COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. I, d. 43, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
PRIMI LIBRI	BOOK ONE
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLIII
ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE SOLE Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 768-771. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 768-771. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum divina essentia sit infinita.	QUESTION 2 Whether the Divine Essence is infinite.
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum essentia sit infinita sive divina potentia sit infinita quantum ad esse. Et quod sic, videtur.	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the (Divine) Essence is infinite or (whether) the Divine Power is infinite as much as regards (Its) ‘being’. And it seems, that it is so,
1. Quia nulla potentia nobilior est substantia; sed divina potentia est infinita: ergo cum¹ non sit nobilior nec maior substantia, necesse est, substantiam esse infinitam.	1. Because no power is more noble than (its) substance; but the Divine Power is infinite: therefore since (the Divine Power)¹ is not more noble nor greater than the (Divine) Substance, it is necessary, that the Substance be infinite.
2. Item, si aliqua duo — liceat sic dicere — sint omnino idem, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed substantia et potentia sunt idem, et esse et posse:² ergo cum divinum posse sit infinitum, et esse, et ita essentia.	2. Likewise, if any two — let one be allow to speak thus — are entirely the same, if one is infinite, the remainder is also; but (God’s) Substance and Power are the Same, and (His) ‘Being’ and “Being able”:² therefore since the Divine “Being able” is infinite, (His) ‘Being’ (is) also, and thus (His) Essence (is) too.
3. Item, quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod ad nihil se extendit unum, ad quod pariter non se extendat reliquum, si unum est infinitum, et reliquum; sed ad nihil omnino se extendit potentia, ad quod non se extendat essentia — nunquam Deus potest facere tot, quin eius substantia possit esse in tot, secundum quod dicitur tertii Regum octavo:³ Si caelum et caeli caelorum etc. — ergo etc.	3. Likewise, whensoever any two so hold themselves, that one extends itself to nothing, to which the remainder does not extend itself equally, if one is infinite, the remainder (is) also; but the (Divine) Power extends Itself to entirely nothing, to which the (Divine) Essence does not extend Itself — God can never do as many as what His Substance can to be in, according to what is said in the eighth (chapter) of the third (book) of Kings:³ If the sky and the Heavens of the heavens etc.. — ergo etc..
4. Item, omni finito potest aliquid cogitari maius, scilicet infinitum ipsum; sed divina essentia est ita bona et magna, quod nihil maius nec melius cogitari potest,⁴ alioquin non est Deus: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, than every finite something can be thought (to be) greater, namely the infinite itself; but the Divine Essence is so good and great, that nothing greater nor better can be thought,⁴ otherwise It is not God: ergo etc..
5. Item, omne finitum bonum melius est cum alio bono quam per se tantum, quia finitum additum finito facit maius: ergo si divina essentia est finita, maius aliquid cum alio erit quam per se tantum: ergo non est perfectissima nec optima; quod omnino nefas est dicere.	5. Likewise, every finite good is better with another good than only through itself, because a finite added to a finite makes a greater: therefore if the Divine Essence is finite, It will be a greater something with another than only through Itself: therefore it is not the most perfect nor the best; which one is entirely forbidden [nefas] to say.
6. Item, omne finitum bonum contingit aliquando aequari et reddi per duplicationem finiti, ut patet in linea — et hoc dico, si illud quod duplatur, facit maius, hoc dico propter punctum⁵ — si ergo divina essentia est finita secundum nobilitatem et bonitatem, si dupletur bonitas creaturae, ascendendo aliquando pervenietur ad bonitatem aequalem divinae bonitati; hoc autem est falsum et impossibile, quod creatura sit proportionalis Creatori, et hoc dicit Augustinus octavo de Trinitate:⁶ ergo et illud, ex quod sequitur, scilicet quod divina essentia sit finita.	6. Likewise, every finite good happens at some time to be equaled and rendered through the duplication of a finite, as is clear in a line — and I say this (under this condition): “if that which is doubled [duplatur], makes a greater”: (for) this I say on account of a point⁵ — if, therefore, the Divine Essence is finite according to nobility and goodness, if the goodness of a creature be doubled, by ascending at some time it will arrive at a goodness equal to the Divine Goodness; but it is false and impossible, that a creature be proportional to the Creator, and this (St.) Augustine says in the eighth (book) On the Trinity:⁶ therefore also that, from which it follows, namely, that the Divine Essence is finite.
SED CONTRA 1. « Finitum et infinitum, ut dicit Philosophus,⁷ sunt propriae passiones ipsius quantitatis »; sed essentia ut essentia non habet quantitatem molis: ergo si consideratur ut in abstractione virtutis ut essentia, divina essentia nec est finita nec infinita.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. « The finite and the infinite, as the Philosopher says,⁷ are proper passions of quantity itself »; but the (Divine) Essence as an essence does not have a quantity of mass: therefore if It is considered as in the abstraction (from a quantity) of virtue as an essence, the Divine Essence is neither finite nor infinite.
2. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest unum solum, ita quod non aliud, est potentia finita: ergo pari ratione omnis essentia, quae est unum solum, ita quod nihil aliud, est essentia finita; sed divina essentia est Deus et nihil aliud: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, every power, which can (cause) only one (effect), thus that (it can) not (cause) another, is a finite power: therefore, for an equal reason, every essence, which is only one (thing), such that (it is) nothing else, is a finite essence; but the Divine Essence is God and nothing else: ergo etc..
3. Item, omne illud quod est finitum summae veritati, est simpliciter finitum — et hoc patet, quia prima veritas iudicat de unoquoque, sicut est: patet etiam in simili, ut hoc est album et nigrum et bonum Deo, ergo simpliciter bonum — sed divina essentia est veritati divinae cognitionis finita, quia Deus ipsam comprehendit et novit perfecte, et « quod scitur, ut dicit Augustinus,⁸ scientis comprehensione finitur »; ergo etc..	3. Likewise, every that which is finite to the Most High Truth, is simply finite — and this is clear, because the First Truth judges of each one, just as it is: it is also clear in the simile, such as “this is white and black and good to God, therefore (it is) simply good” — but the Divine Essence is finite to the truth of the Divine Cognition, because God comprehends and knows [novit] It perfectly, and « what is known [scitur] », as (St.) Augustine⁸ says, « is finished by the comprehension of the one knowing »: ergo etc..
¹ Supple cum cod. M potentia. Subinde idem cod. M post maior interserit quam. — Hoc argumentum fundatur in axiomate: operari sequitur esse. ² Intellige: in Deo. Cfr. August., VI. et VII. de Trin. c. 1. seqq. ³ Vers. 27, et II. Paralip. 2, 6. Primus locus sic prosequitur: te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam aedificavi. — Paulo superius voci nunquam cod. Y praefigit quia; Vat. eidem voci nunquam adiicit enim, et dein pro eius substantia exhibet etiam substantia. ⁴ Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10, et Anselm., Proslog. c. 2, nec non libr. contra Insipientem, c. 1. seqq. — Proxima post pro est Deus Vat. esset Deus. ⁵ Nam punctum additum puncto non facit maius. Cfr. supra pag. 660, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro duplatur aliqui codd. duplicatur, aliqui cum cod. T duplicetur. ⁶ Cap. 2. n. 3. ⁷ Libr. I. Phys. text. 15. (c. 2.): « Infinitum enim in quanto est . . . infiniti enim ratio [definitio] quanto utitur, sed non substantia nec quali ». Quae verba Averroes sic interpretaur: « Infinitum enim et finitum sunt de differentiis quantitatis ». De quantite molis et virtutis, cfr. August., libr. de Quant. animae, c. 3. n. 4. — Ante virtutis supple cum ed. 1 a quantitate. In Vat. desideratur molis, et loco virtutis legitur a quantitate. Dein post ut essentia codd. V X subiiciunt est. ⁸ Libr. XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18.	¹ Supply together with codex M the (Divine) Power [potentia]. Then the same codex M after greater [maior] inserts than [quam] explicitly. — This argument is founded upon the axiom: ‘to operate’ follows ‘to be’. ² Understand these in reference to God. Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bks. VI and VII, ch. 1, ff.. ³ Verse 27, and 2 Paralipomenon 2:6. The first passage continues thus: cannot grasp Thee, how much more this house, which I have built [te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam aedificavi]. — A little above this codex Y prefixes beczause [quia] to God can never [nunquam Deus potest]; the Vatican edition adds for [enim] instead, and then even (His) Substance [etiam substantia] for His Subtance [eius substantia]. ⁴ (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prose 10, and (St.) Anselm, Proslogion., ch. 2, and also (his) book Against the Foolish Man, ch. 1 ff.. — Immediate after this for It is not God [non est Deus] the Vatican edition has It would not be God [non esset Deus]. ⁵ For a point added to a point does not make it greater. Cf. above d. 37, p. II. a. 2, q. 2, p. 660, footnote 6. — A little before this for doubled [duplatur] some codices have duplicated [duplicatur], others together with codex T have doubled [duplicetur] in the subjunctive. ⁶ Chapter 2, n. 3. ⁷ Physics, Bk. I, text 15 (ch. 2): « For the infinite is in a quantum . . . for the reckoning of the infinite uses a quantum, but not substance nor quality ». Which words Averroës interprets thus: « For the infinite and the finite concern differences of quantity ». On the quantity of mass and virtue, cf. (St.) Augustine’s book, On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 3, n. 4. — Before of virtue [virtutis] supply together with edition 1 from a quantity [a quantitate]. In the Vatican edition there is wanting of mass [molis], and in the place of (from a quantity) of virtue [virtutis] there is read from a quantity [a quantitate]. Then after as an essence [ut essentia] codices V and X subjoin is [est]. ⁸ On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 18.

p. 769

4. Item, nullum infinitum finit aliud, quia nihil dat alii quod non habet:¹ ergo si divina essentia est infinita, ergo nihil finit, ergo nullius est finis; et si hoc: ergo nihil bonum.	4. Likewise, no infinite limits [finit] another, because nothing gives to another what it does not have:¹ therefore if the Divine Essence is infinite, therefore it limits nothing, therefore It is the end of nothing; and if this: therefore (It is) not at all [nihil] the Good.
5. Item, nullum infinitum comprehenditur a Beatis, quia aliter non essent beati, nisi Deum perfecte cognoscerent — semper enim appetitus ferretur ad amplius, et non quiescerent, et ita non essent beati — si ergo comprehenditur, non est infinitus.	5. Likewise, no infinite is comprehended by the Blessed, because otherwise they would not be blessed, unless they perfectly cognized God — for (their) appetite would always be born towards the more, and they would not be at rest, and thus would not be blessed — therefore, if it is comprehended, it is not infinite.
6. Item, nulla privatio est habitu nobilior: ergo cum infinitum dicat privationem, finitum dicat habitum, et omne nobilius Deo est attribuendum, patet etc.	6. Likewise, no privation is more noble than a having: therefore since the “infinite” means a privation, the “finite” means a having, and everything more noble must be attributed to God, it is clear that etc..
CONCLUSIO. Essentia divina est omnino infinita in actu.	CONCLUSION The Divine Essence is entirely infinite in act.
RESPONDEO: Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod divina essentia sub ratione essentiae est finita, sub ratione potentiae est infinita. Nam essentia nominat Deum ut in se, et sic est finitus, quia perfectus; finitus etiam, quia comprehenditur a finito, ut a Beatis; et hoc dixerunt propter essentiae simplicitatem, quam dixerunt totam videri. In quantum autem consideratur sub ratione potentiae, sic dicit respectum ad effectus. Et quia non est status ibi, quia semper est aliquid extra accipere,² dixerunt, quod sub ratione potentiae erat infinita. — Sed ista positio erronea fuit manifeste. Nam ista duo sunt incompossibilia, quod potentia sit infinita, omnino existente substantia finita, et quia idem sunt omnino, et quia prior secundum rationem intelligendi est substantia, et quia ad quiquid se extendit potentia sub ratione potentiae, et essentia, ut ostensum est.³	I RESPOND: To this certain (authors) wanted to say, that the Divine Essence under the reckoning of essence is finite, under the reckoning of power is infinite. For “the Essence” names God as (He is) in Himself, and thus He is finite, because (He is) perfect; (He is) also finite, because He is comprehended by the finite, as by the Blessed; and this they said on account of the Simplicity of the Essence, the whole of which they said is seen. But inasmuch as It is considered under the reckoning of power, thus It means a looking back to (Its) effects. And because there is not standing still there, because there is always something extra to accept,² they said, that under the reckoning of power It was infinite. — But that position was manifestly erroneous. For these two are incomposable, that the (Divine) Power be infinite, with the Substance existing as entirely finite, and because They are entirely the Same, and because the Substance is prior according to the reckoning of understanding, and because to whatever the Power extends Itself under the reckoning of power, the Essence (does) also (under the reckoning of essence), as has been shown.³
Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod est infinitum⁴ simpliciter et infinitum nobis: et voluerunt dicere, quod tam essentia quam potentia est finita secundum veritatem, quia est finita Deo, qui est veritas; sed tamen utraque nobis est infinita, quia improportionaliter nos excedit. Unde « Deus infinitus dicitur, quia nec loco nec tempore nec comprehensione comprehenditur », sicut dicit Damascenus.⁵ — Sed iterum ista positio non potest stare, quoniam, sicut supra⁶ probatum est de potentia, quod ipsa non habet statum in possendo, et iterum, est omnino actu, et ideo ponitur vere infinita; sic etiam probari potest essentia.	And on this account some said, that there is a simply infinite⁴ and an infinite to us: and they wanted to say, that both the (Divine) Essence and Power is finite according to truth, because It is finite to God, who is the Truth; but yet each is infinite to us, because It exceeds us improportionally. Wherefore « God is said (to be) “infinite”, because He is neither comprehended by place nor by time nor by comprehension », as (St. John) Damascene says.⁵ — But again this position of theirs cannot stand, since, just as has been proven above⁶ concerning the (Divine) Power, that It does not have a standing still in being able, and again, It is entirely in act, and for that reason It is posited as truly infinite; so also can the (Divine) Essence be proven (to be such).
Necesse est ergo, quod omnino infinita sit actu. Et hoc concedendum est et tenendum est tanquam verum, eo quod magis est consonum fidei, quae dicit Deum immensum, et magis consonum auctoritatibus Sanctorum, qui omnes dicunt ipsum infinitum, unde Damascenus⁷ dicit, quod Deus est « quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum »; magis etiam consonum sententiis magistrorum, magis etiam consonum rationi.	Therefore it is necessary, that It be entirely infinite in act. And this must be conceded and it must be held as true, to this extend that it is more consonant with the Faith, which says that God (is) immense, and (is) more consonant with the authorities of the Saints, who all say that He (is) infinite, wherefore (St. John) Damascene⁷ says, that God is « a certain, infinite sea of substance »; (it is) also more consonant with the sentences of the masters (of theology), (it is) also more consonant with reason.
Ad intelligentiam igitur obiectorum in oppositum notandum, quod infinitum dicitur per abnegationem finis. Potest ergo dupliciter dici infinitum, scilicet a parte negationis, et similiter a parte finis.⁸	Therefore for an understanding of the objections for the opposite it must be noted, that the “infinite” is said through an denial of an end [per abnegationem finis]. Therefore the “infinite” can be said in a twofold manner, namely on the part of a negation and similarly on the part of an end.⁸
A parte finis: nam finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, quod est complementum; et sic infinitum dicitur per privationem complementi, et hoc modo . . .	On the part of an end. for and “end” is said in a twofold manner, in one manner, as that which is a complement; and in this manner the “infinite” is said through a privation of a complement, and in this manner . . .
¹ Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3 (c. 22.). — Ultima huius argumenti conclusio: ergo nihil bonum, plane consequitur ex praecedentibus, dummodo illud axioma adhibetur: finis et bonum sunt idem sive convertuntur, quod axioma apud Aristot. saepe saepius occurit, sic I. Rhetor. c. de Bono et utili (c. 6.), I. Ethic. c. 1, I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. seq. (c. 1.), V. Metaph. text. 3. (IV. c. 2.). — Cod. Y in fine argumenti adiungit: sed hoc falsum: ergo et illud unde sequitur. ² Respicitur Aristotelica definitio infiniti, supra pag. 764, nota 3. ³ Hic in tribus primis fundamentis. ⁴ Vat. cum cod. cc finitum. In ed. 1 legitur sic: Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod [essentia divina] non est infinitum simpliciter, sed infiinitum nobis. ⁵ Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 4. In textu cit. pro dicitur plures codd. est; aliqui codd. omittunt dicitur nec pro eo substituunt aliud verbum. ⁶ Quaest. praecedt. — Paulo inferius pro actu in Vat. habetur actus, et dein omittitur vere. ⁷ Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 9. — Post verba consonum rationi in cod. M largum habetur additamentum, quod ex iis quae postea sequuntur, confectum videtur, paucis tantum additis. Additur igitur: Vel melius ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod in quaestione, in qua est multiplicitas nominis, prius oportet secundum artem distinguere, quam aliquid asserere vel negare. Intelligendum ergo, quod infinitum dupliciter dicitur, scilicet privative et negative. Secundum quod dicitur privative, sic privat actum et reliquit aptitudinem, et hoc modo dicitur infinitum, quod est natum finiri, non tamen est finitum, et sic sonat in incompletionem, ut materia dicitur infinita; secundum autem quod dicitur negative, sic simpliciter removet finem seu finitatem. Sed hoc dupliciter habet intelligi secundum duplicem acceptionem finis: dicitur enim finis terminus, finis complementum, et ideo infinitum dicitur vel per abnegationem finis complementi, et sic dicitur malum infinitum, vel per abnegationem finis termini, et hoc dupliciter potest esse secundum duplicem terminum: est enim terminus secundum quantitatem materialem, et est terminus secundum quantiatem spiritualem. Prima dicitur quantitas molis, secunda dicitur quantitas virtutis. Infinitum igitur per abnegation termini circa quantitatem molis semper dicit aliquam incompletionem aliquod modo vel actu vel potentia, quia dicit rescessum a simplici quantitate; talis enim quantitas non simul stat cum simplicitate in eodem et secundum idem, et tale infinitum nunquam est actu, sed solum potentia, actu autem finitum. Infinitum vero per abnegatinem termini circa quantiatem virtutis non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed summam perfectionem, quia non repugnat simplicitati, immo non potest esse nisi in summe simplici; et tali modo Scripturae auctoritas et fidei confessio ponunt infinitatem sive immensitatem in ipso Deo simplicissimo. ⁸ Sensu est: infinitum, quia st vocabulum compositum ex particula negativa in et verbo finitum, dupliciter considerari potest, et secundum particularm negativam, et secunum verbum.	¹ Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 22). — The last conclusion of this argument: therefore (It is) not at all the good [ergo nihil bonum], plainly follows from the preceding, so long as this axiom is employed: ‘the end and the good are, or are convertible as, the same’, which axiom occurs very frequently in Aristotle, thus Rhetorics, Bk. I, ch. “On the Good and the Useful” (ch. 6); Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1; Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2 f (ch. 1), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 3 (Bk. IV, ch. 2). — Codex Y adjoins at the end of the argument: but this (is) false: therefore aslo that from which it follows [sed hoc falsum: ergo et illud unde sequitur]. ² A reference to the Aristotelian definition of the infinite, cited above in the preceding Question, p. 764, footnote 3. ³ Here in the first three arguments of the fundament. ⁴ The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, have a simply finite [finitum simpliciter]. In edition 1 it reads thus: And on this account some said, that (the Divine Essence) is not simply infinite, but (It is) infinite to us [Et propter hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod non est infinitum simpliciter, sed infiinitum nobis]. ⁵ On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 4. In the text cited for is said (to be) “infinite” [infinitus dicitur] very many codices have is infinite [infinitus est]; some codices read instead (is) infinite [infinitus], omitting entirely anything else. ⁶ In the preceding Question. — A little below this for in act [actu] in the Vatican edition there is had an act [actus], and then truly [vere] is omitted. ⁷ On the Orthodox Faith., Bk. I, ch. 9. — After the words consonant with reason [consonum rationi] there is had in codex M a long addition, which appears to have been composed from those which follow hereafter, with only a few things added. Therefore the addition reads thus: “And/or for a better understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that in the question, in which there is a multiplicity of the name, it is first necessary according to the art (of logic) to distinguish, rather to assert and/or deny something. Therefore it must be understood, that the “infinite” is said in a twofold manner, namely privatively and negatives. According to which it is said privatively, thus it deprives an act and leaves an aptitude, and in this manner there is said (to be) “infinite”, that which is bound to be finished, yet is not finished, and in this manner it means [sonat in] an incompletion, such as matter is said (to be) “infinite”; but according to which it is said negatively, thus it simply removes an end or a finity. But this has in a twofold manner an understanding according to the twofold acceptation of “end”: for and end is said (to be) a “terminus”, (and) an end (is said to be) a “complement”, and for that reason the “infinite” is said either through the denial of an end as a complement, and in this manner evil is said (to be) “infinite”, and/or through the denial of an end as a terminus, and this can be in a twofold manner according to a twofold terminus: for there is a terminus according to a material quantity, and there is a terminus according to a spiritual quantity. The first is said (to be) a “quantity of mass”, the second is said (to be) a “quantity of virtue”. Therefore the “infinite” through a denial of a terminus about a quantity of mass always means some incompletion in some manner, either in act and/or in potency, because it means a recess from a simply quantity; for such a quantity cannot stand together with simplicity in the same (thing) and according to the same (consideration), and such an infinite never is in act, but only in potency, moreover in act (it is) finite. However the “infinite” through a denial of a terminus about the quantity of virtue does not mean some imperfection, but (rather) a most high perfection, because it is not repugnant to simplicity, nay it cannot be except in the Most Highly Simply; and in such a manner the authority of Scripture and the confession of the Faith posit infinity or immensity in God Himself, as the Most Simply One. ⁸ The sense is: the “infinite”, because it is a word composed out of a negative particle, in-, and the verb –finished, can be considered in a twofold manner, both according to the negative particle, and according to the verb.

p. 770

infinitum dicitur in materia et in genere substantiae et in aliis generibus; et hoc modo non cadit in Deo, quia ipse est perfectissimus. Alio modo finis dicitur terminus, sicut finis agri, et sic infinitum dicitur quod caret termino et statu. — Et hoc potest esse dupliciter secundum negationem, quia potest intelligi privative et negative: privative, quia non habet terminum, sed tamen natum est habere, propter hoc quod habet esse limitatum, et hoc modo dicit incompletionem, et non est in Deo. Alio modo negative, quod non habet terminum nec est natum habere; et hoc modo ponitur in Deo propter summam immensitatem.¹	there is said (to be) an “infinite” in matter and in the genus of substance and in the other genera; and in this manner it does not occur in God, because He is most perfect. In another manner an “end” is said (to be) a “terminus”, just as the boundary of a field [finis agri], and in this manner the “infinite” is said (to be) that which lacks a terminus and a standing still. — And this can be in a twofold manner according to negation, because it can be understood privatively and negatively: privatively, because it does not have a terminus, but yet is bound to have (one), on account of this that it has a limited ‘being’, and in this manner it means an incompletion, and is not in God. In another manner negatively, as that which does not have a terminus nor is bound to have (one); and in this manner it is posited in God on account of (His) most high Immensity.¹
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod infinitum est passio quantitatis; dici potest, quod sicut nomen quantitatis extenditur ad quantitatem virtutis, similiter nomen infiniti. Quantitas autem virtutis non tantum attenditur quantum ad opus, sed etiam quantum ad nobilitatem valoris; et hoc patet, quia, ut dicit Augustinus,² « in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius ».	1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the ‘infinite’ is a passion of quantity; it must be said, that just as the name for quantity is extended to the quantity of virtue, similarly the name for the infinite. But the quantity of virtue is not only attained as much as regards the work, but also as much as regards the nobility of value [valoris]; and this is clear, because, as (St.) Augustine² says, « in spiritual (things) ‘greater’ and ‘better’ are the same ».
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est unum ita, quod non est aliud; dicendum, quod aliquid comparari ad multa potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum comparationem causalitatis, aut secundum comparationem identitatis. Comparari ad multa sub ratione causalitatis hoc convenit infinito, quia infinitum; sed secundum rationem identitatis, non. Unde quia infinitum, ideo se extendit ad multa,³ sed non sequitur, quod sit multa. Unde si essentia vel potentia comparetur secundum rationem identitatis ad res, neutra est plurium; unde nec potentia divina est aliae potentiae, nec essentia aliae essentiae; si⁴ secundum rationem causalitatis, sic convenit et potentiae et essentiae. Nam sicut potentiae convenit facere plura, sic essentiae in pluribus esse.	2. To that which is objected, that (the Divine Essence) is so one [unum], that It is not another; it must be said, that something can be compared to many in a twofold manner: either according to a comparison of causality, or according to a comparison of identity. To be compared to many under the reckoning of causality this befits the infinite, because (it is) infinite; but according to the reckoning of identity, (it does) not. Wherefore because (the Divine Essence is) an Infinite (Being), for that reason It extends Itself to many,³ but it does not follow, that It is many. Wherefore if the (Divine) Essence and/or Power be compared according to the reckoning of identity to things, Neither is of many (things); wherefore neither the Divine Power is other powers, nor the (Divine) Essence other essences; if⁴ according to the reckoning of causality, thus (the “infinite”) convenes with both the (Divine) Power and the (Divine) Essence. For just as causing more convenes with the (Divine) Power, so being in more with the (Divine) Essence.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est finitum summae veritati; dicendum, quod haec⁵ est duplex: aut enim est finitum summae veritati, quia veritas iudicat, ipsum esse finitum, aut quia non excedit eius comprehensionem. Primo modo non est Deus sibi finitus, sed infinitus; vere enim scit, se esse infinitum. Secundo modo est finitus, quia se non excedit, cum sit infinitus; et sic non valet argumentum, et est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: si non excedit infinitum: ergo est finitum simpliciter.	3. To that which is objected, that (the Divine Essence) is (something) finite to the Most High Truth; it must be said, that this⁵ is twofold: for either It is (something) finite to the Most High Truth, because the Truth judges, that It is finite, or because It does not exceed Its comprehension. In the first manner God is not finite to Himself, but infinite; for He truly knows, that He is infinite. In the second manner He is finite, because He does not exceed Himself, though He is infinite; and in this manner the argument is not valid, and there is a fallacy there secundum quid and simply: ‘if It does not exceed an infinite: therefore It is (something) simply finite’.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum non finit; dicendum, quod infinitum per privationem perfectionis non finit; sed infinitum per negationem limitationis habet rationem finiendi, quia, cum sit summum, in ipso est omnis status: in hoc enim infinitas non repugnat simplicitati nec complemento.	4. To that which is objected, that the “infinite” does not finish; it must be said, that the “infinite” through a privation of perfection does not finish, but the “infinite” through a negation of limitation has a reckoning of being finished, because, when it most high, there is in it every standing-still: for in this the infinity is not repugnant to simplicity nor to a complement.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod comprehenditur; dicendum, quod non comprehenditur per inclusionem, comprehenditur autem per perfectam visionem, dilectionem et tentionem, et hoc a parte comprehendentis et non comprehensi; et ideo, quia perficitur,⁶ requiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat.	5. To that which is objected, that (the Divine Essence) is comprehended; it must be said, that It is not comprehended through being included, but It is comprehended through perfect vision, dilection and holding, and this on the part of the one comprehending and not (on the part of) the one comprehended; and for that reason, because (the one comprehending)⁶ is perfected, he rests, even though he attains nothing further [ultra non].
6. Quod ultimo obiicitur, solutum est; obiicit enim de infinito, secundum quod dicitur privative; sed prout dicitur de Deo, non dicit privationem secundum rem, sed solum quantum ad modum significandi; et respondet ei summa positio.⁷ Nihil enim dicitur immensum, nisi quod habet summam et perfectissimam actualitatem et nihil coarctans et determinans. Unde etsi videatur dici privative, tamen secundum veritatem excludit omnem privationem.	6. What is objected last, has been solved; for it objects concerning the “infinite”, according to which it is said privatively; but insofar as it is said of God, it does not mean a privation according to thing, but only as much as regards the manner of signifying; and a most high positing (of the “infinite” as ‘unlimited by any constraint’) does respond to this.⁷ For nothing is said (to be) “immense”, except what has a most high and most perfect actuality and (which) nothing constrains and determines. Wherefore even if (the “infinite”) seems to be said privatively (of the Divine Essence), yet according to the truth it excludes every privation.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Opinionem secundam in respons. positam S. Doctor mitius censurat quam primam, quia error, ut videtur, potius in perverso modo loquendi, quam in pravo intellectu consistere potest (cfr. ad 3. 4, et supra d. 35. q. 5. ad 1.). — Solut. ad 2. militat contra pantheismum. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 3.) in eodem sensu dicit; « quod aliquid non debet dici finitum, quia sit hoc et non aliud, sed quia terminatur ad aliud, vel est propter aliud, vel quia perficitur ab alio ». . . .	I. The second opinion posited in the Response is more mildly censured by the Seraphic Doctor than the first, because the error, as is seen, can consist rather in a perverse manner of speaking, than in a depraved understanding (cf. in reply to nn. 3 and 4, and above in d. 35, q. 5, in reply to n. 1). — The solution to n. 2 militates against pantheism. Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. I, q. 6, m. 1, in reply to n. 3) says in the same sense, « that something ought not be said (to be) “finite”, because it is this and not (something) else, but because it is terminated at another, and/or is on account of another, and/or because it is perfected by another ». . . .
¹ De hac duplici acceptione infiniti cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.), et V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16). De discrimine, quod est inter negationem et privationem, cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et IV. Metaph. text. 4. nec non V. text 27. (III. c. 2, et IV. c. 22.). — Paulo superius pro quod habet esse limitatum cod. T quod dicit esse limitatum. ² Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9: Quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse. — Solutionis sententiae haec est: quantitas virtutis non tantum attenditur in effectu sive opere relate ad magnitudinem exteriorem, sed etiam relatae ad intrinsecam nobilitatem et essentialem valorem; unde divina essentia, cui competit quantitas virtutis, quia nobilissime est, erit et infinita. ³ Codicibus nec non ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. ideo transformavit in in Deo, et dein post ad multa prosequitur: quia potentia vel essentia eius comparatur ad multa, ex hoc tamen non sequitur etc. ⁴ Pro si Vat. cum aliquibus mss. sed. ⁵ Scilicet propositio. — Aliquanto inferius pro Secundo modo est finitus plures codd. perperam Secundo modo est infinitus. Circa finem solutione ante non excedit interiecimus si auctoritate codd. A R T. — Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 1. ad 3. ⁶ Id est, quia comprehendens completur et satiatur. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. — Vat. cum nonnullis codd. quia perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat. Alii codd. non pauci sic: quia perficitur res, quiescit, quamvis etc. Nostra lectio, quae est accuratior, depromta est ex codd. B D. ⁷ Pro positio Vat. cum cod. cc potentia. Paulo post pro unde etsi videatur multi codd. Unde si dicatur; incongrue.	¹ On this twofold acceptation of the infinite, cf. Aristotle, Physics, text 63 ff. (ch. 6), and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 21 (Bk. IV. ch. 16). On the division between negation and privation, cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Opposites”, and Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 4 and also text 27 (Bk. III, ch. 2, and BK. IV, ch. 22). — A little above this for that it has a limited ‘being’ [quod habet esse limitatum] codex T has that it means a limited ‘being’ [quod dicit esse limitatum]. ² On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 8, n. 9: (For) those which are great not in mass, that which it is ‘to be better’ is ‘to be greater’. — The solution of the sentence is as follows: a quantity of virtue is not only attained in an effect or work in a manner related to an exterior magnitude, but also in a manner related to intrinsic nobility and essential strength; wherefore the Divine Essence, to which a quantity of virtue is befitting, because It is in a most noble manner, It will also be infinite. ³ Breaking with the codices and even edition 1, the Vatican edition transforms for that reason [ideo] into in God [in Deo], and then after to many [ad multa] it proceeds thus: because His Power and Essence are compared to many, yet from this it does not follow etc. [quia potentia vel essentia eius comparatur ad multa, ex hoc tamen non sequitur etc.]. ⁴ For if [si] the Vatican edition, together with some manuscripts, has but [sed]. ⁵ Namely the proposition. — Somewhat below this for In the second manner He is finite [Secundo modo est finitus] very many codices faultily read In the second manner He is infinite [Secundo modo est infinitus]. Near the end of the solution before It does not exceed [non excedit] we have interjected if [si] on the authority of codices A R and T. — Cf. above d. 19, p. I. q. 1, in reply to n. 3. ⁶ That is, because the one comprehending is completed and satiated. Cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, in reply to n. 2. — The Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, has because the thing is perfected according to its own capacity, it rests, even though it does not attain to (anything) further [quia perficitur res secundum suam capacitatem, quiescit, quamvis ultra non attingat]. Not a few other codices read thus: because the thing is perfected, it rests, even though etc. [quia perficitur res, quiescit, quamvis]. Our reading, which is more accurate, has been taken from codices B and D. ⁷ For positing (of the “infinite” as ‘unlimited by any constraint’) the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has power [potentia]. A little after this for Wherefore even if (the “infinite”) seems [unde etsi videatur] many codices read Wherefore if (the “infinite”) be said [Unde si dicatur], incongruously.

p. 771

S. Thom. (S. I. q. 7. a. 1. ad 3.) eandem obiectionem solvit ex hoc principio, quod esse Dei est per se subsistens, non receptum in aliquo; et ideo distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, licet sit infnitum.	St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 7, a. 1, in reply to n. 3) solves the same objection from this principle, that God’s ‘Being’ is subsistent through Itself, (and is) not received in another; and for that reason It is distinguished from all others, even though It is infinite.
II. Praeter laudatos: S. Thom., S. I. q. 7. a. 1; S. c. Gent. I. c. 43. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 44. q. 1. 2.	II. Besides the (authors) cited: S. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 7, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles., I, c. 43. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, a. 2. — (Bl.) Pet er of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 44, qq. 1 and 2.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLIII