COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 8, P. I, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII
PARS I.	PART I
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE I Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 153-156. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 153-156. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Quaestio II. Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.	Question 2 Whether the Divine ‘to be’ is true to such an extent, that it cannot be thought not to be.
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum haec proprietas conveniat Deo in summo, id est, utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether this property convenes with God in the highest (manner), that is, whether the Divine ‘to be’ [esse] is true to such an extent, that it cannot be thought [cogitari] not to be.
1. Et quod sic, videtur per Anselmum,¹ qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse, quam quod potest; ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit, divinum esse ita est, quod non potest² cogitari non esse.	1. And that (it is) so, seems through (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury)¹ who says, that God according to the common conception of spirit is He whom nothing greater can be thought; but what cannot be thought not to be is greater, than that which can (be so thought); therefore since nothing can be thought greater than God, the Divine ‘to be’ is such, that It cannot² be thought not to be.
2. Item, Damascenus³ dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaliter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nec assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse.	2. Likewise, (St. John) Damascene³ says, that the cognition of what it is to be [essendi] God is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not leave nor grow accustomed (to what is) to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed upon the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore He cannot be thought not to be.
3. Item, maior est veritas in esse divino quam in aliqua dignitate;⁴ sed aliqua dignitas ita est vera, quod non est ei contradicere corde, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia; unde non potest cogitari non esse: ergo multo fortius hoc erit verum dicere de prima veritate.	3. Likewise, greater is the truth in the Divine ‘to be’ than in any (other) dignity;⁴ but any (other) dignity is so true, that there is no internal contradiction [non est ei contradicere corde], so that, every whole is greater than its part, and similar (things); whence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first Truth.
4. Item, intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem,⁵ ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare, non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse.	4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first Light and Truth,⁵ therefore every action of the intellect, which is in thinking something not to be, is through the first Light; but through the first Light one does not happen to think, that the first Light or Truth is not: therefore in no manner does one happen to think, that the first Truth is not.
5. Item, quod contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare;⁶ sed non contingit enuntiare, primam veritatem non esse: ergo nec cogitare. Probatio mediae: omnis sermo enuntiativus asserit, se esse verum; unde sequitur: si homo est asinus, hominem esse asinum est verum; sed omne quod ponit veritatem, ponit primam veritatem, quia omnis veritas infert illam: ergo omnis sermo assert, primam veritatem esse: ergo etc.	5. Likewise, that which happens to think happens to ennunciate;⁶ but one does not happen to think, that the first Truth is not: therefore neither to think (it). Proof of the middle: every enunciative discourse [sermo enuntiativus] asserts, that it is true; whence it follows: if a man is a donkey, that a man is a donkey is true; but everything which posits truth, posits the first Truth, because every truth infers It: therefore every discourse asserts, that the first Truth is: ergo etc..
6. Item, omnis sermo enuntiativus⁷ aut affirmativus est, aut negativus; sed affirmativus affirmat hoc de hoc; sed sequitur: si est ens quod est hoc, est ens quod non est hoc, quia cum dico ens hoc, dico ens limitatum, finitum et arctatum; et tali posito, ponitur ens summum: ergo omnis sermo affirmativus circa creaturam infert Deum.	6. Likewise, every ennunciative⁷ discourse is either affirmative, or negative; but an affirmative affirms this of this; but it follows: if there is a being which is this, it is a being which is not this, because when I say “this being”, I mean a limited, finite, constrained [arctatum] being; and with such posited, there is posited the most high Being: therefore every affirmative discourse about a creature infers God.
7. Item, negativus similiter, quia nullus sermo est magis negativus quam iste: nulla est veritas. Sed Augustinus in Soliloquiis⁸ probat, quod sermo iste ponit, aliquam veritatem esse; quia si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, aliqua veritas est: ergo etc.	7. Likewise, the negative similarly, because no discourse is more negative than this one: there is no truth. But (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies⁸ proves, that that discourse posits, that there is some truth; because if there is no truth, it is true, that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, there is some truth: ergo etc..
SED CONTRA: 1. Damascenus:⁹ « In tantum praevaluit perniciosa hominum malitia, ut dicat, Deum non esse, secundum illud Psalmi: Dixit insipiens etc. »	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St. John) Damascene (says):⁹ « The pernicious wickedness of men prevails to so great an extent [in tantum], that it says, that God is not, according to that (word) of the Psalm: The fool said etc.. »
2. Item, idolatra dicit, quod non est alius Deus nisi idolum, et hoc credit et cogitat; sed constat idolum non esse Deum: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, the idolater says, that there is no other God except an idol, and this he believes and thinks; but it is established that an idol is not God: ergo etc..
3. Item, omne illud, quo intellecto non esse, potest aliquid intelligi, potest cogitari non esse. Sed dicit Boethius in libro de Hebdomadibus,¹⁰ quod in- / -ntellecto per impossibile, . . .	3. Likewise, every that, which when understood not to be, can be understood as something, can be thought not to be. But (St. Severinus) Boethius says in the book On the Seven Rules,¹⁰ that having un- / -derstood per impossibile, . . .
¹ Proslog. c. 2. seqq. ² Aliqui codd. possit. ³ Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 1. et 3: Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat. ⁴ Dignitas, graece axiwma, hic et passim significat propositionem immediate sive per se notam, quam definit Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2, quod sit propositio indemonstrabilis, quam necesse est quemlibet docendum habere; et Boeth. de Hebdomad., quod sit enuntiatio, quam quisque probat auditam. ⁵ De hac propositione, quae fundatur in doctrina S. Augustini, vide supra q. 1 arg. 3. pro affirmativa parte, et d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2, ubi et in Scholio sensus ipsius explicatur. — Mox Vat. post aliquid omittit non et paulo infra post cogitare cum cod. cc omittit verba non esse primam usque cogitare, quae lectio mutila resarcitur ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1. ⁶ Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 verba transponit et modo negativo propositionem sic exhibet: quod non convenit enuntiare, hoc non convenit cogitare. ⁷ De enuntiatione eiusque specibus vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. de Enuntiatione. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 quia sequitur pro sed sequitur. ⁸ Libr. II. c. 2. n. 2 et c. 16. n. 28. — Vat. cum cod. cc post ponit addit primam, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra ed. operum Augustini. ⁹ Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3: Quoniam vero Satanae improbitas tantum adversus hominum naturam valuit, ut et quosdam in stolidissimam et quovis malo peiorem exitii voraginem detruserit, ita ut Deum esse negarent, quorum insipientiam divinorum verborum interpres David palam faciens ait: Dixit insipiens in corde suo (Psalm. 13, 1.) etc. ¹⁰ Seu in libro: Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, circa medium.	¹ Proslogion, ch. 2 ff. ² Some codices have the subjunctive can [possit]. ³ On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 1 and 3: Indeed, there is no one mortal [nemo . . . mortalium], in whom this has not been implanted by Him, to cognize that God is. ⁴ Dignity, in Greek axiwma [axioma], here and passim signifies a proposition known immediately or per se, which Aristotle defines in Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 2, which is an indemonstrable proposition, which anyone to be taught necessarily has; and which (St. Severinus) Boethius in On the Seven Rules (says) is an enunciation, which is proven by anyone who has heard it. ⁵ Concerning this proposition, which is founded upon the doctrine of St. Augustine, see above q. 1. arg. 3 of the affirmative part, and d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundament 2, where also in the Scholium the sense of this is explained. — Next the Vatican text after something [aliquid] omits not [non] and a little below this after to think [cogitare] together with codex cc it omits the words that there is not a prime upto to think [non esse primam . . . cogitare], which mutilated reading is repaired with the help of the other codices and edition 1. ⁶ The Vatican text contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, transposes the words and exhibits the proposition in a negative manner, thus: that which is not agreeable to enunciate, this is not agreeable to think [quod non convenit enuntiare, hoc non convenit cogitare]. ⁷ Concerning enunciation and its species see Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. “On Enunciation”. — Then the Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has because it follows [quia sequitur] in place of but it follows [sed sequitur]. ⁸ Book II, ch. 2, n. 2 and ch. 15. n. 28. — The Vatican text together with codex cc after posits [ponit] reads that there is some first Truth [primam aliquam veritatem esse], but contrary to all the other codices and edition 1 and contrary to the edition of the works of (St.) Augustine. ⁹ On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 3: Since, however, the improbity of Satan has prevailed so much against human nature, that it has pulled certain ones down into a most stupid and worse-than-any-evil chasm of departure, such that they deny that God is, whose foolishness the interpreter of the divine words, David, making clear, said: The fool said in his heart (Ps. 13:1) etc.. ¹⁰ Or in the book: In what manner the substances which are in it, are good, near the middle.

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in- / -tellecto per impossibile, summum bonum non esse, adhuc potest aliquid intelligi rotundum et album: ergo similiter in summo vero, et sic poterit cogitari non esse.	un- / -derstood per impossibile, that there is not a most high Good, something can still be understood (to be) round and white: therefore similarly in the most high True, and thus It can be thought not to be.
4. Item, illud quod maxime nos latet, de facili potest cogitari non esse; sed veritas divini esse est huiusmodi, quia Deus habitat lucem inaccessibilem:¹ ergo etc.	4. Likewise, that which lays most hidden from us [maxime nos latet], easily can be thought not to be; but the truth of the Divine ‘to be’ is of this kind, because God dwells (in) light inaccessible:¹ ergo etc..
5. Item, quaero, quid est dicere, Deum non posse cogitari non esse? Si quia non potest aliquo modo cogitari² nec vere nec false, illud est manifeste falsum; si quia non potest vere, similiter nec anima nec caelum et huiusmodi.	5. Likewise, I ask, what is it to say, that God cannot be thought not to be? If because He cannot in any manner be thought² neither truly nor falsely, that is manifestly false; if because He cannot (be thought not to be) truly, similarly neither the soul nor Heaven and (things) of this kind.
6. Item, quod contingit exprimere contingit³ et cogitare; sed contingit exprimere, divinum esse non esse: ergo et cogitare. Quod contingat, hoc patet, cum dicitur in speciali: Deus non est, et in generali: nihil est; et quod neutra istarum inferat, Deum esse, patet, quia oppositum non infert oppositum,⁴ et quod nihil ponit nihil infert; quaelibet autem istarum nihil ponit.	6. Likewise, that which one happens to express one happens³ also to think; but it happens that (someone) expresses, that the Divine ‘to be’ is not: therefore also to think (this). That it may happen, this is clear, since there is said in particular cases [in speciali]: “God is not”, and in general: “there is nothing”; and that neither of these infers, that God is, it is clear, because an opposite does not infer an opposite,⁴ and what posits nothing infers nothing; moreover any of these posits nothing.
CONCLUSIO. Tanta est veritas divini esse, ut non possit cum assensu cogitari non esse nisi propter defectum ex parte intelligentis, qui ignorat, quid sit Deus; ex parte vero intelligibilis non potest esse defectus nec praesentiae nec evidentiae, sive in se, sive in probando.	CONCLUSION So great is the truth of the Divine ‘to be’, that it cannot with an assent (of the mind) be thought not to be except on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding, who is ignorant of, what God is; on the part of the intelligible, however, there cannot be a defect neither of presence nor of evidence, either in itself, or in being proven.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod aliquid cogitare⁵ non esse est dupliciter. Aut in ratione falsi, sicut cogito de hac: homo est asinus; et hoc cogitare nihil aliud est quam quid est, quod dicitur, intelligere. Hoc modo potest cogitari non esse veritas divini esse.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that ‘that something is thought⁵ not to be’ is in a twofold manner. Either in a false reckoning, just as I think of this: ‘man is an ass’; and to think this is nothing other than to understand what is, that which is said. In this manner there can be thought not to be the truth of the Divine ‘to be’.
Alio modo est cogitare cum assensu, sicut⁶ cogito aliquid non esse, et credo non esse: et hoc modo aliquid cogitare non esse, quod est, potest venire aut ex defectu intelligentis, aut ex defectu intelligibilis.	In the other manner it is to think with an assent (of the mind), just as⁶ I think something not to be, and I believe it not to be: and in this manner ‘that one thinks something not to be’, which is, can come either out of a defect of the one understanding, or out of a defect of the intelligible.
Defectus autem intelligentis est caecitas vel ignorantia, ob quam, quia ignorat rem, cogitat⁷ ipsam non esse. Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet si est et quid est.⁸	Moreover a defect of the one understanding is a blindness and/or ignorance, because of which, since [quia] one is ignorant of a thing, one thinks⁷ that it is not. Moreover that there is a thinking of some being happens in a twofold manner, namely if it is and what it is.⁸
Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem, quid est, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem, si est. Unde Hugo:⁹ « Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, quid esset, poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam, quia esset, poterat ignorari ». Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei, si est, ideo nec potest ignorare, ipsum esse simpliciter,¹⁰ nec cogitare non esse.	Moreover our intellect is deficient in thought [cogitatione] of the Divine Truth as much as regards the cognition, what It is, however it is not deficient as much as regards the cognition, if It is. Whence Hugh (of St. Victor says):⁹ « God has so tempered His own cognition in man from the start, that just as what He is could never be comprehended, so that He is could never be ignored » [ignorari]. Therefore because our intellect is never deficient in the cognition of God, if He is, for that reason neither can it be ignorant of, that He is simply,¹⁰ nor think that He is not.
Quia vero deficit in cognitione, quid est, ideo frequenter cogitat, Deum esse quod non est, sicut idolum, vel non esse quod est, sicut Deum iustum.¹¹ Et quia qui cogitat, Deum non esse quod est, ut iustum, per consequens cogitat, ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat, beatitudinem esse in Deo, negat eum¹² esse.	However [vero] because it is deficient in the cognition, what He is, for that reason frequently it thinks, that God is what He is not, as an idol, and/or that He is not what He is, as the Just God.¹¹ And because he who thinks, that God is not what He is, such as the Just One, consequently think, that He is not: for that reason by reason of the defect of the intellect God or the most high Truth can be thought not to be; not however simply or generally, but from the consequence, just as he who does not know, that beatitude is in God, does not know that it is He.¹²
Hoc autem modo procedunt rationes probantes, quod aliquis intellectus cogitat vel cogitare¹³ potest, divinum esse non esse.	Moreover in this manner proceed the reasons proving, that some intellect does think and/or can think¹³, that the Divine to be is not.
Alio modo potest cogitari, aliquid non esse propter defectum a parte intelligibilis, et huiusmodi defectus potest esse dupliciter: aut defectus praesentiae, aut defectus evidentiae; defectus praesentiae, utpote quia non semper, non ubique,¹⁴ non ubique totaliter. Quod non semper est, aliquando est, aliquando non: et ideo aliquando vere potest cogitari non esse. Similiter de eo quod non est ubique, quia eadem ratione, qua potest cogitari non esse hic, potest cogitari non esse alibi. Similiter de eo quod secundum partem adest, secundum partem abest.	In another manner it can be thought, that something is not on account of a defect on the part of the intelligible, and a defect of this kind can be in a twofold manner: either a defect of presence, or a defect of evidence; a defect of presence, to the extent [utpote] that (it is) not always, not everywhere,¹⁴ and not everywhere totally. What is not always, sometimes is, sometimes is not: and for that reason sometimes it can be truly thought not to be. Similarly concerning that which is not everywhere, because by the same reckoning, by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Similarly concerning that which is present [adest] according to a part, (for it is therefore) absent according to a part.
Deus autem est semper et ubique et totus semper et ubique: ideo non potest cogitari non esse. Hanc rationem assignat Anselmus in libro contra insipientem.¹⁵	Moreover God is always and everywhere and (is) whole always and everywhere: for that reason He cannot be thought not to be. (St.) Anselm assigns this reason in the book Against the Fool.¹⁵
¹ I. Tim. 6, 16; Vulgata: lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem. ² Cod. W potest cogitari aliquo modo non esse nec. ³ Plerique codd. ut A C S T V W etc. omittunt contingit. ⁴ Immo impsum destruit, includendo negationem sui oppositi. ⁵ Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 cogitari, sed cum subnexis minus cohaerenter. ⁶ Codd. aa bb satis bene addunt cum. ⁷ Fide vetustiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus ideo, quod Vat. cum cod. cc praefigit verbo cogitat. Cod. V post rem addit esse. ⁸ Aristot., II. Poster. c. 1. ⁹ Libr. I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 1. in fine. Vat. sola in hoc textu post poterat addit ab homine. ¹⁰ Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 simpliciter nec (quod etiam paulo post occurit) substituimus pro similiter non, quod, mutata insuper interpunctione, habet Vat. cum cod. cc; sed non ita distincta est ista lectio. ¹¹ VAt. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus tamen aliis codd. et ed. 1, hic et paulo infra pro iustum minus bene substituit non iustum; lectionis utriusque unus sensus; in lection siquidem codd. iustum refertur ad praecedens non esse. ¹² Praeferimus lectionem plurimum mss. ut H P T Y ee etc. eum pro eam, utpote quae distinctior est. ¹³ Ita codd. cum ed. 1, quorum lectio hic praeferenda est lectioni Vat. cogitari. Paulo post etiam unus alterve cod. pro cogitari ponit cogitare. ¹⁴ Vat., post semper addito quia, hic adiungit aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique; sed obstat auctoritas mss., quorum plures ut A C F K L R S T U V propter repetitionem verborum non ubique semel haec verba omittunt, sed incongruenter, ut patet ex subnexis. Ed. 1 non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter. Immediate post Vat. cum cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene Quia pro Quod, cui codd. aa, bb adiungunt enim. ¹⁵ Cap. 1.	¹ 1 Tm. 6:16; in the Vulgate: dwells in light inaccessible [lucem inhabitate inaccessibilem]. ² Codex W reads He can be thought in some manner not to be neither [potest cogitari aliquod modo non esse nec]. ³ The greater part of the codices as A C S T V W etc. omit happens. ⁴ Nay rather it destroys it, by including a negation of its opposite. ⁵ Very many codices together with edition one have be thought [cogitari], but less coherently with what is subjoined. ⁶ Codices aa and bb add when [cum] well enough. ⁷ Trusting in the older codices and edition 1 we have expunged for that reason [ideo], which the Vatican text together with codex cc prefixed to the word one thinks [cogitat]. Codex V after a thing [rem] adds to be [esse]. ⁸ Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 1. ⁹ On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. III, ch. 1 at the end. The Vatican text alone in this passage adds by a man [ab homine] after could [poterat]. ¹⁰ On the authority of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted in place of similarly not [similiter non], simply, nor [simpliciter nec], which also occurs a little after this, which reading, with changed punctuation, the Vatican text together with codex cc also has; but its reading is not so clear. ¹¹ The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing however with the other codices and edition 1, here and a little below this substitutes for the Just (One) [iustum] the less well the not Just (One); each reading has one sense; in the reading of the codices the Just is referred to the preceding is not [non esse]. ¹² We prefer the reading of the very many manuscripts as H P T Y ee etc., it is He [eum esse] instead of it is [eam esse], as that which is more distinct. ¹³ Thus the codices together with edition 1, the reading of which is here preferred to the reading of the Vatican text be thought [cogitari]. A little after this one or an other of the codices also puts think [cogitare] in place of be thought [cogitari]. ¹⁴ The Vatican text, after having adding that [quia] after always [semper], here adjoins or that, although always and everywhere [aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique]; but the authority of the manuscripts withstand this, very many of which as A C F K L R S T U V on account of the repetition of the words not everywhere [non ubique], omit these words the first time [semel], but incongruously, as is clear from what is subjoined. Edition 1 reads not always or not everywhere or not everywhere totally [non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter]. Immediately after this the Vatican text together with codex cc, not trusting in all the other manuscripts and edition 1, has less well Because [Quia] in place of What [Quod], to which codices aa and bb adjoin For [enim]. ¹⁵ Chapter 1.

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Non solum propter defectum praesentiae potest cogitari aliquid non esse, sed etiam propter defectum evidentiae, quia non est evidens in se, nec est evidens in probando. Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et in se et in probando. In se, quia sicut principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos,¹ et quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, ideo se ipsis sunt evidentia; sic et in proposito. Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto. Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex² se, sed etiam ex probatione, quoniam divinam veritatem esse probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura creata, quia se est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam. Probat iterum impsam et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas, quae est causa omnis veri.³ Propositio autem negativa non infert ipsam nisi sophistice, ut dicunt. Unde ex hoc quod est nihil esse, vel nullam veritatem esse, non contingit concludere nec inferre, veritatem esse. Haec enim propositio: nihil esse,⁴ destruit omnem veritatem. Et ideo ad ipsam non sequitur aliqua affirmatio, et haec est falsa: si nihil est, nihil esse est verum. Et si dicatur, quod omnis propositio infert dictum, verum est, sed si nihil est, nulla propositio est nec aliquid. Augustinus autem tale argumentum non facit approbando, sed inquirendo.	Not only on account of a defect of presence can it be thought that something is not, but also on account of a defect of evidence, because it is not evident in itself, nor is it evident in being proven. But the truth of the Divine ‘to be’ is evident in itself and in being proven. In itself, because just as we cognize principles inasmuch as (we cognize) terms,¹ and because a cause of a predicate is closed in a subject, for that reason these are by their very selves evident; so also in the proposed. For God or the most high Truth is Itself the ‘To Be’, than whom nothing better can be thought: therefore He cannot not be nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is closed in the subject. Nor does it only have evidence out of² itself, but also out of proof [ex probatione], since every created truth and nature proves and concludes that there is a Divine Truth, because if there is a being through participation and from another, there is a being through essence and not from another. Every right intelligence also proves and concludes it, because upon every soul has its cognition been impressed, and every cognition is through it. Again, every affirmative proposition proves and concludes it; for every such posits something; and with something posited there is posited the true; and with the true posited there is posited the Truth, which is the cause of every true.³ On the other hand [autem] a negative proposition does not infer it except in a sophistic manner, as they say. Whence from this that it is that nothing is, and/or that there is no truth, one does not happen to conclude nor infer, that there is truth. For this proposition: “that nothing is”,⁴ destroys every truth. And for that reason after it there does not follow any affirmation, and this is false: if nothing is, “that nothing is” is true. And if it be said, that every proposition infers what is said, it is true, and if nothing is, no proposition is nor (is) anything. (St.) Augustine, however [autem], does not make such an argument for approving it, but for inquiring (into it).
Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divine esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, qui ignorat, quid est quod per nomen Dei⁵ dicitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae sint sophisticae.	Therefore it must be conceded, that so great is the truth of the Divine ‘to be’, that with an assent (of the mind) it cannot be thought not to be except on account of the ignorance of the one thinking, who is ignorant, what It is which is mean by the name for God.⁵ And the reasons for this are to be conceded, though some are sophistic.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: In tantum praevaluit etc.; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de cogitatione, quae venit ab excaecatione; quod patet ex ipso verbo eius cum dicit malitia.	1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary: To so great an extent does . . . prevail etc.; it must be said, that (St. John) Damascene speaks of the thinking, which comes from complete blindness [ab excaecatione]; which is clear from his very word when he says “wickedness”.
2. Similiter ad illud de idolo, dicendum, quod ideo errat,⁶ quia ignorat, quid sit; unde non cogitat, Deum non esse in universali.	2. Likewise regarding that concerning an idol, it must be said, that for that reason (the idolater) errs,⁶ because he is ignorant of, what He is; whence he does not think, that three is not a God in the universal (sense).
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellecto Deo non esse, possunt alia⁷ intelligi; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de intellectu, quo per impossibile aliquid cogitamus, sed non assentimus.	3. To that which is objected, that with God understood not to be, other (things) can be understood;⁷ it must be said, that (St. Severinus) Boethius speaks of an understanding, by which we think something per impossibile, but do not assent (to it).
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxime nos latet; patet responsio, quia⁸ maxime nos latet, quid est, sed tamen maxime patet, si est.	4. To that which is objected, that It lies most hidden from us; the response is clear, because⁸ what He is does lie most hidden from us, but nevertheless [tamen] if He is lies most openly [maxime patet].
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quid est dicere, divinam veritatem non posse cogitari non esse? dicendum, quod hoc est dicere, quod⁹ aliquis non potest credere, quod Deus non sit, dummodo utatur ratione. Non sic de creaturis; quia etsi certum est, unam creaturam esse praesentem uni, non tamen omnibus, quia non est virtutis tantae, ut se omnibus offerat aequaliter, sicut prima veritas.	5. To that which is objected, "What it is to say, that the Divine Truth cannot be thought not to be?", it must be said, that this is to say, that⁹ someone cannot believe, that God is not, so long as he uses reason. Not so concerning creatures; because even if it is certain, that one creature is present to one, (it is) not, however [tamen], to all (thus certain), because (a creature) is not of so great virtue, that it offers itself equally to all, as the first Truth (does).
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod potest accipi cogitare generaliter pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentientis sive non; et tunc est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione cum assensu; et sic est falsum, quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus in libro Posteriorum.¹⁰	6. To that which is objected, (that) that which one happens to express one happens also to think; it must be said, that “to think” [cogitare] can be accepted generally for an act of the mind whether errant or not, whether assenting or not; and then that is true; and/or for thinking with an assent; and thus it is false, because it happens that one contradicts axioms [dignitatibus] as regards exterior reckoning, not however as much as regards interior, as the Philosopher says in the book Posterior Analytics.¹⁰
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Quaestio haec fere coincidit cum illa, quae communiter sic exprimitur, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Nihilominus, ut bene intelligatur mens S. Doctoris, observare iuvat, quid status quaestionis, et consequenter etiam forma solutionis aliquatenus differunt a questione posita in forma supradicta et eius solutione. Sanctus enim loquitur hic directe de veritate divini esse et tantum indirecte de nostra cognitione huius divini esse; illa vero alia quaestio immeditate est de nostra co- / -gnitione.	I. This question nearly coincides with that, which is commonly expressed thus, whether “that God is” is known through itself [per se notum]. Nevertheless, so that the mind of the Holy Doctor may be well understood, it helps to observe, that the status of the question, and consequently also the form of the solution differs to some extent from the question posited in the above said form and its solution. For the Saint speaks here directly of the truth of the Divine ‘to be’ and only indirectly of our cognition of this Divine ‘to be’; however, that other question immediately concerns our co- / -gnition.
¹ Supple: cognoscimus. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3. (iuxta transl. Boethii): Principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus. ² Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ex pro in. ³ Quomodo haec ratio sit intelligenda, vide supra fundam. 5. et 6. ⁴ Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, est. Proxime sequentem propositionem, quae a Vat. corrupte et mutile exhibetur, restauramus ope mss. et ed. 1 ponendo affirmatio loco affirmativa, dein falsa pro vera, et addendo verba nihil esse usque si nihil est. Codd. in eo tantum dissident, quod alii habent dicatur, alii cum ed. 1 dicat, alii dicas. ⁵ Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt Dei. ⁶ Supple: idolatra. ⁷ Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic non apte additum esse. ⁸ Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 quod. ⁹ Supplevimus ex mss. D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 verba hoc est dicere quod. Mox cod X cogitare loco credere. Paulo infra ex cod. T adiecimus praesentem; deinde ex eodem codice loco veritatis posuimus virtutis, quae lectio et in se distinctior est in corp. art. (de defectu praesentiae), insinuari videtur. ¹⁰ Libr. I. c. 8. (c. 10) iuxta translat. Boethii: Semper enim est instare ad exterius orationem, sed ad interius orationem non semper (pros ton exw logon, pros ton edw logon). Cfr. S. Thomas in Comment. super hunc locum, lect. 19, ubi et in translatione antiqua et in Commentario ipso pro orationem semper habetur rationem. — Vat. transponit contra sensum verborum Aristotelis rationem ante contradicere, et paulo ante pro et sic habet tunc, ac post dignitatibus addit id est propositionibus per se notis, sed praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1.	¹ Supply: we cognize [cognoscimus]. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 3 (according to St. Severinus Boethius' translation): We say that there is a certain principle of a science, inasmuch as we cognize (its) terms. ² From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted out of [ex] for in [in]. ³ In what manner this reckoning is to be understood, see fundaments 5 and 6 above. ⁴ The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing with the other codices and edition 1, as there is nothing [nihil est]. The next following proposition, which is exhibited in a corrupt and mutilated form by the Vatican text, we have restored with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 by putting affirmation [affirmatio] in place of affirmative [affirmativa], then false [falsa] in place of true [vera], and by adding the words that nothing is [nihil esse] upto if nothing is [si nihil est]. The codices disagree in this only, that some have it be said [dicatur], others together with edition 1 one says [dicat], others you say [dicas]. ⁵ Very many codices together with edition 1 omit of God [Dei]. ⁶ Supply: the idolater [idolatra]. ⁷ Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here the not aptly added to be [esse]. ⁸ The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has that [quod]. ⁹ We have supplied from manuscripts D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff and edition 1 the words this is to say that [hoc est dicere quod]. Then codex X has think [cogitare] in place of believe [credere]. A little below this from codex T we have inserted present [praesentem]; then from the same codex in place of of . . . a truth [veritatis] we have put of . . . virtue [virtutis], which reading is both in itself more distinct and seems to be insinuated in the body of the article (from defect of presence. ¹⁰ Book I, ch. 8 (ch. 10) according to the translation of (St. Severinus) Boethius: For there is always an insisting [instare] as regards exterior discourse, but as regards interior discourse not always (proV ton exw logon, proV ton edw logon). Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary on this passage, lect. 19, where both in the ancient translation and in his Commentary reckoning [rationem] is always had in place of discourse [orationem]. — The Vatican text transposes reckoning [rationem] before to contradict [contradicere] contrary to the sense of Aristotle's words, and a little before this it has then [tunc] in place of and thus [et sic], and after axioms [dignitatibus] it has that is propositions known through themselves [id est propositionibus per se notis], but contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1.

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co- / -gnitione. Insuper bene attendendae sunt distinctiones in textu positae.	co- /-gnition. Moreover the distinctions posited in the text must be well attended to.
II. Circa quaestionem, utrum existentia Dei sit per se nota, antiqui Scholastici diverso modo loquuntur. Omnes tamen concedunt, existentiam esse de conceptu essentiali Dei. S. Anselmus docet, omni apprehendenti significationem vocabuli Deus per se notam esse eius existentiam; unde ex ipso conceptu Dei ut entis, quo melius cogitari non potest, format argumentum ad probandam existentiam Dei. De valore huius argumenti disputatur. In favorem ipsius citantur Aegid. R., d. 3. p. I. 1. princ. q. 2. et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. Fortasse etiam hi duo vix discedunt a sententia communi Scholasticorum, qui efficaciam argumenti restringunt ad eos, qui iam propriam Dei rationem ut primi et necessarii entis habent et addmittunt. Porro Nominales asserunt, nec nobis nec Beatis illam propositionem, Deum esse, per se notam esse. Scotus facit quasdam difficultates circa distinctionem inter propositionem per se notam in se et per se notam quoad nos; attamen quoad rem principalem concedit, dictam propositionem esse notam per se Deo et Beatis, non tamen nobis. S. Thomas simpliciter docet, dictam propositionem esse notam per se secundum se, non tamen nobis (S. I. q. 2. a. 1; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. et quaestiunc. 2; de Verit. q. 10. a. 12; S. c. Gent. I. c. 10. 11.).	II. About the question, whether the existence of God is known through itself [per se nota], the ancient Scholastics speak in a diverse manner. However all concede, that existence concerns the essential concept of God. St. Anselm teaches, that for everyone apprehending the significance of the word God, His existence is known through itself; whence from the very concept of God as of a being, a better than which cannot be thought, he forms the argument to prove the existence of God. Concerning the value of this argument there is a dispute. In its favor are cited Giles the Roman, d. 3, p. I, 1st princ., q. 2, and (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. Perhaps these two also slightly depart from the common sentence of the Scholastics, who restrict the efficacy of the argument to those, who already have and admit their own reckoning of God as the first and necessary Being. Furthermore the Nominalists assert, that neither to us, nor to the Blessed is that proposition, ‘that God is’, known through itself. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus mentions certain difficulties about the distinction between a proposition known through itself in itself and one known through itself in regard to us; but he, however, does concede it in regard to the principal matter [rem], that the said proposition is known through itself to God and to the Blessed, not however to us. St. Thomas simply teaches, that the said proposition is known through itself according to itself, not however to us (Summa., I, q. 2, a. 1; Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 1 and quaestiunc. 2; On the Truth, q. 10, a. 12; Summa against the Gentiles , I, chs. 10, 11).
Omnes tamen antiqui Scholastici concedunt, in aliquo sensu existentiam Dei esse etiam nobis notam per se, scilicet non sub ratione propria, sed sub rationibus communibus, nempe entis, veri, boni, beatitudinis; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1. et 3; S. c. Gent. I. c. 11. ad 4; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 3. m. 2. ad 3. rem sic explicat: « Cognitio alicuius potest esse duobus modis: in ratione communi et in ratione propria. Potest igitur aliquid cognosci in ratione communi, et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria, sicut cum aliquis cognoscit mel sub ratione communi, videlicet quod est corpus molle, rubeum, ignorat autem ipsum sub ratione propria; et ideo cum videt, fel esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus credit, ipsum esse mel. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est ratione communi, quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus; tamen in ratione propria ab aliquibus ignoratur. Unde diversi in diversis ponunt et aestimant beatitudinem . . . Similiter dicendum, quod idolatrae Deum in ratione communi non ignorant, quod est ens, principium, omnipotens, Dominus; tamen sub ratione propria ignorant » etc. Idem in solut. ad 4. affirmat, Deum cognitione quid est posse ignorari, non cognitione quia est. Eandem distinctionem et idem exemplum fellis et mellis habet B. Albert., S. tr. 3. q. 19. m. 2. Cfr. etiam Richard., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Hoc posito, intelligitur doctrina illa communis, quod Deus implicite cognoscatur in omni actu intellectualis cognitionis. Ita S. Thom., de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1: « Dicendum, quod omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quodlibet cognitio. Sicut enim nihil hebet rationem appetibilis nisi per similitudinem primae bonitatis, ita nihil est cognoscibile nisi per similitudinem primae veritatis »; S. Bonaventura de Reductione artium ad Deum: « In omni re, quae sentitur sive quae cognoscitur, interius latet ipse Deus »; Scot. I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2: « Cognoscendo enim quodcumque ens, ut hoc ens est, indistinctissime concipitur Deus ».	However all the ancient Scholastics concede, that in some sense the existence of God is also known through itself to us, that is not under a proper reckoning, but under common reckonings, namely of being, the true, the good, beatitude; cf. St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 2, a. 1, at nn. 1 and 3; Summa against the Gentiles, I. ch. 11, at n. 4; Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 3, m. 2, at n. 3, explains the matter thus: « The cognition of anything can be in two manners: in a common reckoning and in a proper reckoning. Therefore something can be cognized in common reckoning, and however be ignored under a proper reckoning, just as when someone cognizes honey under a common reckoning, namely that it is a soft, ruby body [corpus molle, rubeum], but is ignorant of it under a proper reckoning; and therefore when he sees, that gall is a soft, ruby body, being deceived he believes, it to be honey. Similarly the cognition of beatitude and an appetite for it are innate to us in a common reckoning, that it is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods; however in a proper reckoning some are ignorant of it. Whence diverse (things) in diverse manners are posited and estimated to be beatitude . . . Similarly it must be said, that because idolaters are not ignorant of God in the common reckoning, that He is the Being, the Principle, the Omnipotent, the Lord; however under a proper reckoning they are ignorant » etc.. He affirms the same in the solution to n. 4, that God according to the cognition of what He is can be ignored, not according to the cognition of that He is. The same distinction and the same example of gall and honey is had in Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., tr. 3, q. 19, m. 2. Cf. also Richard (of Middleton ), here in p. I, a. 1, q. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2. — With this posited, that doctrine is understood to be common, (which says) that God is implicitly cognized in every act of intellectual cognition. Thus St. Thomas, On the Truth, q. 22, a. 2, at n. 1: « It must be said, that all cognizing cognize implicitly God in everything cognized. For just as nothing has a reckoning of an appetible except through a similitude of the first Goodness, so nothing is cognizable except through a similitude of the first Truth »; St. Bonaventure de Reductione artium ad Deum: « In every thing, which is sensed or which is cognized, God Himself interiorly lays hidden »; (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 2: « For by cognizing whichever being, as this being is, God is most indistinctly conceived ».
Patet ergo, S. Bonaventuram non declinasse a via communi dicendo, intellectam nostrum non deficere quoad questionem, si Deus est (i. e. sub aliqua ratione communi), sed tantum quoad quaestionem, quid Deus est (i. e. sub ratione propria). Cfr. de hoc Trigosus, Summa theol. q. 2. a. 2. dub 1. (qui tamen istam distinctionem non satis considerat). Quodsi Seraphicus argumentum notum Anselmi approbare videtur, observandum est, eum loqui vel de divino esse in se, vel de eo intellectu, qui Deum sub ratione propria iam cognoscit. Huic enim evidens esse debet, existentiam Dei includi in eius essentia. Excaecato vero intellectui et ignoranti, quid Deus est, manet absconditum id quod in se est evidens, ita ut Deum verum et vivum in stultitia sua negare praesumat.	Therefore it is clear, that St. Bonaventure has not departed from the common way by saying, that our intellect does not fail in regard to the question, if God is (i. e. under some common reckoning), but only in regard to the question, what God is (i. e. under a proper reckoning). Cf. on this matter Trigosus, Summa theologica, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 1 (who however does not sufficiently consider this distinction). But if the Seraphic (Doctor) seems to approve the noted argument of (St.) Anselm, it must be observed, that he speaks of the Divine ‘to be’ in itself, and/or of one understanding, who cognizes God already under a proper reckoning. For to this one it ought to be evident, that the existence of God is included in His essence. However having been blinded in understanding and ignorant of, what God is, there remains hidden that which is evident in itself, so that he presumes to deny in his stupidity the true and living God.
III. Quoad ipsas conclusiones praeter iam citatos cfr. Bonav. Itinerar. c. 5; Hexaëm. Serm. 5. et 10. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. per totum, et a. 30. q. 3. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 3. et 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 4.	III. In regard to those conclusions, besides those things already cited, cf. St. Bonaventure, Itinerarium., ch. 5; Hexaëmeron, Sermons 5 and 10. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2d q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1 and 4. — Henry of Gent, Summa., a. 22 throughout, and a. 30, q. 3. — Durandus, here in p. I, qq. 3 and 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 4.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII