S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PARS II.

PART II

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio III.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 170-173.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 170-173.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

 

Quaestio III.

 

Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore,
et tota in qualibet parte ipsius.

 

Question 3

 

Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body,
and whole in any part of it.

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte. Et quod sic, videtur.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether the rational soul is in the whole body, so that (it is) in any part. And it seems that (it is) so.

1. Augustinus1 dicit, quod sicut Deus est in maiori mundo, sic anima in minori; sed Deus sic est in maiori, quod in qualibet parte totus: ergo anima sic est in minori, scilicet in corpore.

1. (St.) Augustine1 says, that just as God is in the macrocosm [maiori mundo], so the soul in the microcosm [minori]; but God is so in the greater, that (He is) whole in any part: therefore in this manner the soul is in the lesser one, that is, in the body.

2. Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma per sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentialiter unitur;2 sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, what gives ‘being’ [esse] to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because form through its own essence gives ‘being’ [esse], and this (is) not (given) except to that to which it is essentially united;2 but the soul gives ‘being’ [esse] to the whole body and to all the parts: ergo etc..

3. Item, in oculo est videre, est sentire, est vivere.3 Quaero ergo, utrum sint haec unus actus vel differentes. Non unus; hoc constat, quia, privato visu, adhuc sentit per tactum, privato sensu, adhuc vivit, sicut4 in paralytico; cum ergo vivere sit a substantia, videre a potentia, in oculo est anima secundum substantiam; eadem ratione potest probari, et in omnibus partibus esse.

3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, there is sensing, there is living.3 Therefore I ask, whether these are one act and/or different ones. Not one; this is established, because, deprived of sight, one still senses through touch, deprived of sensing, one still lives, just as (is clear)4 in a paralytic; therefore since living is by a substance, seeing by a power [a potentia], the soul is in the eye according to substance; for the same reason it can be proven, that it is also in all the parts.

4. Item, anima operatur in toto corpore, ergo in toto corpore5 est per potentiam; sed potentia animae simplex est: ergo si potentia una est in manu et pede, idem est in diversis partibus; sed non est simplicior potentia quam substantia: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body, therefore in the whole body5 it is through (its) power [per potentiam]; but the power of the soul is simple: therefore if there is one power in hand and foot, the same is in diverse parts; but there is not a more simple power than a substance: ergo etc..

5. Item, anima est in corpore: aut ergo6 est in qualibet parte, aut est in una determinate, aut est in puncto. Si in qualibet parte, habeo propositum. Si in una, cum illa habeat plures partes, et anima sit simplex, erit in pluribus partibus: ergo non est inconveniens, animam esse in pluribus partibus. Sed qua ratione est7 in partibus partis, eadem ratione est in partibus totius. Si est in puncto corporis,8 ergo cum punctus non habeat proportionem ad totum corpus, anima est improportionabilis toti corpori: ergo non potest esse perfectio, cum proportio sit perfectionis ad perfectibile.9 Similiter « punctus est substantia posita » sive habens positionem, ergo anima habet situm in corpore; sed nulla forma situalis est motor sufficiens: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore6 either it is in every part, or it is in one determinate (part), or it is in a point. If in every part, I have (proven) the proposed. If in one, since that has more parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in more parts: therefore it is not inconvenient, that the soul be in more parts. But by the reason by which it is7 in parts of a part, by the same reason it is in parts of the whole. If it is in a point of the body,8 therefore since a point does not have a proportion to the whole body, the soul is improportionable to the whole body: therefore there cannot be perfection, since a proportion is of a perfection to the perfectible.9 Similarly « a point is a posited substance » or one having a position, therefore the soul has a site in the body; but no situated [situalis] form is a sufficient motor (of the whole): ergo etc..

SED CONTRA: 1. Forma, quae est in toto et in partibus una, denominat partes et totum ratione consimili.10 Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis: ergo si anima est in qualibet parte, tunc quaelibet pars animalis est animal sicut totum,11 cum quaelibet pars sit substantia animata sensibilis.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. A form, which is one in the whole and in the parts, denominates the parts and the whole by exactly the same reckoning [ratione consimili].10 Whence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of the animal is an animal just as the whole,11 since every part is a sensible, animated substance.

2. Item, existentia animae rationalis non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis, cum sit fixa in se: ergo non est in qualibet.12

2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend from any part of the body, since it has been fixed in itself: therefore it is not in any (part).12

3. Item, operatio eius non dependet ab aliqua parte corporis nec alicui communicatur: ergo in nulla parte corporis est, nec in quantum perfectio, nec in quantum motor. Unde Philosophus13 dicit, quod « anima nullius corporis est actus », id est nullius partis corporis, sed in quo est, est sicut actus.

3. Likewise, its operation does not depend from any part of the body nor is it communicated to any: therefore it is in no part of the body, neither inasmuch as (it is) a perfection, nor inasmuch as (it is) a motor. Whence the Philosopher13 says, that « the soul is an act of no body », that is (it belongs) to no part of the body, but in that which it is, it is just as an act.

4. Item, corpus organicum14 est diversarum rationum in partibus et toto, ergo habet diversam perfectionem: ergo cum anima perficiat totum quantum ad essentiam, perficit partes quantum ad potentiam: ergo anima rationalis non est in partibus nisi solum

4. Likewise, the organic14 body is for diverse reasons in the parts and whole, therefore it has a diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as much as regards essence, it perfects the parts as much as regards power: therefore the rational soul is not in the parts except only

1 Libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. in fine. — Mox in propos. minore post maiori Vat. repetit mundo.
2 Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 16. et 16. (VII. c. 6.). — De proxime sequente propositione vide II. de Anima, text. 4. seqq. et 24. (c. 1. et 2.), ac I. de Part. animal. c. 1.
3 Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis est.
4 Supple cum cod. V patet. — In fine argumenti post partibus cod. Y addit corporis.
5 Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 minus bene omittit in toto corpore.
6 Fide plurimum mss. ut M T V W X Z etc. et ed. 1 adicimus ergo, et dein ter est.
7 Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 hic et paulo post minus apte omittunt est.
8 Codd. aa bb addunt ergo est punctus.
9 Colligitur ex dicto Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2): Videtur enim actus activorum inesse in patiente et disposito. — Et text. 26. ait, quod non videatur quodlibet (subiectum) recipere quodlibet (quamlibet formam). — Sequens definitio puncti datur ab Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6).
10 Aristot., I. de Historia animal. c. 1.
11 Ita antiqui codd. cum ed. 1, licet plurimi eorum post pars omittant animalis; Vat. autem cum cod. cc, omissa particula tunc, pro est animal sicut totum ponit dicitur animal.
12 Codd. W X addunt parte.
13 Libr. II. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 4.).
14 Aliqui codd. ut A I W Y organizatum.

1 The book On Spirit and soul, ch. 13 at the end. — Then in the minor proposition after the greater [maiori] the Vatican text repeats word [mundo].
2 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 15 and 16. (Bk. VII, ch. 6). — On the next, following proposition, see On the Soul, Bk. II, text 4 ff and text 24 (chs. 1 and 2), and On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 1.
3 From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have twice supplied there is [est].
4 Supply together with codex V is clear [patet]. — At the end of the argument after parts [partibus] codex Y adds of the body [corporis].
5 The Vatican text without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, omits less well in the whole body [in toto corpore].
6 Trusting in very many manuscripts as M T V W X Z etc. and edition 1 we have inserted therefore [ergo], and then it is [est] three times.
7 Very many codices together with edition 1 here and a little after this less aptly omit it is [est].
8 Codices aa and bb add therefore it is a point [ergo est punctus].
9 Gathered from the saying of Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2): For the act of acts seems to be within the patient and the disposed. — And in text 26 he says, that it does not seem that any (subject) receives any (form). — The following definition of a point is given by Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 68 (ch. 4) and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 12, (Bk. IV, ch. 6).
10 Aristotle, On the History of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 1.
11 Thus the ancient codices together with edition 1, though very many of them after part [pars] omit of the animal [animalis]; the Vatican text, moreover, together with codex cc, having omitted the particle then [tunc], in place of is an animal just as the whole [est animal sicut totum] pluts is said (to be) an animal [dicitur animal].
12 Codices W and W add part [parte].
13 On the Soul, Bk. II, text 11 (ch. 1) and Bk. III, text 6 (ch. 4).
14 Some codices as A I W and Y read organized [organizatum].

 

p. 171

quantum ad rationem potentiae; et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus:1 « Sicut anima ad corpus, sic partes animae ad partes corporis ».

as much as regards the reckoning of a power and this the Philosopher also says:1 « Just as the soul (is) to the body, so the parts of the soul to the parts of the body ».

5. Item, si anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ergo tota est in manu; sed quando aliquod totum est in aliquo, movetur illo modo:2 ergo mota manu, movetur anima, et similiter, manu quiescente, quiescit: ergo cum manus una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una possit moveri, altera existente in quiete, anima una et eadem numero simul quiescit et movetur secundum idem.

5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body, therefore it is whole in the hand; but when any whole is in anything, it is moved in that manner:2 therefore with the hand moved, the soul is moved, and similarly, with the hand resting, it rests: therefore since one hand can be moved, with the other existing at rest, one soul can be moved, with the other existing at rest, the soul, one and the same in number, simultaneously rests and is moved according to the same (thing).

6. Item, si anima est in pluribus partibus3 tota, qua ratione in tribus, eadem ratione in pluribus, et ita in infinitis, et quantumcumque extendatur corpus: ergo anima nata est esse ubique, et ita videtur, quod anima non sit substantia limitata, sed immensa.

6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in more parts,3 by the reason by which it is in three, by the same reason (it is) in more, and thus in infinite (parts), and however much the body be extended: therefore the soul is bound to be everywhere, and thus it seems, that the soul is not a limited substance, but (rather) an immense one.

7. Item, si tota anima est in manu sicut in aliis partibus: ergo cum vita sit ab4 anima, non magis recipit motum et sensum manus a corde, quam e converso. Hoc autem est contra omnes philosophos;5 et sequitur ex hoc tale inconveniens, quod, sicut laeso corde perit vita, ita laesa manu.

7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand just as in the other parts: therefore since life is by4 the soul, the hand does not receive more movement and sense from the heart, than conversely. But this is contrary to all philosophers;5 and there follows from this such an inconvenient (conclusion), that, just as by a wound in the heart life perishes, so by a wound in the hand.

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod anima secundum essentiam est in aliqua parte determinate, secundum potentiam vero est et influit in toto corpore, sicut aranea est in tela.6 Unde dixerunt, quod est in corde, quia cor est domicilium vitae, et eius inhabitator est anima. Et ad hoc ponendum movit eos experimentum cum defectu rationis. Experimentum, quia visibiliter apparet, quod laeso corde separatur anima, et ab ipso fluit7 sensus et motus, et est membrum nobile existens in medio, sicut centrum corporis. Defectus rationis, quia non potuerunt intelligere, quomodo aliquid limitatum sit unum et idem totum in pluribus; et quia fides non cogit credere, et ratio non intelligit, ideo dicunt, non esse ponendum, quod sit in toto ratione cuiuslibet partis.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that some say, that the soul according to essence is in some determinate part, but according to power it is and inflows in the whole body, just as a spider in a web.6 Whence they said, that it is in the heart, because the heart is the domicile of life, and its inhabitor is the soul. And (it was) proof of experience [experimentum] together with a defect of reason (which) moved them to posit this. Proof of experience, because it visibly appears, that by a wound in the heart the soul is separated, and (that) from this (organ)7 sense and movement flow, and (that) it is the noble member existing in the middle, as the center of the body. A defect of reason, because they could not understand, in what manner something limited is the one and the same whole in the more; and because (our) Faith did not drive (them) to believe, and reason did not understand, for that reason they say, that it is not to be posited, that it is in the whole by reason of any part.

Sed aliorum opinio est, ut Augustini,8 quod anima in qualibet parte corporis sit tota; et ad hoc ponendum movet experimentum, exemplum et rationabile argumentum. Experimentum, quia anima in partibus distantibus a corde ita cito sentit, sicut et in propinquis; item9 simul quasi in ictu oculi sentit laesionem in partibus distantibus, et cum anima separatur, dolor est in singulis partibus et resolutio. Exemplum similiter movet, sicut dicit Augustinus:10 « Videmus enim quod uno animali perfecte sano est una sanitas in singulis partibus, nec maior in maiori nec minor in minori ». Si ergo hoc est in forma corporali, quanto magis, in spirituali? Rationis argumentum movet, quia anima est forma simplex et motor sufficiens. Quia forma totalis corporis, est in toto; quia vero simplex, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia motor sufficiens, ideo non habet situm, et ideo nec est in puncto nec in parte determinata. Et quia magis rationalis est opinio, quae fundatur supra11 rationem, quam quae fundatur supra defectus rationis, et quia Augustinus hoc dicit, hanc approbo tanquam meliorem.

But the opinion of others is, as (St.) Augustine's,8 that the soul in any part of the body is whole; and proof of experience, example and a reasonable argument move to posit this. Proof of experience, because the soul in parts distant from the heart senses as [ita] swiftly, as (it does) even in near ones; likewise9 simultaneously as if in the twinkling of an eye [in ictu oculi] it senses a wound in distant parts, and when the soul is separated, there is pain in the individual [singulis] parts and a release [resolutio]. Example similarly moves, just as (St.) Augustine says:10 « For we see that in one, perfect, healthy animal there is one health in the individual parts, neither greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser ». Therefore if this is in a corporal form, how much more, in the spiritual? An argument of reason moves, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient motor. Because (it is) the form of the whole body, it is in the whole; but because (it is) simple, it is not (there) according to a part and (there is not) a part of itself; because (it is) a sufficient motor, for that reason it does not have a site, and for that reason neither is it in a point nor in a determinate part. And because more reasonable is the opinion, which is founded upon11 reason, than that which is founded upon defects of reason, and because (St.) Augustine says this, this I approve as the better one.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: forma quae est in toto etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est genus formae. Est enim quaedam, quae perficit et extenditur et dependet. Et haec, quia totum perficit, est in toto; quia vero extenditur, perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nec agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus, ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet calefacit. Est alia12 forma, quae perficit et dependet, sed non extenditur; et ta- / -lis forma . . .

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary: a form which is in the whole etc.; it must be said, that threefold is the genus of form. For there is a certain one, which perfects and is extended and does depend. And this one, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; but because it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; but because it depends neither does it act through itself, (but) it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, as is clear in the form of fire, because any part of the fire is fire and any heats. There is another12 form, which perfects and depends, but is not extended; and su- / -ch a form

1 Libr. II. de Anima, text. 9. (c. 1.).
2 Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. ad opp. 3.
3 Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, hic omittit partibus et in fine argumenti substantia, ac contra plures codd. ut F H T V Y etc. ponit ea ratione loco eadem ratione.
4 Aliqui codd. ut A C G I R S omittunt ab. Cod. T cum una sit anima. Codd. L O sit anima vel ab anima.
5 Vide Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. et 4.
6 Chalcidius, qui vixit sub initio IV. saec., in Platonis Timaeum (ed. Lipsiae, 1876, cura Dr. Ioh. Wrobel. pag. 296. n. CCXX.): Sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis, sensuum exordia retinere, ut cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat. — Vat. fluit pro influit. Mox post quia cod. K addit sicut dicitur in libro de Motu cordis. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. (in aliis edd. q. 91.). — De hac opinione cfr. Greg. Nyssen., de Hominis opificio, c. 12.
7 Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus fluit loco influit. — De cordis principatu vide Aristot., III. de Partibu. animal. c. 4.
8 Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8; et de Immort. animae c. 16. n. 25; ac de Origine animae hom. (epist. 166.) n. 4; necnon contra Epist. Manichaei c. 16. n. 20. — Mox nonnulli codd. modo inverso ad hoc movendum ponit, codd. L O ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum ponit; sed cum subnexis haec lectio non cohaeret. Dein plures codd. ut A F G I K T etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 rationale pro rationabile. De differentia horum cfr. August., II. de Ordine, ch. 11. n. 31. seq.
9 Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et edd. 1, 6, repetit hic quia. Cod. W et ita, cod. X et loco item, aliqui codd. vero ut F T particulam et addunt non male post simul.
10 Libr. de Praesentia Dei seu Epistol. 187. c. 4. n. 13: Qualitas vero corporis, quae sanitas dicitur, cum sanum corpus est totum, tanta est in maioribus, quanta in minoribus partibus. Non enim quae minus magnae sunt, ideo minus sanae sunt, aut quae ampliores, ideo saniores. — Ex anitquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus uno.
11 Ed. 1 hic et paulo post super. Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 defectum loco defectus. Dein fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. post rationis addidimus et, quod Vat. minus bene omittit.
12 Nonnulli codd. ut A B D E G P T Y W autem pro alia; cod. I autem alia.

1 On the Soul, Bk. II, text 9 (ch. 1).
2 See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, ad opp. 3.
3 The Vatican text together with codex cc, but disagreeing with the other codices and edition 1, here omits parts [partibus] and at the end of the argument substance [substantia], and contrary to very many codices as F H Y V Y etc. it puts by that reason [ea ratione] in place of by the same reason [eadem ratione].
4 Some codices as A C G I R S omit by [ab]. Codex T reads since the soul is one [cum una sit anima]. Codices L and O read is the soul and/or by the soul [sit anima vel ab anima].
5 See Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Bk. III, chs. 3 and 4.
6 Chalcidius, who lived at the start of the fourth century, On the Timaeus of Plato (ed. Liepzig, 1876, Dr. Iohannes Wrobel, editor, p. 296, n. CCXX): Just as the spider in the midst of a web holds all the warp of filaments with its feet, so that when any of the little beasts run into the trap it senses from nearby (that which is) out of any part whatsovever, so the soul's principle placed in the middle seat of the heart recognizes from nearby that it retains the warp of the senses, when for example they announce anything. — The Vatican text has flows [fluit] in place of inflows [influit]. Then after because [quia] codex K adds just as is said in the book On the Movement of the heart. See Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 87, m. 2, a. 1, § 1 (in other editions q. 91). — On this opinion cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, On the work of man, ch. 12.
7 From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted flows [fluit] in place of inflows [influit]. — On the principality of the heart see Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 4.
8 On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 8; and On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 16, n. 25; and On the Origin of the Soul, homily (epistle 166), n. 4; and also Against the Letter of Manichaeus, ch. 16, n. 20. — Then not a few codices in an inversed manner read posited (them) to move this [ad hoc movendum ponit], codices L and O have posited (them) to demonstrate and/or move this [ad hoc monstrandum vel movendum]; but this reading is not coherent with the subjoined. Then very many codices as A F G I K T etc. together withe editions 1, 2 and 3 read rational [rationale] in place of reasonable [rationabile]. On the difference of these, cf. Augustine, On Order, Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 31 ff.
9 The Vatican text, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and editions 1 and 6, repeats here because [quia]. Codex W has and thus [et ita], codex X has and [et] in place of likewise [item], but some codices as F and T do not badly add the particle and [et] after simultaneously [simul].
10 The book On the Presence of God (Epistle 187), ch. 4, n. 13: However the quality of a body, which is said (to be its) health, when the whole body is healthy, is as much in the greater, as it is in the lesser parts. For, (it is) not (that) those which are less great, are for that reason less healthy, or (that) those which are more ample, (are) for that reason more healthy. — From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied one [uno}.
11 Edition 1 here and a little after this has above [super]. Some codices as V and Y together with edition 1 have a defect [defectum] in place of defects [defectus]. Then trusting in very many manuscripts and six of the first editions after of reason [rationis] we have added the and [et], which the Vatican text has less well omitted. [Trans. Note: a corollary to the previous sentence would be: since the possessing spirits are not the sufficient motor nor the essential form of any body, for that reason a body under diabolical possession must be inhabited by them in one or more sites of the body.]
12 Not a few of the codices as A B D E G P T Y and W have moreover [autem] in place of another [alia]; codex I has moreover another [autem alia].

 

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ta- / -lis forma, quia totum perficit, est in toto et qualibet parte; quia vero non extenditur, ideo actum1 totius non attribuit partibus; quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen qualibet pars animalis vivit et sentit. Est iterum2 forma, quae totum perficit, tamen nec extenditur nec dependet quantum ad operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus; quia non dependet, ideo3 nec operationem communicat; et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis intelligit. Tamen etsi non communicet4 actum totius ut toti, communicat ut partibus; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte.

su- / -ch a form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in any part; but because it is not extended, for that reason it does not attribute the act1 of the whole to the parts; but because it depends, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; and such is the vegetable and sensible soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, however any part of an animal lives and senses. There is again a2 form, which perfects the whole, however, it is neither extended nor does it depend as much as regards operation; and such a one, because it is the perfection (of the whole), is in the whole and the parts; but because it is not extended, it does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts; (and) because it does not depend, for that reason3 neither does it communicate the operation; and such is the rational soul, because no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. However, even if it does not communicate (to a part or parts)4 the act of the whole as to the whole, it does communicate (it) as to the parts; because any part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of the man; and for that reason the perfection of a man is in any part.

3. Et sic patet responsio ad illud, quod nullius corporis est actus; quia nulli parti corporis5 communicat propriam operationem nec perfectionem totius, tamen omnes partes perficit in toto. Similiter ad aliud de forma, quia forma, quae est in partibus, non denominat similiter6 totum et partes, nisi sit forma dependens et extensa; et loquor hic de forma substantiali tantum, non de accidentali.

3. And thus is clear the response to that, that of no body is it the act; because to no part of the body5 does it communicate its proper operation nor the perfection of the whole, however, it does perfect all the parts in the whole. Similarly to the other concerning form, because the form, which is in the parts, does not denominate in a similar manner6 the whole and the parts, unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak of a substantial form only, not of an accidental one.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non sunt eiusdem rationis totum et partes; dicendum, quod in partibus est considerare organizationem et complexionem. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione7 organizationis sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis.

4. To that which is objected, that the whole and the parts do not belong to the same reckoning; it must be said, that it is in the parts that one considers organization and complexion. By reason of (their) complexion they are uniform to the whole and have been disposed to the same genus of life and are perfected by the powers (of the soul) [a potentiis].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod8 movetur, mota manu etc.; dicendum, quod perfectio potest super totum perfectibile et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad potentiam; et cum anima sit perfectio totius corporis, super totum potest, et ideo nullo minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia nec potentia; definitur autem corpore suo, quod perficit, et ideo corpore moto, movetur per consequens; partibus autem non definitur, quia sunt minores toto, et ita est in una, quod est extra illam.9 Et ideo, quia in nulla parte est definitive, non movetur ad motum alicuius partis, sicut nec Deus movetur ad motum alicuius creaturae.

5. To that which is objected, that (the soul)8 is moved, with the hand moved etc.; it must be said, that perfection can (be) over the whole perfectible both as much as regards the substance and as much as regards a power; and since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it can be over the whole, and for no less a reason, than there is a whole body, it is defined by its substance and not by (its) power; moreover it is defined by its own body, which it perfects, and for that reason with the body moved, it is consequently [per consequens] moved; moreover by its parts it is not defined, because they are less than the whole, and thus there is in the one (soul), that which is outside it.9 And for that reason, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved according to [ad] the movement of any part, just as God is neither moved according to the movement of any creature.

6. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia totum corpus comparatur ipsi animae tanquam unus locus; et ideo in pluribus partibus non est nisi in quantum in uno loco; unde si separentur, non erit in illis. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod sit infinita, quia « omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti »,10 et ita corporis humani. Unde potest cogitari tam magnum corpus, quod non posset vivificari ab anima.

6. And through this the following is clear, because the whole body is compared to the soul itself as one place; and for that reason it is not in more parts except inasmuch as (it is) in one place; whence if they be separated, it will not be in them. Nor does it follow from this, that (the soul) is infinite, because « of all constant things nature is the term and the reason for (their) magnitude and increase [augmenti] »,10 and thus of the human body. Whence there can be thought a body so great, that it could not be vivified by the soul.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod tunc una pars non recipit ab alia; dicendum, quod sicut Deus in maiore mundo immediate est in omni creatura ipsam continens, tamen per11 ordinem universi influit aliquid una creatura in aliam; sic intelligendum, quod anima per sui praesentiam est in qualibet parte immediate, quam continet et conservat, non tamen omnino, sed influit in omnes partes per unam; et ideo cessante illa parte et eius influentia, perit ordo corporis essentialis, et ita anima separatur.

7. To that which is objected last, that then one part does not receive from an other; it must be said, that just as God in the macrocosm is immediately in every creature as the One containing it, however, through11 the order of the universe something inflows by one creature into another; so it must be understood, that the soul through its own presence is immediately in any part, which it contains and conserves, not however entirely, but it inflows in all parts through one; and for that reason with that part and its influence ceasing, the essential order of the body perishes, and thus the soul is separated.

 

SCHOLION.

 

SCHOLIUM

I. Propositio in arg. 1. ad opp., quod forma aliqua denominat partes et totum, vera est, quando agitur de rebus organizatione carentibus, quarum partes sunt proinde omnino homogeneae; sed falsissime applicatur ad corpora organizata, sicut fit in illo sophismate Buridani ad probandum digitum hominis esse hominem. Triplici illa distinctione formarum S. Doctor ad 1. istam difficultatem iam solvit.

I. The proposition in argument 1 ad opp., that some form denominates the parts and the whole, is true, when one deals with things lacking organization, the parts of which are for that reason [proinde] entirely homogeneous; but in a most false manner it is applied to organized bodies, just as is done in that sophism of Buridanus to prove that the finger of a man is a man. With that threefold distinction of forms the Seraphic Doctor already solves that difficulty of his.

II. Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 5. hoc notandum. Anima vocatur perfectio totius corporis et corpus perfectibile, quia secundum Aristotelem anima, ut forma substantialis, est actus corporis, unde « super totum potest », i. e. per substantiam suam potest totum corpus vivificare et per potentiam movere. Hoc tamen non excludit, quod magis influat in organa principaliora, uti explicatur in solut. ad 7. Verba: « Ideo nulli minori, quam sit totum corpus, definitur eius substantia », sensum habent, quod anima sit in toto corpore modo definitivo, ut nunc dicitur, non circumscriptivo. Esse in loco circumscriptive dicitur, quando totum locatum est in toto loco, et pars locati in parte loci; quando vero aliquid determinatur quidem ad aliquem locum, ut naturaliter non possit simul esse in alio,

II. For an understanding of the solution to n. 5 this must be noted. The soul is called the perfection of the whole body and the perfectible body, because according to Aristotle the soul, as the substantial form, is the act of the body, whence « it can be above the whole », i. e. through its own substance it can vivify the whole body and move (it) through (its) power. However this does not exclude, that it inflows more in the more principal organs, as is explained in the solution to n. 7. The words: « For no less a reason, that there is a whole body, it is defined by its substance », has the sense, that the soul is in the whole body in a definitive manner, which is now called, non-circumscriptive. To be in a place circumscriptively is said, when the located whole is in the whole place, and a part of the (thing) located (is) in a part of the place; however when something is indeed determined as regards some place, that it naturally cannot simultaneously be in another,

1 Aliqui codd. ut D G T ff addunt sive perfectionem.
2 Codd. P Q adiiciunt tertia.
3 Multi codd. ut A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z ff cum ed. 1 omiitunt ideo.
4 Subaudi: parti vel partibus. — Multi codd. ut A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc ff falso post etsi omittunt non; fere omnes tamen codd. contra Vat. habent communicet pro communicat. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit est part ac post hominis prticulam et.
5 Ex codd. H Y supplevimus parti corporis, certe saltem subaudiendum. Ed. 1 vero paulo ante post nullius addit partis. Sensus responsionis redditur facilior, si ponatur: quia, etsi nulli parti etc. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1. substituimus tamen loco cum et perficit pro perficiat.
6 Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 simul pro similiter; cod. I similiter et.
7 Cod. V addit vero.
8 Supple cum cod. E: anima.
9 Antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1 restituimus ponendo quod est extra illam loco quod non est extra aliam. Paulo ante cod. W particulae ita praefigit ideo. — De hac solutione cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. (c. 4.).
10 Libr. II. de Anima, text. 41. (c. 4).). — Immediate post corrupta et falsa lectio Vat. et cod. cc et ita corpus humanum non potest resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. 1. Mox multorum codd. ut A F G H K T etc. et ed. 1 auctoritate substituimus posset loco possit.
11 Unus alterve codex ut I cum ed. 1 non male secundum loco per. Mox codd. O Z ab pro aliquid.

1 Some codices as D G T and ff add or perfection [sive perfectionem].
2 Codices P and Q insert third [tertia].
3 Many codices as A C E G H I O R S T U V Y Z and ff together with edition 1 omit for that reason [ideo].
4 Understand: to a part and/or parts. — Many codices as A C E G L R S U V Y Z cc and ff after even if [etsi] falsely omit not [non]; nearly all the codices, however, contrary to the Vatican text, have the subjunctive communicate [communicet] in place of communicates [communicat]. Then the Vatican text together with codex cc, but disagreeing with the other codices together with edition 1, omits is a part [est pars] and after of a man [hominis] the particle and [et].
5 From codices H and Y we have supplied part of the body [parti coporis], which certainly must be understood. Edition 1, however, a little before this, reads of no part of a body [nullius partis corporis]. The sense of the response is rendered easier, if one puts it: "because, even if to no part" etc.. Then trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted however [tamen] in place of since [cum] and the indicative it perfects [perficit] in place of the subjunctive it perfects [perficiat].
6 The Vatican text not trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, has simultaneously [simul] in place of similarly [similiter]; codex I reads similarly also [similiter et].
7 Codex V adds however [vero].
8 Supply together with codex E: the soul [anima].
9 The ancient reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored by putting what is outside it [quod est extra illam] in place of what is not outside another [quod non est extra aliam]. A little before this codex W prefaces the particle thus [ita] with for that reason [ideo]. — On this solution, cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 64 (ch. 4).
10 On the Soul, Bk. II, text 41 (ch. 4). — Immediately after this, the corrupt and false reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, and thus the human body cannot(be) [et ita corpus humanum non potest], is repaired from the other manuscripts and edition 1. Then on the authority of many codices as A F G H K T etc. and edition 1, we have substituted could [posset] in place of can [possit].
11 One or the other codex as I together with edition 1 reads not badly according to [secundum] in place of through [per].

 

p. 173

et insuper, ut sit totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte loci, tunc dicitur esse definitive in loco.

and in addition, that it is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the place, then it is said to be definitively in the place.

III. Circa conclusionem omnibus communem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 64. — Scot., De rer. princ. q. 12. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 5, a. 3; S. I. q. 76. a. 8; S. c. Gent. II. c. 72. — B. Albert., hic a. 26. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Richard. a. Med., hic. a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. post medium. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16. q. unic. dub. 4.

III. About the conclusion common to all, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 64. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, On the Principle of Things, q. 12, a. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 5, a. 3; Summa., I, q. 76, a. 8; Summa against the Gentiles, II, ch. 72. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 26. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd. princ., q. 3. — Durandus, here in q. 3. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 7 after the middle. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, q. sole, dubium 4.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.