S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXII

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 565-567.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 565-567.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

DOUBT I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de ratione Augustini, quae ponitur in littera:  Si Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, quam genuit, et hoc est ei esse quod sapere, ergo est sapientia genita.  Videtur enim istud argumentum non valere, quia illud non valet:  hoc est Patri esse quod operari; sed operatur per Filium:  ergo est per Filium.  Ergo nec similiter illud argumentum valet.  Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia operari connotat effectum; obiicitur, quod idem est Patri esse quod esse Patrem;  sed tamen istud argumentum non valet:  Pater deitate est Deus, ergo deitate est Pater:  ergo similiter non valet hoc argumentum:  est sapiens sapientia genita, ergo est sapientia genita.1

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter) and first concerning the reckoning of (St.) Augustine, which is posited in the text (of Master Peter):  If the Father is wise by the begotten Wisdom, which He  begot, and for Him ‘to be’ is that which (it is) ‘to be wise’, therefore He is by begotten Wisdom.  For it seems that that argument of his is not valid, because this is not valid:  “for the Father ‘to be’ is that which (it is) ‘to work’; but He works through the Son:  therefore He is through the Son”.  Therefore, neither, similarly, is that argument valid.  If you say, that it is not similar, because “to work” connotes an effect; there is objected, that it is the same for the Father to be as (it is) to be the Father; but this argument, however, is not valid:  “the Father by the Deity is God, therefore by the Deity He is the Father”:  therefore, similarly, this argument is not valid:  “He is wise by begotten Wisdom, therefore He is by begotten Wisdom”.1

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod argumentum Augustini est necessarium:  quoniam esse sapientem et esse in divinis non differunt modo dicendi a parte rei, sed solum a parte nostra.  Non sic autem est esse et operari, quoniam, etsi operari quantum ad principale significatum sit idem quod esse, tamen quantum ad connotatum differt, et potest esse extraneum, et ita potest ibi esse accidens.2  Tamen hoc quod est esse Deum et esse Patrem, quamvis non differant quantum ad essentiam vel modum essendi, differunt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi, qui vere est in divinis, scilicet3 absolutum et comparatum; et ideo non transit paternitas in substantiam, sicut sapientia; ideo habet alium modum dicendi, qui potest esse extraneus respectu alicuius attributi.  Ideo ibi est accidens, non autem in argumento Augustini.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the argument of (St.) Augustine is necessary:  since ‘to be wise’ and ‘to be’ among the divine do not differ according to the manner of speaking on the part of the thing, but solely on our part.  But not so is ‘to be’ and ‘to work’, since, even if ‘to work’, as much as regards its principal signified, is the same as ‘to be’, yet as much as regards what it connotes [ad connotatum] it does differ, and can be extraneous, and thus it can be a (fallacy of) accident there.2  Yet that which it is ‘to be God’ and ‘to be the Father’, although they do not differ as much as regards essence and/or the manner of being, yet they do differ as much as regards the manner of being regarded [se habendi], which truly is among the divine, namely3 an absolute (manner of being regarded) and a compared one; and for that reason the paternity does not pass over into the Substance, as “Wisdom” (does); for that reason it has another manner of being said, which can be extraneous in respect of some attribute.  For that reason it is (a fallacy of) accident there, but not on the argument of (St.) Augustine.

DUB. II.

DOUBT II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia genita, sed ingenita.  Videtur enim male dicere, quia sicut aeternitas appropriatur Patri, ita sapientia Filio; sed aeternitas non debet dici ingenita, sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Incarnatione Verbi:4  ergo nec sapientia potest nec debet dici ingenita.  Item, si potest dici sapientia ingenita,5 pari ratione potest dici sapientia procedens; et ita videtur, quod sapientia sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto, sicut et Filio.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says, that the Father is not wise by begotten, but by unbegotten Wisdom.  For he seems to speak badly, because just as “eternity” is appropriated to the Father, so “wisdom” to the Son; but Eternity ought not be said (to be) “unbegotten”, just as (St.) Anselm says in the book On the Incarnation of the Word:4  therefore neither can nor ought wisdom be said (to be) “unbegotten”.  Likewise, if wisdom can be said (to be) “unbegotten”,5 for an equal reason wisdom can be said (to be) “proceeding”, and thus it seems, that “wisdom” is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, just as to the Son.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quare non dicitur potentia de potentia, sicut sapientia de sapientia?

In accord with this there is asked, for what reason is Power not said (to be) “from Power”, just as Wisdom (is said to be) “from Wisdom”?

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod sapientia est de nominibus mediis,6 quae sunt nata supponere pro persona.  Et ideo sicut dicitur Deus de Deo, et Deus genitus et ingenitus, ita dicitur etiam sapientia; non tamen ita proprie, quia nomen abstractum est . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “wisdom” is (one) of the middle names,6 which is bound to suppose on behalf of a Person.  And for that reason, just as there is said “God from God”, and “the begotten God” and “the Unbegotten”, so there is also said “Wisdom”; yet not so properly, because it is an abstract name . . .

1  Vat. cum solis edd. 4, 5 omittit ergo est sapientia genita.

2  Intellige hic sicut infra circa finem solutionis:  fallaciam accidentis.

3  Auctoritate plurimorum codd. restituimus scilicet, quod in Vat. desideratur.  Pro scilicet cod. Z id est, ed. 1 secundum et non pauci mss. sed.  Proxime ante pro qui Vat. cum cod. cc quod:  mendose.

4  Titulus integer est:  de Fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi contra blasphemias Ruzelini sive Roscelini, in quo libro c. 9. Anselmus de aeternitate trium divinarum personarum disserens ait:  « Et quoanim ista nativitas et ista processio sine principio sunt; alioquin aeternitas nata et aeternitas procedens, quod falsum est, habet principium:  nequaquam Deum incepisse esse Patrem aut Filium aut Spiritum sanctum cogitare debemus aut possumus ».  Ita textus originalis, quem Alex.Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 1 paulo aliter refert sic:  « Anselmus:  Unus est Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.  Et postmodum loquens de nativitate et processione dicit, quod nativitas et processio sine principio sunt, alioquin esset aeternitas nata et procedens:  —  quod falsum est — nequaquam Deum habere principium aut incepisse Patrem aut Filium aut Spiritum sanctum cogitare debemus.  Ex hoc ergo videtur relinqui, quod cum aeternitas non debeat dici nata vel procedens, quod convenit soli Patri ».  Hunc Anselmi locum, sicut ab Alex. Hal. exhibetur, S. Bonav. ante oculos habuisee et ex eo sententiam sumsisse videtur, quod aeternitas non debeat dici nasci neque ingenita, quam sententiam probat in corp. solutionis.  —  Vat. renitentibus mss. nec non ed. 1, pro ingenita substituit genita, qua lectione argumentum destruitur.  Paulo superius pro quia sicut multi codd. cum ed. 1 quia si, qui et dein omittunt ita; incongrue.

5  In cod. Y hic additur quantum ad Filium, et paulo inferius post procedens in eodem cod. Y et in codd. B D quantum ad Spiritum sanctum.

6  Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1 in corp.  —  Paulo inferius post sapientia cod. dd bene addit de sapientia.

1  The Vatican edition, together with editions 4 and 5 alone, omits therefore He is by begotten Wisdom [ergo est sapientia genita].

2  Understand here, as well as below near the end of the solution: a fallacy of accident [fallacia accidentis].

3  On the authority of very many codices, we have restored namely [scilicet], which is wanting in the Vatican edition.  For namely [scilicet] codex Z has that is [id est], edition 1 has according to [secundum], and not a few manuscripts have but [sed].  Immediately before this for which (being regarding) [qui], the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has faultily which (manner of being regarded) [quod].

4  The entire title is: On Faith in the Trinity and on the Incarnation against the Blasphemies of Ruzelin or Roscelin [de Fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi contra blasphemias Ruzelini sive Roscelini], in which book, in ch. 9, (St.) Anselm, speaking in an orderly manner of the Eternity of the Three Divine Persons, says:  « And since that nativity and that procession are without a beginning; otherwise Eternity born and Eternity proceeding have a beginning, which is false:  we ought or we can think that God has never begun to be the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit ».  Thus the original text, which Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 67, m. 1, reports in a little different manner, thus:  « (St.) Anselm (says):  There is One God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.  And a little while after speaking of the nativity and procession he says, that the nativity and the procession are without a beginning, otherwise there would be an Eternity born and proceeding:  — which is false — we ought to think that God never has a beginning or began (to be) the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit.  From this, therefore, there seems to remain, that since Eternity ought not be said to be born and/or proceeding, because it befits the Father alone ».  It seems that this passage of (St.) Anselm, as exhibited in Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure had before his eyes and took from it the sentence, that Eternity ought not be said “to be born” nor (be) “unbegotten”, which sentence he proves in the body of the solution.  [Trans. note:  In the English translation “Eternity” is a name of the Divine Nature, appropriated to the Father, not the concept.]  —  The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and edition 1 striving against it, substitutes begotten [genita] for unbegotten [ingenita], and destroys the argument by this reading.  A little above this for because just as [quia sicut] many codices, together with edition 1, have because if [quia si], which also then omit so [ita], incongruously.

5  In codex Y there is added here as much as regards the Son [quantum ad Filium], and a little below this after “proceeding” in the same codex Y and in codices B and D there is inserted as much as regards the Holy Spirit [quantum ad Spiritum sanctum].

6  Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in the body (of the question).  —  A little below this after “Wisdom [sapientia] codex dd adds well from Wisdom” [de sapientia].

 

p. 566

 

quodam modo.  Magis tamen dicitur sapientia de sapientia quam aeternitas de aeternitate, quia aeternitas significat in maiori abstractione quam sapientia, et ideo magis abstrahit a ratione originis.  Secundum hoc etiam est concedendum, quod possit dici sapientia procedens, licet adhuc minus proprie.  Nec valet illud argumentum; quamvis enim sapientia non sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto,1 tamen per determinationem adiunctam potest trahi.

in a certain manner.  Yet “Wisdom from Wisdom” is said rather than “Eternity from Eternity”, because “eternity” signifies in greater abstraction than “wisdom” (does), and for that reason it abstracts more from the reckoning of origin.  According to this, it must also be conceded, that “Wisdom” can be said (to be) “proceeding”, though still less properly.  Nor is that argument valid; for although “wisdom” is not appropriable to the Holy Spirit,1 yet it can be drawn (to Him) through an adjoined determination.

Ad illud:2  quare non dicitur potentia de potentia? dicendum, quod non ita proprie dicitur sicut sapientia de sapientia.  Quoniam sapientia appropriatur Filio, qui est ab alio et ab alio habet omne quod habet, ergo et sapientiam ab illo habet:3  ideo sapientia genita ex sua appropriatione praesupponit sapientiam ingenitam.  Sed potentia appropriatur Patri, qui non est ab alio; ideo non sic dicitur potentia de potentia, vel potentia genita.

Regarding that (which is asked):2  for what reason is “Power” not said (to be) “from Power”? it must be said, that it is not said as properly as “Wisdom from Wisdom”.  Since “wisdom” is appropriated to the Son, who is from Another and has from Another all that He Has, therefore He also has Wisdom from Him:3  for that reason “begotten Wisdom” from its appropriation presupposes “unbegotten Wisdom”.  But “power” is appropriated to the Father, who is not from Another; for that reason, thus, there is not said “Power from Power”, and/or “begotten Power”.

DUB. III.

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro Retractationum et ponitur in littera:  Melius istam quaestionem in libro de Trinitate tractavi.  Videtur enim non recte loqui, quia, cum comparativum in utroque extremorum praesupponat rem sui positivi,4 si ibi melius, ergo utrobique bene:  ergo si ibi dicit, quod Pater est sapiens sapientia, quam genuit, videtur quod dicat verum.

Likewise is asked of this which (St.) Augustine says in (his) book of Retractations and (which) is posited in the text (of Master Peter):  I treated that question, better, in the book On the Trinity.  For he seems not to speak rightly, because, since a comparative (adjective) in each of the extremes presupposes the matter of its positive (form),4 if (it is) there in a better manner, therefore in each (it is) in a good manner:  therefore if he says there, that the Father is wise by the Wisdom, which He begot, it seems that he says (something) true.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod abusiva est comparatio,5 quoniam in libro de Trinitate dicit contrarium huius, et ideo si bene, constat quod hic male.  Quantum ad hoc tamen, quod aliqua vera dixit in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum de hac quaestione, ideo non omnino male, sed quodam modo bene, quodam modo male:  et ideo dicit, quod ibi melius, innuens quod aliquid sit ibi male dictum.  Qui enim unum oppositorum astruit, per consequens destruit alterum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the comparison is abusive,5 since in the book On the Trinity he says the contrary of this, and for that reason if (he speaks) well (there), it is established that (he speaks) badly here.  However, as much as regards this, that he said some true (things) in the book of 83 Questions on this question, for that reason (he did not speak) entirely badly, but in a certain manner well, in a certain manner badly:  and for that reason he says, that there (he treated of the question) better, hinting that something had been said there badly.  For he who builds up one of the opposites, consequently [per consequens] destroys the other of the two.

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hac responsione Magistri, quod sapientia genita est sapiens de sapientia ingenita.  Videtur enim non esse bona, quia non videtur respondere ad quaestionem.  Non enim quaeritur, quod sapientia genita sive Filius sit de Patre, sed hoc quaeritur, utrum Filius sit sapiens6 sapientia ingenita.

Likewise is asked concerning this response of Master (Peter), that begotten Wisdom is wise from unbegotten Wisdom.  For it seems not to be good, because it does not seem to respond to the question.  For there is not asked, that begotten Wisdom or the Son is from the Father, but this is asked, whether the Son is wise6 by unbegotten Wisdom.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Magister bene respondet, licet verbis paucis, in quibus innuit hanc distinctionem, quod aliquem esse sapientem aliquo, hoc est dupliciter:  aut ita, quod ablativus teneatur formaliter, et sic Filius est sapiens sapientia genita et Pater sapientia ingenita; aut ita, quod teneatur originaliter, et sic, cum sapientia genita sit de sapientia ingenita, Filius est sapiens sapientia ingenita.  Sed quia ablativus ut plurimum construitur in ratione formae, ideo Magister caute locutus dixit,7 quod Filius, qui est sapientia genita, est de sapientia ingenita sapiens, ut verbum non haberet calumniam; et ideo bene respondet.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that Master (Peter) responds well, though with few words, in which he hints at this distinction, that ‘that one is wise by someone’, this is in a twofold manner:  either thus, that the ablative is held formally, and in this manner the Son is wise by begotten Wisdom, and the Father by unbegotten Wisdom; or thus, that it is held originally, and in this manner, since begotten Wisdom is from unbegotten Wisdom, the Son is wise by unbegotten Wisdom.  But because the ablative for the most part [ut plurimum] is construed in the reckoning of a form, for that reason Master (Peter), having spoken cautiously, said,7 that the Son, who is begotten Wisdom, is wise from unbegotten Wisdom, so that the verse would not be calumniated; and for that reason he responds well.

DUB. V.

DOUBT V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod uterque est una sapientia, et tamen solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.  Videtur enim dicere duo opposita, quia istae duae proprietates8 sapientiam contrahunt, et cum sint proprietates distinctae, distinguunt — et hoc patet, quia solus Pater est sapientia ingenita — quodsi sapientia distinguitur, ergo est alia et alia sapientia, ergo non una.  Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.  Aut enim dicitur sapientia esentialiter, aut personaliter:  si personaliter; ergo non una sapientia est genita et ingenita, cum Pater et Filius non sint una persona; si vero essentialiter, non ergo solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says, that each is the one Wisdom, and yet the Father alone is the unbegotten Wisdom.  For he seems to say two opposite (things), because those two properties8 contract “wisdom”, and since the properties are distinct, they distinguish — and this is clear, because the Father alone is the unbegotten Wisdom — wherefore if “wisdom” is distinguished, therefore there is one and another Wisdom, therefore not one.  Likewise, it seems false to say, when he says, that the Father alone is the unbegotten Wisdom.  For either “wisdom” is said essentially, or personally:  if personally; therefore the one Wisdom is not begotten and unbegotten, since the Father and the Son are not one Person; however, if essentially, therefore the Father alone is not the unbegotten Wisdom.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod in hoc nomine sapientia duo est considerare, scilicet significatum et suppositum.  Et quantum ad significatum dicit essentiam; sed9 suppositum est persona.  Et illae determinationes genita et ingenita non respiciunt significatum, sed suppositum, et ita distinguunt suppositum, manente unitate in significato sive forma; et sapientia genita et ingenita est alia et alia, scilicet persona, sed non est alia et alia sapientia, sicut non est alia essentia.  Et ideo Magister bo- / -num . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that in this name “wisdom” there is a considering of two (things), namely, the signified and the supposed.  And as much as regards the signified it means the essence; but (as much as regards)9 the supposed it is a Person.  And those determinations, “begotten” and “unbegotten”, do not respect the signified, but the supposed, and thus they do distinguish the supposed, while remaining one in the signified or form; and the begotten Wisdom is one and the unbegotten Another, namely, Person, but there is not one and another Wisdom, just as there is no other Essence.  And for that reason Master (Peter) gives [ponit] / a good example . . .

1  Vat., post appropriabilis inserto commate, pro Spiritui sancto ponit Spiritus sanctus, haec verba connectens cum sequentibus.

2  In codd. K P Q W Y hic additur quod quaeritur, in cod. T quod obiicitur.

3  Pro illo habet Vat. cum cod. cc alio.

4  Id est, adiectivum in comparativo praesupponit, quod in positivo de utroque extremo dici potest, sive ut ait Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.):  Si quid magis et minus dicitur, et simpliciter inest.  —  Immediate post pro si non pauci codd. male sed.

5  Comparativum enim melius in dicto Augustini improprie accipiendum est.  —  De retractatione Augustini vide supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

6  Ex codd. F K L O revocavimus sapiens, quod Vat. omittit.  Paulo superius pro quod cod. S quare, cod. Y an, nonnulli alii codd. cum Vat. de, quae etiam subinde post sive subiicit an, et mox post Magister cum cod. cc omittit bene.

7  Aliqui codd. ut B I M cum ed. 1 caute est locutus et (ed. 1 cum) dixit.  —  In eodem sensu solvunt hoc dubium Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 3. a. 2. § 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3; Richard., hic a. 2. q. 2.

8  Scilicet sapientia genita et ingenita.  —  Mox pro distinctae ed. 1 distinctivae et infra bene quodsi pro quia si, quod habent codd. et edd.

9  Cod. M hic repetit quantum ad.

1  The Vatican edition, having inserted a comma after appropriable [appropriabilis], reads yet the Holy Spirit can be drawn (to it) etc. [Spiritus sanctus tamen etc.].

2  In codices K P Q W and Y there is is read Regarding that which is asked [Ad illud quod quaeritur], in codex T Regarding that which is objected [Ad illud quod obiicitur].

3  For therefore He also has Wisdom from Him [ergo et sapientiam ab illo habet] the Vatican edition reads therefore also Wisdom from Another [ergo et sapientiam ab alio].

4  That is, an adjective in the comparative (degree) presupposes, what can be said of each extreme in the positive (degree), or as Aristotle says in Topics, Bk .II,c h. 4 (ch. 11):  If something is more or less said, (then) it is also (there) simply.  —  Immediately after this not a few codices have but [sed] for if [si].

5  For the comparative “better” in the saying of (St.) Augustine is to be accepted improperly.  —  On the retraction of (St.) Augustine, see above a. 2, q. 1, in the body (of the question).

6  From codices F K L and O we have replaced wise [sapiens], which the Vatican edition omits.  A little above this for that [quod] codex S has for what reason [quare], codex Y whether [an], and not a few other codices, together with the Vatican edition read of begotten Wisdom or whether etc. [de sapientia genita sive an etc.] for that begotten Wisdom or [quod sapientia genita sive], and then after Master (Peter) [Magister], together with codex cc, it omits well [bene].

7  Some codices, such as B I and M, together with edition 1, read spoke cautiously and (ed. 1 has when [cum]) said [caute est locutus et dixit].  —  In the same sense this doubt is solved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 67, m. 3. a. 2, § 4: Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 4; St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2. a. 3; Richard (of Middleton), here in a. 2, q. 2.

8  Namely, begotten and unbegotten Wisdom.  —  Next for distinct [distinctae] edition 1 has distinctive [distinctivae] and below, rightly, wherefore if [quod si] for because if [quia si], which the codices and editions have.

9  Codex M here repeats as much as regards [quantum ad].

 

p. 567

 

bo- / -num exemplum ponit in hoc termino Deus, quod significat essentiam et supponit personam.  —  Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum dicatur essentialiter, aut personaliter; dicendum, quod quantum ad significatum dicitur essentialiter, sed quantum ad suppositum dicitur personaliter; et ideo nulla est controversia.1

gives [ponit] / a good example in this term “God”, which signifies the Essence and supposes a Person.  —  Therefore, when there is asked, whether it is said essentially or personally, it must be said, that as much as regards the signified it is said essentially, but as much as regards the supposed it is said personally, and for that reason there is no controversy.1

DUB. VI.

DOUBT VI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius non a se agit, cum Pater in eo manere monstratur; sed similiter Filius manet in Patre:  ergo pari ratione Pater non a se agit.  Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit:  Infirmus sit non a se agendo, nisi a Deo ispe agat, quia secundum hoc, cum omnis creatura agat a Deo, tunc videtur esse agens infirmum, nec in hoc videtur differre Filius ab aliis.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St. Hilary) says, that the Son does not act by Himself, when He is shown to remain in Him, but similarly the Son remains in the Father:  therefore for an equal reason the Father does not act by Himself.  Likewise, he seems to say (something) false, when he says:  He would be infirm, by not acting by Himself, unless He acts by God, because according to this, since every creature acts by God, then the one acting seems to be infirm, and in this the Son does not seem to differ from others.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Hilarius duo intendit ostendere ex verbis Domini in Ioanne, et illa duo ostendit deducendo ad impossibile.  Ipse enim Dominus dicit Ioannis decimo quatro:2  Verba, quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor; Pater in me manens ipse facit opera.  Ex hoc ergo arguit, quod Filius non agit a se, sed a Patre manente in se, non tantum ut consubstantialis, sed ut principium; sic autem non manet Filius in Patre, sed tantum ut consubstantialis.  —  Alia est auctoritas Domini, Ioannis octavo,3 ubi dicit:  Qui misit me non reliquit me solum, quia quae placita sunt ei facio semper.  Si ipse agit semper una cum Patre, tunc ergo per se agit.  —  Haec duo probat per deductionem ad impossibile:  quia omnis potentia est a prima potentia, quae primo residet in Patre:  ergo si Filius non potest a Deo, simpliciter est impotens vel infirmus, quia infirmus habet potentiam deficiendi a se, non a Deo.  Item, si Filius non agit per se, non agit per virtutem propriam sibi connaturalem:  ergo alia est virtus Patris et Filii.  A se enim et non a se, non facit distinctionem in natura, sed solum in persona, quia dicit rationem principii vel originis.  Per se autem et non per se — quia per se dicitur contra per accidens, sive contra per alius — ponit diversitatem in natura;4 et ideo Filius agit per se, quamvis non a se.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that (St.) Hilary intends to shown two (things) from the words of the Lord in (the Gospel of St.) John, and those two he shows by deducing (them) to the impossible.  For the Lord Himself says in the fourteenth (chapter of St.) John:2  The words, which I speak to you, I do not speak by Myself; the Father, remaining in Me, Himself does (these) works.  Therefore, from this he argues, that the Son does not act by Himself, but by the Father remaining in Him, not only as (One who is) consubstantial (to Himself), but as (His) principle; but in this manner the Son does not remain in the Father, but (is) only as (One who is) consubstantial (to Him).  —  The other is the authority of the Lord, in the eighth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John,3 where He says:  He who sent Me has not left Me alone, because those (things) which are pleasing to Him, I do always.  If He Himself acts always as one [una] with the Father, then, therefore, He acts through Himself.  —  He proves these two through a deduction to the impossible:  because every power is from the First Power, which first resides in the Father:  therefore if the Son is not able by God, He is simply impotent and/or infirm, because (one who is) infirm has the power to fail from himself, not from God.  Likewise, if the Son does not act through Himself, He does not act through His own virtue, connatural to Himself:  therefore the virtue of the Father and the Son is different [alia].  For “by himself” [a se] and “not by himself” [non a se], does not cause a distinction in nature, but only in person, because it means the reckoning of a principle and/or of an origin.  But “through himself” [per se] and “not through himself” [non per se] — because per se is said against per accidens, or against per alius (i.e. “through another”) — posits a diversity in nature;4 and for that reason the Son acts through Himself, although not by Himself.

DUB. VII.

DOUBT VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod una est tantum sapientia Patris, sed non uno modo dicitur.  Videtur enim male dicere, quia sapientia semper est5 essentialiter:  ergo falsum dicit, cum dicit:  non uno modo dicta.

Likewise is asked of this which (Master Peter) says, that there is one Wisdom of the Father, but it is not said in one manner.  For he seems to speak badly, because “wisdom” is always (said)5 essentially:  therefore he says (something) false, when he says:  “(it is) not said in one manner”.

RESPONDEO:  Magister non vult,6 quod sapientia sit dicta multipliciter, sed quod sapientia Patris:  quia genitivus potest construi in ratione originis, et sic dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, vel ipsa sapientia genita sapientia Patris, quia est a Patre, vel potest intelligi in ratione subiecti, ut dicatur sapientia Patris, sicut albedo Petri, et sic sapientia genita non dicitur esse Patris, sed Filii.7  Quia ergo ratio passiva, importata per hoc adiectivum genita, non est in persona Patris et Filii una, falsa est locutio ratione determinationis, non ratione eius quod est sapientia:  quia una et eadem est sapientia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa est sapientia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.

I RESPOND:  Master (Peter) does not want,6 that “wisdom” be said in a multiple (sense), but that “the Wisdom of the Father” (be):  because the genitive can be construed in the reckoning of an origin, and in this manner the Son is said (to be) “the Wisdom of the Father”, and/or the begotten Wisdom Itself “the Wisdom of the Father”, because it is from the Father, and/or (“the genitive”) can be understood in the reckoning of a subject, so that “the Wisdom of the Father” be said, just as “the whiteness of Peter” (is), and in this manner “the begotten Wisdom” is not said to be of the Father, but of the Son.7  Therefore, because the passive reckoning, conveyed through this adjective “begotten”, is not one in the Person of the Father and the Son, the expression is false by reason of the determination, not by reason of that which is “the Wisdom”:  because the one and the same Wisdom is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that Wisdom is of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

1  Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. ult.

2  Vers. 10.  —  Post Pater in Vulgata additur autem, in ed. 1 vero, in Vat. enim.  Subinde post manens ex pluribus mss. et ed. 1, consentiente Vulgata, adiecimus ipse.

3  Vers. 29, in quo Vulgata post verba misit me adiungit mecum est et, ac dein post quia voculam ego.  —  Paulo inferius post Patre Vat. cum solo cod. cc addit ergo est una virtus eius et Patris, et sic agunt una virtute.

4  Plura de hoc vide supra d. 30. q. 2. in corp.  —  In hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

5  Plures codd. ut P Q X aa bb cum ed. 1 dicitur.

6  In codd. N P W aa additur dicere.

7  De duplici sensu genitivi cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.  —  Pro sed Filii multi codd. cum ed. 1 et Filii.  —  Eodem modo hoc dubium solvunt S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

1  This doubt is also solved by Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in the last article.  [Tran. note:  This second doubt regards what is said at end of chapter III of Master Peter’s present Distinction].

2  Verse 10.  —  In (the Scriptural quote in) the Vulgate there is read but the Father [Pater autem], in edition 1 but the Father [Pater vero], in the Vatican for the Father [Pater enim].  Then after remaining in Me [in me manens], we have inserted Himself [ipse] from very many manuscripts, with the consent of the Vulgate.

3  Verse 29, in which the Vulgate, after the words sent Me [misit me], has is with Me and [mecum est et], and then after because [quia] has explicitly I [ego].  —  A little below this after with the Father [cum Patre], the Vatican edition, together with codex cc alone, adds therefore, there is one Virtue of Him and of the Father, and thus They act by one Virtue [ergo est una virtus eius et Patris, et sic agunt una virtute].

4  See more on this above in d. 30, q. 2, in the body (of the question).  —  On this doubt, cf. St. Thomas and Richard (of Middleton), here on the text.

5  In codices P Q X aa and bb, together with edition 1, there is had is said [dicitur] for is (said) [est].

6  In codices N P W and add there is added to say [dicere].

7  On the twofold sense of the genitive, cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 1.  —  For but of the Son [sed Filii], many codices, together with edition 1, have and of the Son [et Filii].  —  This doubt is solved in the same sense by St. Thomas and Richard (of Middleton), here on the text.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.