S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PARS I.

PART I

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 162-164.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 162-164.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

DOUBT I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo contingit dubitari de hoc quod dicit Magister: Nunc de veritate sive proprietate divinae essentiae etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia omne, quod habet proprium, distinguitur: sed divina essentia non est distinguibilis: ergo non habet proprium.

In the first part of his (text) there are doubts concerning the text, and first there happens to be a doubt concerning this which Master (Peter) says: Now one must deal with the truth or property of the Divine Essence etc.. For it seems that he speaks badly, because, everything, which has (what is) proper, is distinguished: but the Divine Essence is not distinguishable: therefore it does not have (what is) proper.

RRESPONDEO:1 Dicendum, quod divina essentia eo modo est distinguibilis, quo modo habet proprietates, et e converso; quia quamvis in se non sit distinguibilis per plurificationem sui nec a persona per diversitatem, est tamen distinguibilis respectu essentiae creatae, respectu cuius habet has proprietates.

I RESPOND:1 It must be said, that the Divine Essence is distinguishable in that manner, in which it has properties, and conversely; because although in itself it be not distinguishable through plurification of itself nor from [a] a Person through diversity, it is however distinguishable in respect of a created essence, in respect of which it has properties.

DUB. II.

DOUBT II

Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus, quas ponit, scilicet de veritate, immutabilitate, simplicitate, cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae, quare solum de his tribus agit?

Likewise is asked concerning those three properties, which he posits, that is concerning truth, immutability, simplicity, since there are many other conditions of the Divine Essence, why does he deal solely with these three?

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur esse increatum a creato. Nam creatum,2 eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile: ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate, et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. Increatum vero esse habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam veritas respicit quod est, immutabilitas quo est,3 simplicitas utrumque. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that through these three properties there is sufficiently distinguished uncreated ‘being’ from created (‘being’). For the created,2 for the reason that it (is) created, has ‘being’ after being not, and thus (its) ‘being’ (is) vain and possible: for that reason it has a ‘being’ thoroughly mixed [permixtum] with possibility, and on this account it is lacking [deficit] in truth, stability and simplicity. The uncreated ‘being’, however, has contrary properties, and in these it is sufficiently distinguished. For truth respects what is, immutability how it is,3 simplicity both (of these). For that reason the sufficiency and order (of the argument) is clear.

DUB. III.

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod a sapere dicitur sapientia, quia non videtur dicere verum. Sicut enim albedo se habet ad album, ita sapientia ad sapere; sed albedo non dicitur ab albo, immo magis e contra:4 ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that wisdom [sapientia] is said from “knowing” [sapere], because it does not seem that he speaks truth [verum]. For just as “brightness” regards the “bright” while [albedo se habet ad album], so wisdom regards “knowing”; but brightness is not said from bright white, nay rather on the contrary:4 ergo etc..

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum componentem sapere dicitur a sapientia, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum resolventem est e converso; et quantum ad hunc loquitur Augustinus. — Vel posset dici, quod loquitur secundum considerationem grammatici, non logici.5

I RESPOND: It must be said, that according to a composing intellect “knowing” [sapere] is said from “wisdom” [sapientia], because a composing intellect proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; however according to a resolving intellect it is conversely; and as much as regards this (understanding St.) Augustine speaks. — And/or it could be said, that he speaks according to the consideration of a grammarian, not of a logician.5

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quis magis est quam ille, qui dixit famulo. Videtur enim male dicere, quia esse non recipit magis et minus, et maxime in Deo.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: And who is more than that One, who . . . said to his household-servant. For he seems to speak badly, because  ’being’ does not receive more and less, most of all even in God.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod magis et minus dupliciter possunt considerari, scilicet in comparatione ad idem; et sic6 dicunt intensionem et remissionem;

I RESPOND: It must be said, that more and less can be considered in a twofold manner, that is in comparison to the same (thing); and thus they6 mean intension and remission;

1 Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit Ad quod. Mox plerique codd. ut A F G K S V W X non bene uno pro eo, alii vero ut H T aa bb illo.
2 Aliqui codd. ut F T dd repetunt hic esse. Mox ed. 1 post creatum addit est.
3 Plurimi codd. omittunt est.
4 Plures mss. cum ed. 1 e converso.
5 De intellectu resolvente sive analytico, et componente sive synthetico vide infra d. 28. dub. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1 ad 4. — Secunda solutio inde sumitur, quod grammatici formam verborum abstractam derivant a forma concreta, logici autem sive philosophi (Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1.) e contrario. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3.
6 Vat. praeter fidem omnium mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit non, sed falso, quia iuxta omnes Scholasticos intensio et remissio est motus eiusdem v. g. caloris a statu imperfectiore ad perfectiorem et vicevera. Vide St. Thomam, qui hic circa litteram idem dubium solvit consimili distinctione, scilicet: Magis et minus potest dici aliquid vel quantum ad ipsam naturam participatam, quae secundum se intenditur et remittitur secundum accessum ad terminum vel recessum; et hoc non est nisi in accidentibus; vel quantum ad modum participandi; et sic etiam in essentialibus dicitur magis et minus secundum diversum modum participandi, sicut Angelus dicutr magis intellectualis quam homo.

1 The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing however with all the other codices together with edition 1, adds To which [Ad quod]. Next more of the codices as A F G K S V W X have not well one in place of that [eo], but others as H T aa and bb have that [illo].
2 Some codices as F T and dd here repeat ‘being’ [esse].
3 Very many codices omit it is [est].
4 Very many manuscripts together with edition 1 have conversely [e converso].
5 Concerning a resolving or analytic intellect, and a composing or synthetic one see below in d. 28, dub. 1, and Sent., Bk. IV, d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 4. — Thence the second solution is taken, because the grammarians deriver the abstract form of words from the concrete one, but the logicians or philosophers (Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. 1) in a contrary manner. Cf. below d. 33, q. 3.
6 The Vatican text, not trusting in nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, adds do not [non], but falsely, because according to all the Scholastics, intension and remission are movements of the same thing, v. g. of heat from an more imperfect state toward a more perfect one and vice versa.  See St. Thomas, who on the same text solves a doubt with the exactly same distinction, that is: Something can be said (to be) “more” or “less” as much as regards the participated nature itself, which is intended according to itself and is remitted according to access to and/or recess from a terminus; and this is not but in accidents; and/or as much as regards a manner of participating; and thus there is also said in essentials a “more” or “less” according to a diverse manner of participating, just as an Angel is said (to be) “more” intellectual than a man.

 

p. 163

 

vel in comparatione ad diversas substantias et naturas; et sic dicunt gradum et excessum, et sic est bene1 ponere magis et minus in ente respectu Creatoris et creaturae, et respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionalibilis.

and/or in comparison to diverse substances and natures; and thus they mean a step and excess, and thus it is well1 to posit a more and a less in a being in respect of the Creator and of the creature, and in respect of creatures in regard to one another. But in a comparison of Creator to creature there is an improportionable and infinite excess; in respect of creatures in regard to one another it is proportionable.

DUB. V.

DOUBT V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Videtur enim esse ista proprietas et Angelorum, quia Augustinus de Civitate Dei2 dicit, quod « immortalitas Angelorum non est praeterita, quasi non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit », sed semper est praesens: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: Whose essence knows not past nor future. For that property of His seems also to belong to the Angels, because (St.) Augustine in On the City of God2 says, that « the immortality of the Angels is not past, as if it is not, nor future, as if it is not yet », but is always present: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

RESPONDEO: Quidam dicunt, quod duratio aevi est simplex et tota simul, non habens praeteritum et futurum; nihilominus ipsum aeviturnum3 habet praeteritum et futurum quantum ad affectiones; et ita4 proprium est solius Dei.

I RESPOND: Certain ones say, that the duration of the aevum is simple and wholly simultaneous [tota simul], not having past and future; nevertheless an eviternal (being)3 does itself have a past and future as much as regards (its) affections; and thus (the lack of these)4 is proper to God alone.

Alii dicunt, quod in omni duratione creata, quoniam differt a durante et5 habet esse possibile, est prius et posterius; sed distinguunt in priori et posterior. Quoddam enim est quod dicit durationis successionem, quoddam successionis durationem cum variatione et innovatione. Primum est in aevo, secundum in tempore; et hoc vult Anselmus6 expresse, et hoc credo probabilius. Et patet responsio ad verbum Augustini; ipse enim loquitur de priori et posteriori, quod quidem dicit innovationem et variationem et corruptionem.7

Others say, that in every created duration, since it differs from (the thing) enduring and5 has a possible ‘being’, there is a prior and a posterior; but they distinguish among the prior and the posterior. For one of which is what one calls the “succession of duration”, one of which the “duration of the succession” with variation and innovation. The first is in the aevum, the second in time; and this (St.) Anselm6 wants to express, and this I believe (is) more probable. And the response to the word of (St.) Augustine is clear; for he himself speaks of the prior and the posterior, which he does indeed call innovation and variation and corruption.7

DUB. VI.

DOUBT VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est. Videtur enim falsum, quia quod inest alicui substantialiter non adimitur comparatione aliqua; sed esse est substantiale rei cuilibet: ergo etc. Item ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur, ut dicit Augustinus,8 ergo magis est, quam si non comparetur: ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that to the Divine Essence our ‘being’ is not compared. For it seems false, because what is in anything substantially is not taken away by any comparison; but ‘being’ is substantial to any thing: ergo etc.. Likewise from a comparison to God the creature is made better [melioratur], as (St.) Augustine says,8 therefore it is more, than if it were not compared: ergo etc..

RESPONDEO: Dupliciter est accipere talem comparationem. Uno modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis, quam si non comparetur. Alio modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proportionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla9 est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est, non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem, quia non potest inveniri aliqua proportio quantitativa.

I RESPOND: To accept such a comparison is in a twofold manner. In one manner according to the reckoning of influence and reception; and thus a creature compared to God is more, than if it were not compared. In another manner it is compared according to a habitude of equiparancy [aequiparantiae] and proportion; and in this manner it is true, because no (creature)9 is proportionable according to the condition of truth and nobility of Divine ‘Being’ [esse divini]; and for that reason it is as if nothing, not entirely in itself, but nothing as regards proportion, because there cannot be found any quantitative proportion (between them).

DUB. VII.

DOUBT VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dicatur ergo quod semper fuit, est et erit. Videntur enim haec verba non dici10 de Deo, quia dicunt diversa tempora; sed in Deo non cadit diversitas temporum.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: Therefore let it be said, that He always was, is and shall be. For these words seem not to be spoken10 of God, because they mean diverse times; but in God there does not fall a diversity of times.

RESPONDEO: Quidam voluerunt dicere, quod actus isti non praedicant de Deo diversa tempora secundum essentiam, sed secundum concomitantiam; quia divinum esse omnino invariatum omne tempus concomitatur. Sed haec positio non solvit plene. Dicitur enim vere, quod Deus fuit ante omne tempus; tunc11 ergo concomitantiam non potest dicere. Ideo dicunt alii, quod tempus consignificatum non est dispositio rei acceptae sive intellectae, quando dicitur de Deo, sed solum modi intelligendi; quando vero de re mobili, utroque modo. Exemplum patet de masculinitate12 in lapide et in viro: quoniam in viro est ut dispositio rei acceptae, in lapide ut modus intelligendi solum. Sed haec positio non videtur sufficiens, quia intellectus non ponit praeteritum circa suum intelligere, quando intelligit Deum fuisse: ergo oportet, quod ponat circa rem.

I RESPOND: Certain ones wanted to say, that those acts (of God) do not predicate of God diverse times according to essence, but according to concomitance; because the Divine ‘To Be’ [divinum esse], entirely unvaried, It is concomitant to every time. But this position does not solve it fully. For it is truly said, that God was before every time; therefore then11 it cannot said (to be) concomitance. For that reason others say, that the time consignified is not a disposition of a thing accepted or understood, when it is said of God, but only a manner of understanding; but when (it is said) of a mobile thing, (it is said) in each manner. An example is clear from the masculinity12 in (the word) “stone” [lapide] and in “man” [viro]: since in “man” it is as a disposition of the thing accepted (under the figure of the word), in “stone” only as a manner of understanding. But this position does not seem sufficient, because the intellect does not posit a past about its own understanding, when it understands that God was: therefore it is proper, that it posit (such) about the thing (understood).

Propter hoc notandum, quod verba diversorum temporum aliter dicuntur de aeterno, aliter de aeviturno, aliter de temporali. Nam respectu temporalis important mutabilitatem et successionem et durationem. Secundum vero quod de aeviternis dicuntur, duo tantum important, successionem et durationem, sicut vult Hieronymus,13 Augustinus et Anselmus. Secundum vero quod dicuntur de Deo, important solum durationem. Unde dicitur: Deus fuit, quia eius dur- / -ratio non coepit;

On account of this it must be noted, that words of diverse times are said in one manner of the eternal, in another manner of the eviternal, in another manner of the temporal. For in respect of the temporal they convey [important] mutability and succession and duration. But according to which they are said of aeviternals, they only convey two, succession and duration, just as (Sts.) Jerome,13 Augustine and Anselm want. But according to which they are said of God they convey only duration. Whence there is said: God was, because His du- / -ration did not begin.

1 Cod. T verum, cod. W ibi pro bene.
2 Libr. XII. c. 15. n. 2.
3 Hoc est res aeviterna sive subiectum aevi v. g. Angelus. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 non bene addit seu aeternum, quia non est idem cum aeviterno.
4 Supple: non noscere sive non habere praeteritum vel futurum.
5 Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 etiam, et paulo post cum priori et posteriori (nonnulli codd. habent quidem cum loco est, sed solus cod. cc cum priori et posteriori). Pro nostra lectione militant etiam ea quae S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. habet, ubi fusius hanc questionem pertractans, ex creaturae possibilitate sive ex eo, quod nulla creatura omnino est actus, deducit durationem successionis sive prius et posterius in aevo. — Mox Vat., omnibus mss. et sex primis edd. obnitentibus, de loco in. Paulo infra post successionem cod. I satis bene addit sine variatione et innovatione.
6 Vide Monolog. c. 28. et Proslog. c. 20. et 22.
7 De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 10. a. 5.
8 Libr. I. de Genes. ad lit. c. 4. 5. n. 9. 10. et libr. contra Epist. Manichaei, c. 40. n. 46.
9 Subaudi: creatura. — Vat. autem cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit ratio et paulo infra loco ad proportionem habet a proportione.
10 Plurimis codd. obnitentibus, Vat. praemittit debere.
11 Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus tunc.
12 Substituimus fide antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 masculinitate pro masculino genere.
13 De Hieronymo vide notam hic in lit. Magistri c. 1. — Augustini et Anselmi textus accipe ex dub. 5. — Cfr. Scot., I. Sent. d. 9. q. unica in fine. — Paulo ante post important aliqui codd. ut F aa bb cum ed. 1 addunt scilicet, aliqui ut G I ff et.

1 Codex T reads true [verum], codex W reads there [ibi] in place of well [bene].
2 Book XII, ch. 15, n. 2.
3 This is an eviternal thing or a subject of the aevum, e.g. an Angel. — The Vatican text without the authority of any manuscript and edition 1 does not well add or eternal, because it is not the same as eviternal.
4 Supply: not knowing or not having a past and/or future.
5 The Vatican, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, reads also [etiam], and a little after this with the prior and the posterior {not a few codices have indeed with [sum] in place of is [est], but only codex cc reads with the prior and the posterior). On behalf of our reading there also militates those things which the Seraphic Doctor says in Sent., Bk. II, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 3 in the body, where thoroughly treating this question more fully, deduces from the possibility of a creature or from this, that no creature is entirely an act, that the duration of succession or a prior and a posterior is in the aevum. — Next the Vatican text, disagreeing with all the manuscripts and the six first editions, has concerning [de] in place of among [in]. A little below this after the succession of duration codex I adds sufficiently well without variation and innovation [sine variatione et innovatione].
6 See his Monologion, ch. 28, and his Proslogion, chs. 20 and 22.
7 Concerning this doubt, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — St. Thomas, Summa., I. q. 10, a. 5.
8 On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Book I, chs. 4-5, nn. 9-10 and his book Against the Letter of Manichee, ch. 40, n. 46.
9 Understand: creature. — The Vatican text, moreover, together with codex cc, disagreeing with the other codices, however, and with edition 1, adds reckoning [ratio] and a little below this in place of as regards proportion [ad proportionem] it has from proportion [a proportione]. [Trans. note:  For the definition of equiparancy see d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 3, p. 347, footnote 5.]
10 Disagreeing with very many codices, the Vatican text prefaces this with to ought [debere].
11 From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, we have supplied then [tunc].
12 We have substituted on the testimony of the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 masculinity [masculinitate] in place of the masculine genus [masculino genere].
13 Concerning (St.) Jerome see the note here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1. — The text of (Sts.) Augustine and Anselm is taken from dubium 5. — Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 9, q. sole at the end. — A little before this after they convey [important] some codices as F aa and bb together with edition 1 add that is [scilicet], others as G I and ff also [et].

 

p. 164

 

du- / -ratio non coepit; est, quia duratio eius non interrumpitur; erit, quia non desinit nec corrumpitur. Proprie ergo loquendo, non dicuntur de Deo, ut dicit Hieronymus; large autem loquendo, dicuntur, ut dicit Magister et Augustinus; et ad hoc vadit opinio Magistri.1

du- / -ration did not begin; is, because His duration is not interrupted; shall be, because He does not stop nor is He corrupted. Therefore properly speaking, they are not said of God, as (St.) Jerome says; however broadly speaking, they are said, as Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine say; and toward this does the opinion of Master (Peter) go.1

DUB. VIII.

DOUBT VIII

Item quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: Esse non est Deo accidens etc., quia nec creaturae est accidens — nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse — quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differre a creatura?

Likewise is asked concerning the word of (St.) Hilary: ‘To be’ [esse] is not an accident for God etc., because neither is it an accident for a creature — for to entirely no thing does a ‘to be’ accede — therefore in what manner through this (argument) is God noted to differ from a creature?

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse, ab alio exire, et ab illo2 recedere. Accidens enim dicitur quod inest subiecto et ab illo trahit ortum, et propterea potest adesse et abesse. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam esse nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente, creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere: ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens, quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo; et ideo dicit Hilarius, quod esse non est accidens Deo; et hoc propter contrarias proprietates: quia accidens natum est alii inesse, propter hoc dicit: subsistens veritas; quia natum est ab alio exire, contra hoc dicit: manens causa; quia natum est etiam ab alio recedere, contra hoc dicit: naturalis generis proprietas, quae non dimittit esse.3

I RESPOND: It must be said, that an accident means what is bound to be in another, to go forth form another, and to recede from that.2 For an accident is said (to be) “what is in” a subject and “draws its rise” from it, and on this account it can be present and not be present [adesse et abesse]. In these three properties the created ‘to be’ communicates, though not in entirely the same manner. For our ‘to be’ is dependent on [pendet ab] one sustaining, rises from another effecting, the creature too is born to loose its own ‘to be’: for that reason its ‘to be’ is a quasi-accident, not however truly an accident, because since it is dependent on God, it is not dependent just as (one is) on a subject. On the contrary it is in God; and for that reason (St.) Hilary says, that ‘to be’ is not an accident for God; and this on account of the contrary properties: because an accident is bound to be in another [alii inesse], on this account he says: “a subsisting truth”; because it is bound to go forth from another, he says against this: “a remaining cause”; because it is bound to recede from another, he says against this:
”the property of (His) natural genus, which does not dismiss its ‘to be’”.3

DUB. IX.

DOUBT IX

Item quaeritur, quomodo intelligitur immortalitas, cum dicitur: Solus habet immortalitatem, et dicit Augustinus,4 quod accipitur pro incommutabilitate; sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Mors enim non dicit omnem mutabilitatem, sed solum corruptibilitatem5 viventium: ergo non idem est dicere.

Likewise is asked, how is “immortality” to be understood, when there is said: He alone has immortality, and (St.) Augustine says,4 that it is accepted on behalf of incommutability; but this does not seem convenient. For death does not mean every mutability, but solely the corruptibility5 of the living: therefore to say (this) is not the same thing.

RESPONDEO: Sicut vita accipitur communiter et proprie, ita et mors, ita et immortalitas. Uno enim modo dicitur vita actus continuus et internus,6 qui est a forma spirituali; et sic dicitur proprie, et sic immortalitas dicit vitam talem cum immpossibilitate ad eius privationem. Alio modo dicitur vita actus completus potentiae, quae est secundum rei naturam, sicut dicitur aqua viva, quae habet operationem aquae convenientem; et hoc modo importat repugnantium ad corruptionem. Et ideo7 debet dici secundum hanc vitam immortale quod est ita in actu completo, quod nullo modo potest aliquam peiorationem recipere; et sic accipit Apostolus et exponit Augustinus.

I RESPOND: Just as “life” is accepted commonly and properly, thus also “death”, thus also “immortality”. For in one manner “life” is said (to be) a continuous and internal act,6 which is from [a] the spiritual form; and thus it is said properly, and thus “immortality” means such a life with an impossibility for its privation. In another manner “life” is said (to be) a complete act of potency, which is according to the nature of a thing, just as water is said (to be) “living”, which has an operation convenient to water; and in this manner it conveys repugnance to corruption. And for that reason7 it ought to be said according to this immortal life which is such in complete act, that in no manner can it receive any worsening [peiorationem]; and thus does the Apostle accept and (St.) Augustine expound it.

DUB. X.

DOUBT X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit beatus Iacobus et est in littera:8 Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio; quae differentia est inter vicissitudinem et obumbrationem, et quae convenientiae, ratione cuius dicatur vicissitudo obumbrare?

Likewise is asked concerning this which blessed Jacob says and is in the text:8 nor the overshadowing of vicissitude; what is the difference between vicissitude and overshadowing, and what is the convenience, by the reckoning of which there is said that “a vicissitude overshadows”?

Et dicendum, quod vicissitudo importat numerum vicis, et iste est numerus cum interruptione; sed obumbratio dicitur per privationem actus lucis. Quoniam igitur actus formae lux est, privatio eius recte dicitur obumbratio; et quia vicissitudo ratione numeri dicit interruptionem, et ratione interruptionis dicit privationem, et ratione privationis obumbrationem, hinc est, quod recte dicitur vicissitudinis obumbratio.

And it must be said, that “vicissitude” conveys the number of a turn [vicis], and that is a number with interruption; but “overshadowing” is said through a privation of the act of light. Therefore since light is an act of a form, its privation is rightly said (to be) an “overshadowing”; and because vicissitude by the reckoning of a number means an interruption, and by the reckoning of an interruption means privation, and by reckoning of privation (means) overshadowing, hence it is, that there is rightly said “overshadowing of vicissitude”.

1 Vide supra in lit. c. 1, ubi et verba Augustini afferuntur.
2 Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. cum ed. 1 alio pro illo. — De accidente vide Porphyr., de Praedicab.; Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4. et V. Metaph. text. 13. et 35. (IV. d. 7. et 30.).
3 Plura de hac re vide hic p. II. q. 2. et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.
4 Verba Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2.
5 Ed. 1 corruptionem.
6 Bernard., de Gratia et libr. arb. c. 2. ait: Est enim in quolibet corpore vita, internus ac naturalis motus, vigens tantum intrinsecus.
7 Aliqui codd. ut I Z cc illud pro ideo; ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. ut W illud ideo.
8 Cap. 2.

1 See above in the text, ch. 1, where the words of (St.) Augustine are also brought forward.
2 The Vatican text together with codex cc, contrary to all the other codices together with edition 1, reads another [alio] in place of that [illo]. — Concerning accident see Porphyry, On Predicables; Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 4, and Metaphysics, Bk. V, texts 13 and 45 (Bk. IV, chs. 7 and 30).
3 For more on this matter see part II, q. 2, and Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.
4 See the words of (St.) Augustine above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.
5 Edition 1 reads the corruption [corruptionem].
6 (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux), On Grace and Free Will, ch. 2, says: For there is in any body a life, an internal and natural movement, vigorous as much as intrinsic.
7 Some codices as I Z and cc have that [illud] in place of for that reason [ideo]; edition 1 together with one or the other codex as W reads for that reason that [illud ideo].
8 Chapter 2.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.