COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 38, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 673-676. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 673-676. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis.	ARTICLE II On the (Divine) Foreknowledge as much as regards the reckoning of (Its) necessity.
Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de divina praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.	Consequently there is the question concerning the second Article, namely, concerning the Divine Foreknowledge as much as regards the reckoning of (Its) necessity. And about this two (questions) are asked.
Primo quaeritur, utrum divina praescientia ponat necessitatem circa praescitum.	First there is asked, whether the Divine Foreknowledge posits a necessity about the foreknown.
Secundo, utrum divina praescientia habeat in se necessitatem.	Second, whether the Divine Foreknowledge has a necessity in Itself.

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QUAESTIO I. Utrum praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem imponat.	QUESTION 1 Whether God’s Foreknowledge imposes a necessity upon the things foreknown.
ET QUOD DIVINA praescientia ponat necessitatem ostenditur sic.	AND THAT THE DIVINE Foreknowledge posits a necessity is shown in this manner:
1. Anselmus in libro de Concordantia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii:¹ « Quae praescivit Deus necesse est futura esse ».	1. (St.) Anselm (says) in the book On the Concord of (God’s) Foreknowledge and Free Will:¹ « It is necessary, that those which God foreknew, are going to be ».
2. Item, ratione sic: « ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse semper concluditur de necessario », sicut dicit Philosophus in primo Priorum.² Fiat ergo talis syllogismus: omne praescitum necesse est futurum — hoc patet per Anselmum — sed hoc est praescitum, quolibet demonstrato: ergo necesse est esse futurum.	2. Likewise, by reason in this manner: « from a major concerning a necessary and a minor concerning a ‘being in’ [inesse], one always concludes concerning a necessary », just as the Philosopher says in the first (book) of the Prior Analytics.² Therefore, let there be such a syllogism: ‘it is necessary that every foreknown (is) going to be’ — this is clear through (St.) Anselm — but with it demonstrated in any (manner), (that) ‘this has been foreknown’: therefore it is necessary that ‘it is going to be’.
3. Item, omne quod Deus praescit, est verum; sed ut dicit Philosophus in primo Perihermenias,³ « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse »: ergo si praescitum est modo verum, necesse est, nunc esse verum. Et futurum est praescitum: ergo modo necessarium est esse futurum: ergo de necessitate eveniet.	3. Likewise, everything which God foreknows, is true; but as the Philosophers says in the first (book) On Interpretation,³ « everything which is, when it is, it is necessary that it is »: therefore, if the foreknown is now true, it is necessary, that it is now true. And the foreknown is going to be: therefore now it is necessary that it is going to be: therefore of necessity it comes forth.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile: Deus praescit aliquid in partem affirmativam; quaero ergo, utrum illud possit non esse; si non: ergo est necessarium; si sic: ergo potest aliter evenire, quam Deus praescit: ergo divina praescientia est fallibilis et incerta. Et hoc est argumentum Augustini⁴ et etiam Boethii in quinto de Consolatione: « Si aliorsum, quam praevisae sunt, detorqueri valent res praevisae, iam non erit firma futuri praescientia ».	4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown per impossibile: God foreknows something in the affirmative [in partem affirmativam]; therefore I ask, whether that can not be; if (it can) not: therefore it is necessary; if it can [si sic]: therefore it can turn out [evenire] otherwise, than God foreknows: therefore the Divine Foreknowledge is fallible and uncertain. And this is the argument of (St.) Augustine⁴ and also of (St. Severinus) Boethius in the fifth book On the Consolation (of Philosophy): « If things foreseen are able to be turned aside [detorqueri valent] in a manner other than they have been foreseen, there will already be no firm Foreknowledge of the future »
5. Item, Deus praescit, aliquid esse futurum: aut ergo possibile est, non esse futurum, aut impossibile: si impossibile, non esse, ergo necesse est esse; si autem possibile; sed omne possibile ponibile, et falso possibili posito in esse, quod sequitur non est impossibile.⁵ Ponatur ergo, hoc non esse; et Deus praescivit hoc esse: ergo Deus praescivit falsum. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est aliquod praecedentium.	5. Likewise, God foreknows, that something is going to be: therefore either it is possible, that it is not going to be, or impossible. if (it is) impossible, that it not be, therefore it is necessary that it be; but if (it is possible); but every possible (is) able to be posited [ponibile], and having posited a false possible in a ‘to be’, that it follows, is not impossible.⁵ Let it be posited, therefore, that this is not; and God foreknew that this is: therefore God foreknew a falsehood. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible that something (belong) to the preceding.
CONTRA: 1. Quod non inferat necessitatem, ostenditur auctoriate Augustini, sumta a simili, in libro de Libero arbitrio:⁶ « Sicut mea memoria non cogit, facta esse quae praeterierunt, sic Dei praescientia non cogit, facienda esse quae futura sunt ».	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. That it does not infer a necessity, is shown by the authority of (St.) Augustine, taken from a simile, in the book On Free Will:⁶ « Just as my memory does not compel [cogit], that those which have passed away, are made, so God’s Foreknowledge does not compel, that those which are going to be, come to be ».
2. Item, ratione ostenditur illud idem: intelligamus, Deum nihil praescire, ergo ex hoc nihil accrescit libero arbitrio: ergo positio praescientiae nihil ei aufert:⁷ ergo cum liberum arbitrium de se sit causa rerum ad utrumlibet et contingentium, divina praescientia hoc non tollit.	2. Likewise, the same is shown by reason: let us understand, that God foreknows nothing, therefore from this nothing accrues [accrescit] to free will: therefore the positing of a foreknowledge bears nothing away from it:⁷ therefore since free will of itself, regarding each [ad utrumlibet], is the cause of things and of contingents, the Divine Foreknowledge does not take this away.
3. Item, sicut supra probatum est,⁸ divina praescientia in pluribus aut non est causa, aut non est tota causa; sed quod dat alicui necessitatem, habet rationem causae, quia a quo est esse, et esse necessarium: cum igitur divina praescientia multo- / -rum	3. Likewise, just as has been proved above,⁸ the Divine Foreknowledge in many (things) either is not the cause, or is not the whole cause; but that which grants a necessity to something, has the reckoning of a cause, because that from which is (its) ‘being’, (is) also (its) ‘being necessary’ [esse necessarium]: therefore since the Divine Foreknowledge of many . . .
¹ Quaest. 1. c. 1. — Paulo ante verbo necessitatem cod. V. adiungit circa praescitum. ² Cap. 9. — Duae generatim species propositionum, duce Aristotele, (loc. cit. c. 2.), distinguuntur, scil. absoluta et modalis. Prior est illa, in qua simpliciter dicitur, praedicatum convenire (inesse), vel non convenire subiecto; posterior autem est illa, in qua etiam exprimitur modus, quo praedicatum convenit, vel non convenit subiecto. Prior vocatur etiam propositio de inesse, quae duplex est, scilicet de inesse simpliciter, et de inesse ut nunc, prout praedicatum subiecto convenit aut necessario (v. g. homo est anima), aut contingenter. Simliter propositio de necessario duplex est, scilicet de necessarsio simpliciter, et de necessario ut nunc. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 3. ad. 2, et S. Thom., de Verit. q. 2. a. 12. obiect. 4, secundum antiquiores Aristotelis expositores, Theophrastum, Eudemium et Themistium, dicunt, in tali syllogismo non sequi conclusionem de necessario. At S. Bonaventura et etiam S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. obiect. 5. contrarium dicunt cum ipso Aristotele nec non cum Averroe, qui in Comment. in hunc textum, de hac controversia disserens, illos interpretes multis verbis impugnat. Ceterum hae duae opiniones contrariae bene conciliari possunt, si dicatur, unam opinionem loqui de inesse simpliciter, alteram de inesse ut nunc. Cfr. Scot., I. Prior. q. 28, ubi cum distinctione tam unam quam alteram opinionem approbat. — Verba Anselmi, ad quae S. Doctor mox provocat, sunt citata in argm. praecedenti. ³ Cap. 7. (c. 9.), ubi agitur de veritate et falsitate propositionum, quae respiciunt futura contingentia. « Igitur, ait ibi Philosophus, esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est ». ⁴ Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. Verba Boethii invenies loc. cit. prosa 3. — Aliquanto superius post utrum illud Vat. inserit non, quod repugnant ex sententiae argumenti et codd. H P Q T Z etc. ⁵ Respicitur illa contingentis definitio, quam Aristotelis proponit I. Prior. c. 12: « Dico autem contingere et contingens, quo non existente necessario, posito autem in esse, nihil erit propter hoc impossibile »; et VIII. Phys. text. 36. (c. 5.): « Si ergo ponamus possibile esse, nullum impossibile accidet, falsum autem fortassi »; quae verba Scholastici sic reddere solebant: Possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile (cfr. Gilb. Porret., de Sex princ. circa finem). ⁶ Libr. III. c. 4. n. 11. In textu originali verba citata sic sonat: Sicut enim tu memoria tua non cogis, facta esse quae praeterierunt etc. ⁷ Sensus est: sicut si fingeremus, Deum nihil praescire, libero arbitrio nihil accresceret, sive liberum arbitrium esse omnino indifferens ad utrumlibet: ita, posita praescientia, nihil ei aufertur, sed ipsum manet indifferens. ⁸ Art. praeced. q. 1. — Cfr. et Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 1. c. 7.	¹ Question 1, ch. 1. — A little before this to the word a necessity [necessitatem] codex V adjoins about the foreknown [circa praescitum]. ² Chapter 9. — Generally the two species of propositions, starting with Aristotle (loc. cit., ch. 2), are distinguished, namely, as absolute and modal. The former is that, in which there is said simply, that the predicate convenes with (or is in), and/or does not convene with the subject; but the latter is that, in which there is also expressed the manner, in which the predicate convenes with, and/or does not convene with the subject. The former is also called a proposition concerning ‘being in’ [de inesse], which is twofold, namely, concerning ‘being in’ simply, and concerning ‘being in’ as now, insofar as the predicate convenes with the subject either necessarily (v. g. ‘a man is a soul’), or contingently. Similarly a proposition concerning a necessary is twofold, namely, concerning the necessary simply, and concerning the necessary as now. — Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 28. m. 4. a. 3, in reply to n. 2, and St. Thomas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 12, objection 4, according to the more ancient expositors of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus and Themistius, say, that in such a syllogism the conclusion does not follow concerning a necessary. But St. Bonaventure and even St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 5, objection 5, say the contrary, with Aristotle himself and also with Averroës, who in his Commentary on this text, discussing this controversy, impugns those interpreters with many words. Otherwise, these two contrary opinions can be well reconciled, if one says, that one opinion speaks of ‘being in’ simply, the other of ‘being in’ as now. Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Prior Analytics, Bk. I, q. 28, where he approves both the one and the other opinion with a distinction. — The words of (St.) Anselm, regard which the Seraphic Doctor next refers, have been cited in the preceding argument. ³ Chapter 7 (ch. 9), where he deals with the truth and falsity of the propositions, which respect future contingents. « Therefore, the Philosopher says there, that it is necessary that which is, when it is, is, and that that which is not, when it is not, is not ». ⁴ Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1 at the end. The words of (St.) Severinus Boethius are found loc. cit., prose 3. — Somewhat above this after whether that can- [utrum illud] the Vatican inserts –not, which is repugnant to the thought of the argument and to codices H P Q T Z etc.. ⁵ A reference to that definition of a contingent, which Aristotle proposes in Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 12: « Moreover, I say, that the contingent, by according to which it (is) not necessarily existing, is also contingent, but when (it has) been posited in a ‘to be’, nothing will be on this account impossible »; and Physics, Bk. VIII, text 36 (ch. 5): « If we posit, therefore, that it is possible, nothing impossible accedes, but perhaps a falsehood », which words the Scholastics were accustomed to render in this manner: With a possible posited in a ‘to be’, nothing impossible follows (cf. Gilbert of Porretain, de Sex principiis, near the end.) ⁶ Book III, ch. 4, n. 11. In the original text the cited words sound like this: For just as you by your memory do not compel, that those which have passed aware are made etc.. ⁷ The sense is: just as if we were to imagine, that God foreknew nothing, nothing would accrue to free will, or that free will is entirely indifferent to each: so, with the (Divine) Foreknowledge posited, nothing is taken away from it, but it remains indifferent. ⁸ In the preceding Article, q. 1. — Cf. also (St.) Anselm, On the Concord of God’s Foreknowledge with Free Will, q. 1, ch. 7.

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multo- / -rum futurorum non sit causa, ut malorum, nullam rebus imponit necessitatem.	future (things) is not the cause, such as of evil (things), It imposes no necessity upon things.
4. Item, divina praescientia praescit res, sicut sunt eventurae, cum nihil praesciat nisi verum: ergo cum praescit, aliquem peccaturum, cum peccatum non sit nisi per volutatem, praescit, istum per voluntatem hoc facere, et praescit, aliud posse facere. Ergo si omne quod praescit, est verum, verum est, quod iste per voluntatem hoc faciet et poterit aliud facere; et si hoc est contingens: ergo, si cum¹ divina praescientia est contingentia circa res, non ergo necessitas.	4. Likewise, the Divine Foreknowledge foreknows things, just as they are going to turn out, since It foreknows naught but (what is) true: therefore when It does foreknow, that someone (is) going to sin, since a sin is not but through a will, It foreknows, that this one through (his) will does this, and It foreknows, that he can do (something) else. Therefore, if everything which It foreknows, is true, it is true, that this one, through (his own) will, will do this; and if this is contingent: therefore, if with¹ the Divine Foreknowledge there is a contingency about things, therefore no necessity (is imposed with It).
5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus ducentibus ad impossibile. Si imponit praescientia rebus necessitatem, perit ergo casus et fortuna. Secundum impossibile est, quod perit liberum arbitrium et consilium. Tertium, quod perit meritum et demeritum. Quartum, quod perit laus et vituperium.²	5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown by reasons leading to the impossible. If the Foreknowledge imposes a necessity upon things, therefore chance [casus] and fortune perish. Second, it is impossible, that free will and counsel perish. Third, (it is impossible) that merit and demerit perish. Fourth, (it is impossible) that praise and blame [vituperium] perish.²
CONCLUSIO. Praescientia divina rebus non imponit necessitatem, sed ipsum modum contingentiae rerum contingentium praescit.	CONCLUSION The Divine Foreknowledge does not impose a necessity upon things, but It does foreknow the very manner of the contingence of contingent things.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod tres circa hoc fuerunt positiones.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that there were three positions about this.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod praescientia necessario, cum sit infallibilis, imponit necessitatem, et ideo abstulerunt liberum arbitrium et peccatum. — Et ista positio fuit haeretica et iniqua, quia destruit bonos mores.	For certain (authors) said, that the (Divine) Foreknowledge necessarily, since It is infallible, imposes a necessity, and for that reason they took away [abstulerunt] free will and sin. — And that position of their was heretical and iniquitous, because it destroyed good morals.
Alia positio fuit, quod divina praescientia, si esset, necessitatem imponeret, et sic omnis virtus et laus periret.³ Et quia dilexerunt rem publicam, ideo abstulerunt a Deo praescientiam, et a propositionibus de futuro abstulerunt veritatem. — Et haec haeretica fuit et impia, quia derogat nobilitate divinae.	The other position was, that the Divine Foreknowledge, if there was (such), would impose a necessity, and thus every virtue and praise would perish.³ And because they loved the State [rem publicam], for that reason they removed [abstulerunt] foreknowledge from God, and they removed truth from propositions concerning the future. — And this was heretical and impious, because it derogated from the Divine Nobility.
Tertia positio est catholica, quae Deum honorat et bonos mores conservat, et ideo iusta, pia et vera: quod⁴ divina praescientia est, et tamen non imponit rebus necessitatem. Omnia enim sic praecognoscit esse eventura, sicut eventura sunt; et ideo, cum multa sint eventura contingenter, ut illa quae sunt a libero arbitrio et casu et fortuna, sicut praescit, haec esse futura ab istis, sic praescit modum contingentiae, secundum quem sunt ab istis.	The third position is the Catholic one, which honor God and conserves good morals, and for that reason (it is) just, pious and true: that⁴ there is a Divine Foreknowledge, and yet It does not impose a necessity upon things. For in this manner He foreknows that they are going to turn out, just as they are going to turn out; and for that reason, since many are going to turn out contingently, such as those which are from free will and chance and fortune, just as He foreknows, that the former are going to be from the latter, so He foreknows the manner of (their) contingency, according to which they are from the latter.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod duplex est necessitas, scilicet absoluta, et respectiva. Necessitas absoluta, quae opponitur contingentiae, dicitur necessitas consequentis. Necessitas respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae; et haec non opponitur contingenti. Nam aliquod contingens necessario sequitur, ut si ambulet, necessario sequitur, quod movetur.⁵	Moreover, for an understanding of the objections it must be noted, that there is a twofold necessity, namely, the absolute, and the respective. An absolute necessity, which is opposed to contingency, is said (to be) the necessity of the consequent. A respective necessity is said (to be) the necessity of the consequence, and this is not opposed to the contingent. For something contingent necessarily follows, so that if one walks, it necessarily follows, that he moves.⁵
Dicendum ergo, quod in praescito non est necessitas absoluta, sed solum consequentiae, quia necessario sequitur: Deus praescit hoc, ergo hoc erit. Et hoc modo intelligitur auctoritas Anselmi, et consimiles auctoritates, quae proponuntur cum modo necessitatis; et sic patet primum.	It must be said, therefore, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only (a necessity) of consequence, because there necessarily follows: ‘God foreknows this, therefore this will be’. And in this manner the authority of (St.) Anselm is understood, and (those) completely similar authorities, which are proposed with a manner of necessity; and in this manner the first (objection) is clear.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de syllogismo ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse; dicendum, quod sicut patet, et Philosophus exponit, hoc intelligitur de ea propositione, quae est de inesse simpliciter, quod aequivalet necessario; sed minor huius syllogismi, scilicet: hoc est praescitum, non est de inesse simpliciter; sicut enim infra⁶ patebit, non est necessaria.	2. To that which is objected second concerning a syllogism (formed) from a major concerning a necessary and a minor concerning ‘being in’; it must be said, that just as is clear, and (as) the Philosopher expounds (it), this is understood of that proposition, which concerns ‘being in’ simply, which is equivalent to the necessary; but the minor of this syllogism, namely: ‘this has been foreknown’, does not concern ‘being in’ simply; for just as will be clear below,⁶ it is not necessary.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praescito, quod verum est, et si verum est, necessario est modo; dicendum, quod istam rationem facit Philosophus ad ostendendum, quod in futuris non est veritas; et est sophistica.⁷ Nam quando dicitur: omne quod est, quando est, necessario est; intelligitur de eo, quod ponit aliquid in actu circa suppositum, quod ex quo positum est, impossibile est non esse positum; sed verum de futuro nihil ponit circa subiectum, quia⁸ non est verum pro praesenti, sed solum pro futuro: et ideo nulla est necessitas, neque simpliciter, neque ut nunc, quia nihil ponit ut nunc.	3. To that which is objected concerning the foreknown, that it is true, and if it is true, it is now necessarily; it must be said, that the Philosopher makes that reckoning to shown, that among future (things) there is no truth; and it is a sophistic one [sophistica].⁷ For when there is said: “everything which is, when it is, is necessarily”; it is understood of that, which posits something in act about a supposed, to the extent that [quod] it is impossible that, that from which it has been posited, not have been posited, but the true concerning a future posits nothing about a subject, because⁸ it is not true for the present, but only for the future: and for that reason there is no necessity, neither simply, nor as now, because it posits nothing as now.
¹ Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2, 3 indebite omittunt cum. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 3. seq., et Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 2. c. 3. ² Cfr. de his Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 7. (c. 9.) et Boeth., Comment. in hunc locum, nec non August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 2. seqq., et V. de Civ. Dei, c. 9. seq., ubi recensentur diversae opiniones, quae mox in corpore quaestionis a S. Doctore adducuntur. ³ In cod. T additur et imponitur Tullio et sequacibus eius. ⁴ Cod. T scilicet quod; Vat. cum cod. cc quia. ⁵ Secundum Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 3. et 6. haec duplex necessitas vocatur absoluta et conditionalis, secundum Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17., et de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 1. c. 3. dicitur antecedens et consequens. — Paulo superius post sequitur cod. O addit ad aliud contingens. Mox post Dicendum in pluribus mss. et ed. 1 desideratur ergo. ⁶ Quaest. seq. ⁷ Sophistica est illa ratio non in sensu, quod illud principium Aristotelis sit falsum, sed quatenus applicatur ad probandum, vel quod in propositionibus de futuro nulla sit veritas, etiam supposito respectu ad primam causam (ut vult opinio 2. in corp. relata), vel quod etiam futurum contingens praescitum necessario eveniat (ut vult opinio 1. et opponens). Ceterum quod « in futuro, quantum est ex parte rei contingentis, nulla sit certitudo » cum S. Thoma docet S. Bonav. infra q. 2. Aliter loquendum de futuro sub ratione divinae praesvisionis. — Codd. R X sic: veritas determinata; et ista ratio est sophistica. Pro sophistica ed. 1 sophisma. Mox pro omne quod multi codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, esse quod. ⁸ Cod. T particulam quia, hic suppressam, paulo ante interiicit post verba de futuro. In fine solutionis verba quia nihil ponit, ut nunc, sic sunt explicanda: quia nulllum ponit subiectum actu existens.	¹ Very many codices, and also editions 1, 2, and 3, unduly omit with [cum]. — Concerning this argument cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, prose 3 f., and (St.) Anselm, On the Concord of God’s Foreknowledge and Free Will, q. 2, ch. 3. ² Concerning these, cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 7 (ch. 9), and (St. Severinus) Boethius’ Commentary on this passage, and also (St.) Augustine, On Free Will¸ Bk. III, ch. 2, ff., and On the City of God, Bk. V, ch. 9 f., where the diverse opinions, which are next adduced in the body of the Question by the Seraphic Doctor, are reviewed. ³ In codex T there is added and it was imposed by (Marcus) Tullius (Cicero) and his followers [et imponitur Tullio et sequacibus eius]. ⁴ Codex T has namely, that [scilicet quod]; the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has because [quia]. ⁵ According to (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, prose 3 and 6, this twofold necessity is called absolute and conditional; according to (St.) Anselm, Why God became Man, Bk. II, ch. 17, and his On the Concord of God’s Foreknowledge and Free Will, q. 1, ch. 3, there is said (to be) a antecedent and consequent (necessity). Next after It must be said [Dicendum] in many manuscripts and edition 1 there is wanting therefore [ergo]. ⁶ In the following Question. ⁷ That reckoning is sophistic not in the sense, that that principle of Aristotle is false, but to the extent that it is applied to prove, either that in propositions concerning the future there is no truth, even when supposed in respect to the First Cause (as the 2nd opinion related in the body of the Response would have it), and/or that even a foreknown, contingent future (thing) necessarily comes forth (as the 1st opinion and the objection would have it). Otherwise that « in a future (thing), as much as it is on the part of the contingent thing, there is no certitude » St. Bonaventure, together with St. Thomas, teaches, below in q. 2. On must speak in another manner concerning the future (thing) under the reckoning of the Divine Foresight. — Codices R and X read thus: there is no determined truth; and that reckoning is sophistic [veritas determinate; et ista ratio est sophistica]. For a sophistic one [sophistica] edition 1 has a sophism [sophisma]. Next for everything which [omne quod] many codices, and editions 1, 2, and 3, have the ‘being’ which [esse quod]. ⁸ Codex T moves the particle because [quia] after for the present [pro praesenti]. At the end of the solution the words because it posits nothing as now [quia nihil ponit, ut nunc] are to be explained thus: because it posits no subject existing in act.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur per impossibile, quod si posset aliter esse, posset falli etc.; dicendum, quod¹ falsitas venit ex discordia intellectus ad cognitum, similiter potentia fallendi ex potentia discordandi. Dico igitur, quoniam necessario praescitum: sequitur ad praescientiam, ideo non possunt discordare: et ideo nunquam fallitur, nec potest falli.	4. To that which is objected per impossibile, that if it could be otherwise, It could fail; it must be said, that¹ falsehood [falsitas] comes from the discord of an intellect regarding the cognized, similarly the potency to fail [potential fallendi] from the potency to be discordant [potential discordandi]. Therefore, I say, that since (it is) necessarily foreknown: it follows after the Foreknowledge, for that reason they cannot be discordant: and for that reason It never fails, nor can It fail.
5. Quod ergo obiciitur, utrum aliter possit esse; dicendum, quod aliter potest esse, quia Deus potest aliter praescisse; et cum ponitur, quod aliter sit,² ponitur, quod aliter praescit. Quando ergo infertur: potest aliter esse, quam sit; et Deus praescivit sic: ergo aliter,³ quam Deus praescit, distinguenda est conclusio: quia potest intelligi divisim, et sic vera est; et est sensus: Deus praescit hoc evenire, et possibile est, illud non evenire; si autem coniunctim, falsa; et est sensus: illud est possibile, quod Deus praescit uno modo, et eveniat alio. Et est fallacia compositionis in illo processu, sicut hic: currens potest non moveri: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis currat et non moveatur; non sequitur. Similiter, cum quaeritur, quod ponatur; ponendum est; sed cum assumit: Deus praescivit, hoc est oppositum ponenti:⁴ et ideo est negandum.	5. What, therefore, is objected, whether it can be otherwise; it must be said, that it can be otherwise, because God could have foreknown (it) otherwise; and when it is posited, that it is² otherwise, it is posited, that He foreknows (it) otherwise. Therefore when it is inferred: ‘it can be otherwise, than it is; and God thus foreknew (it): therefore (this can be)³ otherwise, than God foreknows (it)’, the conclusion must be distinguished: because it can be understood separately [divisim], and thus it is true: and the sense is: ‘God foreknows that this comes forth’, and ‘it is possible, that it does not come forth’; but if conjunctively, (it is) false; and the sense is: ‘it is possible, that God foreknows (it) in one manner, and it turns out in another’. And there is a fallacy of composition in that (manner of) proceeding, just as here: ‘the one running can not move: therefore it is possible, that someone runs and does not move’; (which) does not follow. Similarly, when there is asked, “Whether it may be posited (etc.) ?”; it must be posited (that ‘everything possible (is) able to be posited’); but when it assumes: ‘God foreknew (it)’, this is opposed to the (thing it) posits:⁴ and for that reason it must be denied.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Utramque opinionem quae vel libertatem creaturae negat, ut divinam praescientiam salvet, vel praescientiam tollit, ut libertatem salvet, ut impiam respuendam esse, catholic fide constat. Cum autem divinae praescientiae conveniat omnimoda infallibilitas et immutabilitas in sciendo, et in ea etiam implicetur quaedam causalitas respectu sciti, ex utroque capite libertati creati arbitrii praeiudicari posse videtur. Secundam hanc difficultatem S. Doctor hic 3. et 5. argg. in fundam breviter elidit; plura vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp., et infra d. 40. dub. 7, et ibid. a. 2. q. 1, d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Omnino constat, quod causalitas illa, qua Deus influit in causas secundas et cooperatur liberis actibus creaturarum intellectualium, congruit naturae agentium nec libertatem tollit, sed potius ponit; tamen de modo, quo fiat hic concursus et quo libertas sit salvanda, inter theologos catholicos desceptatur. — Prima autem difficultas hic cum communi sententia evidenter solvitur, adhibita illa distinctione inter necessitatem consequentis et consequentiae, quam ex Boethio (de Consolat. V. pros. 6.) scholae catholicae sub variis nominibus receperunt. Verba Boethiis sunt: « Duae sunt necessitates: simplex una, veluti quod necesse est, omnes homines esse mortales; altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, cum ambulare necesse est. Quod enim quisque novit, id esse aliter ac notum est nequit. Sed haec conditio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim necessitatem non propria facit natura, sed conditionis adiectio. Nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere voluntarie gradientem, quamvis eum tamen, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit ». Deinde idem auctor hanc distinctionem adhibet ad demonstrandum, divina providentia non laedi libertatem creatam. — Eandem distinctionem S. Doctor adhibet infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 47. q. 1. et alibi.	I.. Each opinion which either denies the liberty of the creature, to save the Divine Foreknowledge, or takes away the Foreknowledge, to save the liberty, it is established by the Catholic Faith, that it must be rejected as impious. However, since with the Divine Foreknowledge there convenes an omnimodal infallibility and immutability in knowing, and in those too there is implied a certain causality in respect of the known, it does seem that from each source [capite] the liberty of created judgment can be prejudiced. This second difficulty the Seraphic Doctor, here in the 3rd and 5th argument of the fundament, briefly destroys; see more on this in a. 1, q. 2, in the body (of the Response), and below in d. 40, dubium 7, and ibid., a. 2, q. 1, and in d. 45, a. 2. q. 2. It is entirely established, that that causality, by which God influences [influit in] second causes and cooperates with the free acts of intellectual creatures, is congruent with the nature of (free) agents and does not take away (their) liberty, but rather posits (it); yet concerning the manner, in which this concursus comes to be and in which liberty is saved, there is a debate among Catholic theologians. — However, the first difficulty is evidently solved here together with the common sentence, by employing that distinction between the necessity of a consequent and of a consequence, which the Catholic Schools received from (St. Severinus) Boethius (On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, pros. 6) under various names. The words of (St.) Boethius are these: « There are two necessities: one simple, as that it is necessary, that all men are mortal; the other of a condition, such as whether you know that someone is walking, when it is necessary that he is walking. For it is not possible, that anyone knew, that it was other than it was known. But this condition draws with it that simple (necessity) least of all. For its own nature does not cause the latter necessity, but the adjunction of a condition (does). For no necessity compels that one walking voluntarily go forward, though it is necessary, however, that when he walks, he goes forward ». Then the same author employs this distinction to demonstrate, that the Divine Providence does not injure created liberty. — the same distinction is employed by the Seraphic Doctor below in d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 and 2, and in d. 47, q. 1 and elsewhere.
II. Solutiones ad 2. 3. fundantur in distinctione rei actu existentis et rei futurae. Quoad rem existentem vera est sententia Aristotelis, quod omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse, necessitate scilicet, quae consequitur ex suppositione, quod subiectum nunc existit (unde vocatur a S. Doctore « necessitas ut nunc »), quia existentia excludit non-existentiam; non autem verum est de eo, quod nondum est, sed futurum est, quia pro nunc nihil ponit in re circa subiectum. — In 5. ad oppost. supponitur, aliquid esse a Deo praescitum, et tamen non esse futurum. Ad eludendum sophisma opponentium S. Doctor utitur celebri distinctione compositi et divisi, uti ex littera patet. Eandem obiectionem S. Thom. (hic a. 5. ad 5.) in eodem sensu solvit, adhibita distinctione, « quod potest esse (propositio) de dicto, vel de re; et si sit de dicto, vera est (scil. quod omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse), et si sit de re, falsa est ».	II. The solutions to nn. 2 and 3 are founded on the distinction of a thing exiting in act [rei actu existentis] and of a thing going to be [rei futurae]. In regard to the existing thing the sentence of Aristotle is true, that everything which is, when it is, it is necessary that it is, by a necessity, namely, which is consequent from the supposition, that the subject now exists (whence it is called by the Seraphic Doctor « the necessity as now »), because existence excludes non-existence; but it is not true of that, which is not yet, but is going to be, because in virtue of the now nothing is posited in the thing about the subject. — In the 5th opposed argument there is supposed, that something has been foreknown by God, and yet is not going to be. To elude the sophism of the objections, the Seraphic Doctor uses the celebrated distinction of the composed and the divided, as is clear from the text. St. Thomas (here in a. 5, in reply to n. 5) solves the same objection, by employing the distinction, « that (the proposition) can concern the saying, and/or the thing; and if it concerns the saying, it is true (that is, that it is necessary, that everything known by God, be), and if it concerns the thing, it is false ».
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 24. m. 4. 5. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 39. q. unica; de Rerum principio, q. 4. a. 2. sectio 5. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5, S. I. q. 14. a. 13; S. c. Gent. I. c. 67; de Verit. q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 15. q. 61. m. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. n. 19. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.	III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 24, m. 4 and 5. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 39, q. sole; de Rerum principio, q. 4, a. 2, section 5. — St. Thomas, here in the q. sole, a. 5, Summa., I, q. 14, a. 13; Summa contra Gentiles. I, c. 67; Disputed Questions on Truth., q. 2, a. 12. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus)., here in a. 4; Summa., p. I, tr. 15, q. 61, m. 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 6. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd princ., q. 3. — Durandus, here in q. 3, n. 19. ff.. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in the q. sole.
¹ Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, nullo codice suffragante, addit: sicut veritas venit ex concordia intellectus ad rem cognitam, haec autem concordia non est aliud, quam adaequatio rei et intellectus: sic. Mox pro Dico igitur codd. H T interserunt quod. ² Fide codd. A F H K T et plurium aliorum, postulante insuper contextu, cum ed. 1 substituimus sit pro scit, quae est vitiosa lectio Vat. Paulo ante pro praescisse cod. V praescire. ³ Intellige: hoc potest esse sive evenire. — Verba, quae mox sequuntur: potest intelligi divisim . . . coniunctim, dicere volunt: conclusio potest intelligi in sensu diviso et in sensu composito. ⁴ Vat. posito, et paulo ante ponitur pro ponatur. Utraque lectio est obscura ob brevitatem et ambiguum sensum verbi ponere, quod vel inferre, vel supponere poterit significare. Facilior explicatio videtur esse haec: post ponatur supple: etc., scil. hoc non esse, ut legitur in 5.* ad opposit. Verba Ponendum est concedunt applicationem principii ibi memorati: omne possible ponibile.	¹ The Vatican edition, together with editions 4 and 5, supported by no codex, adds: just as truth comes from the concord of an intellect regarding the thing cognized, but this concord is not other, than the adequation of thing and intellect: so [sicut veritas venit ex concordia intellectus ad rem cognitam, haec autem concordia non est aliud, quam adaequatio rei et intellectus: sic]. Next for I say, therefore [Dico igitur] codices H and T insert Wherefore [quod]. ² Trusting in codices A F H K T and very many others, as required moreover by the context, we have substituted, together with edition 1, it is [sit] for He knows (it) [scit], which is the vitiated reading of the Vatican edition. A little before this for could have foreknown [potest praescisse] codex V has can foreknow [potest praescire]. ³ Understand: this can be or come forth [hoc potest esse sive evenire].. — The words, which follow next: it can be understood separately . . . but if conjunctively, [potest intelligi divisim . . . coniunctim], mean to say: the conclusion can be understood in a divided and a composite sense. ⁴ The Vatican edition reads to (the thing) posited [ponento], and a little before this it has what is posited [quod ponitur] for whether it may be posited [quod ponatur]. Each reading is obscure on account of the brevity and ambiguous sense of the verb to posit [ponere], which could signify either to infer or to suppose. The easier explanation seems to be this: after it be posited [ponatur] supply: etc., namely that this is not [hoc non esse], as is read in the 5th* opposed argument. The words it must be posited [ponendum est] concede the application of the principle cited there: ‘everything possible (is) able to be posited’.
* [Trans. nota: Hic nota originalis perperam legivit 4 pro 5]	* [Trans. note: Here the original note faultily reads 4th for 5th.]

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII