S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

 

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII

 

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 144-146.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 144-146.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

 

DUB. I.

 

DOUBT I

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima est de solutione ista Magistri, qua dicit, quod non sequitur: Pater potest generare, quod non1 Filius: ergo potest aliquid, quod non Filius; et respondet, quod posse generare non est posse aliquid subiectum divinae potentiae. Sed hoc non videture solvere, sed aggravare argumentum. Tunc enim, cum posse generare2 sit posse maximum, videtur quod maius inconveniens sequatur, et magis derogetur potentiae Filii, si in hoc deficit, quam si in subiectis3 divinae potentiae.

In that part of his (text) there occur doubts about the text, and the first concerns that solution of Master (Peter's), which says, that it does not follow (that if): the Father can generate, what the Son (can) not:1 therefore He can (do) something, which the Son (can) not; and he responds, that to be able to generate is not to be able (to do) something subject to the divine power. But this does not seem to solve, but rather aggravate the argument. For then, since to be able to generate2 is the maximum to be able, it seems that a more unfitting (conclusion) follows, and it derogates more from the power of the Son, if (His power) fails in this, than if (it fails) in (those acts) subject3 to the divine power.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Magister bene solvit. Potentia enim Patris habet comparari ad inferius et ad aequale, sed ad superius non, cum careat superiori. Cum comparatur ad inferius, tunc est potentia essentialis et essentialiter retenta, quia connotat respectum4 in creatura; et respectu talis potentiae inconveniens esset, quod aliquid posset Pater, quod non posset Filius, quia tunc different per essentiam. Cum autem comparatur ad aequale, ut ad personam, tunc trahitur ad personam; et tunc nullum inconveniens est, si aliqua proprietas personalis est in Patre, quae non est in Filio. Ideo non sequitur, quod aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.5

I RESPOND: It must be said, that Master (Peter) solves (it) well. For the power of the Father has to be compared to an inferior and to an equal, but not to a superior, since He lacks [careat] a superior. When it is compared to an inferior, then it is an essential power and (is) essentially retained, because it connotes the looking-backwards [respectum]4 (that is) in a creature; and in respect of such a power it would be unfitting, that the Father would be able (to do) something, which the Son would not be able (to do), because They would then differ by Essence. Moreover when it is compared to an equal, as to a Person, then it is extended [trahitur] toward a Person; and then there is nothing [nullus] unfitting, if there is some personal property in the Father, which is not in the Son. For that reason it does not follow, that there is some power in the Father, which is not in the Son.5

 

DUB. II.

 

DOUBT II

Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod generatio Filii non est de omnibus. Videtur enim Richardus de sancto Victore6 dicere contrarium, qui dicit, quod quia omnipotens est, excusari non potest, quin Filium genuerit: ergo generatio Filii continetur sub omnipotentia: ergo Filius inter omnia continetur et est.

Likewise is doubted concerning this which is said, that the generation of the Son does not concern all. For Richard of St. Victor6 seems to say the contrary, he who says, that because He is omnipotent, it cannot be excluded [excusari], that the Son generate: therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained and is among all.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, generatio Filii non continetur sub omnipotentia, nisi acciperetur omnipotentia per appropriationem. Et quod dicit Richardus non intelligitur,7 tanquam Filius sit inter omnia, sed tanquam ante omnia; unde arguit a posteriori. Si enim emanatio naturae secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit emanationem secundum rationem voluntatis, nunquam Deus esset potens producere creaturam per voluntatem, nisi etiam produxisset Filium per naturam.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that, just as Master (Peter) says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence, unless omnipotence would be accepted through appropriation. And what Richard says is not understood,7 as if the Son is among all, but as before all; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of the Nature according to the reckoning of understanding preceded the emanation according to the reckoning of the Will, God would never be able to produce a creature through (His) Will, unless He also produced a Son through (His) Nature.

 

DUB. III.

 

DOUBT III

Item videtur male dicere, cum dicit, quod esse Patrem non est esse aliquid; quia cum inter aliquid et nihil non cadat medium, si non est esse aliquid: ergo est esse nihil.8

Likewise he seems to speak badly, when he says, that to be the Father is not to be something; because between something and nothing falls no medium [non cadit medium], if it is not that "that He is something": therefore it is that "He is nothing".8

RESPONDEO: Esse aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel communiter ad essentiam et personam; et sic non cadit medium, et in hoc sensu esse Patrem est esse aliquid; alio modo, prout trahitur9 ad essentiam; et sic cadit inter esse aliquid et esse nihil medium, scilicet esse aliquem; persona enim praedicatur ut quis, non ut quid.10

I RESPOND: To be something is said in a twofold manner: (it is said) for example [vel] commonly regarding "essence" and "person"; and thus there falls no medium, and in this sense to be the Father is to be something; in another manner, insofar as it is extended9 to "essence"; and thus there does fall between to be something and to be nothing a medium, that is, to be someone; for a person is predicated as a who, not as a what.10

 

DUB. IV.

 

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari, et ponitur ibi: Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius etc. Videtur ista illatio non valere, quia in creaturis, ubi / magis differt relatio a supposito, . . .

Likewise is asked concerning that illation of Master (Peter's): "the Holy Spirit could be the Son, therefore He could be changed", and it is posited there (where he says): For if He could be born, He could be the Son etc. That illation of his seems to be not valid, because in creatures, where / relation differs more from a supposit, . . .

1 Supple hic et paulo infra cum codd. X dd potest.
2 Vat. confuse et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 Cum loco Tunc, et deinde prosequitur: enim generare eum posse sit posse etc.
3 Vat. falso pro in subiectis ponit eum generare Filium esset aliquid subiectum et contra omnes codd. cum ed. 1, qui in eo tantum dissident, quod multi ut A C F G H M R S T etc. post quam minus bene omittunt si. Cod. si enim in hoc deficit, plus deficit, quam si deficit in subiectis.
4 Praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 praemittit Vat. effectum seu, et paulo ante ponti tenta pro retenta.
5 De hoc et sequenti dubio vide hic q. 3. et 4. cum Scholiis.
6 Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4: Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per impossibilitatem excusari non potest.
7 Aliqui codd. intelligit; codd. H O intelligas. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 post arguit substituimus a pro ex.
8 Ita mss. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. si Pater non esset aliquid, ergo esset nihil. Resp. Dicendum quod esse etc.
9 Plerique codd. ut A F G K T U V Y etc. cum ed. 1 contrahitur.
10 Plura vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3.

1 Supply here and a little below this with codices X and dd can [potest].
2 The Vatican text confusedly and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 has When [Cum] in place of Then [Tunc], and then it proceeds to read: for "to be able to generate Him" is the greatest "to be able" etc..
3 The Vatican text falsely, in place of in (those acts) subject [in subiectis], puts "that He generates the Son" would be something subject and contrary to all the codices together with edition 1, which dissent only in this, that many of them as A C F G H M R S T etc. after than [quam] omit less well the if [si]. Codex O has for if in this it fails, it fails more, than if it fails in (those acts) subject (to the divine power).
4 Not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, the Vatican text prefaces this with an effect or [effectum seu], and a little before this it puts held [tenta] in place of retained [retenta].
5 Concerning this and the following doubt see here q. 3 and 4 together with the Scholia.
6 On the Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 4: But who without doubt is omnipotent, cannot be excluded through an impossibility.
7 Some codices read does not understand [non intelligit]; codices H and O have you may not understand [non intelligas]. A little below this from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 after he argues [arguit] we have substituted a [a] in place of ex [ex].
8 Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1, but the Vatican text reads if the Father would not be something, therefore He would be nothing. I respond: It must be said that to be etc..
9 Very many codices as A F G K T U V Y etc. together with edition 1 read it is contracted [contrahitur].  [Trans. note: It is common in English to use the notion of “extended” to mean applied to, even though strictly speaking what is extended “reaches outside” some limit. This latter sense is not contained in the Latin trahitur, since it would imply that the Son is of another Being than the Father.]
10 (For) more (on this) see above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3.

 

p. 145

magis differt relatio a supposito, potest dici, quod1 similis potest esse alteri dissimilis sine sui mutatione: ergo cum filiatio et spiratio sint relationes, pari ratione Filius poterit esse Spiritus sanctus, et e converso sine mutatione. Item, omne mutabile est aliquid praeter illud, secundum quod mutatur, ut si non album fiat album, est aliud quam albedo: ergo si intelligatur Spiritus sanctus mutari, si generetur, tunc aliud esset in eo generatio, aliud ille qui generatur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

relation differs more from supposit, it can be said that the1 similar can be dissimilar to the other of the two without its own mutation: therefore since filiation and spiration are relations, for an equal reason the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely without mutation. Likewise, every mutable is something besides that, according to which it is changed, so that if a non-white becomes white, it is other than whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit is understood to be changed, if He would be generated, then in this the one would be the generation, the other the That who is generated; but this (is) false: ergo etc..

RESPONDEO: Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur, quod proprietas2 insit hypostasi, intelligitur esse hypostatis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse. Cum ergo Spiritus sanctus non possit simul spirari et generari — quia quamvis una persona possit duobus modis producere, tamen una persona non potest nisi uno modo produci — sequitur de necessitate: si potest Spiritus sanctus esse Filius vel potuit, potest non esse Spiritus sive non spirari; et si potuit generari, potuit esse: et ita potuit fieri de ente non ens et de non ente ens, ac per hoc mutari.

I RESPOND: It is otherwise in the relations of creature and God: since relations in creatures do not grant relatives to exist; whence a thing can be without them and with them; but among the divine they grant Persons to exist; and for that reason if there is understood in the Persons, what a property2 is in [insit] a hypostasis, it is understood to belong to a hypostasis, and similarly, if it is understood to not be in (a hypostasis), it is understood not to belong to a hypostasis. Therefore since the Holy Spirit could not simultaneously be spirated and generated — because although one Person could produce in two manners, nevertheless [tamen] one Person cannot but be produced in one manner — it follows of [de] necessity: if the Holy Spirit can and/or could be the Son, He can not be the Spirit or (He can) not be spirated; and if He could be generated, He could be (the Son): and thus He could be made a ‘not being’ from a ‘being’ and a ‘being’ from a ‘not being’, and through this be changed.

Et sic3 patet ultimum, quia non dicitur mutari propter diversificationem proprietatum circa idem suppositum, sicut est in mutatione naturali, sed propter corruptionem et inceptionem eiusdem. Nec est illud simile: Pater potest generare et spirare sine sui mutatione: ergo Spiritus sanctus4 generari et spirari; quia non est inconveniens, unum principium pluribus modis producere, sed unum principiatum pluribus modis produci est impossibile et incompossibile; et ideo patet illud.

And thus2 the last (objection) is clear, because one is not said to be changed on account of a diversification of properties about the same supposit, just as is in natural mutation, but on account of corruption and inception of the same. Nor is that similar: "the Father can generate and spirate without His own mutation: therefore the Holy Spirit (can)4 be generated and spirated"; because it is not an unfitting (conclusion), that one principle produce by more manners, but that One begun be produced by more manners is impossible and incomposeable [incompossibile]; and for that reason that (objection) is clear.

 

DUB. V.

 

DOUBT V

Item videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia est essentia, quia secundum hoc generare, quod nullo modo est essentiale, nullo modo esset potentiae.

Likewise it seems that he speaks a falsehood, when he says: the Father is not able except by nature; for His power is by essence, because according to this "to generate, what in no manner is essential", would in no manner belong to (His) power.

RESPONDEO: Quamvis potentia, absolute considerata, sit idem quod essentia, tamen potentia, quia non est nomen adeo abstractum sicut essentia, trahitur ad personam. Unde potentia generandi non dicit naturam divinam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in tali persona, scilicet innascibili; ideo non est simile de hoc nomine essentia et de hoc nomine potentia.5

I RESPOND: Although power, absolutely considered, is the same (thing) which essence (is), nevertheless [tamen] "power", because it is not a noun so [adeo] abstract as "essence", is extended to a Person. Whence "the power of generating" does not mean "the Divine Nature" simply, but "the Nature as (it is) in such a Person", that is, (in) an Innascible One; for that reason the (case) is not similar concerning this noun essence and concerning this noun power.5

 

DUB. VI.

 

DOUBT VI

Item videtur male dicere ibi: Aliam significes potentiam, qua Pater potest gignere etc.; quia potentiae divisio sufficiens est per activam et passivam;6 sed posse generare dicit potentiam activam, posse gigni potentiam passivam: ergo non potest alia potentia significari. Si tu dicas, quod generare non est agere proprie, similiter nec generari pati; obiicitur, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus;7 sed aliud est gignere et aliud gigni: ergo alia est potentia huius et illius.

Likewise it seems that he speaks badly there (where he says): You signify the one power, by which the Father is able to beget etc.; because there is a sufficient division of power by active and passive;6 but to be able to generate means an active power, to be able to be begotten a passive power: therefore another power cannot be signified. If you say, that to generate is not to act properly, nor (is) to be generated similarly to suffer; it is objected, that powers are distinguished through acts;7 but it is one (thing) to beget and another to be begotten: therefore there is another power belonging to the latter and to the former.

RESPONDEO: Ista distinctio, quam ponit Magister de potentia gignendi active et passive, fundatur super hoc, quod potentia potest considerari secundum id quod est; et sic dicit naturam, et sicut una natura est in generante et genito, sed alio est alio modo, sic eadem potentia. Potest iterum considerari secundum id ad quod est; et sic dicit modum existendi naturam in persona in comparatione ad alium, qui est principium vel principiatum. Et sic, cum diversi modi sint, diversae dicuntur proprietates posse generare et posse generari et distinguuntur secundum actus personales; sed primo modo non.

I RESPOND: That distinction of his, which Master (Peter) posits concerning the power of begetting and of being begotten [potentia gignendi active et passive], is founded upon this, that power can be considered according to that which it is; and thus it means the Nature, and just as one Nature is in the One generating and the One begotten, but in the other it is in another manner, so (it is) the same power. Again it can be considered according to that toward which it is; and thus it means a manner of existing that the nature (has) in a Person in comparison to the other, who is the beginning and/or the begun. And thus, since there are diverse manners, the diverse properties are called the to be able to generate and the to be able to be generated and they are distinguished according to personal acts; but not (so) in the first manner.

 

DUB. VII.

 

DOUBT VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius sive qua potest gigni. Videtur enim dubium vel falsum, quia gigni omnino est a gignere, et gignere est a potentia Patris: ergo et gigni.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says,, that the Son has a power, by which He can be the Son or by which He can be begotten. For it seems dubious and/or false, because to be begotten is entirely from to beget, and to beget is from [a] the power of the Father: therefore also to be begotten.

RESPONDEO: Sicut potentia gignendi in Patre non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam ex se producere aliam, sic potentia gignendi in Filio non dicit nisi naturam8 in persona ut natam duci ab alia; sicut enim hypostasi Patris convenit generare, sic hypostasi Filii convenit generari. Nec valet quod obiicitur in contrarium. Nam omne quod habet Filius, sive essentiale sive personale, habet a Patre. Ideo quamvis ipsum gigni sit a potentia Patris, non excluditur tamen,9 quin potentia gignendi passiva sit in Filio. Sed illa potentia non / est principium generationis, . . .

I RESPOND: Just as in the Father the power of begetting means naught but the Nature in the Person as it is bound [natam] out of Itself to produce an Other, so in the Son the power of being begotten [potentia gignendi] means naught but the Nature8 in the Person as it is bound to be lead from an Other; for just as "to generate" is fitting to the hypostasis of the Father, so "to be generated" is fitting to the hypostasis of the Son. Nor is what is objected in the contrary valid. For everything which the Son has, whether essential or personal, He has from [a] the Father. For that reason although "that He is begotten" is from the power of the Father, it nevertheless [tamen] does not exlude,9 that the power of being begotten [potentia gignendi passiva] is in the Son. But that power is / not the principle of generation, . . .

1 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit idem.
2 De varia acceptione huius nomins proprietas, quatenus scilicet convenit cum relatione et ab ea distinguitur, sicuti et de relationibus in Deo vide infra d. 26. per totam. — Codd. hoc oco inter se non conveniunt; aliqui enim ut X cc post ideo si omittunt in personis, e contra cod. T cum ed. 1 addit divinis; mox post esse multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, omittunt hypostasis, quod cod. cc, interpunctione mutata, ponit loco hypostasi.
3 Plures codd. ut A G H I K S T W X Z cum ed. 1 omittunt sic, et paulo infra fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. diversificationem ponunt pro diversitatem.
4 Cod. dd addit potest.
5 Plura de hoc dubio, sicut et de duobus seqq. vide hic q. 2. et 3. ac apud Richardum, hic q. 3.
6 Vide. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et ibid. IX. text. 2. (IV c. 12. et VIII c. 1.).
7 Vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.
8 Aliqui codd. ut T cc modo positivo in Filio dicit naturam. Cod. bb post persona addit Filii.
9 Codd. omittunt tamen.

1 The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 adds same [idem].
2 Concerning the varying accepting of this noun property, that is, to the extent that it convenes with relation and is distinguished from it, just as also concerning the relations in God, see below d. 26 throughout. — The codices in this passage do not agree among themselves; for some as X and cc after for that reason if [ideo si] omit in the Persons [in personis], on the contrary codex T together with edition 1 adds Divine [divinis]; then after to belong [esse] many codices together with editions 1, 2 and 3 omit to a hypostasis, which codex cc, with changed punctuation, puts in place of the prior a hypostasis [hypostasi].
3 Very many codices as A G H I K S T W X Z together with edition 1 omit thus [sic], and a little below this nearly all the codices together with edition 1, contrary to the Vatican text, put a diversification [diversificationem] in place of diversitatem [a diversity].
4 Codex dd adds can [potest].
5 (For) more on this doubt, just as on the two following, see here q. 2 and 3 and in Richard (of Middleton's Commentary), here at q. 3.
6 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 17, and ibid., Bk. IX, text 2, (Bk. IV, ch. 12, and Bk. VIII, ch. 1).
7 See above, q. 1, fundament 2.
8 Some codices as T and cc have in a positive manner in the Son . . . means the Nature [in Filio dicit naturam]. Codex bb after person adds of the Son.
9 The codices omit nevertheless [tamen].

 

p. 146

 

est principium generationis, sed idoneitas personae sive hypostasis cum sua proprietate ad generari. Unde quod dicitur posse gigni, potentia potest intelligi originaliter, et sic est in solo Patre; vel formaliter, et sic ponitur esse in Filio; alio autem modo non.

is / not the principle of generation, rather [sed] (it is) the idoneity of the Person or hypostasis together with its property to be generated.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.