COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXV
De scientia Dei in generali secundum se.	On God’s Knowledge in general, according to itself.
ARTICULUS UNICUS Quaestio I.	ARTICLE SOLE Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 599-604. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 599-604. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Cumque supra disseruerimus ac plura dixerimus.	And since above we have spoken in an orderly manner and said many etc.
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Supra egit Magister de sacramento Trinitatis et Unitatis; in hac parte agit de conditionibus, secundum quas est in Deo ratio causalitatis, quae sunt scilicet potentia, sapientia et voluntas. Habet autem haec pars tres partes. In quarum prima agit de scientia; in secunda de potentia, infra distinctione quadragesima secunda: Nunc de omnipotentia Dei agendum est; in tertia de voluntate, infra distinctione quadragesima quinta: Iam de voluntate Dei etc.	Above Master (Peter) dealt with the sacrament of the Trinity and Unity; in this part he deals with the conditions, according to which there is in God a reckoning of causality, which are, that is, power, wisdom and will. Moreover, this part has three parts. In the first of which he deals with (God’s) knowledge; in the second with (His) power, below in the Forty-Second Distinction, (where he says): Now the omnipotence of God must be dealt with; in the third with (God’s) Will, below in the Forty-Fifth Distinction: Now something must be said concerning God’s Will etc..
Prima pars habet tres.¹ In prima agit de scientia in generali secundum se. In secunda agit de modis divinae cognitionis, utrum Deus cognoscat mutabiliter vel immutabiliter, et quo modo, distinctione trigesima octava: Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes. In tertia vero agit quantum ad speciales effectus, infra distinctione quadragesima: Praedestinatio vero est de bonis salutaribus.	The first part has three (parts).¹ In the first he deals with (God’s) knowledge in general, according to itself. In the second he deals with the manners of the divine cognition, whether God cognizes mutably and/or immutably, and in what manner, in the Thirty-Eighth Distinction, (where he says): Now, therefore, returning to the proposed etc.. In the third, however, he speaks [agit] as much as regards the special effects (of God’s knowledge), below in the Fortieth Distinction, (where he says): However, predestination concerns salutary goods etc..
Prima pars dividitur in tres. In prima Magister determinat de ipsa Dei scientia. In secunda, quia res agnitae sunt in sciente per modum scientis, determinat, quomodo res sunt in Deo, infra distinctione trigesima sexta: Solet hic quaeri, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione. In tertia vero incidenter determinat, quomodo Deus est in rebus, infra distinctione trigesima septima: Et quoniam demonstratum est ex parte.	The first part is divided into three (parts). In the first Master (Peter) makes a determination [determinat] concerning the knowledge of God itself. In the second, because things are acknowledge in the one knowing through the manner of the one knowing, he determines, in what manner things are in God, below in the Thirty-Sixth Distinction, (where he says): Here one is accustomed to ask, since all are said to be in God’s cognition etc.. But in the third he incidentally determines, in what manner God is in things, below in the Thirty-Seventh Distinction, (where he says): And since it has been demonstrated in part etc..
Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, tres habet.² In prima, cum Dei scientia sit una, determinat, quomodo sortitur plura nomina. In secunda, cum Dei scientia vel praescientia sit aeterna, determinat, quomodo se habeat ad temporalia vel creata, ibi: Hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia vel praescientia. In tertia, cum Dei scientia sit ens, quomodo cognoscat non entia, ibi: Propterea omnia dicuntur esse in Deo etc.	The first part, which contains the present Distinction, has three (parts).² In the first, since God’s Knowledge is one, he determines, in what manner it obtains many names. In the second, since God’s Knowledge and/or Foreknowledge is eternal, he determines, in what manner it holds itself to temporal and/or created things, there (where he says): Here it is necessary that one consider, whether there could be knowledge and/or foreknowledge etc.. In the third, since God’s Knowledge is a being, in what manner He cognizes non beings [non entia], there (where he says): On which account all are said to be and to have been “in God” etc..
In prima parte, se ipsum continuans dicit, quod divina essentia plura habet nomina propter connotata.³ In secunda dicit, quod Dei scientia esset, si nihil futurum esset, et esset scientia, sed non diceretur praescientia. In tertia ostendit, quod omnes res⁴ habent rationes in Deo, per quas cognoscuntur et sunt in ipso, et ita omnia sunt sibi praesentia; et sic patet divisio et sententia. Subdivisiones enim⁵ partium manifestae sunt in littera.	In the first part, continuing with what he has been saying [se ipsum continans], he says, that the Divine Essence has many names on account of those which it connotes [propter connotata].³ In the second he says, that God would have knowledge, if nothing were going to be, and (that) it would be a knowledge, but would not be said (to be) a foreknowledge. In the third he shows, that all things⁴ have their reasons in God, through which they are cognized and are in Him, and thus all are present to Him; and in this manner the division and the sentence (of Master Peter) is clear. For⁵ the subdivisions of the parts are manifest in the text.
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de ratione divinae cognitionis, quae idea consuevit appellari.	For an understanding of the present Distinction there is the question [quaeritur] concerning the reckoning of the Divine Cognition, which is accustomed to be named an “idea”.
Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponenda ratio idealis.	First there is asked, whether in God there is to be posited the reckoning of an idea [ratio idealis].
Secundo dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum rem.	Second, granted that there is, there is asked, whether it has a plurality according to thing.
Tertio, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum rationem.	Third, whether it has a plurality according to reckoning.
Quarto, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum numerum universalium, an singularium.	Fourth, whether it has a plurality according to the number of universals, or (according to the number) of singulars.
Quinto, utrum habeat pluralitatem secundum numerum finitum, vel infinitum.	Fifth, whether it has a plurality according to a finite and/or infinite number.
Sexto, utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum numerum ordinatum, vel confusum.	Sixth, whether among ideas there is a plurality according to an ordered and/or confused number.
¹ Cod. I subiungit partes. ² Vat. addit partes. ³ Vat. ante connotata repetit nomina, codd. non suffragantibus. ⁴ Pro omnes res, quam lectionem ex codd. P Q restituimus, ceteri codd. cum ed. 1 substituunt solummodo omnes, Vat. omnia. ⁵ Cod. V. autem.	¹ Codex I subjoins parts [partes]. ² The Vatican edition adds parts [partes]. ³ The Vatican edition has on account of (its) connoted names [propter nomina connotata], with out the support of the codices. ⁴ For all things [omnes res], which reading we have restored from codices P and Q, all the other codices, together with edition 1, substitute only all (things) [omnes], the Vatican all (beings) [omnia]. ⁵ Codex V has But [autem].

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ARTICULUS UNICUS. De ideis.	ARTICLE SOLE On ideas.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum ponendae sint ideae in Deo.	QUESTION 1 Whether ideas are to be posited in God.
QUANTUM ERGO ad primum quaeritur, utrum sit in Deo ponere ideas. Et quod sic, ostenditur:	THEREFORE AS MUCH AS regards the first there is asked, whether there is in God a positing of ideas. And that there is, is shown:
1. Primo auctoritate Augustini libro Octoginta trium Quaestionem:¹ « Ideae sunt formae aeternae et incommutabiles, quae in divina intelligentia continentur ». Ex his tribus conditionibus concluditur, quod idea sit in Deo.	1. First by the authority of (St.) Augustine in the book On Eighty-Three Questions:¹ « Ideas are eternal and incommutable forms, which are contained in the Divine Intelligence ». From these three conditions one concludes, that there is an idea is in God.
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: omne agens rationabiliter,² non a casu, vel ex necessitate, precognoscit rem, antequam sit; sed omnis cognoscens habet rem cognitam vel secundum veritatem, vel secundum similitudinem; sed res, antequam sint, non possunt haberi a Deo secundum veritatem: ergo secundum similitudinem. Sed similitudo rei, per quam res cognoscitur et producitur, est idea: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, it is shown by reason in this manner: everything acting in a rational manner,² not by chance, and/or out of necessity, cognizes a thing before it is; but everyone cognizing has the thing cognized, either according to truth, and/or according to a similitude; but things, before they are, cannot be had by God according to truth: therefore according to a similitude. But the similitude of a thing, through which a thing is cognized and produced, is an idea: ergo etc..
3. Item, omne quod determinate ducit in alterum cognoscendum, habet penes se similitudinem cogniti, vel ipsum est eius similitudo; sed speculum aeternum mentes se videtium ducit in cognitionem omnium creatorum, sicut dicit Augustinus,³ quod rectius ibi cognoscunt quam alibi: ergo restat, quod in eo resident similitudines. Et constat, quod sunt in eo sicut in cognoscente, quia non tantum aliis repraesentat, sed sibi; sed haec est tota ratio ideae: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, everything which leads in a determinate manner unto the cognizing of the other, has within itself a similitude of the (thing) cognized, and/or is itself a similitude of it; but the Eternal Mirror leads the minds seeing It into the cognition of all created (things), just as (St.) Augustine says,³ that they more rightly cognize There than elsewhere: therefore it remains, that in Him reside the similitudes (of things). And it is established, that they are in Him as in One cognizing, because He not only represents (them) to others, but to Himself; but this is the whole reckoning of an idea: ergo etc..
4. Item, quia res a Deo producuntur, ideo sunt in Deo tanquam in efficiente, et Deus verissime est efficiens; similiter, quia ab ipso finiuntur, ideo verissime est finis:⁴ ergo pari ratione, quia ab ipso cognoscuntur et exprimuntur, per se ipsum Deus verissime est exemplar. Sed exemplar non est, nisi in quo sunt rerum exemplatarum ideae: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, because things are produces by God, for that reason they are in God as in One working [in efficiente], and God is most truly efficient; similarly, because they are finished by Him, for that reason He is most truly (their)⁴ End: therefore, for an equal reason, because they are cognized and expressed by Him, God is through Himself (their) Exemplar. But an exemplar is not, but (that) in which are the exemplified ideas of things: ergo etc..
CONTRA: 1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus:⁵ « Cognoscit divinus intellectus, sed ex se ipso et per se ipsum, non secundum ideam singulis se immittens, sed secundum unam excellentiae causam omnia noscens et continens »: ergo Deus singula non cognoscit per ideam.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite says) On the Divine Names:⁵ « The Divine Intellect does cognize, but out of Itself, and through Itself, not directing [immittens] Itself according to an idea unto singulars [singulis], but knowing and containing all according to one cause of excellence »: therefore God does not know singulars through an idea.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia idea dicit rationem similitudinis, et similitudo dicit rationem convenientiae; Dei autem ad creaturam, cum sit summa distantia, nulla est⁶ convenientia, aut si est, minima est: ergo aut nulla similitudo, aut minima. Aut ergo non est idea in Deo, aut si est, secundum rationem imperfectam est; sed nihil imperfectum ponendum est in Deo: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because “idea” means the reckoning of a similitude, and a “similitude” means the reckoning of a convening; but there⁶ is no convening of God to the creature, since there is a most high distance, or if there is (a convening), it is the smallest: therefore either (there is) no similitude, or the smallest. Therefore, either there is no idea in God, or if there is, it is according to an imperfect reckoning; but nothing imperfect is to be posited in God: ergo etc..
3. Item, nobilissimus modus cognitionis est Deo attribuendus; sed cognitio per rei essentiam est nobilior quam per similitudinem rei: ergo Deus cognoscit per essentiam rei, non per similitudinem. Sed idea est similitudo, non essentia rei: et sic etc.	3. Likewise, the most noble manner of cognition is to be attributed to God; but cognition through the essence of a thing is more noble than through the similitude of a thing: therefore God cognizes through the essence of the thing, not through a similitude. But an idea is a similitude, not the essence of the thing: and thus etc..
4. Item, idea non est necessaria nisi ad dirigendum in cognoscendo et regulandum in operando;⁷ sed nihil indiget dirigente vel regulante, nisi quod potest errare vel deviare. Deus autem nullum horum habet: ergo frustra ponuntur in Deo ideae.	4. Likewise, an idea is not necessary except for directing (one) in cognizing and regulating (one) in working;⁷ but nothing needs one directing and/or regulating, except that which can err and/or deviate. But God has nothing of these: therefore, in vain [frustra] are ideas posited in God.
¹ Quaest. 46. n. 2, in quo loco textus originalis pro aeternae exhibit principales. ² In codd. aa bb hic interseritur vel ex proposito sive ex voluntate, et subinde post rem antequam additur fiat, sed Deus est agens rationabilissime, non a casu vel ex necessitate, ergo cognoscit rem, antequam fiat vel. — De hac propositione maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1, ubi docetur, quod agentes per intellectum, nescientes rationem operum suorum, non agunt, sed faciunt, sicut comburit ignis; ac II. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 5.), et XI. Metaph. c. 7. (X. c. 8.), ubi per oppositionem ad causam per se distinguitur fortuna, quae est praeter electionem et intellectum. De prima minori vide supra d. 3. p. I. q. 1. Summam huius argumenti invenies apud August., I. Retract. c. 3. n. 2; et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. n. 3; nec non Anselm., Monolog. c. 9. ³ Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. — Proxime post pro cognoscunt codd. D P T Z cum ed. 1 cognoscuntur. ⁴ Cod. Q voci finis praemittit earum. — De hoc argumento cfr. Dionyus., de Div. Nom. c. 5, et Schol. S. Maximi (ed. Migne) in hunc locum. ⁵ Cap. 7. § 2. In ipso textu Vat. hic et infra in solutione huius obiectionis pro se immittens substituit innitens. Nostrae lectioni, quae habetur etiam apud Scotum Erigenam, favent multi codd. exhibentes immittens, omissa autem vocula se. ⁶ Vat. et codd. cc hic addunt ibi. ⁷ Respicitur hic Senecae definitio ideae, quae habetur Epist. 65. ad Lucilium: Idea est exemplar, ad quod respiciens artifex id quod destinabat, effecit. Ibid. et haec Planotica definitio ideae invenitur: Idea est eorum quae naturaliter fiunt exemplar aeternum. — Pro confirmatione huius argumenti communiter allegatur Aristot., I. Metaph. text. 31. (c. 9.): Dicere vero exemplaria eas (formas) esse . . . vaniloquia et metaphoras poeticas dicere est. Quod enim est, quod agit, ad ideas inspiciens? — Paulo inferius pro vel deviare Vat. cum cod. cc et deviare.	¹ Question 46, n. 2, in which passage th e text of the original exhibits principal [principales] for eternal [aeternae]. ² In codices aa and bb there is here inserted either out of design or out of will [vel ex proposito sive ex voluntate], and then after a thing before [rem antequam] there is added it is made, but God is acting in a most rational manner, not by chance and/or by necessity, therefore He cognizes a thing, before it is made or [rem antequam additur fiat, sed Deus est agens rationabilissime, non a casu vel ex necessitate, ergo cognoscit rem, antequam fiat vel]. — On this major proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. I, ch. 1, where there is taught, that those acting through understanding, who do not know the reason for their work, do not act, but make, just as fire burns; and Physics, Bk. II, text 39 ff. (ch. 5), and Metaphysics, Bk VI, ch. 7 (Bk. X, ch. 8), where fortune, which is other than choosing and understanding, is distinguished through opposition to a per se cause. On the first minor, see above d. 3, p. I, q. 1. You will find a summary of this argument in (St.) Augustine, Retractations, Bk. I, ch. 3, n. 2; and On the City of God, Bk XI, ch. 10, n. 3; and also in (St.) Anselm, Monologion, ch. 9. ³ On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 29. — Immediately after this codices D P T and Z, together with edition 1, have they (i.e. things) are more rightly cognized There [rectius ibi cognoscuntur] for they (i.e. minds) more rightly cognize There [rectius ibi cognoscunt]. ⁴ Codex Q prefixes their [earum] to End [finis]. — On this argument, cf. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 5, and the Scholium of St. Maximus (in Migne’s edition) on this passage. ⁵ Chapter 7, § 2. In the text itself the Vatican edition here and below in the solution to this objection substitutes leaning . . . upon [innitens] for directing Itself . . . unto [se immittens]. Our reading, which is also had in Scotus Erigena, is favored by many codices, which exhibit the directing unto [immittens], but which omit the word Itself [se]. ⁶ The Vatican edition and codex cc here add explicitly there [ibi]. ⁷ A reference to Seneca’s definition of idea, which is had in Epistle n. 65 to Lucilius: An idea is an exemplar, looking back to which a craftsman effects that which he destined (to do). In the same place this Platonic definition of the idea is found: An idea is the eternal exemplar of those which are made naturally. — For a confirmation of this argument there is commonly cited Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 31 (ch. 9): However to say that they are exemplary (forms) is idle talk and to speak poetic metaphors. For what is it, that one does, looking upon ideas? — A little below this for and/or deviate [vel deviare] the Vatican edition and codex cc have and deviate [et deviare].

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CONCLUSIO. Deus cognoscit per ideas et habet in se rationes et similitudines rerum, quas cognoscit.	CONCLUSION God cognizes through ideas and has in Himself the reasons for and similitudes of the things, which He cognizes.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.¹	I RESPOND: It must be said, that about this there was a twofold opinion.¹
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod Deus non cognoscit secundum rationem ideae, sed secundum rationem causae. Et ponunt simile: sicut si punctus cognosceret suam virtutem, cognosceret lineas et circumferentiam; similiter, si unitas haberet potentiam cognitivam, per quam converteret se super se, cognosceret omnes numeros. Quoniam enim Deus habet virtutem producendi omnia et cognoscit totam suam virtutem, ideo cognoscit omnia. Et hoc dicunt, Dionysium sensisse, cum dixit, quod « non secundum ideam, sed secundum unam excellentiae causam cognoscit omnia ». — Sed haec positio non potest stare. Primum quidem, quia Deus cognoscit non per collationem deveniendi a principio ad principiatum, sed simplici aspectu. Et iterum, omne cognoscens, in quantum huiusmodi, simile est cognoscibili: ergo² habet eius similitudinem, vel ipse est similitudo. Rursus, omnis cognoscens ideo distincte producit, quia distincte cognoscit, non e converso: ergo ratio producendi non est ratio cognoscendi. Et iterum, aliqua cognoscit, quae ab ipso non sunt.³ Propter haec et similia aliter dicendum.	For certain (authors) said, that God does not cognize according to the reckoning of an idea, but according to the reckoning of a cause. And they posit (this) simile: ‘just as if a point cognized its own virtue, it would cognize lines and circumferences; similarly, if a unity had a cognitive power, through which it could turn itself upon itself, it would cognize all numbers’. For since God has the virtue of producing all and cognizes the whole of His own virtue, for that reason He cognizes all. And this they say, (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) thought, when he says, that « He cognizes all not according to an idea, but according to one cause of excellence ». — But this position cannot stand. First indeed, because God does not cognize through the conference of that which reaches [collationem deveniendi] from a beginning to a begun, but by a simple gaze [simplici aspectu]. And again, everything cognizing, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, is similar to the cognizable: therefore² (God too) has His similitude, and/or is Himself a similitude. Again, everyone cognizing produces distinctly for this reason, because he cognizes distinctly, and not the other way around: therefore a reckoning of producing is not a reckoning of cognizing. And again, He cognizes some (things), which are not from Him.³ On account of these (considerations) and (those) similar one must speak in another manner.
Ideo est alia positio, et secundum Sanctos, et secundum philosophos, quod Deus cognoscit per ideas et habet in se rationes et similitudines rerum, quas cognoscit, in quibus non tantum ipse cognoscit, sed etiam aspicientes in eum: et has rationes vocat Augustinus ideas et causas primordiales.⁴	For that reason there is another position, both according to the Saints, and according to philosophers, that God cognizes through ideas and has in Himself the reasons for and similitudes of the things, which He cognizes, in which not only does He Himself cognize (things), but also those looking upon Him: and these reasons (St.) Augustine calls “ideas” and “primordial causes”.⁴
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum intelligendum, quod idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae. Similitudo autem dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum convenientiam duorum in tertio, et haec est similitudo secundum univocationem; alio modo est similitudo, secundum quod unum dicitur⁵ similitudo alterius; et haec similitudo non concernit convenientiam in aliquo communi, quia similitudo se ipsa est similis, non in tertio; et hoc modo dicitur creatura similitudo Dei, vel e converso Deus similitudo creaturae. Hoc modo sumendo similitudinem, similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, et haec dicitur idea. — Sed aliter est in nobis, aliter in Deo. In nobis quidem ratio cognoscendi est similitudo, cognitum est veritas. Nam in nobis est similitudo accepta et impressa ab extrinseco, propter hoc quod intellectus noster respectu cogniti est possibilis et non actus purus; ideo fit in actu per aliquid cogniti, quod est similitudo eius.⁶ In Deo autem est e converso, quia ratio cognoscendi est ipsa veritas, et cognitum est similitudo veritatis, scilicet ipsa creatura. Et quia ratio cognoscendi consistit in ipsa veritate prima,⁷ ideo ratio cognoscendi in Deo est summe expressiva. Et quoniam omne id quod summe exprimit, perfectissime assimilat cognitum assimilatione competente cognitioni, ideo patet, quod ipsa veritas ex hoc, quod facit cognoscere, est similitudo expressiva⁸ et idea. E contrario est in nobis, quia eo ipso, quod est similitudo, facit cognoscere. Ex his patent obiecta.	For an understanding, however, of the objections, it must be understood, that an idea is said (to be) “the similitude of the thing cognized”. But “similitude” is said in a twofold manner: in one manner according to the convening of two in a third, and this is the similitude according to univocation; in another there is the similitude, according to which one is said⁵ (to be) “the similitude of the other”; and this similitude does not concern a convening in something common, because the similitude is by itself similar, not in a third; and in this manner the creature is said (to be) “the similitude of God”, and/or conversely God (is said to be) “the Similitude of the creature”. Taking similitude in this manner, a similitude is the reason for cognizing, and this (similitude) is said (to be) an “idea”. — But it is in us in one manner, in God in another. Indeed, in us the reason for cognizing is a similitude, the cognized is a truth. For in us the similitude has been accepted and impressed by (something) extrinsic, on this account, that our intellect, in respect of the cognized, is possible and not a pure act; for that reason it comes to be in act through something of the cognized, which is its similitude.⁶ But in God it is the other way around, because the reason for cognizing is the Truth Itself, and the cognized is a similitude of the Truth, that is, a creature itself. And because the reason for cognizing consists in the First Truth Itself,⁷ for that reason the reason for cognizing in God is most highly expressive. And since every that which expresses most highly, assimilates most perfectly the cognized by an assimilation suitable to [competente] (its) cognition, for that reason it is clear, that the Truth Itself from this, that It causes the act of cognizing [cognoscere], is an expressive⁸ similitude and an idea. It is the other way around in us, because by this very (thing), that it is a similitude, it causes the act of cognizing. And from these the objections are clear.
1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod non⁹ secundum ideam singulis se immittens; dicendum, quod Dionysius ex hoc non vult removere rationem ideae a Deo, sed vult dicere, quod non sic est multitudo et differentia idearum secundum singula, sicut in nobis.	1. For what is objected, that (the Divine Intellect cognizes)⁹ not directing Itself according to an idea unto singulars; it must be said, that (St.) Dionysius from this does not want to remove the reckoning of an idea from God, but wants to say, that (in the Divine Intellect) there is not in this manner a multitude and difference of ideas according to singulars, as (there is) in us.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla est convenientia, vel minima; dicendum, quod est similitudo univocationis sive participationis, et similitudo imitationis, et expressionis. Similitudo participationis nulla est omnino, quia nihil est commune.¹⁰ Similitudo imitationis est modica, quia in modico potest finitum imitari infinitum, unde semper maior est dissimilitudo quam similitudo. Similitudo vero expressionis est summa, quia causatur ab intentione veritatis, ut visum est, quae est ipsa expressio; ideo Deus summe omnia cognoscit.	2. To that which is objected, that there is no convening, and/or (it is) the least; it must be said, that there is a similitude of univocation or of participation, and a similitude of imitation, and (a similitude) of expression. There is entirely no similitude of participation, because nothing is common (to God and a creature).¹⁰ There is a limited [modica] similitude of imitation, because in a limited manner (something) finite can imitate (something) infinite, wherefore there is always a greater dissimilitude than a similitude. But there is a most high similitude of expression, because (this convening) is caused by the intention of a truth, which, as has been seen, is itself an expression (of the First Truth); for that reason God cognizes all most highly.
¹ In cod. Y hic additur: quoniam secundum etymologiam idea dicitur ab ydos (eidoV), quod est forma; forma autem dicitur tripliciter: aut a qua res formatur, ut forma agentis, a qua procedit formatio effectus; aut per quam aliquid informatur, ut anima est forma naturalis hominis; aut ad quam aliquid formatur, et haec est forma exemplaris, ad cuius imitationem aliquid producitur. Et hoc tertio modo dicitur forma idea, et de hac quidam dixerunt etc. ² Supple: et Deus. — Mox Vat. omnibus ferme codd. contradicentibus ipsum. Subinde voci similitudo cod. Z adiungit eius. ³ In cod. O adtextitur ut mala culpae. ⁴ De ideis cfr. supra fundam. 1. seqq.; de causis primordialibus cfr. V. de Genes. ad lit. c. 4. n. 10, et VI. c. 145. n. 25, ac IX. c. 17. n. 32 seqq. — Explicationem doctrinae Augustinis invenies apud Bonav., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ⁵ Pro dicitur Vat. cum cod. cc est. Paulo inferius ante tertio sola Vat. omittit in. — De hac duplici acceptione similitudinis cfr. supra pag. 594, nota 6. ⁶ Supple: unde immediata ratio cognosendi non est obiectum cognitum (veritas), sed similitudo eius. — In sequenti propositione e converso accipiendum est pro e contrario, quod etiam exstat in ed. 1. ⁷ Vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 primo. Mox pro assimilat cognitum cod. bb assimilatur cognito, et subinde pro competente plures codd. cum ed. 1 minus clare competenti. ⁸ Cod. Z expressissima. Paulo inferius post cognoscere cod. D addit veritatem, quae est extra; e contrario autem erat in Deo, quia in ipso veritas, quae est infra, facit cognoscere similitudinem, quae est extra. Deinde post patent cod. S addit omnia. ⁹ Vat. hic subiicit est, pro quo multo melius substituendum esset: cognoscit intellectus divinus. Paulo inferius eadem Vat., nonnullis codd. faventibus, vocem multitudo immutavit in similitudo. ¹⁰ Supple cum cod. X scilicet Deo et creaturae.	¹ In codex Y there is here added. since according to (its) etymology an “idea” is said from “eidos” (eidoV), which is a form; but “form” is said in a threefold manner: either that by which a thing is formed, such as the form of a agent, from which the formation of the effect proceeds; or that through which something is informed, as the soul is the natural form of a man; or that according to which something is formed, and this is the exemplary form, according to the imitation of which something is produced. And in this third manner a form is said (to be) an “idea”, and concerning this certain (authors) indeed said etc.. [quoniam secundum etymologiam idea dicitur ab ydos, quod est forma; forma autem dicitur tripliciter: aut a qua res formatur, ut forma agentis, a qua procedit formatio effectus; aut per quam aliquid informatur, ut anima est forma naturalis hominis; aut ad quam aliquid formatur, et haec est forma exemplaris, ad cuius imitationem aliquid producitur. Et hoc tertio modo dicitur forma idea, et de hac quidam dixerunt etc.] ² Supply: God too [et Deus]. — Next the Vatican edition, with nearly all the codices contradiction this, reads it is [ipsum est] for is Himself [ipse est]. [Trans. note: This reading of the footnote is conjectured upon the context of St. Bonaventure’s text, since the footnote itself makes no specification for the location of what it speakes.] Then codex Z reads His similitude [similitude eius] for a similitude [similitudo]. ³ In codex O there is added to the text such as the evils of fault [ut mala culpae]. ⁴ Concerning ideas, cf. above 1st. argument of the fundament and ff.; concerning primordial causes, cf. (Augustine’s) On the Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. V. ch. 4, n. 10, and Bk. VI. ch. 145, n. 25, and Bk. IX, ch. 17, n. 32 ff. — You will find an explanation of (St.) Augustine’s doctrine in (St.) Bonaventure, Sent., Bk. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2. ⁵ For is said (to be) [dicitur] the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has is [est]. A little below this before third [tertio] the Vatican edition alone reads to a for in a [in]. — On this twofold acceptation of “similitude”, cf. d. 34, a. sole, q. 4, p. 594, footnote 6. ⁶ Supply: whence the immediate reckoning of cognizing is not the cognized object (i.e. a truth), but a similitude of it. — In the following proposition the other way around [e converso] it to be accepted as contrariwise [e contrario], which is also extant in edition 1. ⁷ The older codices, together with edition 1, have first in the Truth Itself [in ipsa veritate primo] for in the First Truth Itself [in ipsa veritate prima]. Next for assimilates . . . the cognized [assimilat cognitum] codex bb has is assimilated . . . to the cognized [assimilatur cognito], and then for suitable to (its) cognition [competente cognitioni] very many codices, together with edition 1, have less clearly to a suitable cognition [competenti cognitioni]. ⁸ Codex Z has most express [expressissima]. A little below this after it causes [facit] it reads one to cognize the truth, which is outside; but it was contrariwise in God, because in Him the truth, which is below, causes Him to cognize a similitude, which is outside [veritatem, quae est extra; e contrario autem erat in Deo, quia in ipso veritas, quae est infra, facit cognoscere similitudinem, quae est extra]. Then before the objections [obiecta] codex S adds all [omnia]. ⁹ The Vatican edition here subjoins is [est], in place of which it would be much better to substitute: the Divine Intellect cognizes [cognoscit intellectus divinus]. A little below this the same Vatican edition, favored by not a few codices, changes a multitude [multitudo] into a similitude [similitudo]. ¹⁰ Supply together with codex X namely to God and a creature [scilicet Deo et creaturae].

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod nobilior est cognitio per essentiam; dicendum, quod est similitudo causata a veritate rei extra, et de hac verum est, quod nunquam ita perfecte exprimit rem, sicut ipsa res, si praesentialiter¹ esset apud animam; et hac similitudine non cognoscit Deus. Est alia similitudo, quae est ipsa veritas expressiva cogniti et eo similitudo, quo veritas; et haec similitudo melius exprimit rem, quam ipsa res se ipsam exprimat, quia res ipsa accipit rationem expressionis ab illa; et secundum hanc est perfectior cognitio, et hac cognoscit Deus.	3. To that which is objected third, that cognition through an essence is more noble; it must be said, that there is a similitude caused by the truth of a thing outside, and concerning this it is true, that it thus never perfectly expresses the thing, just as the thing itself (would be), if it were by being present [praesentialiter]¹ in the soul; and by this similitude God does not cognize. There is another similitude, which is the very expressive truth of the cognized and (is) a similitude by this, by which (it is) a truth; and this similitude expresses the thing better, than the thing itself expresses it, because the thing itself accepts a reckoning of expression from it; and according to this it is a more perfect cognition, and in this manner God cognizes.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idea est ad regulandum et dirigendum; dicendum, quod regulari et dirigi potest esse dupliciter: aut per regulam differentem a directo et regulato, et haec ponit imperfectionem et possibilitatem erroris; aut per regulam, quae est idem quod regulatum, et haec ponit impossibilitatem erroris. Quia enim regula errare non potest, et² Deus est ipsa regula et idea; ideo impossibile est, eum errare. Et sic patet, quod idea in Deo non ponit³ imperfectionem, sed complementum.	4. To that which is objected, that an idea is for regulating and directing; it must be said, that there can be a ‘to be regulated’ and a ‘to be directed’ in a twofold manner: either through a rule differing from the one directed and regulated, and this posts an imperfection and a possibility of error; or through a rule, which is the same as the one regulated, and this posits the impossibility of error. For because the rule cannot wander [errare], and (because)² God is the very Rule and Idea; for that reason it is impossible, that He err. And thus it is clear, that an idea in God does not posit³ an imperfection, but (rather) a complement.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Doctrina de ideis, quae et gravitate rei et controversiarum multitudine celebris est, a Scholasticis ex S. Augustino, praecipue ex libro 83 Quaest. q. 46, et de Civ. Dei, VII. c. 28. desumta est. In primo loco S. Augustinus asserit, Platonem primo nomen ideae usurpasse, non autem rem ipsam primo intellexisse; deinde (n. 2.) docet: « Ideas igitur Latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus — rationes enim Graece λόγοι appellantur, non ideae — sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit ». — Omnes autem doctores catholici in hoc conveniunt, ponendas esse ideas in Deo, quia alias sequeretur, eum agere vel a casu vel necessitate naturae, non arbitrio voluntatis. Nam agere per voluntatem praesupponit, quod per intellectum agenda praedefiniantur. Nam « agens secundum naturam producit per formas, quae sunt vere naturae, sicut homo hominem et asinus asinum; agens per intellectum producit per formas, quae non sunt aliquid rei, sed ideae in mente, sicut artifex producit arcam » (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.). « Creatura egreditur a Creatore, sed non per naturam, quia alterius naturae est, ergo per artem, cum non sit alius modus emanandi nobilis quam per naturam, vel per artem sive ex voluntate; et ars illa non est extra ipsum: ergo est agens per artem et volens: ergo necesse est, ut habeat rationes expressivas. Si enim dat formam huic rei, per quam distinguitur ab alia re, vel proprietatem, per quam distinguitur, necese est, ut habeat formam idealem, immo formas ideales » (Hexaëm. Serm. 12, in princ.). Cum doctrina de ideis maximi momenti sit, ut sententia S. Bonaventurae de praescientia et scientia Dei (infra d. 38. 39.) recte intelligatur, nonnulla praemittimus tum de pluribus terminis, qui hic occurrunt, tum de opinionum principalium differentiis, quae fere in eo fundantur, quod de formali idearum ratione auctores non idem sentiunt.	I. The doctrine of ideas, which is famous, both on account of the gravity of the matter and the multitude of controversies about it, has been taken from St. Augustine, chiefly from his books Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, and On the City of God, Bk. VII, ch. 28. In the first place St. Augustine asserted, that Plato was the first to employ the name of “idea”, but not the first to understand the thing itself; then (in n. 2) he teaches: « Therefore in Latin we can say “ideas” and/or “forms” and/or “species”, as it seems to us to translate the word from the word. But if we call them reasons [rationes], we indeed depart from the propriety of translation — for in Greek rationes are named λόγοι, not ideas — but yet anyone who would want to use this word, would not err in this matter. For ideas are also certain principal forms and/or reasons for things, stable and incommutable (in themselves), which have not themselves been formed, and through this eternal and always holding themselves in the same manner, which are contained in the Divine Intelligence. And though they neither arise themselves nor are lost [intereant], yet everything, which can arise and be lost, and everything, which arises and is lost, is said according to them ». — Moreover all Catholic doctors convene in this, that ideas are to be posited in God, because otherwise it would follow, that He acts either by chance and/or by the necessity of nature, not by the judgment of the Will [arbitrio voluntatis]. For ‘to act through the will’ presupposes, that the (things) to be done are predefined through the intellect. For « one acting according to nature produces through forms, which are truly of the nature, just as a man (produces) a man, and a donkey a donkey; one acting through understanding produces through forms, which are not anything of a thing, but ideas in the mind, just as a craftsman produces a chest [arcam] » (St. Bonaventure, Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, p. I, q. 1, in reply to n. 3). « A creature steps forth form the Creator, but not through nature, because it is of another nature, therefore through art, since there is no other, noble manner of emanating than through nature, either through art or from the will; and that Art is not outside of Him: therefore He is acting and willing through (His) Art: therefore it is necessary, that He have expressive reasons. For if He gives form to this thing, through which it is distinguished from another thing, and/or (gives) a property, through which it is distinguish, it is necessary, that He have the ideal form, nay ideal forms » (Hexaëmeron., Sermon 12, at the beginning). Since the doctrine concerning ideas is of the greatest moment, so that the sentence of St. Bonaventure concerning God’s foreknowledge and knowledge (below in d. 38 and 39) may be rightly understood, we will mention here not a few things, both concerning the many terms, which occur here, and concerning the differences of the principal opinions, all of which are nearly founded upon this, that the authors do not all think the same thing concerning the formal reckoning of an idea.
II. De variis terminis fere synonymis Seraphicus in Breviloq. (p. I. c. 8.) sic ait: Sapientia divina « in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia cognita, dicitur lux; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa et approbata, dicitur speculum; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur exemplar; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et reprobata, dicitur liber vitae. Est igitur liber vitae respectu rerum ut redeuntium, exemplar ut exeuntium, speculum ut euntium, lux vero respectu omnium. — Ad exemplar autem spectat idea, verbum, ars et ratio: idea secundum quod actum praevidendi, verbum secundum actum proponendi, ars secundum actum prosequendi, ratio secundum actum perficiendi, quia superaddit intentionem finis. Quia vero haec omnia unum sunt in Deo, ideo frequenter acciptur unum pro alio ».	II. On the various terms, nearly all synonymous, the Seraphic (Doctor) thus says in (his) Breviloquium. (p. I, ch. 8): The Divine Wisdom « inasmuch as It is the reason for cognizing all (things) cognized, is said (to be) “the Light”; inasmuch as It is the reason for cognizing (things) seen and approved, is said (to be) “the Mirror”; inasmuch as It is a reason for cognizing (things) foreseen and disposed, is said (to be) “the Exemplar”; inasmuch as It is the reason for cognizing (things) predestined and reproved, is said to be “the Book of Life”. Therefore It is the Book of Life in respect of things, as returning, the Exemplar (of things), as going forth, the Mirror (of things), as they go, but the Light in respect of all. — But to an exemplar looks an idea, a word, an art, and a reckoning: an idea according to which (it is) an act of foreseeing, a word according to which (it is) an act of proposing, an art according to which (it is) an act of prosecuting, a reckoning according to which (it is) an act of perfecting, because it adds upon an intention of the end. However, because all these are one [unum] in God, for that reason one is frequently accepted on behalf of the other ».
Paulo aliter de iisdem loquitur Uldaricus (apud Dionys. Carth., hic I. Sent. d. 36. q. 1.): « Vocatur idea, id est prima forma, quia idea est forma omnium formarum, cuius participatione formalitas omnibus eis inest; exemplar, in quantum ipsam omnia imitantur; ratio, in quantum est similitudo rerum in intellectu; species, in quantum est medium cognoscendi; paradigma, in quantum secundum respectum eius ad rem Deus operatur — paradigma enim dicitur a para, quod iuxta, et dogma (!), quasi docens operare [παραδειγμα a παραδείχνυμαι]. Vocatur etiam mundus archetypus a Platone in Timaeo, id est principale exempar ». — Similia leguntur apud Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1, et p. II. q. 3. m. 3; et B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. m. 2. a. 4. — Notandum autem, quod proprie loquendo ratio cognosendi accipitur potius ex parte potentiae ut dispositio, qua ipsa reditur expedita ad intelligentiam, sive est id quo cognoscitur. Haec in intellectu humano est tum species intelligibilis, tum lumen intellectu agentis, vel etiam illuminatio a superiore causa effecta. In Deo autem ipsa eius essentia sola est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia. Idea autem, ut ex sequentibus patebit, a plerisque nunc accipitur ut id quod cognoscitur, sive ut id quod intellectui obiicitur ut terminus ipsius, ad quem respiciens agens operatur et rem producit; et sic proprie est exemplar. Nihilominus S. Thomas et praecipue S. Bonaventura ideam accipiunt etiam ut principium, quo cognoscitur; et sic est idem quod ratio cognoscendi.	Ulric (quoted by Bl. Dionysius the Carthusian in, Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, q. 1) speaks a little differently of the same: « (The Divine Wisdom) is called an “idea”, that is a first form, because an idea is a form of all the forms, in which the formality of it is by participation; (It is called) an “exemplar”, inasmuch as all imitate It; a “reason”, inasmuch as It is the similitude of the things in the intellect; a “species”, inasmuch as It is a means of cognizing; a “paradigm” [paradigma], inasmuch as God works according to Its looking-back to the thing — for “paradigm” is said from para-, which (means) “in accord with” [iuxta] and –dogma (sic), as if “one teaching to work” [the Greek παραδειγμα is derived from παραδείχνυμαι]. It is also called the World Archetype by Plato in the Timaeus, that is “the principal Exemplar” ». — Similar things are read in Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1; and in p. II, q. 3, m. 3; and in Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 4. — However, it must be noted, that properly speaking a ratio cognoscendi* is accepted rather on the part of the power as a disposition, by which it is rendered equipped [expedita] for understanding, or is that according to which (the object) is cognized. In the human intellect this is both an intelligible species, and the light of the agent intellect, and/or also an illumination effected by a superior cause. But in God, His own Essence Itself is alone the ratio cognoscendi of Itself and all. Moreover (the term) “idea”, as will be clear from what is to follow, is now accepted by very many as that which is cognized, or as that which is the object of the intellect as its term, looking back toward which, an agent works and produces a thing; and in this manner it is properly (speaking) an “exemplar”. Nevertheless St. Thomas and chiefly St. Bonaventure accept “idea” also as a principle, according to which (an object) is cognized, and in this manner it is the same as a reckoning of cognizing.
III. Circa formalem idearum significationem existit magna in scholis opinionum pugna.	III. About the formal signification of ideas there is exists a great debate [magna opinionum pugna] among the Schools.
1. Secundum sententiam Scoti (hic q. unica), cum qua fere conveniunt Durandus (I. Sent. d. 36. q. 3.) multique Nomina- / -les, . . .	1. According to the sentence of (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in the q. sole, with which there nearly agree Durandus (Sent., I, d. 36, q. 3) and many Nominalists, . . .
¹ Aliquot codd. ut A T V cum ed. 1 praesenter, alii ut X Z aa praesens. Voci animam, quae proxime sequitur, cod. R praefigit ipsam. Dein post alia similitudo cod. O addit causata a veritate, et paulo inferius post et eo cod. X inserit est. ² Supple cum cod. bb quia. ³ Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 hic interponit defectum et.	¹ A few codices, such as A T V, together with edition 1, have presently [praesenter], others, such as X Z and aa, present [praesens]. [Trans. note: Cf. presentiaiter in the Rational for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms, in the Introduction to this translation.] To the word the soul [animam], which follows immediately, codex R adds itself [ipsam]. Then after another similitude [alia similitudo] codex O adds caused by truth [causata a veritate], and a little below this at a similitude by this [eo similitudo] codex x inserts is [est]. ² Supply together with codex bb because [quia]. ³ The Vatican edition, not trusting in the codices and edition 1, here interposes a defect and [defectum et].
	* [Trans. note: As that « by which an intellect is rendered equipped for understanding », a ratio cognoscendi is a “reason for cognizing”, but as « that according to which (a thing) is cognized » it is a “reckoning of cognizing”. See ratio in the Rationale for the English Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms, in the Introduction to this English translation.]

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Nomina- / -les, et quam non improbabilem aestimat Richard. a Med. (I. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2.), ideae sunt ipsae creaturae secundum esse possibile, cognitae in mente divina, sive, ut dicit Mastrius (Disputationes theolog. t. I. disp. 3. q. 2.) « sunt creaturae praecognitae a Deo ut factibiles, adeo ut obiective tantum in divina intelligentia contineantur tanquam reales conceptus obiectivi ». Docet enim Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 50. q. 3. n. 4.): « Si idea ponitur respectus essentiae divinae ad extra, cognitio illorum, ad quae est respectus ille, necesario praesupponitur: essentia enim nunquam est comparata, nisi prius intelligatur illud ad quod fit comparatio; non enim fit comparatio ad ignotum ». — In hac sententia ideae non sunt praecise divina essentia (quae tamen praesupponitur), nec quatenus essentia divina abolute accipitur, nec quatenus includit relationem ad creaturas sive respectum imitabilitatis. Idem tamen dicit (loc. cit.), quod omnia cognoscantur « per illam essentiam, quae perfectissime omnia repraesentat, quae, ut sic repraesentans illa ut obiecta cognita, habet rationem ideae ». — Inde sequitur, quod in via Scoti ideae non possint poni tanquam ratio cognoscendi creaturas (nisi terminative et secundario), sed tantum tanquam ratio sive principium producendi easdem, et quidem non effective, sed tantum exemplariter. — Sequitur etiam, ideas per se non habere respectum nisi ad res conceptas ut possibiles, non ut productas vel producendas in tempore. — Cum autem Scotus illud esse cognitum, quod res habent in intellectu divino, nominet esse diminutum et esse secundum quid, haec verba non debent intelligi in sensu Wicleffi, qui fertur docuisse, creaturas in Deo ab aeterno habuisse reale esse essentiae et existentiae; neque in sensu Henrici Gand., qui creaturis in Deo attribuit quoddam esse essentiae, non autem existentiae (quam sententiam Scotus multis argumentis imppugnat), neque in hoc sensu, quem Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 14.) aliique Scoto imponut, quod illud esse teneat medium inter ens reale et ens rationis. Nam ex ipsius Scoti verbis (loc. cit., et d. 45. q. unica, n. 5; d. 3. q. 4. n. 18.) nec non ex praecipuis Scotistis satis apparet, illud esse diminutum ponendum esse inter entia rationis (cfr. Mastrius, loc. cit.; Rada, loc. cit. a. 3; et inter nostrae aetatis auctores cl. P. Kleutgen: Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, tom. II. Abhandl. 6. n. 582. 583.).	and which Richard of Middleton (Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2) judges (to be) not improbable, that ideas are the creatures themselves, according to (their) possible ‘being’, cognized in the Divine Mind, or as Mastrius says (Disputationes theolog., tome I, disputation 3, q. 2): « they are creatures precognized by God as able to be made, to this extent that objectively they are only contained in the Divine Intelligence as real, objective concepts ». For (Bl.) Scotus teaches (Sent., Bk. IV, d. 50, q. 3, n. 4): « If an idea is posited in respect of the Divine Essence ad extra, the cognition of those, to which that looking-back is, is necessarily presupposed: for the Essence is never compared, unless that to which that comparison is made is first understood; for no comparison is made regarding an unknown ». — In this sentence ideas are not precisely the Divine Essence, which however is presupposed, neither to the extent that “the Divine Essence” accepted absolutely, nor to the extent that It includes a relation to creatures or a respect of imitability. Yet the same says (loc. cit.) that all are cognized « through that Essence, which perfectly represents all, which (Essence), as One representing them in this manner, as cognized objects, has the reckoning of an idea ». — From this it follows, that from (Bl.) Scotus’ point of view ideas cannot be posited as a ratio cognoscendi of creatures, except terminatively and secondarily, but only as the reckoning or principle of producing them, and indeed not effectively, but only exemplarily. — For it follows, that ideas per se do not have a looking-back except to things conceived as possibles, not as produced and/or to be produced in time. — But since (Bl.) Scotus names that cognized ‘being’, which things have in the Divine Intellect, a « diminished ‘being’ [esse diminutum] » and a « ‘being’ secundum quid », these words ought not be understood in the sense of Wycliffe, who is reported to have taught, that creatures in God had from eternity a real ‘being’ of essence and existence; nor in the sense of Henry of Ghent, who attributed to creatures in God a certain ‘being’ of essence, but not of existence (which sentence Scotus impugns with many arguments), nor in that sense, which Cajetan (commenting on the Summa., I, q. 14) and others impose upon (Bl.) Scotus, that that ‘being’ holds a middle (position) between real being and a being of reason [ens rationis]. For from the words themselves of (Bl.) Scotus (loc. cit. and in d. 45, q. sole, n. 5, and d. 3, q. 4, n. 18) and of the principal Scotists it sufficiently appears, that that diminished ‘being’ is to be posited among the beings of reason (cf. Mastrius, loc. cit.; Rada, loc. cit., a. 3; and among the authors of our own day, cf. Fr. Kleutgen: Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, tom. II. Abhandl. 6. n. 582. 583).
2. Alii doctores in hoc conveniunt, quod statuunt, ideas creaturarum esse essentiam divinam, sed de modo, quo est idea sive de ratione formali dissentiunt. S. Thomas (de Verit. q. 3. a. 2.) primum dicit: « Essentia (Dei) est idea rerum ut est intellecta », et deinde: « Divina essentia, cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad eam, est idea uniuscuiusque » (cfr. S. I. q. 15. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. I. c. 45.). Secundum S. Thomam igitur, ut Caietanus eum interpretatur, idea est divina essentia, ut formativa est rei medio intellectu, sive est divina essentia, quatenus a Deo intelligitur ut imitabilis a creatura. Unde essentia, considerata in se cum omnibus suis attributis, est obiectum divini intellctus primarium, proprium et motivum; at considerata in comparatione ad alia extra Deum producenda, est obiectum intellectus secundarium. — Porro, ideae referuntur tum ad res mere possibiles, tum ad res in qualibet differentia temporis existentes, attamen non eodem modo (de Verit. q. 3. a. 6; S. p. I. q. 15. a. 3. ad 2.). — Item, idea non tantum est principium producendi, sed etiam cognoscendi (S. I. q. 15. a. 3.). Exemplar autem sunt ideae, quatenus sunt in intellectu ut aliorum similitudo; ratio vero sunt, quatenus sunt in intellectu ut in se intellectae, scilicet actu quasi reflexo (ibid. a. 2. ad 2.). — Denique distinctio idearum resultat ex diversis ad divinam essentiam respectibus, qui in rebus sunt.	2. The other doctors agree in this, that they state, that the ideas of creatures are the Divine Essence, but concerning the manner, according to which It is an idea, or concerning the formal reckoning (of an idea), they disagree. St. Thomas (de Veritate, q. 3, a. 2) first says: « (God’s) Essence is the Idea of things, as It is understood », and then: « The Divine Essence, with the diverse proportions of things to It co-intellected, is the Idea of each one »; (cf. Summa., I, q. 15, a. 1 and 2; Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 45). According to St. Thomas, therefore, as Cajetan interprets him, an idea is the Divine Essence, as It is formative of the thing according to a middle understanding, or is the Divine Essence, to the extent that It is understood by God as imitable by the creature. Whence the Essence, considered in Itself with all Its attributes, is the prime, proper, and motive object of the Divine Intellect; but considered in comparison to others to be produced outside of God, It is the secondary object of the (Divine) Intellect. — Furthermore, ideas are referred both to merely possible things, and to things existing in any difference of time, but yet not in the same manner (de Veritate, q. 3, a. 6; Summa. , I, q. 15, a. 3, in reply to n. 2). — Likewise, an idea is not only a principle of producing, but also of cognizing (Summa., I, q. 15, a. 3). Moreover, ideas are an exemplar, to the extent that they are in an intellect as a similitude of others; but they are a reason, to the extent that they are in an intellect as understood in themselves, namely, by a quasi reflex act (ibid., a. 2, in reply to n. 2). — Finally, the distinction of ideas results from the diverse looking-backs, which are in things, to the Divine Essence.
Haec omnia saltem quoad substantiam approbantur ab Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et etiam a S. Bonaventurae.	All these, at least in regard to (their) substance, are approved by Alexander of Hales, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton and even St. Bonaventure.
3. Nihilominus S. Bonaventura in nonnullis alium modum loquendi et procedendi adhibet, quem ob rei gravitatem ex multis locis contracte exhibemus:	3. Nevertheless St. Bonaventure in not a few (things) employs another manner of speaking and proceeding, which on account of the gravity of the matter we exhibit (here) in a contracted manner from many passages:
a) Pater se intelligendo exprimit se et omnia in Verbo. « Pater Verbo suo, quod ab ipso procedit, dicit se et omnia quia Verbo suo se ipsum declarat » (supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 5. in fundam.). « Summus Spiritus, cum sit purus actus et sit non tantum intelligens, sed et intellectus, non potest se non intelligere. Cum igitur intellectus aequetur intelligenti, intelligit quiquid est et quidquid potest: ergo et ratio intelligentis aequatur intellectui, quia similitudo eius est. Haec autem similitudo Verbum est, quia secundum Augustinum et Anselmum similitudo mentis convertentis se super se, quae in acie mentis est, verbum est. Si ergo haec similiutudo aequalis est, Deus est. Igitur species originata repraesentat originantem secundum omne quod est, et secundum omne quod potest: ergo repraesentat multa. Item, cum virtutem Patris repraesentat, repraesentat virtutem immensissimam » etc. « Igitur cum summus intellectus sit activum principium, in similitudine sua omnia disponit, omnia exprimit, omnia agit » (Hexaëm. Serm. 3.).	a) The Father by understanding Himself expresses Himself and all (things) in the Word. « but the Father by His own Word, which proceeds from Him, speaks Himself and all (things), because the Father by His own Word, which proceeds from Him, declares His very Self » (above in d. 32, a. 1, q, 1, 5th argument of the fundament, p. 557). « The Most High Spirit, since He is a pure act and is not only intelligent, but also an intellect, cannot not understand Himself. Since, therefore, an intellect is equated to one understanding, it understands whatever it is and whatever its is able: therefore, also the reckoning of one understanding is equated to an intellect, because it is its similitude. Moreover this similitude is the Word, because according to (Sts.) Augustine and Anselm, the similitude of a mind turning itself upon itself, which (similitude) is in the insight [acie] of the mind, is a word. If, therefore, this similitude is equal (to the mind itself), it is God. Therefore the Species originated represents the One originating according to everything which is, and according to everything which can be: therefore It represents many (things). Likewise, when It represents the virtue of the Father, It represents a most immense virtue » etc.. « Therefore since the Most High Intellect is an active principle, in His own Similitude He disposes all, He expresses all, He sets all in motion » (Hexaëmeron., Sermon 3).
b) Idea est divina esentia in comparatione ad creaturas. Ipsa significat « divinam essentiam in comparatione ad creaturam » (hic q. 3. in corp.), sive « in respectu ad id quod futurum est, vel etiam potest esse » (ibid. ad 5.).	b) An idea is the Divine Essence in comparison to creatures. It signifies « the Divine Essence in comparison to the creature » (here in q. 3, in the body of the question); or « in respect to that which is to be, and/or can also be » (ibid., in reply to n. 5).
c) Idea autem non est essentia, praecise quatenus est essentia, sed cum ordine ad intellectum, quatenus est veritas (hic in corp. et passim). Veritas autem concipitur ut proprietas divinae essentiae, quatenus se exprimit intellectui, sive ut « proprietas, quae est ratio significandi et intelligendi essentiam increatam » (supra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad ult.; cfr. d. 3. p. I. dub. 4.). Sicut enim ens dicitur bonum per comparationem ad causam finalem, sic verum per comparationem ad causam exemplarem. « Sicut dicitur bonum ratione ordinis (in finem), sic verum ratione expressionis, et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris » (ibid. ad 4. 7.).	c) But an idea is not the Essence, precisely to the extent that It is the Essence, but with an order to understanding, to the extent that It is the truth: cf. here in the body of the question and passim. Moreover the Truth is conceived as a property of the Divine Essence, to the extent that It expresses Itself to an intellect, or as « a property, which is a reason for signifying and understanding the Uncreated Essence » (above in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to the last objection; cf. d. 3, p. I, dubium 4). For just as a being is said (to be) “good” through a comparison to a final cause, so (is it said to be) “true” through a comparison to an exemplary cause. « Just as the good is said according to a reckoning of an order (unto an end), so the true according to a reckoning of an expression, and a reckoning of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself » (ibid., in reply to nn. 4 and 7).
d) Divina veritas est lux et summe expressiva. « Veritas est lux summa, cui nihil potest occultari, nec etiam tenebrae obscurantur ab ipsa » (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.), ipsa est « expressiva omnium » (hic in corp.). « Divina veritas una et summa expressione exprimit se et alia; ideo summa assimilitatio est non tantum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu aliorum » (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.).	d) The Divine Truth is a light and (is) most highly expressive. « The Truth is a most high Light, which nothing can hide [occultari], nor are even shadows hidden [obscurantur] from It » (below in d. 39, a. 1, q. 2), It Itself is « expressive of all » (here in the body of the question). « The Divine Truth by one and a most high expression expresses Itself and others; for that reason there is a most high assimilation not only in respect of Itself, but also in respect of others » (below in d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 4).
e) Idea est similitudo cogniti expressiva. « Idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae » (hic in corp.). « Idea secundum rem est divina veritas, secundum rationem intelligendi est similitudo cogniti » (hic q. 4. in corp.). Non autem « similitudo impressa vel expressa (ut aliqui posteriores Scholastici putarunt), sed exprimens. Quia omnino exprimens, ideo summe exprimit, secundum omnes conditiones » (hic q. 2, ad 3.); ipsa dicit « immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo et cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile » (hic q. 5. ad 3.) et aliis (d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. 3.).	e) An idea is the expressive similitude of the (thing) cognized. « An idea is said (to be) “the similitude of the thing cognized” » (here in the body of the question). « An idea according to thing is the Divine Truth, according to the reckoning of understanding it is a similitude of (the thing) cognized » (here in q. 4, in the body of the question). Moreover (it is) not « an impressed and/or expressed similitude » as some later Scholastics thought, « but an expressing one. Because (it is) entirely expressing, for that reason it expresses most highly, according to all conditions » (here in q. 2, in reply to n. 3); it means « the immensity of the Divine Truth in expressing and cognizing everything which is possible to God » (here in q. 5, in reply to n. 3) and to others (d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to nn. 1, 2 and 3).
f) Haec similitudo differt a similitudine univocationis et imitationis. Non est similitudo univocationis, qua utrumque extremum per participationem convenit in alio tertio, nec solum similitudo imitationis, qua finitum in modico imitatur infinitum, sed potius similitudo expressionis, et quidem « summa, quia causatur ab intentione veritatis, quae est ipsa expressio » (hic ad 2.).	f) This similitude differs from the similitude of univocation and imitation. It is not a similitude of univocation, by which each extreme convenes through a participation in another third, nor only a similitude of imitation, by which a finite in a limited manner imitates an infinite, but (it is) rather a similitude of expression, and indeed « a most high one, because (this convening) is caused by the intention of a truth, which is itself an expression (of the First Truth) » (hic ad 2.).
g) Idea ut similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, sed differt a similitudine, quae est in nostro intellectu. « Aliter est in nobis, aliter in Deo. In nobis quidem ratio cognoscendi est similitudo, cognitum est veritas. Nam in nobis est similitudo accepta et impressa ab extrinseco . . . In Deo autem est e converso, quia ratio cognoscendi est ipsa veritas, et cognitum est similitudo veritatis, scilicet ipsa creatura » etc. (hic in corp.).	g) An idea as a similitude is a ratio cognoscendi, but it differs from the similitude, which is in our intellect. « But it is in us in one manner, in God in another. Indeed, in us the reason for cognizing is a similitude, the cognized is a truth. For in us the similitude has been accepted and impressed by (something) extrinsic, . . . But in God it is the other way around, because the reason for cognizing is the Truth Itself, and the cognized is a similitude of the Truth, that is, a creature itself » etc. (here in the body of the question).
h) Haec similitudo est ratio cognoscendi omnium expressiva. « Haec similitudo est ratio expressiva cognoscendi non tantum universale, sed etiam singulare » (hic q. 4, in corp.). « Haec est ipsa veritas expressiva cogniti, et eo similitudo, quo veritas . . . melius exprimit rem, quam ipsa res se ipsam exprimat » (hic ad. 3.); ipsa « est actus purus et ipsa veritas »; est « extra genus », « non arctata nec limitata, sed extendit se ad omnia, sicut divina essentia »; ipsa est « similitudo communis . . .	h) This similitude is the expressive reason for cognizing all (things). « This similitude is the expressive reason for cognizing not only the universal, but also the singular » (here in q. 4, in the body of the question). « It is the very expressive truth of the (thing) cognized, and a similitude by that, by which (it is) a truth . . . it expresses the thing better, than the thing itself expresses it » (here in reply to n. 3); it « is a pure act and the truth itself (of the thing cognized) »; it is « outside a genus », « not constrained nor limited, but it extends itself to all, just as the Divine Essence (does) »; it itself is a common (universal) similitude . . .

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(universalis) quantum ad indifferentiam et amplitudinem, propria vero quantum ad discretissimam expressionem » (hic q. 2. ad 3.). Dum igitur res creata per similitudinem (speciem) ab ipsa causatam non potest exprimere nisi se ipsam (II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.), et ne hoc quidem nisi ex parte; e contra « divina veritas una et summa expressione exprimit se et alia; ideo summa assimilatio est, non tantum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu aliorum » (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.).	as much as regards (its) indifference and amplitude, but a proper one as much as regards (its) most discrete expression » (here in q. 2, in reply to n. 3). Therefore, while a created thing through a similitude (species) caused by itself can express naught but itself (Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1), and this indeed naught but in part; on the contrary « the Divine Truth by one and a most high expression expresses Itself and others; for that reason there is a most high assimilation, not only in respect of Itself, but even in respect of others » (below in d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 4).
i) A priima veritate omnia vera dependent. Sicut omnia entia dependent a primo et summo ente, ita omnes veritates a primo et summo vero. « Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quid si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem » (supra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. 7.). In eodem sensu dicit S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. I. c. 68.): « Sicut prima essentia omnis essentiae, ita prima intellectio et volitio omnis intellectionis et volitionis principium est ».	i) All truths depend from the First Truth. Just as all beings depend from the First and Most High Being, so all truths from the First and Most High Truth. « For all are true and are bound to express themselves through an expression of that Most High Light; which if it would cease to shine upon them [influere], all others would cease to be true. For that reason no created truth is true through (its) essence, but through participation » (above in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to 4 and 7.). In the same sense St. Thomas says (Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 68): « Just as the First Essence is the principle of every essence, so the First Intellection and Volition (is the principle) of every intellection and volition ».
k) Idea est similitudo rei, per quam res cognoscitur et producitur (hic arg. 2. in fundam.). Ipsa igitur non tantum est terminus cognitionis (id quod cognoscitur) et principium exemplare producendi ut « ratio, secundum quam artifex producit opera sua » (II. Sent. d. 11. a. 1. q. 2.), sed etiam principium cognitionis (id quo cognoscitur), sive ratio, qua Deus omnia alia cognoscit (cfr. d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.).	k) An idea is the similitude of a thing, through which the thing is cognized and produced (here in the 2nd. argument of the fundament). Therefore it is not only a terminus of cognition (that which is cognized), and a exemplary principle for producing as « the reckoning, according to which a craftsman produces his own works » (Sent., Bk. II, d. 11, a. 1, q. 2), but also a principle of cognition (that according to which it is cognized), or the reckoning, by which God cognizes all others (cf. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 3).
l) Proprietates idearum. « Idea quamvis in Deo sit absolutum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum », qui « secundum rem plus se tenet ex parte cognoscentis, quia est ipse Deus, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi similitudo plus se tenet ex parte cogniti » (hic q. 3. in corp.). Pluralitas idearum est secundum rationem intelligendi (ibid.).	l) The properties of ideas. « An idea, though it is (something) absolute in God, yet according to the manner of understanding it means a middle respect between the One cognizing and the cognized », which « according to thing holds itself more on the part of the One cognizing, who is God, yet according to the reckoning of understanding or of saying a similitude holds itself more on the part of the one cognized » (here in q. 3, in the body of the question). The plurality of ideas is according to the reckoning of understanding (ibid.).
m) Definitio ideae. Ad mentem igitur Seraphici videtur esse defintiio ideae, quae legitur in anecdoto compendio Compmentarii eiusdem, scripto a Fr. Gulielmo de Marra, in I. Sent. d. 35. q. 3. (biblioth. National. Florentiae, cod. n. 727, A.2.): « Idea est essentia divina seu aeterna veritas determinatio modo imitabilis et expressiva huius imitabilitatis apud intellctum divinum: quoniam imitabilis, hoc materiale in ratione ideae; quod expressiva imitabilitatis, hoc formale. Unde in ratione ideae est considerare quod est, scilicet divina essentia vel veritas; ad quod est, scil. ideata; et quo est, et hoc est ratio exprimendi apud intellectum divinum ».	m) The definition of an idea. Therefore according to the mind of the Seraphic (Doctor) the definition of an idea seems to be, that which is read in the unpublished compendium of his Commentary, written by Fr. Guilielmo de Marra, on Sent, I, d. 35, q. 3 (National Library of Florence, codex n. 727, A. 2): « An idea is the Divine Essence or the Eternal Truth in a determined manner imitable and expressive of this imitability in the Divine Intellect: that (it is) imitable, this is (its) the material (aspect) in (its) being reckoned as an idea; that (it is) expressive of imitability, this (is its) formal (aspect). Whence in the reckoning of an idea there is a considering of that which it is, namely, the Divine Essence and/or Truth; of that for which it is, namely the ideated (thing); and of that according to which it is, and this is a reckoning of expressing in the Divine Intellect ».
IV. Si quaeritur, utrum doctrina S. Bonaventurae omnino conveniat cum sententia S. Thomae, P. Trigosus (Sum. q. 11. a. 2. dub. 2.) aliique expositores asserunt, utrumque S. Doctorem idem aliis verbis docere; sed P. Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theol. t. I.disput. 5. q. 2, et q. 6.) late probare nititur, notabilem differentiam esse inter utramque positionem. Hanc differentiam explicat asserens, secundum « Thomistas » ideam esse essentiam Dei, quatenus ipse sit ratio eminenter continens omnes creaturas tantum in essendo, « sive prout contineat res eminenter et virtualiter per modum causae aequivocae, et prout cognita directe ab intellectu divino sub diversis respectibis imitabilitatis a creaturis ». Hanc autem continentiam rerum in Deo secundum eminentiam et causativam potentiam non sufficere, ut sit ratio perfecte cognoscendi creaturas in individuo, quatenus sunt, per finitatem contractae, sed sub hac ratione essentiam divinam tantum radicaliter et quasi sub ratione materiali esse ideam; atque res sic esse in Deo non actu, sed potentia. S. Bonaventuram autem praeter illam continentiam eminentiae et causalitatis in essendo requirere continentiam eminentialem in cognoscendo, quam habet divina essentia ex duplici capite: primo, quatenus est prima et summa veritas, summe et infinite exprimens se et omnes alias veritates; secundo, quatenus habet rationem universalis et particularis causae et communis et propriae similitudinis (speciei), ut explicatur hic q. 2. ad 2. 3. Hanc esse rationem, quare S. Bonav. toties connectat duplicem rationem, scilicet continentiam virtualem rerum in potentia Dei, et continentiam exemplarem in summa veritate (ut I. Sent. d. 36. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, a. 2. q. 1; d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.), et quare (hic ad 2.) non pracise similitudinem imitationis, sed similitudinem expressionis ad ideam spectare asserat. Porro dicit, ideam esse simul rationem cognoscendi rem ideatam et producendi eam, ipsamque secundum primam rationem proprie ideam dici, secundum aliam exemplar. Haec ex longiore discursu huius auctoris excerpsimus.	IV. If one asks, whether the doctrine of St. Bonaventure entirely convenes with the sentence of St. Tomas, Father Trigoso (Summa, q. 11, a. 2, dubium 2) and other expositors assert, that each Saintly Doctor teaches the same (thing) with different words; but Father Bartolomeo dei Barberii (Cursus theol., tome I, disputation 5, q. 2, and q. 6) strives very much to prove, that there is a notable difference between each position. He explains this difference asserting, that according to « the Thomists » an idea is God’s Essence, to the extent that It is a reason eminently containing all creatures only in being [in essendo], « or insofar as It contains things eminently and virtually through the manner of an equivocal cause, and insofar as (It is) cognized directly by the Divine Intellect under diverse respects of imitability by creatures ». (He asserts) moreover, that this containing of things in God according to eminence and causative power is not sufficient, to be perfectly a reason for cognizing creatures in the individual, to the extent that they are, contracted through finiteness, but that under this reckoning the Divine Essence is only radically, and as if under the reckoning of matter, an idea; and that things are thus in God not in act, but in potency. Moreover, (he asserts) that St. Bonaventure, besides that containing of an eminence and causality in being [in essendo], requires an eminential containing in cognizing, which the Divine Essence has out of a twofold source [capite]: first, to the extent that It is the First and Most High Truth, most highly and infinitely expressing Itself and all other truths; second, to the extent that It has the reckoning of a universal and particular cause and of a common and proper similitude (species), as is explained here in q. 2, in reply to nn. 2 and 3. He asserts, that this is the reason, why St. Bonaventure so often connects a twofold reason, namely, that (there is) a virtual containing of things in God’s power, and an exemplary containing (of them) in the Most High Truth (as is said in Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 2, and a. 2, q. 1; d. 39, a. 1, q. 2), and why (here in the reply to n. 2) he says that not precisely a similitude of imitation, but a similitude of expression pertains to the idea. Next he says, that an idea is at once a reason for cognizing an ideated thing and for producing it, and that according to its first reckoning it is properly said (to be) an “idea”, according to the other and “exemplar”. We have excerpted what he says here from the author’s longer discourse.
Utrum autem doctrina Angelici et Seraphici Doctoris praeter differentiam in modo loquendi et procedendi revera ita differat, ut vult de Barberiis, subtilliore et longiore disquisitione indigeret, quam libenter sapientioribus relinquimus. Tamen manifestum est, S. Thomam, S. Bonaventuram ipsumque Scotum concorditer docere haec: ideae sunt in divino intellctu per modum formarum sive similitudinem — ipsae habent triplicem comparationem scil. ad essentiam divinam, ad intellectum, ad res ideatas extra Deum, quas connotant — realiter in Deo idem sunt essentia, intellectus, veritas, idea. Manifestum est etiam ex praedictis, a S. Bonaventura praecipiue urgeri illa increatae essentiae proprietas (in qua ultima omnis veritatis radix quaerenda est), qua essentia divina se sibi ut intelligenti infinite exprimit ac delcarat; unde est, quod increata essentia est prima et infinita veritas. Sicut autem a prima essentia res creatae acceperunt, ut sint, ita a prima veritate, ut se ipsas possint exprimere, sive ut sint verae per participationem primae veritatis. Ipsae autem non possunt exprimere nisi se ipsas, et per imperfectam similitudinem. Prima autem veritas, quae est per essentiam, exprimendo se exprimit etiam omnia alia a se, et sic est eorum idea. — Doctrina haec est profundissima.	However, whether the doctrine of the Angelic and Seraphic Doctors, besides the difference in their manner of speaking and proceeding, truly differ thus, as dei Barberii would have them, would require a more subtle and longer disquisition, which we freely relinquish to those wiser (that ourselves). However it is manifest, that St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus himself in agreement teach the following: ideas are in the Divine Intellect through the manner of forms or of a similitude — they have a threefold comparison, namely, to the Divine Essence, to the (Divine) Intellect, (and) to the things ideated outside of God, which they connote — in God the Essence, Intellect, Truth, (and) an idea are really the same. It is also manifest from the aforesaid, that there is chiefly urged by St. Bonaventure, that (an idea is) a property of the Uncreated Essence (in which the ultimate root of every truth is to be sought), by which the Divine Essence infinitely expresses and declares Itself to Itself as to One understanding; whence it is, that the Uncreated Essence is the First and Infinite Truth. Moreover just as created things have accepted from the First Essence, to be, so from the First Truth, to be able to express themselves, or to be true through a participation in the First Truth. Moreover these cannot express but themselves, and through an imperfect similitude. But the First Truth, which is (truth) through essence, by expressing Itself expresses also all (things) other than Itself, and in this manner is their Idea. — This doctrine is most profound.
V. Quoad primum opinionem in respons. improbatum est notandum, quod cognoscere per causam intelligi debet sub additione in ratione causae sive inferendo effectum ex causa. Hoc observat Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2.) ita dicens: « Potest considerari Deus velut id quod est causa, vel in ratione causae. Si consideratur ipse, qui est causa, omnia scit per causam, quia omnia scit per se, qui est causa omnium. Non autem scit omnia in ratione causae. Nam ubi intelligens et intellectum sunt idem, non est necessarium medium causa, ut patet, cum anima intelligit se, non intelligit se per causam » etc. Ceterum cognitio per causam non opponitur cognitioni per ideam, quae potius in causalitate nititur (cfr. S. Thom., de Verit. q. 2. a. 4.).	V. In regard to the first opinion, disproved in the Response, it must be noted, that ‘to cognize through a cause’ ought to be understood under the addition “in the reckoning of a cause” or “by inferring an effect from a cause”. Alexander of Hales makes this observation (Summa, p. I, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2) thus saying: « God can be considered as that which is a cause, and/or in the reckoning of a cause. If He is considered, as a cause, He knows all through a cause, because He knows all through Himself, as the Cause of all. But He does not know all in the reckoning of a cause. For where the one understanding and the intellect are the same, no middle cause is necessary, as is clear, since the soul understands itself, it does not understand itself through a cause ». Otherwise “cognition through a cause” is not opposed to “cognition through an idea”, which rather is supported in causality (cf. St. Thomas, de Veritate, q. 2, a. 4).
VI. Praeter auctores iam citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 2. a. 1. 4, et m. 4. a. 1. — Scot., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica; Reportat., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. I. tr. 13. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., d. 36. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 36. princ. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 5. n. 6. seq. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 36. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 5.	VI. Besides the authors already cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 23, m. 2, aa. 1 and 4, and m. 4, a. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following two questions, here in the q. sole; Reportatio., on this and the following two questions, here in q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 7; Summa., p. I, tr. 13, m. 2, a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, d. 36, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2. — Giles the Roman, d. 36, 2nd princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 68, q. 5, n. 6 f.. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, q. 3. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 5.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXV