S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLIII

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio IV.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 4

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 774-775.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 774-775.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO IV.

 

Utrum ratio divinae potentiae se extendat ad infinita.

QUESTION 4

 

Whether the reason for the Divine Power extends itself to (things) infinite.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur de infinitate divinae potentiae quantum ad rationem operandi, et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi1 se extendit in infinitum.  Et quod sic, videtur:

FOURTH AND LAST there is asked concerning the infinity of the Divine Power as much as regards (Its) reason for operating, and there is asked, whether (Its) reason for operating1 extends itself unto infinity.  And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Quia quidquid Deus potest, rationabiliter potest; sed potest infinita:  ergo rationabiliter potest infinita.  Et si hoc, ergo ratio operandi ipsius potentiae se extendit ad infinita.

1. Because whatever God can (do), He can do reasonably; but He can (cause) infinite (things):  therefore He can reasonably (cause) infinite (things).  And if this, therefore the reason of the operating of His Power extends itself to (things) infinite.

2. Item, sicut se habet ratio sciendi ad scientiam, ita ratio producendi ad potentiam; sed quia divina scientia est infinita, ideo habet in se rationes infinitas cognoscendi:2  ergo cum divina potentia sit infinita, similiter et rationes producendi habet infinitas.

2. Likewise, just as a reason for knowing holds itself to knowledge, so a reason for producing to power; but because the Divine Knowledge is infinite, for that reason It has in Itself infinite reasons for cognizing:2  therefore since the Divine Power is infinite, It similarly has infinite reasons for producing.

3. Item, ratio operandi in Deo non est aliud quam bonitas et sapientia; sed sapientia et bonitas est infinita:  ergo et ratio operandi.3

3. Likewise, in God the reason for operating is not other than (His) Goodness and Wisdom; but (His) Goodness and Wisdom is infinite:  therefore (His) reason for operating3 (is) too.

4. Item, ratio operandi in Deo non est aliud quam Deus sive divina essentia, quidquid dicatur4 illa ratio; sed divina essentia est infinita:  ergo et ratio operandi.

4. Likewise, in God the reason for operating is not other than God or the Divine Essence, whatever that reason be said (to be);4 but the Divine Essence is infinite:  therefore (His) reason for operating (is) too.

CONTRA 1. Potentia se extendit ad opera secundum exigentiam rationis — nihil enim omittit de his quae ratio exigit — si ergo ratio se extendit ad infinita, ergo videtur, quod divina potentia producat infinita, quod falsum est.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (God’s) Power extends Itself to works according to the exigency of (Its) reason — for It omits nothing concern those which (Its) reason (for operating) requires — if, therefore, (Its) reason (for operating) extends itself to (things) infinite, therefore it seems, that the Divine Power produces (things) infinite, which is false.

2. Item, ratio operandi est ipsa ars et dispositio; sed dispositio non est nisi finitorum:  ergo ratio operandi non est nisi finitorum.5

2. Likewise, (Its) reason for operating is (Its) very Art and disposition; but (Its) disposition is not but of (things) infinite:  therefore (Its) reason for operating is not but of (things) finite.5

3. Item, ratio operandi est ipsa divina iustitia, quia universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas;6 sed iustitia non est nisi finitorum:  ergo videtur, quod ratio operandi similiter.

3. Likewise, (Its) reason for operating is the Divine Justice Itself, because each and every way of the Lord (is) mercy and truth;6 but (His) Justice is not but of (things) finite:  therefore it seems that (Its) reason for operating (is) similarly.

4. Item, obiicitur de praescientia, quae similiter est ratio operandi et est in plus quam potentia, quia respectu malorum; et tamen non est respectu infinitorum.  Si tu dicas, quod dispositio vel praescientia vel iustitia non complectitur plenam rationem, per quam potest operari divina potentia;7 contra:  si non totam complectitur, ergo divina potentia sine his potest rationabiliter operari:  ergo possibile est, Deum operari praeter dispositionem, praeter iustitiam et praeter praescientiam.  Sed nullus talis operatur sapienter nec recte:  ergo etc.  Restat igitur, quod totam complectitur rationem.

4. Likewise, there is the objection [obiicitur] concerning (God’s) Foreknowledge, which is similarly a reason for operating and is unto more than (God’s) Power, because (It is) in respect of evils; and yet it is not in respect of (things) infinite.  If you say, that (God’s) disposition and/or Foreknowledge and/or Justice does not comprise the full reason, through which the Divine Power can operate;7 on the contrary:  if it does not comprise the whole (reason), therefore the Divine Power can reasonably operate without these:  therefore it is possible, that God operate apart from disposition, apart from justice and apart from foreknowledge.  But no such operates wisely nor uprightly:  ergo etc..  Therefore, it remains, that it does comprise the whole reason.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Ratio operandi in Deo respectu actus, qui est posse, accipitur in habitu et se extendit ad infinita; respectu actus, qui est facere, accipitur in actu et est finita secundum divinam dispositionem.

CONCLUSION

 

In God the reason for operating in respect of the act, which is ‘to be able’, is accepted in regard to the habit and extends itself to (things) infinite; in respect of the act, which is ‘to cause’, it is accepted in regard to the act and is finite according to the Divine disposition.

RESPONDEO:  Sicut dicit Magister in littera,8 aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod ratio divinae potentiae est finita.  Et ex hoc voluerunt divinam potentiam limitare, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi ex optima . . .

I RESPOND:  Just as Master (Peter) says in the text,8 some wanted to say, the reason of the Divine Power is finite.  And on this account they wanted to limit the Divine Power, both because It can do and/or leave off (doing) nothing but out of the best . . .

1  Vat. loco verborum et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi, quae suppressit, ponit an; cod. cc si.

2  Cfr. supra d. 35. q. 5.

3  Cod. T producendi.

4  Vat. cum edd. 4, 5 dicat.

5  Cod. M nisi respectu finitorum.  —  Vat. hoc argumentum tertio loco ponit.

6  Psalm 24, 10.

7  Dispositio enim et praescientia et iustitia respiciunt tantum ea quae erunt, eorumque tantum rationem continent, non autem eorum quae possent esse, ad quae tamen divina potentia se extendit.

8  Hic c. 1.  —  Paulo post mendum Vat. ratione exhibentis pro ratio correximus auctoritate codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

1  The Vatican edition in place of the words and there is asked, whether (Its) reason for operating [et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi], which it suppressed, puts whether it [an]; codex cc if it [si].

2  Cf. above d. 35, q. 5.

3  Codex T has for producing [producendi].

4  The Vatican edition, together with editions 4 and 5, has means [dicat] for be said to be [dicatur].

5  Codex M has but in respect of (things) finite [nisi respectu finitorum].  —  The Vatican edition puts this argument in the third position.

6  Ps. 24:10.

7  For (God’s) disposition and Foreknowledge and Justice respect only those which will be, and they contain a reckoning of these only, but not of those which could be, to which, however, the Divine Power extends Itself.

8  Here in ch. 1.  —  A little after this we have corrected, on the authority of the codices and editions 1, 2 and 3, the error of the Vatican edition, which exhibits by reason [ratione] for the reason [ratio].

p. 775

ratione, nec dimittere, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi praesciens, nihil nisi iuste; et ideo cum haec finitorum sint, ut puta eorum quae facit, dixerunt, divinam potentiam non posse alia, quam quae facit.  —  Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando; et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baalardi.1  Ratio autem huius stultae positionis fuit, quia nescierunt distinguere rationem potentiae nec actus eius.  Actus enim potentiae duplex est:  unus per modum habitus, scilicet posse, alius per modum actus, scilicet operari.

reason, and because It can do nothing except as One foreknowing, nothing but in a just manner; and for that reason since these are of (things) finite, as for example of those which It does, they said, that the Divine Power cannot (work) others, than those which It works.  —  But this position is erroneous, just as Master (Peter) shows in the text, because it derogates the nobility of the Divine Power by limiting Its immensity; and it is said to have been (the opinion) of Master Peter Abelard [Baalardi].1  Moreover the reason for this foolish position was, because they did not know how to distinguish the reason of a power and its acts.  For the act of a power is twofold:  the one through the manner of a habit, namely ‘to be able’, the other through the manner of an act, namely ‘to operate’.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum ratio divinae potentiae sit infinita; dicendum, quod sicut duplex est actus, ita2 dupliciter potest accipi ratio.  Respectu enim actus, qui est posse, accipitur ratio in habitu, scilicet divina scientia et divinae bonitatis condecentia; et haec ratio se extendit ad infinita, quemadmodum et ipsa potentia respectu actus, qui est posse.  Respectu vero actus, qui est facere, accipitur ratio in actu, scilicet divina dispositio sive praescientia et meritorum exigentia.  Nihil enim facit,3 nisi quod disponit; nihil etiam retribuit, nisi secundum quod merita exigunt, quando retribuit; nullam rem gubernat nec regit aliter, quam natura eius sive iustitia naturalis exigat.

Therefore, when it is asked, whether the reason of Divine Power is infinite; it must be said, that just as there is a twofold act, so2 “reason” can be accepted in a twofold manner.  For in respect of the act, which is ‘to be able’, “reason” is accepted in regard to the habit [in habitu], that is, as the Divine Knowledge and the co-fittingness [condecentia] of the Divine Goodness; and this reason extends itself to (things) infinite, according to which manner the Power Itself (is) also in respect of the act, which is ‘to be able’.  However in respect of the act, which is ‘to cause’, “reason” is accepted in regard to the act [in actu], namely, the Divine disposition or Foreknowledge and the demand of merits.  For (God) 3 does nothing, except that which He disposes; He also pays back nothing, except according to which merits demand, when He pays back; He governs no thing nor rules in another manner, than His Nature or the Justice of (His) Nature [iustitia naturalis] demand.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet responsio ad primo quaesitum et ad rationes inductas:  quaedam enim procedunt secundum unam viam, quaedam secundum aliam.

And according to this distinction the response to the first question [primo quaestum] and to the reasons brought forward (on its behalf), is clear:  for certain ones proceed according to one way, certain ones according to the other.

3. 4. Ad illud quod postea obiicitur de iustitia, dicendum, quod iustitia, secundum quod dicit condecentiam divinae bonitatis et potestatis, sic est generalis ratio, quae complectitur totum posse; sed in quantum connotat exigentiam a parte meritorum, sic non complectitur totum posse nec totum agere; in quantum vero connotat condecentiam bonitatis respectu cuiuslibet temporis4 in actu, sic complectitur agere, sed posse non.  Dispositio similiter et praescientia agere complectitur, sed non posse; sed agere est respect finitorum, sicut et illa sunt, sed posse est respectu infinitorum.

3. 4. To that which is objected afterwards concerning justice, it must be said, that the (Divine) Justice, according to which it means the complete fittingness of the Divine Goodness and Possibility, thus is the general reason, which comprises the whole ‘being able’; but inasmuch as It connotes a demand [exigentiam] on the part of merits, thus it does not comprise the whole ‘being able’ nor the whole acting; however, inasmuch as It connotes the complete fittingness of the (Divine) Goodness in respect of anything of time in act,4 thus it comprises acting, but not the ‘being able’.  The (Divine) disposition and Foreknowledge similarly comprise the acting, but not the ‘being able’; but (the Divine Power’s) acting is in respect of (things) finite, just as these are also (finite), but (Its) ‘being able’ is in respect of (things) infinite.

Quod ergo obiicitur tunc, quod Deus potest sine eis rationabiliter operari; dicendum, quod falsum est nec sequitur ex illo.  Quamvis enim Deus possit plura, quam velit, tamen non potest operari sine voluntate; quoniam nihil potest facere, quin possit velle, sic et praescire et disponere.  Necesse est enim, potentiam5 exsequentem illis adaequari, scilicet dispositioni et voluntati, sed non oportet de potentia ut potente:  ideo non sequitur, quod possit facere sine illis.

Therefore what it then objected, that God can operate reasonably without these; it must be said, that (this) is false and it does not follow from the former.  For though God can (do) more, than He wills, yet He cannot operate without a will; since He can do nothing, that He cannot will, thus (nothing which He cannot) both foreknow and dispose.  For it is necessary, that the executing Power5 be adequated to these, that is, to the (Divine) disposition and Will, but it is not necessary [non oportet] (that this) concern the Power, as powerful:  for that reason it does not follow, that He can work without these.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Abaelardus cum aliis concessit quidem, potentiam divinam in se et ad extra esse infinitam, sed quoad rationem operandi ad extra (quae est aliquid quod est intra Deum) voluit divinam potentiam limitare.  Contra hunc errorem Magister in tota hac distinctione disputat, et diffuse etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 2. § 1. 2.  —  Aliis rationibus motus, Wicleffus peiorem errorem docuit, scil. quod Deus non possit facere alia, quam facit; cum quod fere conveniunt plurimi illi philosophi antiqui et recentiores, qui Deum in operibus ad extra non libere, sed ex necessitate naturae agere, temere docuerunt.  Contra multiplices hos errores responsio optime servire potest.  Tota vis argumentationis stat in distinctione rationis operandi secundum actum primum et secundum.

I. Abelard, together with others, indeed conceded, that the Divine Power in Itself and ad extra is infinite, but in regard to (Its) reason for operating ad extra (which is something which is within God) he wanted to limit the Divine Power.  Against this error Master (Peter) disputes throughout this whole Distinction, and Alexander of Hales at length too in Summa., p. I, q. 21, m. 2, § 1 and 2.  —  Moved by other reasons, Wycliffe taught a worse error, namely, that God cannot do others, that which He does; with which very many philosophers, ancient and recent, nearly agree, who taught that God in (His) works ad extra does not act freely, but acts out of the necessity of (His) Nature, blindly.  Against these multiple errors the Response can be of the greatest utility.  The whole force of the argumentation stands in the distinction of a “reason for operating” according to first and second act.

II. Alex. Hal., loc. cit.  — Scot., I. Sent. d. 44. q. unica, et Report. hic q. 2, et d. 44. q. 1.  —  S. Thom. (quoad principia) S. I. q. 25. a. 5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 26. 27.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3.  —  Richard. a Med., hic q. 7.  —  Durand., hic q. 5.  —  Biel, hic q. 1.

II. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit.  — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 44, q. sole, and Reportatio. ere in q. 2, and d. 44, q. 1.  —  St. Thomas (in regard to the principles of the solution) Summa., I, q. 25, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles. Bk. II, chs. 26 and 27.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 3.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in q. 7.  —  Durandus, here in q. 5.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

1  Sive Abaelardi, cuius opinionem vide in eius introd. ad Tholog. libr. III. n. 5.  —  Similem opinionem profert Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 5. (VIII. c. 3.):  Sunt autem quidam, ut Megarici, qui dicunt, tunc solum posse [aliquem], cum agat; cum vero non agat, non posse:  ut puta eum qui non aedificat, aedificare non posse, sed aedificantem, cum aedificat.

2  Vat. cum cod. cc subiicit etiam, et mox post Respectu Vat. inserit enim, quam particulam codd. et sex primae edd. incongrue ponunt post accipitur, quod paulo post sequitur.  —  Locutionem subinde occurentem divinae bonitatis condecentia intellige illud quod decet divinam bonitatem, praecise in se consideratam.  Locutio ipsa sumta est ex Anselm., Proslog. c. 10:  Cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est.

3  Ed. 1 adiicit Deus, et dein cum cod. M (in marg.) pro nihil etiam habet nulli etiam.  Loco disponit, quod verbis nihil etiam praecedit, cod. R disposuit.  Mox pro quando retribuit codd. V X quod retribuat.  Post retribuit Vat. interserit, quia.  Dein locutio iustitia naturalis non in sensu morali accipienda est, sed tantum ut circumlocutio quaedam explicativa pro natura.

4  Id est omnium quae in tempore fiunt.  —  Pro temporis Vat. operis.

5  Codd. V X  post potentiam inserunt ut.  Paulo ante pro sic et Vat. cum codd. cc sicut et.

1  Whose opinion is expressed in his Introduction to Theology, Bk. III, n. 5.  —  Aristotle proffers a similar opinion in his Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 5 (Bk. VIII, ch. 3):  Moreover there are certain ones, such as the Megarans (i.e. those of the school of Eucleides of Megara), who say, that (someone) is only able, when he acts, but when he does not act, that he is not able:  as for example he who does not build, that he is not able to build, but when building (he is), since he builds.

2  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, subjoins too [etiam], and at the beginning of the next sentence the Vatican edition inserts For [enim], which particle the codices and the six first editions incongruously place after the accipitur (or in English before “reason”), which follows a little after this.  —  The expression which then occurs the complete fittingness of the Divine Goodness [divinae bonitatis condecentia] is to be understood as that which befits the Divine Goodness, considered precisely in Itself.  The expression is taken from (St.) Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 10:  However, when Thou doest spare the wicked, it is a just (act), not because of their merits, but because it is completely fitting to Thy Goodness [bonitati tuae condecens est].

3  Edition 1 adjoins God [Deus], and then together with codex M (in the margin) for He also . . . nothing [nihil etiam] it has He also . . . to no one [nulli etiam].  In place of He disposes [disponit], which precedes the words He also pays back [nihil etiam], codex R has He disposed [disposuit].  Next for when He pays back [quando retibuit] codex V and X have when He pays back [quod retribuat] in the subjunctive.  Immediately after this the Vatican edition inserts because [quia].  Then the expression iustitia naturalis is not to be accepted in the moral sense, but only as a certain explicit circumlocution on behalf of the Nature [natura].

4  That is of all those which come to be in time.  —  For of time [temporis] the Vatican edition has of a work [operis].

5  Codices V and X read the Power as One executing [potentiam ut exsequentem].  A little before this for thus (nothing which He cannot) both foreknow and dispose [sic et praescire et disponere] the Vatican edition, together with codex cc has just as (He cannot) both foreknow and dispose (nothing) [sicut et praescire et dispondere].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.