S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

De proprietatibus et conditionibus essentialibus Trinitatis et Unitatis.

 

On the essential properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity.

 

PARS I.

 

De veritate et immutabilitate Dei.

 

PART I

 

On the truth and immutability of God.

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 149-153.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 149-153.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Terminatis superius duabus partibus istius partis principalis, quae est de Trinitate secundum quod intelligitur, in quibus ad probandum Trinitem Magister adduxit rationes et removit dubitationes; in hac tertia parte determinat Magister ipsius1 Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones. Et quoniam quaedam sunt proprietates respicientes essentiam, ut veritas, quaedam personas, ut generatio, quaedam utrasque, ut aequalitas: ideo haec pars tres habet partes. In prima parte agit Magister de proprietatibus essentialibus; in secunda, de proprietatibus personalibus, infra distinctione nona: Nunc ad distinctionem personarum etc.; in tertia, de proprietatibus et conditionibus quodam modo essentialibus et quodam modo personalibus, sicut est aequalitas personarum in aeternitate, magnitudine et virtute,2 infra distinctione decima nona: Nunc postquam coeaternitatem trium personarum etc..

Having terminated the above two parts of that principal part (of his book), which concerns the Trinity according to what it is understood (to be), in which to prove the Trinity Master (Peter) brought forward reasons and removed doubts; in this third part Master (Peter) determines the properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity Itself.1 And since there are certain properties respecting the Essence, as truth, certain ones the Persons, as generation, certain ones both, as equality: for that reason this part has three parts. In the first part Master (Peter) deals with the essential properties; in the second, with the personal properties, below in the ninth distinction: Now let us approach the distinction of persons.; in the third, with the properties and conditions (which are) in a certain manner essential and in a certain manner personal, as is the equality of the Persons in eternity, magnitude and virtue,2 below in the nineteenth distinction: Now after we have hinted at the coeternity of the Three Persons etc..

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, tres habet partes secundum tres proprietates, quas assignat; et prima est de veritate; secunda de immutabilitate, et haec ponitur tertio capitulo:3 Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur; tertia de simplicitate, quae ponitur quarto capitulo:4 Eademque sola proprie, ac vere simplex est etc..

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has three parts according to the three properties, which he assigns: and the first concerns truth; the second concerns immutability, and this is put in the third chapter:3 Also of God alone is the Essence properly said (to be) incommutable; the third concerns simplicity, which is put in the forth chapter:4 And the Same alone is properly, and truly simple etc..

1 Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omisso Magister, substituit Vat. istius loco ipsius et paulo infra utraque pro utrasque.
2 Vat. unitate pro virtute, sed contra textum Magistri et codd.
3 Ita codd. cum ed. 1 ad normam alterius divisionis capitulorum; in nostra vide c. 2. — Vat. hic et in seqq. ibi.
4 In nostra ed. c. 3. — Vat. et haec loco quae, sed contra mss.

1 Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text, having omitted Master (Peter) substitutes of It [istius] in place of Itself [ipsius] and a little below this both [utraque] in place of each [utrasque].
2 The Vatican text has unity [unitate] in place of virtue [virtute], but contrary to the text of Master (Peter) and the codices.
3 Thus the codices together with edition 1, according to the norm of the other division of the chapters; in ours see ch. 2. — The Vatican text here and in the following (quote) there (where he says) [ibi].
4 In our edition ch. 3. — The Vatican text reads and this [et haec] in place of which [quae], but contrary to the manuscripts.

p. 150

Item prima pars habet duas partes, quia primo attribuit Deo proprietatem veritatis; secundo removet dubitationem habentem ortum ex praedictis, secundo capitulo:1 Hic diligenter advertendum est. Similiter secunda pars habet duas: in prima assignat Deo2 proprietatem incommutabilitatis et probat auctoritate Augustini; in secunda confirmat per Apostolum, ibi: Ideoque Apostolus loquens etc. Tertia, de simplicitate infra subdividetur.

Likewise the first part has two parts, because he first attributes to God the property of the truth; second he removes the doubt having risen out of the aforesaid, in the second chapter:1 Here it must diligently be adverted. Similarly the second part has two (parts): in the first he assigns to God2 the property of incommutability and proves (it) by the authority of (St.) Augustine; in the second he confirms (it) through the Apostle, there (where he says): And for that reason the Apostle (Paul) speaking etc.. The third (part), concerning simplicity, is subdivided below.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

In parte ista3 ad evidentiam duarum primarum proprietatum, quas Magister primo assignat, scilicet veritatis et incommutabilitatis, duo principaliter quaeruntur:

In that part (of his text),3 to evidence the two first properties, which Master (Peter) assigns first, that is, (the property) of truth and of incommutability, two (questions) are principally asked:

Primo quaeritur4 de ipsa veritate.

First there is asked (the question) concerning the truth itself.

Secundo de immutabilite.

Second concerning immutability.

De veritate iterum quaeruntur duo:

Concerning the truth there is again asked two (questions):

Primo, utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.

First, whether the truth be a property of the Divine ‘being’.

Secundo, utrum sit eius proprietas in summo, id est, adeo quod non possit cogitari non esse.

Secondly, whether the property belongs to Him in a most high manner, that is, to such an extent that it cannot be thought not to be.

 

ARTICULUS I.

 

De veritate Dei.

ARTICLE I

 

On the truth of God.

Questio I.

 

Utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.

Question 1

 

Whether truth is a property of the Divine ‘being’.

QUOD VERITAS sit proprietas divini esse, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus.

THAT TRUTH is a property of the Divine ‘being’, is shown by authorities and by reasons.

1. Primo modo sic: Hieronymus ad Marcellam, et habet in littera:5 « Solus Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est »; sed quod alicui soli convenit, est proprium illi: ergo veritas est proprium divini esse.

1. In the first manner thus: (St.) Jerome to Marcella, and he has it in the text:5 « God alone truly is, to whose Essence our ‘being’ is not compared »; but what is fitting to someone alone, is proper to him: therefore truth is proper to the Divine ‘Being’.

2. Item, Augustinus de Vera Religione:6 « Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imitantur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt ». Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine On the True Religion:6 « Falsity is from those things, which imitate that One, by whom anything is one, inasmuch as they cannot fulfill that ». Therefore if no creature can fulfill that most high One, there is no truth in any creature, but (rather) falsity in all (things).

3. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis et de Vera Religione7 dicit, quod lux increata est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia cognoscibilia: ergo si veritas est ratio cognoscendi, et sola lux increata est veritas: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies and On the True Religion7 says, that the uncreated Light is the reason for cognizing Itself and all cognizables: therefore if truth is the reason for cognizing, and the uncreated Light alone is the Truth: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

4. Item, Anselmus in libro de Veritate8 dicit, quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate: aut ergo intelligit effective, aut formaliter; non effective, quia similiter omnia possent dici vera9 prima bonitate: ergo intelligitur formaliter: ergo non est alia veritas quam veritas increata: ergo si illa est in Deo et Deus, veritas est solius Dei proprietas.

4. Likewise, (St.) Anselm in (his) book On the Truth8 says, that all (things) are true by the first Truth: therefore either he understands (this) effectively, or formally; not effectively, because all (things) can similarly be said (to be) true9 by the first Goodness: therefore it is understood formally: therefore there is no truth other than the uncreated Truth: therefore if that is in God and (is) God, truth is a property of God alone.

5. Item, rationibus probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem10 et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas.

5. Likewise, by reasons it is proven thus: truth and vanity are opposed; but every creature has vanity10 and a ‘being thoroughly mixed’ with a ‘not being’ [permixtionem cum non esse], since it is out of nothing, and God alone entirely lacks this (mixture): therefore in God alone is truth.

6. Item, veritas opponitur umbrae. Quod enim est umbra rei, non habet veritatem;11 sed creaturae sunt umbrae illius summi esse: ergo non habent veritatem in esse.

6. Likewise, truth is opposed to shadows. For that which is a shadow of a thing, does not have truth;11 but creatures are the shadows of that Most High ‘Being’: therefore they do not have truth in being [in esse].

7. Item, veritas est, qua aliquid est verum; sed veritas est vera, cum sit cognoscibilis; sed constat quod non alio quam se, quia alias12 esset abire in infinitum; sed quod est verum se ipso, est verum per essentiam: ergo omnis veritas est vera per essentiam; sed sola veritas increata est vera per essentiam: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

7. Likewise, the truth is, that by which something is true; but the truth is true, since it is cognizable; but it is established that (it is such) not by another than itself, because otherwise12 it would go off into infinity; but what is true by its very self, is true through (its) essence: therefore every truth is true through (its) essence; but only the uncreated Truth is true through (Its) Essence: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

CONTRA: 1. Si veritas est Dei proprietas, aut ergo veritas complexa, aut incomplexa. Non complexa; quia talis est cum compositione, in Deo autem non est compositio aliqua. Non incomplexa; quia haec convertitur cum ente:13 ergo cum entitas non sit Dei proprietas, pari ratione nec veritas erit.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. If truth is a property of God, therefore either (this property) is a complex truth, or a not complex [incomplexa]. Not complex; because such is with composition, but in God there is no composition. Not not complex; because this is convertible with being [ente]:13 therefore since entity is not a property of God, for an equal reason neither is truth.

1 In nostra ed. c. 1 circa medium.
2 Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt Deo et incommutabilitatis.
3 Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 hac pro ista; mox dicitur primarum, quia ut tertia proprietas a Magistro enumeratur simplicitas; omittitur tamen primarum a paucis codd. et ed. 1.
4 Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus quaeritur.
5 Cap. 1. cira initium. — Vat. prater fidem mss. et ed. 1 auctoritate Hieronymi pro Hieronymus.
6 Cap. 36. n. 66: Si enim falsitas ex iis est, quae imitantur unum, no in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt. — Et ibid. paulo ante ait: At si corpora in tanum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitatri, a quo principio unum est, quidquid est. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. summe loco summum.
7 Libr. I. Soliloq. c. 8. n. 15. — De Vera Religione c. 34. n. 64. et c. 36. n. 66. — Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit verba se et omnia usque cognoscendi.
8 Cap. 13, ubi probat omnium rerum unam solum esse rectitudinem, ex qua concludit: una igitur in omnibus ilils est veritas.
9 Ita cum ed. 1 antiquiores codd., quorum quidem aliqui possunt legunt pro possent; Vat. autem cum cod. cc possunt dici bona, quoa posito argumentum destruitur; recte siquidem omnia effective dicuntur et sunt bona bonitate prima. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc post si illa est repetit verbum est, et immediate post Vat. sola pro et Desu ponit etc. ergo; sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
10 Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. Cfr. etiam Ecclesiastes 3, 19.
11 Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 29.). — Mox post summi supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 male omissum esse.
12 Codd. cum ed. 1 tunc pro alias, sed non ita bene.
13 Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.

1 In our edition ch. 1, near the middle.
2 The codices together with edition 1 omit to God [Deo] and of incommutability [incommutabilitatis].
3 The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has this [hac] for that . . . (of his text) [ista]; then it reads of the first (parts) [primarum], because simplicity is enumerated by Master (Peter) as the third (part); however of the first (parts) is omitted by a few codices and edition 1.
4 From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we inserted there is asked (the question) [quaeritur].
5 Chapter 1 near the beginning. — The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 reads by the authority of (St.) Jerome [auctoritate Hieronomi] in place of (St.) Jerome [Hieronomus].
6 Chapter 36, n. 66: For if falsity is from those (things), which imitate the One, not inasmuch as they imitate It, but inasmuch as they cannot fulfill (It). — And ibid. a little before this he says: But if bodies fail to this extent [in tantum], inasmuch as they do not fulfill that One which they are proven guilty (in) imitating, from which Principle, whatever is, is one. — The Vatican text contrary to very many codices has most highly [summe] in place of most high [summum].
7 Soliloquies, Bk. I, ch. 8, n. 15. — On the True Religion, ch. 34, n. 64 and ch. 36, n. 66. — The Vatican text, without any authority from the manuscripts and edition 1, omits the words Itself and all up to for cognizing [se et omnia . . . cognoscendi].
8 Chapter 13, where he proves that there is only one rectitude of all things, from which he concludes: therefore there is one truth in all those (things).
9 Thus together with edition 1 the more ancient codices, of which indeed some read the indicative for can; but the Vatican text together with codex cc has can be said (to be) good [possunt dici bona], which posited destroys the argument; if indeed rightly all are said effectively and are good by the first goodness. Near the end of the argument the Vatican text together with codex cc, after if that is repeats the word is [est], and immediately after this the Vatican text alone puts etc., therefore in place of and (is) God.
10 Rm 8:20: For to vanity has the creature been subjected. Cf. also Ecclesiastes 3:19.
11 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 34. (Bk. IV, ch. 29). — Then after most high [summi] we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the badly omitted ‘Being’ [esse].
12 The codices together with edition 1 have then [tunc] in place of otherwise [alias], but not so well.
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 4 (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 1): Any one (thing) just as it holds itself so as to be, thus also (does it hold itself) to the truth.

 

p. 151

 

2. Item, verum aeque commune est ut bonum, et quodam modo magis;1 sed bonitas non est Dei proprietas: ergo pari ratione nec veritas.

2. Likewise, the true is as equally common as the good, and in a certain sense moreso;1 but goodness is not a property of God: therefore for an equal reason neither truth.

3. Item, veritas est ratio discernendi Creatorem a creatura et creaturam a creatura;2 sed quod est ratio discernendi et distinguendi est diversum in diversis: ergo alia veritas est in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura quam in alia: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

3. Likewise, truth is the reason for discerning the Creator from the creature and a creature from a creature;2 but that which is the reason for discerning and distinguishing is diverse in diverse (things): therefore truth in God is other than (it is) in a creature, and in one creature than in another: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

4. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis:3 « Verum est id quid est », ergo veritas est ipsa entitas: ergo non est proprium essentiae, quia si sic, qua ratione dicitur: Veritas est4 proprietas essentiae, posset dici e converso, cum omnino idem sint.

4. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies:3  « The true is that which is », therefore truth is entity itself:  therefore it is not proper to an essence, because if so, by the reckoning by which there is said:  “Truth is4 a property of an essence”, there could be said conversely (“Essence is a property of truth”), since they are entirely the same.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Veritas, quatenus opponitur falsitati, invenitur etiam in creaturis secundum triplicem suam comparationem ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, ad intellectum quem excitat; quatenus vero opponitur permixtioni, est proprietas solius Dei.

CONCLUSION

 

Truth, to the extent that it is opposed to falsity, is even found in creatures according to its threefold comparison to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, to the intellect which it excites; however to the extent that it is opposed to confusion [permixtioni], it is a property of God alone.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod veritas habet triplicem comparationem. Habet enim comparari ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, et ad intellectum quem excitat. In comparatione ad subiectum veritatis dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad principium dicitur veritas summae unitatis5 et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad intellectum dicitur veritas ratio discernendi.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that truth has a threefold comparison. For it has to be compared to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, and to the intellect which it excites. In being compared [comparatione] to a subject of the truth, truth is meant as the act and the indivision of the power. In being compared to a principle, truth is meant as the representation or imitation of the most high and first Unity.5 In being compared to an intellect truth is meant as the reason for discerning.

Et in omnibus istis comparationibus dupliciter potest accipi veritas: uno modo, prout distinguitur contra falsitatem; alio modo, prout distinguitur contra permixtionem, secundum quod verum dicitur purum et impermixtum.

And in all those comparisons truth can be accepted in a twofold manner: in one manner, insofar as it is distinguished against falsity; in another manner, insofar as it is distinguished against confusion [permixtionem], according to which the true is said to be pure and thoroughly unmixed [impermixtum].

Prout veritas dividitur contra falsitatem, quae est privatio indivisionis et imitationis et6 expressionis, sic cum in creatura sit aliquo modo invenire et indivisionem et imitationem et expressionem, sic est veritas non tantum in Creatore, sed etiam in creatura; et sic non assignatur Dei proprietas.

Insofar as the truth is divided against falsity, which is a privation of indivision and imitation and6 expression, thus since in a creature there is in some manner to be found both indivision and imitation and expression, so truth is not only in the Creator, but also in the creature; and in this manner a property of God is not assigned.

Alio modo, prout veritas dividitur contra permixtionem sive impuritatem, sic est in solo Deo. Nam in solo Deo est indivisio pura, non permixta alicui diversitati; in solo Deo est imitatio et similitudo pura non permixta alicui dissimilitudini; et in solo Deo est expressio luminis non permixta obscuritati.7 In creatura autem est indivisio cum actus et potentiae diversitate et imitatio cum dissimilitudine; est ulterius in ea expressio cum obscuritate. Et ideo hoc modo veritas est divini esse proprietas; et sic accipit Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse, quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate, nihil de non entitate. Et ideo in Deo non cadit praeteritio et futuritio, quae aliquo modo non entia sunt.

In another manner, insofar as truth is divided against confusion [permixtionem] or impurity, thus it is in God alone. For in God alone there is pure indivision, not confused [non permixta] with any diversity; in God alone there is pure imitation and similitude, not confused with any dissimilitude; and in God alone there is the expression of a light [luminis], not confused with obscurity.7 In the creature, on the other hand, there is indivision with diversity of act and power and imitation with dissimilitude; there is furthermore in it an expression with obscurity. And for that reason in this manner truth is a property of the Divine ‘Being’; and thus do Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine and (St.) Jerome accept it. For they call a “true ‘being’” [verum esse], that which has nothing concerning possibility, has nothing concerning vanity, nothing concerning non-entity. And for that reason in God there does not fall a ‘passing away’ [praeteritio] and a ‘coming to be’ [futuritio], which in some manner are not beings.

1, 2, 5, 6. Et sic procedunt duae primae auctorites et rationes.

1, 2, 5, 6. And thus proceed the first two authorities and reasons.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non sit alia veritas quam aeterna, quia ipsa sola facit intelligere; dicendum, quod sicut color est obiectum visus et motivum visus — tamen non sine actu lucis — et differt ab8 ipsa luce; sic dicendum, quod veritas creata, quamvis non possit movere sine veritate increata, nihilominus est motiva suo modo et alia veritas ab illa.

3. However to that which is objected, that there is not an other truth than the eternal One, because It Itself alone causes understanding; it must be said, that just as color is the object of seeing and the motive for seeing — however not without the act of light — and differs from8 the light itself; so it must be said, that created truth, although it cannot move without uncreated Truth, nevertheless it is motive in its own manner and a truth other than that One.

4. et 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima; dicendum, quod verum de sui impositione dicit comparationem ad causam exemplarem, sicut bonum ad causam finalem. Sicut enim dicitur bonum ratione ordinis, sic verum ratione expressionis; et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris. Sicut igitur, cum dicitur de bonis creatis, quod sunt bona bonitate increata, bonitas praedicat finem in ablativo, non formam, quia Dei bonitas9 nullius creati est forma; similiter, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt vera veritate increata, ablativus dicit causam formalem exemplarem.10 Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem; et per hoc patet ultimum.

4. and 7. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Anselm, that all (things) are true by the prime Truth; it must be said, that the true from its own imposition means a comparison to an exemplary cause, just as the good (does) to a final cause. For just as the good is said according to a reckoning of order, so the true according to a reckoning of expression; and a reckoning of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself. Therefore just as, when there is said of created goods, that they are good by the uncreated Goodness, “goodness” is said before the end (of the phrase) in the ablative, not (before the) form, because the goodness9 of God is the form of no created (thing); similarly, when there is said, that all (things) are true by the uncreated Truth, the ablative means the formal, exemplary cause.10 For all (things) are true and are bound to express themselves through the expression of that most high Light; which if It would cease to shine upon them [influere], all others would cease to be true. For that reason no created truth is true through (its) essence, but (rather) through participation; and by this (reckoning) the last (affirmative proposition) is clear.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est proprietas; patet responsio: quoniam / obiicit de veritate, . . .

To that, however, which is objected in the contrary, that it is not a property; the response is clear: since / it objects concerning the truth, . . .

1 Ratio communiter allegata est, quia verum est enti propinquius et in se abstactius.
2 August., de Vera Religione, c. 7. n. 13: Omnis enim res vel essentia . . . simul haec tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat.
3 Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.
4 Multi codd. ut B D F I P Q T X Y Z cum ed. 1 omittunt est.
5 Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic pro veritatis substituimus unitatis, et paulo infra pro distinguendi posuimus discernendi, quae lectio etiam comprobatur argumento secundo pro affirmativa parte et argumento tertio pro negativa parte supra allato.
6 Ex plurimus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis particulam et.
7 Vat. cum cod. cc permixti obscuritate, sed contra antiquiores codd., quorum tamen nonnulli etiam habet obscuritate, sed minus bene et contra immediate praecedentia.
8 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 ipsa a luce, sed incongrue, et in fine argumenti contra antiquiores mss. post veritas addit est.
9 Vat. contra antiquiores codd. bonitas increata pro Dei bonitas.
10 Codd. D T expressius ablativus non dicit causam formalem esse rerum complectivam, sed exemplarem. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra alios et ed. 1, expressione loco per expressionem, et in fine Vat. sola patent ultima pro patet ultimum, sed falso.

1 The reason commonly alleged is, that the true is nearer to being and in se more abstract.
2 (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, ch. 7, n. 13: For every thing and/or essence . . . at once has these three (characteristics), that it is both one something, and by its proper species is discerned from all the others, and it does not exceed the order of things.
3 Book II, ch. 5, n. 8: The true seems to me to be that which is.
4 Many codices as B D F I P Q T X Y Z together with edition 1 omit is [est].
5 From nearly all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have here substituted unity [unitatis] for truth [veritatis], and a little below this we have put for discerning [discernendi] in place of for distinguishing [distinguendi], which reading is also corroborated by the second argument in the affirmative and the third argument in the negative, quoted above.
6 From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied twice the particle ant [et].
7 The Vatican text together with codex cc has the masculine not confused [non permixti] referring to a light rather than the feminine not thoroughly mixed [non permixta] refering to expression, but contrary to the more ancient codices, not a few of which, however, have only in obscurity [obscuritate], but less well and contrary to what immediately precedes this.
8 The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, has itself from the light [ipsa a luce], but incongruously, and at the end of the argument contrary to the more ancient manuscripts it reads is another truth from that One [alia veritas est ab illa].
9 The Vatican text contrary to the more ancient codices reads uncreated goodness [bonitas increata] for goodness of God [Dei bonitas].
10 Codices D and T more expressly read the ablative does not mean that there is a formal cause embracing things, but (rather) exemplary (of them). A little below this the Vatican edition together with codex cc, but contrary to the others and edition 1, reads by an expression [expressione] in place of through an expression [per expressionem], and at the end the Vatican text alone has the last (propositions) are clear [patet ultima] in place of the last (affirmative proposition) is clear [patet ultimum], but falsely.

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obiicit de veritate, secundum quod habet oppositionem ad defectum falsitatis, non ad permixtionem possibilitatis; praedicto enim modo convenit non tantum Creatori, sed etiam creaturae.

it objects concerning the truth, according to which it has an opposition to the defect of falsity, not to the confusion of possibility; for in the aforesaid manner it is not only agreeable [convenit] to the Creator, but also to the creature.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est idem quod divina essentia; dicendum, quod de ratione proprietatis in creatura sunt ista tria: primum est, quod convenit soli; secundum est, quod est ratio innotescendi; tertium est, quod differt ab eo cuius est proprietas.1 Duo prima sunt perfectionis, ultimum vero imperfectionis, quia excludit simplicitatem. Et ideo veritas dicitur divinae essentiae proprietas, non quia differat vel sit inhaerens divinae essentiae, sicut accidens2 subiecto, sed quia soli convenit et est ratio cognoscendi eam. Et haec est causa, quare e converso essentia non est proprietas veritatis, quia non est ratio innotescendi eam, sicut e converso.

4. To that which is objected, that truth is the same as the Divine Essence; it must be said, that these three concern the reckoning of property in a creature:  the first is, that it convenes with the latter alone [soli]; the second is, that it is a reason for (it) becoming known [ratio innotescendi]; the third is, that it differs from that of which it is the property.1  The first two belong to perfection, but the last to imperfection, because it excludes simplicity.  And for that reason truth is said (to be) a property of the Divine Essence, not because it differs from and/or is inherent to the Divine Essence, as an accident2 to a subject, but because it convenes with the latter alone and is a reason for cognizing it.  And this is the cause, why conversely the Essence is not a property of truth, because it is not a reason for coming to know it [ratio innotescendi eam], just as (the latter is) conversely.

Si autem quaeras, cum idem significent essentia et veritas, quare unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et non e converso; ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod quamvis idem significent essentia et veritas, tamen unum, scilicet veritas, est magis ratio cognoscendi ratione connotati. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia veritas nihil connotat. Dicendum ergo, quod hoc est ratione modi significandi et intelligendi.

Moreover if you ask, since essence and truth signify the same (thing), why one is the reason for cognizing the other, and not conversely; to this some have said, that although essence and truth signify the same (thing), one however, namely the truth, is a greater reason for cognizing by reason of the (thing) connoted. But this cannot stand, because the truth connotes nothing. Therefore it must be said, that this (lack of reciprocity) is by reason of the manner of signifying and understanding.

Et notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de his nominibus; uno modo ratione eius quod nominant seu significant; alio modo ratione eius, in quo significatur poni quod nominant.3 Unde differt dicere sensum et sensum hominis; quia primo dicitur commune ad sensum hominis et bruti, secundo proprium hominis. Si ergo accipimus huiusmodi nomina secundum se, alia est ratio essentiae, alia veritatis, quoniam essentia dicit quid, veritas conditionem entis. Cum vero essentiam et veritatem trahimus ad Deum, quamvis idem sint, tamen ratione generalium significatorum unum accipitur ut proprietas alterius; et non est ibi synonymia nec sunt nomina synonyma, sed manet ratio subiecti et proprietatis secundum modum significandi, et manet etiam secundum modum intelligendi; quia per essentiam in creatura intelligimus essentiam in Creatore, et per veritatem creaturae intelligimus veritatem increatam. Unde sicut veritas creata est proprietas et ratio cognoscendi essentiam creatam, sic veritas increata secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi est ratio cognoscendi et intelligendi essentiam increatam.

And it must be noted, that there is a twofold manner in which one speaks [dupliciter est loqui] of these nouns; in one manner by reason of that which they name or signify; in another manner by reason of that, in which there is signified that there is posited what they name.3 Whence it is different to say the sense and the sense of a man; because in the first manner it is meant commonly according to the sense of man and brute, in the second (according to what is) proper to a man. Therefore if we accept nouns of this manner according to themselves, one is the reckoning of the essence, another of the truth, since the essence means the what, the truth the condition of the being. However when we treat of essence and truth as regards God, although they are the same (Thing), however by reason of the general signifieds one is accepted as the property of the other; and There there is not a synonym nor are nouns synonymous, but (rather) there remains a reckoning of subject and of property according to the manner of signifying, and it remains also according to the manner of understanding; because through the essence in a creature we understand the Essence in the Creator, and through the truth of a creature we understand the uncreated Truth. Whence just as created truth is a property and a reason for cognizing a created essence, so the uncreated Truth, according to a reckoning of signifying and understanding, is a reason for cognizing and understanding the uncreated Essence.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Sensus quaestionis est, utrum veritas competat Deo tanquam proprium, sive utrum sit de essentia Dei et proprietas Dei solius. Veritas hic accipitur, non prout est formaliter in intellectu, nec etiam pro re, quatenus est obiectum intellectus, sed in ordine ad ipsam rem, cuius est actus, sive quatenus dicit indivisionem entis et esse. — Ad intelligentiam terminorum, qui in prima ratione pro parte negativa et alibi saepe occurrunt, notandum, quod complexum et incomplexum idem sunt ac compositum et incompositum. Veritas complexa est passio sive proprietas propositionis, quae dicit connexionem praedicati cum subiecto, et habetur in secunda mentis operatione, nempe in iudicio. Veritas autem incomplexa est passio simplex cuiuslibet entis et definitur per hoc, quod sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum, qui rem cognoscit sicuti est. Haec habetur in qualibet prima mentis operatione, quae est simplex apprehensio.

I. The sense of the question is, whether truth pertains [competat] to God as (something) proper, or whether it concerns the essence of God and (is) a property of God alone. Truth is here accepted, not insofar as it is formally in the intellect, nor even on behalf of a thing, to the extent that it is an object of the intellect, but in order to the thing itself, of which it is the act, or to the extent that it means an indivision of a being and (its) ‘to be’. — For an understanding of the terms, which in the first reason occur on behalf of the negative side and often elsewhere, it must be noted, that the complex and the non-complex are the same as the composite and the not-composite. Complex truth is a passion or property of a proposition, which means a connection of the predicate with the subject, and (this) is had in the second operation of the mind, namely in judgment. But an non-complex truth is a simple passion of any being and is defined through this, that it is an adequation of a thing to the intellect, which cognizes the thing just as it is. This is had in any first operation of the mind, which is simple apprehension.

II. Alibi S. Bonav. cum sententia communi distinguit veritatem tripliciter, scil. sumtam vel formaliter, quae est veritas in intellectu, vel radicaliter sive causaliter, quae est in rebus, vel prout est in oratione tanquam in signo. Cfr. infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. q. 2; Hexaëm. Serm. 5. De veritate singi, infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 19. q. 5; de Verit. q. 1. a. 1. et seqq.; S. I. q. 16. a. 1. 2. 3. 5. — Hoc loco et in Prolog. ad Comment. in Ecclesiast. circa finem agit solummodo de veritate in rebus, sive prout veritas est proprietas entis. Haec veritas in rebus iterum triplici modo considerari potest: primo quidem respectu subiecti; et sic veritas est indivisio actus et potentiae, vel cum Avicenna in VIII. Metaph. c. 6: Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est rei; sive veritas est illa res, quae est in actu; et sub hoc respectu definitur: indivisio esse et quod est. — Secundo consideratur respectu sui principii, quod est exemplar divinum, cui res assimilantur; et sub hoc respectu definitur secundum Augustinum in libr. de Vera Religione c. 36. n. 66: Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est, unde falsitas oritur. — Tertio modo consideratur respectu ad effectum consequentem, quatenus obiectum intellectu causat veritatem; et sic est ratio cognoscendi rem eamque distinguendi, et sub hoc respectu definitur ab Augustino (loc. cit.): Veritas est quae ostendit id quod est; et ab Hilario: Veritas est declaritivum esse. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 15. m. 3; S. Thom., de Veritate q. 1. a. 1. — Alia distinctio veritatis contra falsitatem et contra permixtionem patet ex textu.

II. Elsewhere St. Bonaventure, together with the common opinion, distinguishes “truth” in a threefold manner, that is, taken formally, which is truth in the intellect, and/or radically or causally, which is the one in things, and/or insofar as it is in conversation [oratione] as in a sign. Cf. below d. 31, p. II, a. 1. q. 1; above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Sent., Bk. II, d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; Hexaëmeron, Sermon 5 "On the truth of a sign", below in d. 46, a. 1, q. 4. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, q. 5; On the Truth, q. 1, a. 1, and ff.; Summa., I, q. 16, aa. 1-3, 5. — In this passage and in the Prologue to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes near the end he only deals with truth in things, or insofar as truth is a property of a being. This truth in things can again be considered in a threefold manner: first of all in respect to a subject; and thus truth is the indivision of act and potency, and or with Avicenna in Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, ch. 6: The truth of any thing is a property of its ‘being’, which when established belongs to the thing; or the truth is that thing, which is in act; and under this respect there is defined: the indivision of ‘being’ and that which is. — Second it is considered in respect to its principle, which is the Divine Exemplar, to which the thing is assimilated; and under this respect it is defined according to (St.) Augustine in (his) book On the True Religion, ch. 36, n. 66: Truth is the most high similitude of the principle, which without any dissimilitude is, whence falsity arises. — In the third manner it is considered in respect to the consequent effect, to the extent that the object in the intellect causes truth; and thus it is a reason for cognizing a thing and for distinguishing it, and under this respect it is defined by (St.) Augustine (loc. cit.): Truth is that which shows what is; and by (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers): Truth is declarative ‘being’. Cf. above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alexander of Hales, p. I., q. 15, m. 3; St. Thomas, On the Truth, q. 1, a. 1. — The other distinction of truth against falsity and against confusion is clear from the text.

III. Quoad ordinem argumentorum pro et contra notandum, quod prima propositio, quae agit de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra falsitatem, probatur tribus prioribus argumentis pro parte negativa. Secunda vero, quae est de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra permixtionem, probatur 5. et 6. argumento pro parte affirmativa. Cetera argumenta per distinctionem in recto sensu explicantur. — Attentione digna sunt, quae hic in corp. et in solut. ad 1. 2. et ad ult. de veritate creata dicuntur, scil. quod nulla veritas creata sit veritas per essentiam, . . .

III. In regard to the order of the arguments pro and contra it must be noted, that the first proposition, which deals with truth, to the extent that it is distinguished against falsity, is proven by the three prior arguments on the negative side. But the second, which concerns truth, to the extent that it is distinguished against confusion [permixtionem], is proven in the 5th and 6th argument on the affirmative side. All the other arguments are explained through a distinction in the right sense. — With due attention these are, those which are here said in the body (of the response) and in the solution to n. 1 and 2 and to the last concerning created truth, namely that no created truth is truth through (its) essence, . . .

1 Cfr. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1. et 2. ac Porphyr., de Praedicabili. c. de Proprio.
2 Mendum Vat. antecedens loco accidens correximus fide mss. et trium primarum edd. Paulo infra post veritatis non nulli codd. cum ed. 1 non apte addunt particulam et.
3 Plerique codd. ut A R S T Y etc. denominat. Unde differret, et paulo deinde pro secundo et accipiamus loco accipimus.

1 Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. V, chs. 1 and 2, and Porphyry, On Predicables, ch. "On the Proper".
2 The error of the Vatican text of putting antecedent [antecedens] in place of accident [accidens], we have corrected on the testimony of the manuscripts and the first three editions. A little below this after of truth [veritatis] not a few codices together with edition 1 add not aptly the particle and [et].
3 Very many codices as A R S T Y etc. read they name . . . Whence it would be different [demoninant. Unde differret], and a little below this they have then [deinde] in place of second [secondo] and the subjunctive we accept [accipiamus] in place of the indicative.

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sed per participationem, et quod nihilominus suo modo est ratio cognoscendi distincta a veritate increata. Quod dictum est contra rigidos Ontologistas.

but (rather) through participation, and that nevertheless in its own manner it is a reason for cognizing distinct from uncreated Truth. What has been said is contrary to the rigid Ontologists.

IV. Quoad 1. et 2. concl. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 5; et q. 17. m. 4. — Pro explicatione loci sumti ex Anselmo (4. fundam.) cfr. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 16. a. 6.) et praecipue Richard. (hic q. 2. a. 4.), qui in extenso et bene rem tractat, licet alia via incedat ac S. Bonav. — De differentia inter esse divinum et esse creatum cfr. hic dub. 8.

IV. In regard to the first and second conclusion, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 15, m. 5; and q. 17, m . 4. — For an explication of the text taken from (St.) Anselm (4th fundament) cf. St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 16, a. 6) and especially Richard of Middleton (here in q. 2, a. 4), who treats of the matter extensively and well, though he proceeds in the other way as St. Bonaventure does. — On the difference among the Divine "to be" and the created "to be" cf. here in dub. 8.

De tota quaestione: S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 60; S. I. q. 16. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 46, a. 11. seqq., ubi diffuse multas de hac re quaestiones solvit; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a. Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 2. — Richard. a Med., hic. q. 1. et 2. — Aegid. R., hic. 1. princ. q. 1. et d. 19. 2. princ. q. 2. et 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. per tot. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

On the whole question: St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles., I, ch. 60; Summa., I, q. 16, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 1, and d. 46, a. 11 ff., where he solves many questions concerning this matter at length; Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1 and 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1 and 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st princ. q. 1, and d. 19, 2nd princ. q. 2 and 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 34. throughout. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.