S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII

 

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio III.

 

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 141-142.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 141-142.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

 

Quaestio III.

Utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint unica potentia.

 

Question 3

Whether the power of generating and the power of creating are a unique power.

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum posse generare et creare sit1 unicum posse; et quod non sit unicum, videtur.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether to be able to generate and to create is1 a unique to be able; and it seems that it is not a unique one.

1. Augustinus:2 « Alio est Pater, alio est Deus »: ergo alio est generans, alio creans; sed potentia generandi est generans, potentia creandi est creans: ergo etc.

1. (St.) Augustine (says):2 « To one belongs the Father, to the other belongs God »: therefore to one belongs the one generating, to the other the one creating; but the power of generating is the one generating, the power of creating is the one creating: therefore etc..

2. Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta:3 ergo si generatio terminatur ad Deum et creatio ad creaturam, et haec sunt omnino diversa: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, powers are distinguished through acts and acts through objects:3 therefore if generation is terminated at God and creation at the creature, and these are entirely diverse: ergo etc..

3. Item, potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, quoniam in pluribus potentibus4 plures sunt potentiae; sed potentia creandi est in Filio sive posse creare, in eo autem non est posse generare: ergo non sunt unum posse.

3. Likewise, powers are plurified through subjects, since in more (things) able [in pluribus potentibus]4 there are more powers; but the power of creating is in the Son or the “to be able to create” (is), but in Him there is not a “to be able to generate”: therefore they are not one “to be able”.

4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum potest intelligi, altero non intellecto, et e converso, illa non sunt unum; sed posse generare potest intelligi, circumscripta potentia creandi; et e converso posse creare, circumscripta potentia generandi:5 ergo etc.

4. Likewise, whatever hold themselves thus, that one can be understood, with the other of the two not understood, and conversely, those are not one; but “to be able to generate” can be understood, with the power of creating excluded [circumscripta]; and conversely “to be able to create”, with the power of generating excluded:5 ergo etc.

CONTRA: 1. Unius potentis omnino simplicis unicum tantum est posse; sed6 Pater est potens omnino simplex: ergo unicum tantum habet posse; sed habet posse generare et posse creare: ergo illa duo sunt unicum posse.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To one entirely simple able (thing) there is only one “to be able”; but6 the Father is an entirely simple able: therefore He has only a unique “to be able”; but He has a “to be able to generate” and a “to be able to create”: therefore those two are a unique “to be able”.

2. Item, si posse est aliud et aliud,7 cum posse generare respiciat personam, posse creare naturam: ergo natura et persona sunt duo: ergo nec natura de persona, nec e converso dicitur, quod est omnino falsum.

2. Likewise, if there is one “to be able” and an other,7 since “to be able to generate” regards a Person, “to be able to create” the Nature: therefore Nature and Person are two: therefore neither is Nature said of Person, nor conversely, which is entirely false.

3. Item, si est distinctio inter posse generare et posse creare: ergo est ibi ordo. Quaero igitur, quod si prius8 secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod potentia generandi, videtur, quia est respectu aeterni, et aeternum ante temporale. Sed contra: intellectus communis est ante intellectum proprii; sed potentia creandi dicit commune tribus, potentia generandi proprium Patris: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, if there is a distinction between “to be able to generate” and “to be able to create”: therefore there is an order there. Therefore I ask, which is prior8 according to the reckoning of understanding. And it seems, that the power of generating (is), because it is in respect of the eternal, and the eternal (is) before the temporal. But on the contrary: an understanding of the common is before the understanding of the proper; but the power of creating means (something) common to the Three, the power of generating (something) proper to the Father: ergo etc..

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Potentia generandi et potentia creandi non secundum rem, sed solummodo secundum rationem intelligendi differunt.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The power of generating and the power of creating differ not according to thing, but only according to the reckoning of understanding.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod posse generare et posse creare est9 posse unicum, tamen dupliciter dictum. Unum enim esse est in re esse Patrem et esse Deum, differens autem secundum rationem intelligendi; quia hoc10 est absolutum, cum dico esse Deum, illud relatum, cum dico esse Patrem. Similiter et in posse est intelligendum. Unde sicut essentia et persona unum sunt in re, tamen est11 differentia rationis in intelligendo et in dicendo; similiter dicendum est de potentia generandi et creandi.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that to be able to generate and to be able to create is9 a unique “to be able”, said, however, in a twofold manner. For in reality [in re] one “to be” is the “to be the Father” and the “to be God”, but differing according to the reckoning of understanding; because this (saying)10 is absolute, when I say to be God, that one relative [relatum], when I say to be the Father. Similarly also in a “to be able” it must (thus) be understood. Whence just as the Essence and Person are in reality One, nevertheless [tamen] there is11 a difference of reckoning in (their) understanding and in (their) saying; similarly it must be said concerning the power of generating and of creating.

Et12 sicut est ibi differentia non re, sed secundum rationem, ita est ibi ordo secundum rationem intelligendi. Unde secundum diversas comparationes habent alium et alium ordinem. Comparando enim posse creare et posse generare ad illud cuius sunt; cum posse creare sit naturae, posse generare sit personae, et intellectus communis13 ante intellectum proprii; sic absque calumnia prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia creandi. Comparando autem ad illud ad quod terminatur; cum potentia creandi respiciat temporale, potentia vero generandi aeternum; prior est secundum rationem intelligendi potentia generandi quam potentia creandi; et sic patent obiecta de ordine.

And12 just as the difference there is not according to thing, but according to reckoning, thus the order there is according to the reckoning of understanding. Whence according to diverse comparisons they have one order and an other. For when comparing “to be able to create” and “to be able to generate” to that to which they belong; since “to be able to create” belongs to nature, “to be able to generate” belongs to person, and understanding of the common (belongs)13 before understanding of the proper; so without calumny the power of creating is prior according to the reckoning of understanding. Moreover when comparing (that) to that toward which it is terminated; since the power of creating regards the temporal, but the power of generating the eternal; the power of generating is prior according to the reckoning of understanding to the power of creating; and thus are clear the objections concerning order.

Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod non differunt posse generare et posse creare differentia secundum rem sive secundum essentiam.

Therefore to be conceded are the reasons showing, that “to be able to generate” and “to be able to create” do not differ by a difference according to thing or according to essence.

1. Ad illud ergo14 quod obiicitur, quod alio est / Deus, alio Pater; . . .

1. To that which is objected, that to one belongs / God, to the other the Father; . . .

1 Vat. hic et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 sint.
2 Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. et 6. ac Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. per Augustinum; ed. 1 dicere Augustinus.
3 Aristotelis verba hac de re vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.
4 Ita antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc quia in pluribus subiectis.
5 Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, qui omittunt verba et e converso usque generandi, restauramus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.
6 Adiecimus ex vetusioribus mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum sed.
7 Cod. bb satis bene si posse creare et posse generare est aliud et aliud posse.
8 Plurimi codd. non ita bene nec cum subnexis cohaerenter principalius.
9 Vat. contra mss. sunt. Mox post enim nonnulli codd. ut C R S omittunt esse.
10 Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 quod pro hoc, et paulo infra idem est loco illud.
11 Codd. inter se non conveniunt; alii ut A F G HG K M T V cum ed. 1 pro tamen est habent cum, alii cum Vat. exhibent textum nostrum, cod. R tamen differunt ratione. Mox post rationis nonnulli codd. ut A T X etc. cum ed. 1 addunt particulam et.
12 Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. supplevimus Et. Mox pauci codd. ut H K post rationem habent intelligendi, ita.
13 Faventibus plurimus codd. et ed. 1, expunximus hic additum est.
14 Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus ergo.

1 The Vatican text here a little after this, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has are [sint].
2 On the Trinity, Bk. II, ch. 1 and 6, and On Psalm 68, Sermon 1, n. 5. — The Vatican text, contrary to the more ancient codices, has Through (St.) Augustine (there is said); edition 1 has (St.) Augustine, you are said (to have said) [dicere Augustinus].
3 See the words of Aristotle on this matter above in q. 1, fundament 2.
4 Thus the more ancient codices together with edition 1, but the Vatican text together with codex cc has because in more subjects [quia in pluribus subiectis].
5 The mutilated reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, which omit the words and conversely up to of generating excluded, we have restored with the help of the other manuscripts and edition 1.
6 We have inserted from the older manuscripts and edition 1 the less well omitted but [sed].
7 Codex bb has well enough if “to be able to create” is one “to be able” and “to be able to generate” an other.
8 Very many codices, not so well nor coherently with what is subjoined, read more principal [principalius].
9 The Vatican text, contrary to the manuscripts, has are [sunt].
10 The Vatican text, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, has what [quod] in place of this (saying) [hoc], and a little below this the same is [idem est] in place of that [illud].
11 The codices do not agree among themselves; some as A F G H K M T V together with edition 1 have with in place of nevertheless there is [tamen est], others together with the Vatican text exhibit our text, codex R reads there differ in reckoning [differunt ratione]. Then after of reckoning [rationis] not a few codices as A T X etc. together with edition 1 adds the particle both [et].
12 Trusting in the manuscripts and the six of the first editions we have supplied And [Et]. Then a few codices as H and K have a reckoning of understanding [rationem intelligendi, thus].
13 With very many codices and edition 1 favoring it, we have expunged the here added is [est].
14 From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted therefore [ergo].

p. 142

Deus, alio Pater; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de alio et alio alietate rationis, et non rei. Et intelligitur alietas rationis per illum modum, quo supra dictum est distinctione quinta,1 ubi quaeritur, utrum essentia generet.

God, to the other the Father; it must be said, that (St.) Augustine speaks of the one and the other according to an anotherness of reckoning, and not of thing. And an anotherness of reckoning is understood through that manner, by which it has been said above in the fifth distinction,1 where there is asked, whether the Essence would generate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod2 potentiae distinguantur per actus etc.; dicendum, quod verum est hoc de illis actibus, qui habent completionem ab obiectis; sed non sunt sic actus divini. Unde quamvis creatura et Filius omnino differant, attamen generatio et creatio idem sunt, sicut essentia et persona. Deus enim in agendo non completur ab obiecto, quia se ipso agit.

2. To that which is objected, that2 powers are distinguished through acts etc.; it must be said, that this is true concerning those acts, which have (their) completion from (their) objects; but not so are the divine acts. Whence although a creature and the Son differ entirely, however generation and creation are but the same, just as essence and person. For God in acting is not completed by an object, because He acts by His very self [se ipso].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae plurificantur per subiecta; dicendum, quod istud verum est de subiecto proprio; sed Filius non in quantum Filius est subiectum potentiae creandi, sed in quantum Deus. Et constat, quod natura divina non facit numerum cum Patre; ita nec potentia respiciens naturam cum potentia Patris.

3. To that which is objected, that powers are plurified through subjects; it must be said, that that is true concerning a proper subject; but the Son (is) not, inasmuch as He (is) the Son, a subject of a power of creating, but rather inasmuch (as He is) God. And it is established, that the Divine Nature is not numbered [non facit numerum] with the Father; thus neither (is) the power regarding the Nature (numbered) with the power of the Father.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unum potest intelligi sine altero et e converso; dicendum, quod aut loqueris quantum ad3 significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Si quantum ad connotatum, verum dicis, quod creatura potest intelligi, non intellecta persona Filii, et e converso. Si quantum ad principale significatum, dicis4 falsum; impossibile est enim, intelligi potentiam generandi sine potentia creandi, sicut impossibile est intelligere personam sine essentia.

4. To that which is objected last, that the one can be understood without the other of the two and conversely; it must be said, that either you are speaking as much as regards the3 signified, or as much as regards the connoted. If as much as regards the connoted, you speak a truth, because a creature can be understood, the Person of the Son not understood, and conversely.  If as much as regards the principal signified, you speak4 falsely; for it is impossible, that the power of generating be understood without the power of creating, just as it is impossible to understand the Person without the Essence.

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I.  De differentia inter essentiam et personam cfr. infra d. 33. q. 2. et Scholion. —  Ad verba in solut. ad 3: « Verum est de subiecto proprio », notandum, quod distinguitur subiectum proximum et adaequatum alicuius potentiae et remotum.  Subiectum proximum sive primarium potentiae divinae creativae est unicum scil. Essentia divina.  Et axioma:  potentiae plurificantur per subiecta, non oportet quod sit verum, quando agitur de subiecto remoto, quod est pesona divina.

I.  On the difference between essence and person cf. below, d. 33, q. 2 and the Scholium.  —  Regarding the words in the solution to n. 3: « that is true concerning a proper subject », it must be noted, that a proximate subject is distinguished from an adequate (subject) of any power and a remote one.  The proximate or primary subject of the Divine Creative Power is unique, namely, the Divine Essence.  And the axiom:  ‘powers are plurified through their subjects’, does not have to be true, when it concerns a remote subject, which is a Divine Person.

II.  Hanc quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici non nisi breviter tractant.  Ipsam tangit S. Doctor infra d. 20. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; de Potent. q. 2. a. 6.  —  Petr. A Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1.  —  Richard. A Med., hic. q. 4.  —  Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 3.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II.  The other ancient Scholastics do not but briefly treat of this question.  The same is touched upon by the Seraphic Doctor below in d. 20, a. 1, q. 1.  —   Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 1. and 2.  —  St. Thomas, here at q. 1, a. 3; de Potent., q. 2, a. 6.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 3, a. 1.  —  Richard o f Middleton, hic. q. 4.  —  Giles the Roman, on this and the following question, here in 1. princ., q. 3.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian., hic q. 2.

1  Art. 1. q. 1.
2  Vat. praeter fidem msss. et ed. 1 omittit quod.  —  Proxime sequens propositio intelligitur de illis actibus, qui causantur aliquo modo ab obiectis, sicuti fit in intellectione nostra.
3  Cod. Z propter subnexa non incongrue addit principale i. e. quod primo et per se significatur, exclusa omni connotatione.
4  Antiquiores codd. ut A F G H K S W etc. vel omittunt dicis, quod tunc certe est supplendum, vel cum ed. 1 loco ipius ponunt est.

1  Article 1, q. 1.
2  The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 omits that [quod].  —  Next the following proposition is understood of those acts, which are caused in some manner by their objects, just as happens in our act of understanding [intellectione].
3  Codex Z, on account of what is subjoined, does not incongruously adds principal [principale], that is,  that which is first and per se signified, having excluded every connotation.
4  The more ancient codices such as A F G H K S W etc. either omit you say [dicis], which then certainly is to be supplied, and/or with edition 1 put is [est] in its place.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.