COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 7, a. 1, q. 4 S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII
ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quaestio IV.	ARTICLE SOLE Question 4
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 142-144. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 142-144. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Quaestio IV. Utrum posse generari et posse creari sint univocum posse.	Question 4 Whether "to be able to be generated" and "to be able to be created" are a univocal "to be able".
ULTIMO QUAERITUR, utrum posse generari et posse creari sint⁵ posse univocum. Et quod non, videtur:	LAST THERE IS OBJECTED, whether to be able to be generated and to be able to be created are⁵ a univocal “to be able”. And it seems that (they are) not:
1. Quia quamvis idem sit generare et creare quantum ad principale significatum, aliud tamen est generari et creari, sicut Creator et creatura: ergo cum non habeant⁶ esse univocum creatura et Creator: ergo etc.	1. Because, although it is the same “to generate” and “to create” as much as regards the principal signified, nevertheless it is another “to be generated” and “to be created”, as Creator and creature (are): therefore since Creator and creature do not have⁶ a univocal “to be”: ergo etc..
2. Item, creatio dicit egressum et mutationem, generatio vero omnem excludit mutationem: ergo cum posse creari importet potentiam transmutandi, posse generari non, cum potentiae differant in sua generalitate in potentia transmutandi,⁷ et in hac non conveniunt: ergo in nulla.	2. Likewise, creation means an egress and a mutation, generation, however, excludes every mutation: therefore since “to be able to be created” introduces a power of being transmuted [transmutandi], (and) “to be able to be generated” (does) not, since the powers differ in their generality in the power of being transmutated,⁷ and in this they do not convene: therefore (they convene) in no (power).
3. Item omne distribuit terminum pro omnibus, quae univocantur vel analogantur in illo;⁸ sed cum dico omnipotens, non fit distributio pro illo, quod potest generare, quia tunc Filius non esset omnipotens: ergo manifestum est, quod utrumque posse nec est univocum nec analogum: alioquin omnipotentia non convenit Filio.	3. Likewise every distributes a term on behalf of all, which are univocally and/or analogically meant [univocantur vel analogantur] in it;⁸ but when I say omnipotent, a distribution does not come to be on behalf of that, which can generate, because then the Son would not be omnipotent: therefore it is manifest, that each “to be able” is neither univocal nor analogical: otherwise omnipotence would not befit the Son.
SED CONTRA: 1. Res est commune ad fruibile et utibile: ergo cum aequalis ambitus vel maioris sit possibile quam res, et non sit maior differentia inter generatum et creatum⁹ quam inter fruibile et utibile, pari ratione possibile sive posse est commune ad utrumque.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Thing is common to the enjoyable and the usable: therefore since the possible belongs to an equal and/or greater ambit than the thing, and (since) there is not a greater difference between the generated and the created⁹ than between the enjoyable and the usable, for an equal reason the possible or “to be able” is common to each.
2. Item, in aeternis non potest esse multiplicitas / nec diversitas: . . .	2. Likewise, in eternals there cannot be multiplicity / nor diversity: . . .
⁵ Mss. plurimi cum sex primis edd. sit. ⁶ Vat., obnitentibus multis codd. ut H I S T W Z aa etc. et ed. 1, minus apte habeat. ⁷ Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.), ubi species potentiae recensentur et pro genere earum proximo, in quo omnes conveniunt, assignatur, quod sint principium motus aut transmutationis. ⁸ Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 26.): Quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam omne dicitur. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summula. tract. de Distributione. — Mox antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 generare; Vat. et cod. cc. non bene generari. Agitur quidem de generatione passiva, sed argumentatio incipit a potentia activa, importata in voce omnipotens, et recte infertur, si potentia activa generandi non cadit proprie sub omnipotentia, tunc et generatio passiva non cadit sub omnia quae potest: ergo etc. ⁹ Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatum pro creaturam.	⁵ Very many manuscripts together with the six first editions have is [sit]. ⁶ The Vatican text, disagreeing with many codices as H I S T W Z aa etc. and edition 1, has less aptly does not have [habeat]. ⁷ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 17 and Bk. IX, text 2 (Bl. IV, ch. 2, and Bk. VIII, ch. 1), where the species of power are recounted and for their proximate genus, in which they all agree, there is assigned, that they are the principle of movement or transmutation. ⁸ Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 34 (Bk. IV, ch. 26): Of those (terms) which indeed the position does not cause a difference every is said. Cf. Peter of Spain, Summula, tract "On Distribution". — Then the more ancient codices together with edition 1 have to generate [generare]; the Vatican text and codex cc have the not well said to be generated. Indeed one deals with passive generation, but the argumentation begins from active power, introduced under the word omnipotent, and rightly is it inferred, that if an active power of generating does not properly fall under omnipotence, then passive generation also does not fall under the all which it can (accomplish): ergo etc.. ⁹ Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted the created [creatum] for the creature [creaturam].

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nec diversitas: ergo cum posse creari et posse generari ab aeterno ante conditionem creaturae fuerint, ergo non¹ habent multiplicationem in ipsa potentia.	nor diversity: therefore since there were a “to be able to be created” and a “to be able to be generated” from eternity before the foundation of creation [ante conditionem creaturae], therefore they do not¹ have a multiplication in the power itself.
3. Item, cum dico: creatura potest creari, nihil dico² creatum; quia illud vere dicitur de eo quod omnino nihil est, sicut de anima antichristi: ergo solum dico potentiam agentis; sed potentia Dei est unica, non habens aliquam multiplicatatem: ergo eius posse univocum est ad posse creari et posse generari.	3. Likewise, when I say: “a creature can be created”, I mean² nothing (is to be) created; because that is truly said of that which is (yet) entirely nothing, just as (one presently speaks) of the soul of the Antichrist: therefore I only mean the power of the agent; but the power of God is unique, not having any multiplicity: therefore to Him there belongs a univocal “to be able” regarding “to be able to be created” and “to be able to be generated”.
CONCLUSIO. Posse generari et posse creari quoad principale significatum re idem sunt et univoce dicuntur, quoad connotatum vero analogice.	CONCLUSION “To be able to be generated” and “to be able to be created” in regard to the principal signified by the thing are the same and are said univocally, however in regard to the connoted (they are said) analogically.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod cum dico posse creari et posse generari, dico principale significatum et dico connotatum. Quantum ad principale significatum, dico, quod posse creari idem dicit re, quod posse creare, differens solum³ modo loquendi vel dicendi: quia quod dicitur per modum actionis per posse creare, dicit posse creari per modum passionis. Quantum vero ad connotatum dicit effectum in creatura.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that when I say to be able to be created and to be able to be generated, I mean the principal (thing) signified and I mean the (thing) connoted. As much as regards the principal (thing) signified, I mean, that “to be able to be created” means the same in thing, which “to be able to create” (means), differing solely³ by a manner of speaking and/or meaning: because what is meant through a manner of action by “to be able to create”, “to be able to be created” means through a manner of passion. However as much as regards the connoted, it means the effect in the creature.
Quando⁴ ergo comparantur posse creari, et posse generari, si comparentur ratione principalis significati, dico, quod non tantum est univocum, immo etiam unicum, ut visum est,⁵ aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum, sicut posse generare et posse creare. Si autem ratione connotati comparentur, sic concedo, quod est analogum, sicut hoc nomen res ad fruibilia et utibilia. Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum.	When,⁴ therefore, “to be able to be created” and “to be able to be generated” are compared, if they are compared by a reckoning of the principal signified, I say, that not only it is univocal, nay rather (it is) also unique, as it has been seen,⁵ however (it is) in one way and (is) understood and enunciated in another [aliter tamen et aliter intellectum et enuntiatum]. But if they are compared by a reckoning of the connoted, thus I concede, that it is analogous, just as the noun thing (is) regarding enjoyables and useables. For although the Creator and the creature do not have a common univocal (term), nevertheless [tamen] they do have a (common) analogous one.
Notandum tamen, quod duplex est analogia: quaedam⁶ per reductionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum⁷ distribuit pro omnibus contentis, nisi sit distributio restricta ex additione, vel ex usu sive modo loquendi, sicut dicitur distributio accomoda,⁸ ut si dicatur: caelum tegit omnia. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia.⁹ Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens inter omnia, sed super omnia.	It must be noted, however, that analogy is twofold: a certain⁶ (kind of analogy is) through a reduction toward unity of nature according to prior and posterior; and this can be by comparing creature to creature, and in this the sign⁷ distributes on behalf of all contained, unless there is a distribution restricted out of an addition, and/or out of use or a manner of speaking, just as an apt [accommoda] distribution⁸ is meant, such as if one says: “heaven covers all”. The other is the analogy through reduction toward unity of proportional similitude, not of nature; and what is thus analogically spoken of is not among others, but over others.⁹ Whence distribution, properly on behalf of that, does not distribute, unless it has been extended. Whence God is not a being among all (beings), but over all.
Et hinc est, quod omnipotens non distribuit pro potentia generandi proprie accepta distributione, nisi fiat quaedam extensio, et ex illa per consequens fiat quaedam appropriato circa suppositum. Unde proprie omnipotens convenit tribus, quia non distribuit¹⁰ pro potentia generandi; appropriate autem, secundum quod fit ampliatio ex parte signi, solius est Patris.	And hence it is, that “omnipotent” does not distribute on behalf of the power of generating properly accepted as a distribution, unless a certain extension be made, and from that, per consequens, a certain appropriation be made about the subject [suppositum]. Whence properly “omnipotent” convenes to Three, because it does not distribute¹⁰ on behalf of a power of generating; but appropriately, according to which there is an amplification [fit ampliatio] on the part of the sign, it belongs to the Father alone.
Ex his patent omnia obiecta; procedunt enim per diversas vias, ut patet intuenti.	From these all the objections are clear; for they proceed by diverse ways, as is clear to the one looking at them attentively [patet intuenti].
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Ut subtilis haec quaestio, quae a paucis antiquis Scholasticis tractatur, recte intelligatur, attendendum est, quo sensu S. Doctor accipiat locutionem: posse creari. Non sumitur in sensu passivae potentiae, quae est ex parte creaturae, sed in sensu activae potentiae, quae est in Deo, ut patet ex ult. arg. Ratio huius modi loquendi explicatur infra d. 42. q. 4, ubi S. Doctor inter alia haec habet (ad 2.): « mundum creari, quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa. » Item (ad 1.): « Possibile potest dici denominative a potentia passiva vel activa; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur possibile simpliciter secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva ». Hanc sententiam probat in corp. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 2. et 3, et S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. a. 2. Certe res creabilis ante suam creationem nihil omnino est nec habet, ergo nec potentiam passivam; unde solummodo denominatione extrinseca i. e. cum respectum ad primam causam, attribuitur ipsi posse creari.	I. To understand rightly this subtle question, which is treated by few of the ancient Scholastics, one must attend to the sense in which the Seraphic doctor accepts the saying: to be able to be created. It is not taken in the sense of a passive power, which is on the part of the creature, but in the sense of an active power, which is in God, as is clear from the last argument. The reason for this manner of speaking is explained below in d. 42, q. 4, where the Seraphic Doctor says among other things the following (at n. 2): « “(the power of) the world to be created” [mundum creari], although it means a power through a manner of passion, however according to thing it does not mean but an active power, because before the creation of the world there is nothing but active power. » Likewise (at n. 1): «The “possible” can be said denominatively by reason of [a] a passive and/or active power; and because in God there is properly an active power, for that reason the “possible” is meant simple according to that which is denominated by it, not according to which (is) from a passive (power) ». He proves this sentence in the body (of the response). Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 2 and 3, and St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2. Certainly a creatable thing before its own creation is entirely nothing nor has (anything), therefore neither (does it have) a passive power; whence only in the manner of a extrinsic denomination, i. e. with regard to the prime cause, is there attributed to it a to be able to be created.
II. His suppositis tres propositiones S. Doctoris sunt manifeste: 1. Posse creari et posse creare, licet differant grammaticaliter, non differunt in re, si attenditur principale significatum, quod est creatrix essentia divina. — 2. Posse creari et posse generari ratione principalis significati sunt univoca, immo unicum. « Nam ipsa divina substantia sub ratione, qua communicabilis est per generationem, est potentia, qua Filius potuit generari », Richard (hic q. 3). — 3. Posse generari et posse creari ratione connotati non habent aliquid commune nisi analogum, cum primum connotet Filium aeternum, secundum vero creaturam.	II. With these supposed, the three propositions of the Seraphic Doctor are manifestly: 1. To be able to be created and to be able to create, though they differ grammatically, they do not differ in thing, if one attends to the principal (thing) signified, which is the Divine, creative Essence. — 2. To be able to be created and to be able to be generated by reason of the principal signified are univocal, nay rather unique. « For the Divine Substance Itself under the reckoning, by which it is communicable through generation, is the Power, by which the Son could be generated », Richard of Middleton (here at q. 3). — 3. To be able to be generated and to be able to be created by reason of the connoted do not have anything common except the analogous, since the first connotes the eternal Son, but the second a creature.
¹ Cod. W nec. ² Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 dicit; cod. I creaturam posse creari, nihil dico esse creatum. Paulo infra post sicut cod. M addit est. ³ Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum in; aliqui codd. solo pro solum. Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, dicitur per loco dicit. ⁴ Mendosa lectio Vat. Quo modo pro Quando castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1. ⁵ Paulo supra; vide etiam quaest. praeced. ⁶ Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit est, quod tamen abest a ceteris mss. et ed. 1. ⁷ Id est omne, quod ideo vocatur signum, quia per ipsum indicatur, quantum alius terminus valeat. ⁸ Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 accomodata, et paulo infra proportionis loco proportionalis. Pauci codd. regit pro tegit, sed incongrue et contra Petr. Hispan. Summulam tract. de Distributione. — Mox post naturae codd. aa bb addunt ut Creatoris ad creaturam. ⁹ Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus sed super alia, et paulo infra, consentientibus omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus sed super omnia. ¹⁰ Codd. M X addunt proprie.	¹ Codex W reads neither do they [nec]. ² The Vatican text together with codex cc, contrary to the rest of the codices and edition 1, has it means [dicit]; codex I reads that the creature can be created, I say that nothing is created. A little below this after just as [sicut] codex M reads as it is (presently) concerning the soul [est de anima]. ³ Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the here added in [in]. Then the Vatican text, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has is meant by "to be able to be created" [dicitur per posse creari] in place of "to be able to be created" means [dicit posse creari]. ⁴ The faulty reading of the Vatican text, By that manner which [Quo modo] instead of When [Quando], is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. ⁵ A little above this; see also the preceding question. ⁶ The Vatican text together with codex cc has a certain one is [est quaedam], which is is absent from the rest of the manuscripts and edition 1. ⁷ That is "every", which is for that reason called the sign, because through it there is indicated, how much the other term is worth. ⁸ The Vatican text, not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has an accommodated distribution [accomodata distributio], and a little below this of the similitude of proportion [proportionis similitudinis] in place of proportional similitude [proportionalis similitudinis]. A few codices have rules [regit] in place of covers [tegit], but incongruously and contrary to Peter of Spain's, Summula, tract "On Distribution". — Then after of nature [naturae], codices aa and bb add as of the Creator to the creature. ⁹ From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied but above others [sed super alia], and a little below this, with the consent of all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, we have inserted but over all [sed super omnia]. ¹⁰ Codices M and X add properly [proprie].

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III. Quoad analogiam in genere cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 5. et ibid. a. 3. q. 1. ad. 1. ac Scholion. Duplicem analogiam distinguit textus: prima species est quae fit per reductionem ad unitatem naturae; secunda, per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis. Circa primam speciem haec notamus. In unoquoque genere rerum creatarum est unum, quod sic est mensura aliorum, ut unumquodque in tantum habeat perfectionem suae naturae, in quantum plus minusve ad hanc mensuram accedit. In prima haec specie analogiae « signum distributivum (v. g. omnis) distribuit pro omnibus contentis » i. e. applicat conceptum termini ad omnia et singula sub ipso comprehensa. Sed hoc non valet quoad secundam speciem. Secunda species sive analogia proportionalitatis declaratur in textu. Ex hoc principio S. Doctor deducit, quod potentia generandi in Deo non comprehendatur proprie sub omnipotentia (in corp. et dub. 1. 2.). Idem docent: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., Report., I. Sent. d. 20. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 20. princ. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic. q. 3. — Consentit etiam S. Thom. I. Sent. d. 20. q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. ad 3; tamen de Potentia q. 2. a. 5. aliter loquitur. Videtur autem, quod solus modus loquendi sit diversus.

III. In regard to analogy in general cf. above d. 1, dubium 5, and ibid., a. 3, q. 1 and the Scholium. The text distinguishes a twofold analogy: the first species is that which comes to be through a “leading back” [reduction] toward the unity of nature; the second, through a leading back toward the unity of proportional similitude. About the first species we note these (things). In any one genus of created things there is one, which is thus the measure of the others, so that anyone (of them) has perfection of its nature only inasmuch as it approaches more or less this measure. In this first species of analogy « a distributive sign (e. g. “every”) distributes on behalf of all those contained », i. e. it applies the concept of the term (it modifies) to all and each comprehended under it. But this is not valid in regard to the second species. The second species or the analogy of proportionality is explained in the text. From this principle the Seraphic Doctor deduces, that the power of generating in God is not comprehended properly under “omnipotence” (in the body and in dubium 1 and 2). (The following) teach the same: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Reportatio, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3. a. 2. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, principle 1, q. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 3. — St. Thomas also agrees, Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 6, at n. 3; however in On Power, q. 2, a. 5 he speaks otherwise. But it seems, that solely (his) manner of speaking is diverse.

IV. Quoad conclusionem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 1. et 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4.

IV. In regard to the conclusion cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 20, m. 1 and 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert, here in a. 4.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII