S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXV

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 439-441.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 439-441.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum recte a Boethio definita sit persona, quod sit rationalis naturae individua substantia, et utrum haec ratio conveniat divinis personis.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether “person” has been rightly defined by Boethius, as that which is an individual substance of a rational nature, and whether this reckoning befits the Divine Persons.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR de hoc nomine persona, quod sit secundum definitionem; et definit eam Boethius1 sic:  « Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia ».  Et quod ista definitio sit conveniens divinae personae, ostenditur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED concerning this name “person”, what is it according to (its) definition; and (St. Severinus) Boethius1 defines it in this manner:  « A person is an individual substance of a rational nature ».  And that this definition of his is fitting for a Divine Person is shown:

1. Per intentionem auctoris, quia Boethius intendit agere de persona Christi; constat autem, personam Christi esse increatam:  ergo intendit assignare rationem personae divinae sive increatae.

1. Through the intention of the author, because (St. Severinus) Boethius intends to deal with the Person of Christ; but it is established, that the Person of Christ is uncreated:  therefore he intends to assign a reckoning to a Divine or Uncreated Person.

2. Item, quod haec sit ratio personae2 in divinis, videtur:  nam in Deo constat ponendum esse suppositum incommunicabilis, et hoc suppositum est substantia divina, et hoc etiam est rationalis naturae; et non convenit ei, nisi de quo dicitur persona:  ergo est eius ratio, ut videtur.

2. Likewise, it seems that this is the reckoning of a Person2 among the divine:  for in God it is established, that there must be posited that a Supposit is incommunicable, and this Supposit is the Divine Substance, and it is also of a rational Nature; and (this) does not befit but that of which a “person” is said:  therefore it is its reckoning, as it seems.

CONTRA:  1. Omnis definitio dicit aggregationem, cum constet ex pluribus,3 alioquin esset ibi nugatio; in simplici autem nulla est aggregatio:  ergo nullum simplex est definibile.  Sed persona in divinis est omnino simplex:  ergo etc.  Si dicas, secundum quod dicunt aliqui, quod quamvis sit simplex secundum rationem; contra:  aut illi rationi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; si aliquid:  ergo aliqua compositio est in re; si nihil:  ergo ratio omnino vana est.  Sed propter rationem vanam non est aliquid definiendum:  ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Every definition means an aggregation, since it is established out of many (parts),3 otherwise in this it would be worthless; but in a simple (thing) there is no aggregation:  therefore no simple (thing) is definable.  But a Person among the divine is entirely simple:  ergo etc..  If you say, as [secundum quod] some say, that although It is simple according to reckoning;  on the contrary:  either there responds to that reckoning something in the thing, or nothing; if something:  therefore some composition is in the thing; if nothing:  therefore the reckoning is entirely vain.  But on account of a vain reckoning there is nothing to be defined:  ergo etc..

2. Item, ratione suarum partium non videtur convenire divinae personae.  Nam rationale est differentia animalis:  ergo cui non convenit esse animal, non convenit natura rationalis.  Sed animal non convenit Deo, cum sit species corporis:  ergo nec hoc quod est rationale.

2. Likewise, by reason of its own parts it does not seem to befit a Divine Person.  For ‘rational’ is the difference of ‘animal’:  therefore to that, to which ‘animal’ does not convene, a rational nature does not convene.  But ‘animal’ does not convene with God, since it is a species of body:  therefore neither that which is rational.

3. Item, videtur quod substantia non dicatur in recto de persona, quia, multiplicato definito, necesse est multiplicari4 definitionem et partes definitionis:  ergo si persona est substantia, cum sint plures personae, ergo plures substantiae.  —  Si tu dicas, quod substantia stat ibi pro hypostasi; contra:  hypostasis dicitur substantia individua, sicut dicit Boethius:5  ergo sicut est nugatio, si diceretur:  homo rationalis, sic et in praedicta notificatione.  —  Quaeritur ergo, utrum hoc nomen substantia stet pro communi, vel pro hypostasi.6

3. Likewise, it seems that “substance” is not said in its right sense of a person, because, with the defined multiplied, it is necessary that there be multiplied4 the definition and the parts of the definition:  therefore if a person is a substance, since there are many Persons, therefore many Substances.  —  If you say, that “substance” stands there for [pro] a hypostasis; on the contrary:  a hypostasis is said (to be) “an individual substance”, just as (St. Severinus) Boethius says:  therefore, just as it is worthless, if there would be said:  “a rational man”, so also in the aforesaid notification.  —  Therefore, there is asked, whether this name “substance” stands for (something) common, and/or for a hypostasis.6

4. Item, videtur non esse convertibilis.  Nam anima hominis est naturae rationalis substantia individua:  ergo etc.  —  Ultimo quaeritur, cum assignentur diversae definitiones de persona,7 quomodo differunt.

4. Likewise, it seems that it is not convertible.  For the soul of a man is an individual substance of a rational nature:  ergo etc..  —  Last there is asked, since diverse definitions of “person” are assigned,7 in what manner do they differ.

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Definitio illa Boethii est bona et conveniens divinis personis.

CONCLUSION

 

That definition of Boethius is good and fitting for the Divine Persons.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, sicut patet ex intentione auctoris, haec definitio personae convenit et assignatur divinae personae.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that just as is clear from the intention of the author, this definition of “person” befits and is assigned to a Divine Person.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simplex non est definibile; dicunt aliqui, quod dupliciter est aliquid definire.  Uno modo in recto et per differentiam dicentem positionem, ut cum dicitur:  homo est animal rationale, morale; et hoc modo verum est, quod definitio dicit aggregationem et compositionem, et hoc modo solum8 aggregatum est definibile.  Alio modo contingit aliquid definire in obliquo et per differentiam dicentem privationem, ut cum dicitur:  simitas est curvitas nasi; et tunc non significatur, substantiam rei aggregari ex diversis, quoniam quod ponitur in obliquo non intrat essentiam de necessitate.  Ulterius, differentia privans non ponit aliquam compositionem sive appositionem; et talis est dicta . . .

1. To that, however, which is objected, that a simple (thing) is not definable; some say that to define anything is in a twofold manner.  In one manner in its right sense and through a difference meaning a positing, as when there is said:  “man is a rational, mortal animal”; and in this manner it is true, that a definition means an aggregation and composition, and in this manner the aggregated alone is definable.8  In another manner it happens that one defines something in its oblique sense and through a difference meaning a privation, as when there is said:  “simity is the curvature of a nose”; and then there is not signified, that the substance of the thing is aggregated out of diverse (things), since what is posited in an oblique sense does not, of necessity, enter into the essence (of the thing).  Furthermore, a depriving [privans] difference does not posit some composition or apposition; and such is the said . . .

1  Libr. de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c. 3.

2  Adiecimus ex cod. W personae.  —  Paulo inferius cod. M cum ed. 1 individua pro divina; cod. T in marg. exhibet:  hoc suppositum est idem quod substantia divina.

3  Secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 33. et 43. (VI. c. 10. 12.), definitio est ratio (sermo) habens partes, quae sunt genus et differentia.

4  Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. multiplicare.

5  Libr. de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c. 3.

6  Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt hanc quaestionem, ad quam tamen infra in solutione ad 3. datur responsio; quare cum Vat. eam in textum recepimus.

7  Vat., favente solo cod. cc, cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona.

8  Codd. P Q cum ed. 1 addunt quod est.

1  In the book, On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, ch. 3.

2  We have inserted, from codex W, of a Person [personae].  —  A little below this, codex M, together with edition 1, has an individual [individua] for the Divine [divina]; codex T in the margin exhibits this reading:  this Supposit is the same as the Divine Substance [hoc suppositum est idem quod substantia divina].

3  According to Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 33 and 43 (Bk. VI, chs. 10 and 12), a definition is a reckoning (discourse) having parts, which (parts) are a genus and a difference.

4  The Vatican edition, together with one and/or another codex, reads that one multiply [multiplicare] for that there be multiplied [multiplicari].

5  In the book, On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, ch. 3.

6  The codices together with edition 1 omits this question, to which, however, a response is given below in the solution to n. 3; for which reason we have, together with the Vatican edition, received it into the text.

7  The Vatican edition, supported by codex cc alone, reads since the definitions are diverse or are assigned concerning a “person” [cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona].

8  Codices P and Q, together with edition 1, reads only what is aggregated is definable [solum quod est aggregatum est definible] for the aggregated alone is definable [solum aggregatum est definible].

p. 440

ratio.  Nam hoc quod rationalis naturae1 cadit in obliquo, et haec differentia individua non ponit, sed privat.  —  Sed haec responsio non potest stare.  Primum quidem, quia quod definitur per obliquum, aut definitur sicut accidens per substantiam, aut sicut per rem eiusdem generis; sed sive sic, sive, sic, est ibi additio.  Nam definitiones accidentium, sicut dicit Philosophus,2 sunt ex additamento.  Similiter, si per rem eiusdem generis; tunc ergo intrat essentiam et non dicit totam, cum sit pars definitionis:  ergo necesse est, illud quod apponitur, aliquid addere secundum rem, et ita sive in recto, sive in obliquo necesse est dicere aggregationem.

reckoning.  For that which (belongs) to a rational nature1 falls (to it) in its oblique sense, and this difference, ‘individual’, does not posit (something), but deprives it.  —  But this response cannot stand.  First, indeed, because what is defined through an oblique sense, either is defined just as an accident (is) through a substance, or just as (an accident is) through a thing of the same genus; but either (“person” is defined) in this manner, or in this manner there is an addition there.  For definitions of accidents, just as the Philosopher says,2 are out of something added [additamento].  Similarly, if (it is defined) through a thing of the same genus; then, therefore it does enter into the essence and does not mean the whole, since it is a part of the definition:  therefore, it is necessary, that that which is apposed, add something according to the thing, and thus either in its right sense, or in its oblique sense it is necessary that it mean an aggregation.

Et propter hoc dicendum aliter, quod haec ratio, intellecta de persona creata, est notificatio dicens aggregationem.  In Deo autem non dicit aggregationem secundum rem, sed secundum intelligendi rationem; quae tamen non est vana, eo quod omnia, quae dicuntur in ratione personae, inveniuntur in Deo, licet non per diversitatem.  —  Et hoc quidem potest intelligi sic.  In creaturis specificatio per additionem complentem est,3 individuatio per additionem sive appositionem contrahentem.  Et ideo, cum dicitur substantia individua, individuum realiter addit supra substantiam, unde4 et substantia individua supra naturam; et ideo necesse est, esse compositam personam in creatura.  Sed in Deo est individuatio vel distinctio per solam originem.  Et quia persona oritur se ipsa, ideo nulla est ibi omnino5 additio, sed plurificatio, et per plurificationem distinctio et individuatio; et ideo nec individua addit supra substantiam, nec substantia supra naturam.  Ideo vere dicitur6 et vera est ratio intelligendi; et notificatio ista convenit personae divinae, nec significatur in ea aliqua compositio; unde tenet rationem cuiusdam notificationis et cadit a ratione definitionis, quia nec Deus nec divina persona est definibilis, et tamen cognoscibilis, et notificabilis.

And on this account it must be said in another manner, that this reckoning, understood of a created person, is a notification meaning an aggregation.  But in God it does not mean an aggregation according to thing, but according to the reckoning of understanding; which, however, is not vain for this, that all (the parts of the definition), which are said in the reckoning of ‘person’, are found in God, though not through a diversity.  —  And this indeed can be understood thus.  In creatures specification is through a completing addition,3 individuation through an addition or contracting apposition.  And for that reason, when there is said “an individual substance”, ‘individual’ really does add upon ‘substance’, whence4 even ‘individual substance’ (adds) upon ‘nature’; and for that reason it is necessary, that in the creature a person be composite.  But in God there is individuation and/or distinction through origin alone. And because a Person arises by His very self, for that reason there is There entirely no addition,5 but (rather) a plurification, and through the plurification (of Persons) a distinction and individuation; and for that reason (in God) neither does “individual” adds upon the Substance, nor “substance” upon the Nature.  For that reason (that definition of St. Boethius)6 is truly said and the reckoning of (its) understanding is true; and that notification of his befits a Divine Person, and in it there is not signified any composition; whence it has the reckoning of a certain notification and occurs by reason of the definition, because neither God nor a Divine Person is definable, and yet (They are) cognizable, and can be made known [notificabilis].

2. Ad illud quod obiciitur de differentiis positis, sive de membris, dicendum, quod rationale dicitur uno modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi bonum a malo, verum a falso — et sic Deo et creaturae convenit;7 alio modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi per inquisitionem et collationem et discursum — et hoc est animae coniunctae carni.  Et sic differentia talis primo modo ponitur in definitione, sed secundo modo obiicit.

2. To that which is objected concerning the differences posited, or concerning the members (of the definition), it must be said, that the “rational” is said in one manner (to be), that which it has the power of discerning good from evil, true from false — and in this manner it convenes with God and creature;7 in another manner (to be), that which has the power of discerning through an inquisition and a gathering and discourse — and this belongs to a soul conjoined to the flesh.  And in this manner such a difference is posited in the definition in the first manner, but objected to in the second manner.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia individua dicitur in recto; dicendum, quod numeratur, sicut persona.  Nam, sicut dicit Anselmus,8 plures substantiae sunt individuae, sicut plures personae.

3. To that which is objected, that “individual substance” is said in its right sense; it must be said, that it is numbered, just as (is) ‘person’.  For, just as (St.) Anselm says,8 as many as there are individual substances, so (are there) many persons.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia stet pro communi, aut pro hypostasi; consuevit tripliciter9 responderi.

To that which is asked, whether this name “substance” stands for (something) common, or for a hypostasis; it is customary to respond in a threefold manner.9

Primo modo sic, quod substantia stet pro communi.  Et si tu obiicias, quod illa non individuatur; dicunt, quod differentia adveniens respicit substantiam ratione suppositi, non ratione formae, ut patet, cum dicitur:  animal individuum.  —  Sed haec responsio non videtur conveniens, quia10 hoc nomen substantia, secundum quod stat pro communi, non supponit personam.  Unde haec est falsa:  essentia generat; et haec:  substantia generat.

In the first manner yes, that “substance” does stand for (something) common.  And if you object, that it is not individuated; they say, that an adventive difference looks back to substance by reason of the supposit, not by reason of the form, as is clear, when there is said:  “an individual animal”.  —  But this response does not seem fitting, because10 this name “substance”, according to which it stands for (something) common, does not suppose a person.  Whence this is false:  “the Essence generates”; and this (too):  “the Substance generates”.

Secundo modo dicitur, quod substantia ibi tantum valet quantum hypostasis; nec est nugatio.  Nam individuatio attenditur in persona quantum ad triplicem incommunicabilitatem,11 scilicet per praedicationem, et haec convenit hypostasi; et per compositionem, quia non est alteri componibilis; et per unionem, prout aliquid unitur digniori.  Et ita differentia individua dicit istas duas incommunicabilitates.12  Unde patet, quod non est ibi nugatio:  patet . . .

In the second manner it is said, that “substance” there is worth only as much as “hypostasis”; nor is it worthless.  For individuation is attained in a person as much as regards a threefold incommutability,11 namely, through predication, and this befits a hypostasis; and through composition, because it is not composable with the other; and through union, insofar as something is united to (anything) more worthy.  And thus the difference ‘individual’ means those two incommutabilities.  Whence it is clear, that there is nothing worthless there:  it is also / clear . . .

1  In compluribus codd. desideratur naturae, et mox post vocem differentia ed. 1 addit quae est.

2  Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 12 (VI. c. 4.).  —  Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut S T Z per subiectum pro per substantiam.  Inferius post totam cod. R adiungit rationem.

3  Cod. Y:  In creaturis specificatio fit per differentiam vel per additionem complentem.

4  A cod. O abest unde.

5  Vat. cum cod. cc, voci ideo praemisso et, omittit omnino.  Immediate ante cod. O originem habet a se ipsa pro oritur se ipsa.

6  Supple:   definitio illa Boethii.  —  Mox vocabula ista desideratur in plurimus mss. nec non in ed. 1.

7  Cfr. August., II. de Ordine, c. 11. n. 30 seqq.

8  Monolog. c. 78:  Quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae.

9  Vat. cum cod. cc dupliciter, et paulo ante multi codd. persona pro substantia, sed perperam.  Vide pag. praeced. notam 6.  —  Paulo infra pro vocabulo substantia cod. O exhibet stet pro essentia.

10  Complures codd. ut G H T Z cum, et consequenter deinde supponat pro supponit.

11  Incommunicabilitas opponitur communicabilitati, quae duplex est, scilicet ut quod et ut quo.  Per primam communicatur superius inferiori per identitatem et essentialiter, ut animal communicatur homini et praedicatur de homine.  Communicabilitas ut quo fit per informationem, vel saltem ad modum formae.  Haec est triplex, cui opponitur triplex incommunicabilitas.  Prima fit per identitatem, ut natura communicatur suis suppositis et universale inferioribus; et tunc quod communicatur ut quo est etiam communicatum ut quod; unde est etiam praedicatio in primo modo dicendi, ut Petrus est homo.  Secunda fit per compositionem in ratione formae et materiae, vel accidentis et subiecti.  Hac communicatione id cui communicatur, non fit ipsum communicatum, sed aliquid tale, v. g. corpus, vivens etc.  Tertia fit per unionem, ut natura humana Christi communicatur Verbo, ut ab illo sustentetur, quae unio non est proprie per informationem nisi secundum quandam analogiam.  His tribus modis communicabilitatis respondet triplex incommunicabilitas; et his tribus modis persona est incommunicabilis.  Cfr. S. Thom., hic. q. 1 a. 1. ad 7, et Scotus, III. Sent., d. 1. a. 1. n. 9. et seqq.  —  Paulo infra pro alteri cod. S. alii.

12  Scil. secundam et tertiam.  —  Vat. cum pluribus codd. hic et paulo infra incommunitates pro incommunicabilitates.

1  In very many codices there is wanting nature [naturae], and next after the word difference [differentia], edition 1 adds which is [quae est].

2  Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 12 (Bk. VI, ch. 4).  —  A little above this, some codices, such as S T and Z, have through a subject [per subiectum] for through a substance [per substantiam].  Below this, after the whole [totam], codex R adds reckoning [rationem].

3  Codex Y reads:  In creatures, specification comes to be through a difference and/or through a completing addition [In creaturis specificatio fit per differentiam vel per additionem complentem].

4  From codex O there is absent whence [unde].

5  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, having prefaced he word and [et] to the word for that reason [ideo], omits entirely [omnino].  Immediately before this, codex O has has (His) origin from His very self [originem habet a se ipsa] for arises from His very self [oritur se ipsa].

6  Supply:  that definition of (St.) Boethius.  —  Next the word that . . . of his [ista] is wanting in very many manuscripts, and also in edition 1.  [Trans. note:  a “notification” is in this case a “verbal explanation”.]

7  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On Order, Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 30 ff.

8  Monologion, ch. 78:  As many persons, so many are the individual substances.

9  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has in a twofold manner [dupliciter], and a little before this many codices have “person” [persona] for “substance” [substantia], but faultily.  See the preceding page, footnote 6.  —  A little below this, codex O reads what stands for the essence [quod stet pro essentia] for that “substance” [quod substantia].

10  Very many codices, such as G H T and Z, have since [cum], and consequently then have the verb suppose [supponat] in the subjunctive.

11  Incommutability is opposed to that communicability, which is twofold, namely as what (is communicated) and as whereby (it is communicated) [ut quod et ut quo].  Through the first a superior is communicated to an inferior through an identity and essentially, as ‘animal’ is communicated to ‘man’ and is predicated of ‘man’.  Communicability as whereby (something is communicated) comes to be through being informed, and/or at least according to the manner of the form.  This (communicability) is threefold, and to it is opposed a threefold incommutability.  The first comes to be through an identity, such as (when) a nature is communicated to its own supposits and a universal to (its) inferiors; and then what is communicated as whereby is also the one communicated as what; whence there is also a predication in the first manner of speaking, such as “Peter is a man”.  The second comes to be through a composition in the reckoning of form and matter, and/or of accident and subject.  Buy this communication that to which it is communicated, does not come to be the very thing communicated, but something such, v. g. a body, a living thing etc..  The third comes to be through a union, such as (when) the Human Nature of Christ is communicated to the Word, to be sustained by Him, which union is not properly through a being informed except according to a certain analogy.  To these three manners of communicability there corresponds a threefold incommunicability; and in these three manners a person is incommunicable.  Cf. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, in reply to n. 7, and (Bl. John Duns Scotus), Sent., Bk. III, d. 1, a. 1, n. 9, and ff.  —  A little below this codex S has another [alii] for the other [alteri].

12  That is, the second and the third.  —  The Vatican edition, together with very many codices, here and a little below this, has incommunities [incommunitates] for incommunicabilities [incommunicabilitates].

p. 441

etiam, quod definitio est convertibilis.  Per istam duplicem incommunibilitatem excluditur anima hominis, quae est alii componilibis, et human natura in Christo, quae est unita digniori.  —  Sed tamen, licet illud rationabiliter sit dictum, adhuc restat quaestio de hypostasi, quia hypostasis est substantia individua.  Quaeritur similiter, quomodo ibi accipiatur substantia, et non potest accipi pro communi, nec pro hypostasi.1

also / clear, that the definition is convertible (among creatures and God).  Through that twofold incommutability there is excluded the soul of man, which is composable with another, and the Human Nature in Christ, which is united to (Something) more worthy.  —  But yet, though that has been reasonably said, still there remains the question of the hypostasis, because a hypostasis is an individual substance.  Similarly, there is asked, in what manner is “substance” accepted there, and (yet) it cannot be accepted for (something) common, nor for a hypostasis.1

Et propter hoc dicitur tertio, quod hoc nomen substantia stat ibi, secundum quod substantia dividitur in substantiam primam et secundam,2 et ita in quadam communitate ad substantiam universalem et particularem; et illud colligunt ex verbis Boethii, quando venatur definitionem personae per praedicatam divisionem substantiae, ut ibi patet.3  Unde hoc nomen individua coarctat illam indifferentiam illius nominis, ut stet pro substantiam prima; et sic non est ibi nugatio nec substantiae communis individuatio.

And on this account there is said third, that this name “substance” stands there, according to which ‘substance’ is divided into first and second ‘substance’,2 and thus in a certain commonness [communitate] to universal and particular ‘substance’; and they gather this from the words of (St. Severinus) Boethius, when he hunts for the definition of “person” through the aforesaid division of ‘substance’, as is clear there.3  Whence this name “individual” constrains that definition of this name, so that it stands for ‘first substance’; and thus there is nothing worthless there nor (is) the individuation of a common substance.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de assignatione definitionem, dicendum, quod persona definitur a Boethio sic:  persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia; a Richardo4 sic:  persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia.  Definitur etiam alio modo sic:  persona est existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum.  A magistris definitur sic:  persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente.  —  Et notanda est differentia harum definitionum:  quia Boethius magis considerat rationem rei, magistri vero adhuc5 rationem translationis.  Definitiones vero Richardi sunt personae, prout est in divinis praecipue; sed una est propria assignatio, alia vero definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio.6  —  Posset tamen dici, quod omnes idem dicunt, differunt tamen secundum modum dicendi; quia definitio Boethii fuit data et videbatur improprietatem sonare; ideo posuit Richardus aliam magis per propria verba; et sic usque ad quartem.

4. To that which is asked last concerning the assignation of the definition, it must be said, that a “person” is defined by (St. Severinus) Boethius in this manner:  “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature”; by Richard (of St. Victor)4 in this manner:  “a person is an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature”.  It is also defined in another manner, thus:  “a person is one existing through himself alone according to a certain, singular manner of rational existence”.  By the masters (of theology) it is defined thus:  “a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to nobility”.  —  And the difference of these definitions is to be noted:  because (St. Severinus) Boethius considers more the reckoning of the thing, but the masters still5 (consider) the reckoning of the translation.  However, the definitions of Richard belong to a person, insofar as it is chiefly among the divine; but one is the proper assignation, but the other the exposition or correction of the definition of (St. Severinus) Boethius.6  —  However it can be said, that all mean the same (thing), yet they differ according to the manner of speaking; because the definition of (St. Severinus) Boethius was given and seemed to sound improper [improprietatem sonare]; for that reason Richard (of St. Victor) posited another through more proper words; and (it was defined) in this manner even as regards the fourth (definition).

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Scotus (I. Sent. d. 23. q. unic.) definitionem Boethii hic positam reprobat eique aliam Richardi substituit, quod « persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia ».  Haec tamen, ut dicit S. Bonav. (ad 4.), est « definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio ».  Cum aliqua expositione definitio Boethii communiter recipitur, et eodem modo explicatur ab Angelico et Seraphico.  In specie explicatione indigent vocabula substantia et individua, de quo vide solut. ad 3.  De primo vocabulo S. Doctor cum S. Thoma (S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 2.) asserit, quod accipitur nec praecise pro substantia prima (hypostasi), nec pro substantia secunda (« pro communi », id est essentia), sed « accipitur communiter, prout dividitur per primam et secundam ». (S. Thom. loc. cit.).  —  Vocabulum individua non potest hic significare singulare; tunc enim sequeretur, quod humana Christi natura esset persona humana, quod est haeresis; et insuper, quod anima separata esset persona, quod communiter non approbatur.  Dicendum igitur, quod individua stat pro incommunicabilis.

I. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 23, q. sole,  reproves the definition of (St. Severinus) Boethius posited here, and substituted the other (definition) of Richard, that « a “person” is an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature ».  Yet this one, as St. Bonaventure says (in reply to n. 4), is « an exposition or correction of the definition of (St.) Boethius ».  The definition of (St.) Boethius is commonly received with some exposition, as it is explained in the same manner by the Angelic and Seraphic Doctors.  In particular the words “substance” and “individual” need explanation, concerning which see the solution to n. 3.  Concerning the first word the Seraphic Doctor, together with St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 29, a. 1, in reply to n. 2), asserts, that it is accepted neither precisely for a ‘first substance’ (a hypostasis), nor for a ‘second substance’ ( « for (something) common », that is, an essence), but « is accepted commonly, insofar as it is divided through first and second (substance) » (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).  —  Here the word “individual” cannot signify “singular”; for then it would follow, that the Human Nature of Christ was a human person, which is heresy; and moreover, that a soul separated (from a body) was a person, which is commonly not approved.  Therefore it must be said, that “individual” stands for “incommunicable”.

Notanda sunt ultima verba solutionis ad 1.  —  Ultima obiectio ideo non est soluta, quia ex dictis iam manifestum est, quod individua ibi dicitur pro incommunicabilis.

The final words of the solution to n. 1 are to be noted.  —  The last objection has not been solved for this reason, because from what has been said it is already manifest, that “individual” there is said on behalf of “incommunicable”.

II.  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 3.  —  Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 29. a. 1.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 10. a. 44. m. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. 3.  —  Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3.  — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 1.  —  Durand., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23.  —  Biel, I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1.

II.  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 56, m. 3.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version, Sent., Bk. I,  d. 23, q. 1.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa. , I, q. 29, a. 1.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 10, a. 44, m. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2 and 3.  —  Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 3.  — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 53, q. 1.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. I,  d. 23, q. 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. I,  d. 23.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. I,  d. 23. q. 1.

1  Cod. O adiungit:  quia tunc idem definiretur.

2  Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, hac divisionem ponit intelligens sub prima substantia ipsum individuum, ut quidam homo, sub secunda speciem, ut homo.  —  Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc post secundum quod inserit hoc nomen, et subinde post dividitur in omittit substantiam.

3  Loc. cit. (pag. 439), c. 2.  —  Hanc sententiam et S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 1, praefert.  —  Mox post vocem nomins sola Vat., nullo suffragante cod., addit substantia.

4  Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 22. 23.  —  Sequens definitio invenitur etiam apud Richardum loc. cit. c. 24; ultima autem colligitur ex lit. Magistri, hic c. 3.

5  Supple:  considerant.  —  Pro adhuc, quod ex praestantioribus codd. revocavimus, Vat. cum cod. cc addunt.  Et revera, quia in persona est proprietas ad nobilitatem pertinens, ideo hoc nomen personae transferri potest ad divina.

6  Cfr. Richard, IV. de Trin. c. 21. seqq., ubi definitionem a Boethio datam pertractat.  —  Plures codd. ut A T W X cum ed. 1 correptio pro correctio.  —  Mox post fuit cod. I inserit prius.

1  Codex O adds:  because then the same (term) would be defined [quia tunc idem definiretur].

2  Aristotle, On Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”, posits this division, understanding under ‘first substance’ the individual itself, as a certain man, under ‘second (substance)’, the species, such as man.  —  A little before this the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, after according to which [secundum quod] inserts this name [hoc nomen], and then after is divided [dividitur] it omits substance [substantiam].

3  Loc. cit. (page 439), ch. 2.  —  This sentence even St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, prefers.  —  Next after of this name [illius nominis] the Vatican alone, supported by no codex, adds “substance” [substantia].

4  On the Trinity, Bk. IV, chs. 22 and 23.  —  The following definition is found also in Richard (of St. Victor), loc. cit., ch. 24; but the last one is gathered from the text of Master (Peter), here in ch. 3.

5  Supply:  consider [considerant].  —  For still [adhuc], which we have recalled from the more outstanding codices, the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has add [addunt].  And in truth, because in a Person there is a property pertaining to nobility, for that reason this name “persons” can be transferred to the divine.

6  Cf. Richard (of St. Victor), On the Trinity, Bk. IV, ch. 21 ff., where he thoroughly treats of the definition given by (St. Severinus) Boethius.  —  Very many codices, such as A T W X together with edition 1 shortening [correptio] for correction [correctio].  —  Next after was [fuit], codex I inserts first [prius].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.