manuscripts then read this must be said [hoc dicendum] and/or to this (objection) [ad hoc]. Then on the authority of the same manuscripts and edition 1 we have put a ‘to be able to generate’ in place of the power of generating [potentiam generandi]. ¹⁰ Thus the older codices together with edition 1, contrary to the Vatican text and codex cc, which have a principle [principium] in place of the first [primum], but less elegantly. Then the codices dissent among themselves; for some as F G H I K cc and ee read for this (saying) is an [nam haec est], other as P and Q together with editions 4 and 5 read for this is [nam hoc est], others still with the Vatican text and edition 1 read for here there is [nam hic est]. ¹¹ Part I, a. 1, q. 2. ¹² With the manuscripts and edition 1 favoring it, we have substituted since [quoniam] for because [quia]. Codex R after Similarly adds on account of emanation [propter emanationem]. ¹³ Very many codices together with edition 1 here and immediately below have nature [naturam] in place of matter [materiam], but falsely, as is clear from the context.

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communicatio- / -em non debet communicare, quia multiplicatio suppositorum secundum similem modum egrediendi non est nisi aut propter defectum durationis, sicut dictum est,¹ in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, ut per successivam generationem perpetuetur esse, aut propter defectum perfectae actionis, ut fiat per plures, quod non potest² per unum. Sicut sunt factae plures stellae, quia non sufficeret una ad hoc quod faciunt omnes, sic etiam plures Angeli et plures animae ad implendam illam civitatem et manifestandum Dei bonitatem, quam nec una anima nec unus Angelus poterat sufficienter manifestare. Cum ergo in Filio Dei sit plenissima communicatio, quia totam infinitem suam dat sibi Pater, non fuit conveniens, quod communicaret Filio illam potentiam: et ideo fuit impossibile, quia inconveniens quodlibet in divinis est impossibile.³	He ought not communicate, because a multiplication of supposits according to a similar manner of stepping forth is not but either on account of a defect of duration, just as has been said,¹ in (regard to things) generable and corruptible, that (their) ‘to be’ is perpetuated through a successive generation, or on account of a defect of perfect action, so that there is done [fiat] through the more, what cannot (be done)² through the one. Just as more stars have been made, because one would not suffice for that which all do, so also (there are) more Angels and more souls to fill that City (of God) and to manifest the goodness of God, which neither one soul nor one Angel could have sufficiently manifested. Therefore since in the Son of God there is a most full communication, because the Father gives His own whole infinity to Him, it was not fitting, that He communicate to the Son that power: and for that reason it was impossible, because in the divine anything unfitting is impossible.³
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium per auctoritatem Hilarii, quod Filius habet in se naturam gignentem; dicendum, quod verbum illud est improprium, et ex verbis impropriis non est arguendum, sed magis eorum improprietas exponenda, ut Magister superius exposuit. Est enim sensus: habet in se naturam gignentem, id est naturam Patris gignentis.	1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary through the authority of (St.) Hilary, that the Son has in Himself a nature begetting; it must be said, that that word is improper, and one must not argue out of improper words, but rather their impropriety is to be expounded, as Master (Peter) above expounded (them). For the sense is: ‘He has in Himself a Nature begetting, that is the Nature of the Father begetting’.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod neque⁴ non potuit; dicendum, quod Magister bene exponit, id est, non fuit ex hoc impotens. Unde secundum artem distinguendum est, quando dicitur, Filius non potuit generare: quia non potest teneri privative; et tunc est sensus, non potuit, id est, impotens fuit; et tunc negatur potentia, et relinquitur aptitudo, sicut de truncato dicitur, quod non potest gradi, quia aptus natus est ad gradiendum et non potest gradi;⁵ hoc modo non potest dici de Filio, quia non habet ad hoc aptitudinem; et in hoc sensu loquitur Augustinus. Alio modo non posse tenetur negative; et in hoc sensu concedendum est, quod Filius non potuit generare.	2. To that which is objected, that neither⁴ could He not; it must be said, that Master (Peter) expounds (this) well, that is, (that) He was not impotent out of this. Whence technically [secundum artem] one must distinguish, when there is said, the Son could not generate: because not can be held privatively; and then the sense is, He could not, that is, He was impotent; and then power is denied, and aptitude is left behind, just as concerning an amputee [tuncatus] there is said, that he cannot take a step, because (as) one apt he has been born to take a step and he cannot take a step;⁵ in this manner there cannot be said of the Son, that He does not have an aptitude for this; and in this sense (St.) Augustine speaks. In another manner not to be able is held negatively; and in this sense it must be conceded, that the Son cannot generate.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod Pater communicat Filio potentiam spirativam; patet responsio: quia cum Filius generetur, non potest habere primitatem respectu generationis; sed cum non spiretur, est inspirabilis; et ideo potuit habere primitatem et fecunditatem respectu illius: et sic patet quod⁶ non valet ratio.	3. To that which is objected: that the Father communicates to the Son a spirative power; the response is clear: because since the Son would generate, He cannot have a primacy in respect of generation; but since He is not spirated, He is unable to be spirated [inspirabilis]; and for that reason He could have a primacy and a fecundity in respect of that: and thus it is clear that⁶ the reason is not valid.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius est expressissima imago etc.; dicendum, quod ideo Filius dicitur⁷ expressissima imago, quia repraesentat in omnibus, in quibus imago nata est repraesentare; sed imago sic nata est repraesentare, ut tamen ipsa non sit imaginatum; alioquin non esset imago. Si autem Filius repraesentaret in actu generandi, iam esset Pater: et ideo nec intelligibile nec possibile est, Filium generare sive in generatione Patrem imitari.	4. To that which is objected, that the Son is the most express image etc.; it must be said, that the Son is said⁷ (to be) the most express image for the reason that He represents in all (respects), in which an image is bound to represent; but thus an image is bound to represent, however, so that it not be the (thing) imaged; otherwise it would not be an image. Moreover if the Son would represent in the act of generating, He would already be the Father: and for that reason it is neither intelligible nor possible, that the Son generate or that the Father in generation be imitated.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de luce et splendore, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux non perfecte se multiplicat in primo splendore: ideo in pluribus facit quod non potest in uno.	5. To that which is objected concerning light and splendor, it must be said, that it is not similar, because light does not perfectly multiply itself in the first splendor: for that reason it does in more what it cannot in one.
6. Similiter et in filio carnali intelligendum; unde unus pater generat plures filios.⁸ Haec tamen ratio non est principalis, sed illa quae dicta est supra,⁹ quia in his inferioribus non est fecunditas per rationem primitatis, sed per rationem perfectionis. In Deo autem, quia est perfectissimum et primum, non tantum est per naturam perfectionis; quia tunc in omnibus personis esset, et status¹⁰ esse non posset; sed per rationem primitatis. Item rationes istae non procedunt per simile, immo magis per dissimile.	6. Similarly also in a carnal son (this) must be understood; whence one father generates more sons.⁸ However this reason is not the principal one, but that which has been said above (is),⁹ because in these inferiors there is not a fecundity through a reckoning of primacy, but through a reckoning of perfection. In God, moreover, because He is the most perfect and first, it is not only through a Nature of perfection; because then it would be in all the Persons, and (its) standing still¹⁰ could not be; but (also) through a reckoning of primacy. Likewise those reasons do not proceed through the similar, nay rather (they proceed) more through the dissimilar.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Haec quaestio intime cohaeret cum praecedenti. In respons. dicitur: personas distingui per originem sive habitudinem. Hoc non disiunctive intelligi debet, sed sic: per originem cum relationibus inde resultantibus, cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3. et Scholion. — In solut. ad 2. verba: « et tunc negatur potentia et relinquitur aptitudo » etc. facile intelliguntur, si attenditur, quod oratio cum negatione privata exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una negat actum, altera ponit subjectum ex natura sua aptum ad actum. Si igitur verba: Filius non potuit, sumuntur private i. e. ut impotens, tunc supponitur primo, quod ex natura sua sit ad hoc aptus, et deinde asseritur, quod hoc non potest actu. Cfr. S. Thom. et Ricard., hic circa lit.	I. This question adheres [cohaeret] intimately with the preceding In the response there is said: that the Persons are distinguished through origin or habitude. This ought not be understood disjunctively, but rather thus: through origin with the relations resulting from this, cf. below d. 26, q. 3 and the Scholium. — In the solution to n. 2 the words: « and then power is denied and aptitude is left behind » etc. are easily understood, if one attends, that the statement is expounded with a privative negation by two propositions, one of which denies the act, the other of the two posits a subject out of its nature apt for acting. Therefore if the words: The Son can not, are taken privatively, i. e. that (He is) impotent, then there is first supposed, that from the Nature itself He is apt for this, and then there is asserted, that He cannot be in act. Cf. St. Thomas and Richard (of Middleton), here about the text (of Master Peter).
II. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., Report., hic q. 2. (ubi expressis verbis solutionem Seraphici approbat). — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. princ. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 54. q. 8. et a. 58. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 3.	II. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 3, a. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio, here in q. 2 (where he explicitly approves of the Seraphic Doctor's solution). — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 6, at n. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 5, 10, and 11. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2 at the beginning. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 54, q. 8 and a. 58, q. 1. — Durandus, here in q. 3. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 3.
¹ Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. omittit dictum , sed obstant fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1. ² Supple cum cod. Z fieri, vel lerge cum nonnullis codd. ut A S T V et ed. 1 potest unum. Mox ope mss. vetustiorum et ed. 1 substituimus factae loco perfectae. Cod. M cum ed. 1 sic pro sicut. ³ Vide supra d. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ergo loco autem. ⁴ Adiecimus particulam neque, quae ex obiectione et contextu requiritur, pro qua cod. T ponit non; plurimi codd. particulam illam omittunt legentes quod non potuit, fortase eo quod, sicut supra in obiectoine notavimus, verba Augustini alio modo allegant, scil. non potuit Filius non generare; in qua lectione hic supplenda sunt verba non generare. Cod. T paulo infra post Filius habet non non potuit; sed duplex negatio hic non ita necessaria videtur, sicut paulo supra. ⁵ Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba quia aptus usque ad gradi, sed obstant antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1. ⁶ Nonnulli codd. ut bb ff cum ed. 1 quare. ⁷ Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ideo et loco est substituimus dicitur, ac paulo infra post sed expunximus tamen. ⁸ Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt carnales, quod Vat. cum cod. cc superflue addit. ⁹ Scil., prima in corp. huius quaestionis. — Mox post perfectionis codd. L O non male adiiciunt tantum. ¹⁰ Cod. K principiatus loco status. In fine responsionis codd. aa bb addunt quia lux et pater producunt diversum a se.	¹ Distinction 5, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican text has just as there is [sicut est], but nearly all the codices together with edition 1 withstand this. ² Supply with codex Z be done [fieri], and or read with not a few codices as A S T V and edition 1 one cannot [non potest unum]. Then with the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted have been made [sunt factae] in place of have been perfected [sunt perfectae]. Codex M together with edition 1 read as [sic] in place of just as [sicut]. ³ See above d. 2, q. 1. at n. 1. — Then, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted therefore [ergo] for moreover [autem]. ⁴ We have inserted the particle neither [neque], which is required from the context and for the objection, in place of which codex T puts not [non]; very many codices omits this particle, reading that He could not [quod non potuit], perhaps for the reason that, just as we have noted above in the objection, the words of (St.) Augustine are quoted in another manner, namely not (that) the Son could not generate; in which reading the words not generate [non generare] are to be supplied. Codex T a little below this, after the Son, has not could not; but a twofold negation here does not seem as necessary, as (it does) a little above. ⁵ The Vatican text together with codex cc omits the words because (as) one apt [quia aptus] upto to take a step [gradi], but the more ancient codices together with edition 1 withdstand this. ⁶ Not a few codices as bb and ff together with edition 1 have why [quare]. ⁷ Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied for the reason [ideo] and in place of is [est] we have substituted is said (to be) [dicitur], and a little below this after but [sed] we have expunged nevertheless [tamen]. ⁸ The more ancient codices together with edition 1 omit here carnal [carnales], which the Vatican text together with codex cc superfluously adds. ⁹ That is, first in the body of this question. — Then at but through a reckoning of perfection [sed per rationem perfectionis] codices L and O add not badly only [tantum]. ¹⁰ Codex K has being begun [principatus] in place of standing still [status]. At the end of the response codices aa and bb add because light and a father produce (something) diverse from themselves.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII