S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLV

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLV

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 810-811.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 810-811.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

De numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.

QUESTION 2

 

On the number and sufficiency of the signs of the Divine Will.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR de numero et sufficientia signorum divinae voluntatis.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED concerning the number and sufficiency of the signs of the Divine Will.

Et ponit Magister1 quique signa, quae continentur in hoc versu:

And Master (Peter)1 posits five signs, which are contained in this verse:

Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.

He precepts and prohibits, permits, counsels, fulfills.

Et videtur, quod debeat ponere pauciora.

And it seems, that there ought to be posited fewer (signs).

1. Quoniam signum et signatum dicuntur correlative, et si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum, sed si unum non dicitur multipliciter, nec reliquum, per artem Topicorum;2 sed voluntas Dei est una et uno modo se habens:  ergo unum solum debet habere signum.

1. Since “sign” and “signed” are said correlatively, and if one of (two) opposed (terms) is said in a multiple manner, the remainder (is) also, but if one is not said in a multiple manner, neither (is) the remainder, through the logic [artem] of (the book of) Topics;2 but the Will of God is one and holding Itself in one manner:  therefore It ought to have only one sign.

2. Item, aut signa haec distinguuntur ratione modi significandi, aut ratione rei.3  Si ratione rei significantis, ergo tot debent esse signa, quot res, quia omnis res signum est divinae voluntatis tanquam causae.  Si ratione modi significandi; sed eodem modo significant divinam voluntatem praeceptio et prohibitio:  ergo sunt unum signum.

2. Likewise, either these signs are distinguished by reason of (their) manner of signifying, or by reason of the thing.3  If by reason of the signifying thing, therefore there ought to be as many signs, as (there are) things, because every thing is a sign of the Divine Will, as of a cause.  If by reason of (their) manner of signifying; but a preception and prohibition signify the Divine Will in the same manner:  therefore they are one sign.

3. Item, voluntas Dei, sicut infra4 patebit, non est respectu mali, ergo nullum signum eius debet accipi per comparationem ad malum:  cum ergo permissio et prohibitio sint respectu mali, non sunt signa voluntatis divinae.

3. Likewise, the Will of God, just as will be clear below,4 is not in respect of evil, therefore no sign of It ought to be accepted through a comparison to evil:  therefore, since a permission and prohibition are in respect of an evil, they are not signs of the Divine Will.

Quod sint plura, videtur:

That there are more (signs), seems:

4. Quia cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito, immo uni bono plura mala:5  ergo tot vel plura signa debent accipi a parte mali, sicut ex parte boni.  Cum ergo ex parte boni sint tria:  patet etc.

4. Because, to any good there responds an evil ex opposito, nay to one good (there are) many evils:5  therefore as many and/or more signs ought to be accepted on the part of the evil, just as on the part of a good.  Therefore, since on the part of the good there are three (signs):  it is clear that etc..

5. Item, sicut impletioni respondet permissio, ita et cohibitio,6 immo multo fortius et magis ex opposito:  ergo videtur, quod plura sint signa.

5. Likewise, just as to (an act of) fulfilling [impletioni] there responds a permission [permissio], so also (an act of) restraining [cohibitio],6 nay much more strongly ex opposito:  therefore it seems, that there are more signs.

6. Item, sicut praeceptioni opponitur prohibitio, ita consilio dissuasio:  ergo videtur, quod sint plura.

6. Likewise, just as to (an act of) precepting there is opposed (an act of) prohibiting, so to a counsel, (an act of ) dissuading [dissuasio]:  therefore it seems, that there are more (signs).

CONCLUSIO.

 

Numerus et sufficientia quinque signorum voluntatis divinae explicantur.

CONCLUSION

 

The number and sufficiency of the five signs of the Divine Will are explained.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod numerus signorum uno modo consuevit accipi sic.  Voluntas enim divina, proprie loquendo, est praesentium et futurorum; praeteritorum autem aut non est, aut7 non alio modo quam praesentium.  —  Secundum hoc notandum, quod si est respectu praesentis, aut illud est bonum, et sic impletio; aut malum, et sic permissio.  Si respectu futuri, hoc tripliciter:  aut est malum, et sic prohibitio; aut bonum supererogationis, et sic consilium.  Bonum autem supererogationis non habet malum oppositum, ideo nec consilium habet signum oppositum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the number of signs is accustomed to be accepted in one manner thus.  For the Divine Will, properly speaking, is of (things) present and future; but It either is not of (things) past, or7 not in a manner other than of (things) present.  —  According to this it must be noted, that if It is in respect of (something) present, either that is good, or and thus (there is God’s act of ) fulfilling; or evil, and thus (there is His) permission.  If in respect of (something) future, this (is) in a threefold manner:  either (something) evil, and thus (there is God’s) prohibition; or a good of supererogation, and thus (there is a Divine) counsel.  Moreover, a good of supererogation does not have an opposed evil, for that reason counsel does not have an opposed sign.

Alio modo possunt distingui sic:  voluntas divina, sicut infra8 patebit, aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult conditionaliter sive quantum in se; et utroque modo contingit eam signifIcari.  Voluntas ergo absoluta potest ad aliquid comparari aut per modum complacentiae, aut per modum displicentiae.  Si per modum displicentiae, illud nullo modo fit; et ita hanc non contingit significari nec sciri aliquo signo exteriori.  Si per modum complacentiae, aut quia placet illud quod fit, et sic impletio; aut quia placet aliquid9 ex illo, et sic permissio; et sic habemus duo signa.  Potest iterum significari divina voluntas ut antecedens sive conditionalis, et hoc dupliciter:  aut per modum complacentiae, ita quod oppositum displicet, et sic praeceptio; aut per modum displicentiae, et sic prohibitio; aut per modum complacentiae, ita tamen quod oppositum non displicet, et sic consilium.  Per modum vero displicentiae,10 ita quod oppositum non placet, . . .

In another manner they can be distinguished thus:  the Divine Will, just as will be clear below,8 wills something simply, (and) wills something conditionally or as much as (it is) in itself; and in each manner it happens that It is signified.  Therefore the absolute Will can be compared to something either through a manner of complacency, or through a manner of displeasure.  If through a manner of displeasure, that (something) in no manner comes to be; and thus it happens that this is not signified nor known by any exterior sign.  If through a manner of complacency, either because that which comes to be is pleasing, and thus (there is God’s act of ) fulfilling; or because something9 out of it is pleasing, and thus (there is God’s) permission: and thus we have two signs.  Again the Divine Will can be signified as antecedent or conditional, and this in a twofold manner:  either through a manner of complacency, such that (what is) opposed is displeasing, and thus (there is God’s) preception; or through a manner of displeasure, and thus (there is God’s) prohibition; or through a manner of complacency, yet such that (what is) opposed is not displeasing, and thus (there is God’s) counsel.  However, through a manner of displeasure,10 such that (what is) opposed is not pleasing, . . .

1  Hic c. 6.

2  Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13.

3  Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit significatae, quam vocem et proxime post substituit pro significantis, sed falso, quia res significata hic est ipsa voluntas Dei.

4  Dist. 46. q. 2.

5  Similiter Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6:  « Peccare multis modis possumus; malum enim est infiniti, ut Pythagorici coniectabant, bonum autem finiti ».  Et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31:  Optimorum (tvn agatvn) causa una, optimo malum contrarium, mali causae multae.

6  Vat. cum cod. cc prohibitio, at in solutione obiectionis etiam Vat. legit cohibitio.

7  Vat., suppresis verbis aut non est, aut non, sic:  praeteritorum autem alio modo non est quam etc.  Pro aut non alio modo plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 aut alio modo, omissa particula non, quam ex cod. T restituimus.

8  Dist. 46. q. 1.  —  Immediate post pro aliquid vult simpliciter, aliquid vult Vat. aut vult simpliciter, aut vult.

9  Vat. cum cod. cc aliud.

10  Ed. 1:  Per modum vero nec placentiae nec displicentiae.

1  Here in ch. 6.

2  Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 13.

3  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, adjoins signified [significatae], which word it substitutes also immediately after this for signifying [significantis] (of the thing signified for of the signifying thing), but falsely, because the Thing signified here is the very Will of God.

4  Distinction 46, q. 2.

5  Similarly Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 6:  « We can sin in many manners; for evil is of an infinite (number), as the Pythagoreans used to conjecture, but the good (is) of a finite (number) ».  And (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 31 (says):  Of the best [tvn agatvn] (there is) one cause, to the best evil (is) contrary, of evil (there are) many causes.

6  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has a prohibition [prohibitio] for (an act of) restraining [cohibitio], but in the solution of the objection the Vatican edition also reads (an act of) restraining [cohibitio].

7  The Vatican edition, having suppressed the words It either is not . . ., or not [aut non est, aut non], reads thus however of (things) past it is not in a manner other than etc. [praeteritorum autem alio modo non est quam etc.].  For or not in a manner other [aut non alio modo] very many codices, together with edition 1, have or in a manner other [aut alio modo], having omitted not [non], which we have restored from codex T.

8  Distinction 46, q. 1.  —  Immediately after this for wills something simply, (and) wills something [aliquid vult simplicityer, aliquid vult] the Vatican edition has either wills simply, or wills [aut vult simpliciter, aut vult].

9  The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has (something) else [aliud] for something [aliquid].

10  Edition 1 reads:  However, through a manner neither of pleasure nor of displeasure [Per modum vero nec placentiae nec displicentiae].

 

p. 811

 

non est possibile reperiri.  —  Et secundum hoc patet numerus et sufficientia et solutio obiectorum.

(such) is not possible to be found.  —  And according to this, the number and sufficiency (of the signs of God’s Will) and the solution of the objections is clear.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod voluntas beneplaciti non est multiplex; dicendum, quod hoc verum est quantum ad substantiam; tamen quantum ad connotata multiplex est, ut visum est.  Voluntas enim absoluta connotat effectum, voluntas conditionata connotat naturalem ordinationem rei ad eventum, sicut omnium ad salutem.1

1. For what is objected, that the Will of the Good Pleasure is not multiple; it must be said, that this is true as much as regards (Its) Substance; yet as much as regards those which it connotes [connotata] It is multiple, as has been seen.  For the absolute Will connotes an effect, the established Will [voluntas conditionata] connotes the natural ordination of the thing to the outcome, just as (is the natural ordination of) all (things) to salvation.1

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum2 ratione modi significandi etc.; dicendum, quod ratione modi significandi.  Est enim aliquis modus significandi voluntatem ut detestantem, quod facit prohibitio; alius modus ut approbantem, quod facit praeceptio.

2. To that which is asked, whether2 (these signs are distinguished) by reason of (their) manner of signifying etc.; it must be said, that (they are distinguished) by reason of (their) manner of signifying.  For there is one manner of signifying the Will as One detesting, which a prohibition does; another manner as One approving, which a preception does.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas non est respectu mali; dicendum, quod per modum approbationis non est respectu mali, sed3 ex malo eliciti; per modum vero detestantis est respectu mali in se.

3. To that which is objected, that the (Divine) Will is not in respect of evil; it must be said, that through the manner of approbation It is not in respect of an evil, but (in respect of a good)3 elicited out of evil; however through the manner of one detesting It is in respect of an evil in itself.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cuilibet bono respondet malum ex opposito; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen bono supererogationis potest opponi malum et non-malum.  In quantum enim supererogationis, opponitur minus bonum; in quantum autem bonum, opponitur malum, sed non aliud, et illud quidem opponitur4 bono praecepti; et ideo cadit sub prohibitione.

4. To that which is objected, that to any good there responds an evil ex opposite; it must be said, that it is true; yet to the good of supererogation there can be opposed an evil and a non-evil.  For inasmuch as (it is a good) of supererogation, (what is) less good is opposed (to it) but inasmuch as (it is) a good, an evil (is opposed to it); but not the other (i. e. the non-evil), and the former (of these two, i.e. an evil), indeed, is opposed4 to the good of a precept; and for that reason falls under prohibition.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cohibitione, dicendum, quod illa impedit effectum, et propter hoc privat rationem significandi, ut visum est.

5. To that which is objected concerning (an act of) restraining [cohibitio], it must be said, that that impedes an effect, and on account of that it deprives the reckoning of signifying, as has been seen.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consilio opponitur dissuasio; dicendum, quod, sicut opinio est una contrariorum, quia est acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius,5 sic consilium, quia non accipit alteram partem determinate, comprehendit suasionem et dissuasionem.  Nam qui suadet consulit, et qui dissuadet similiter consulit aliquid.

6. To that which is objected, that to a counsel there is opposed (an act of) dissuading; it must be said, that, just as an opinion is one of (two) contraries, because it is the accepting [acceptio] of one side with dread [formidine] for the other,5 so a counsel, because it does not accept the other side in a determined manner, comprehends a recommendation [suasionem] and a dissuasion [dissuasionem].  For he who recommends counsels, and he who dissuades similarly counsels something.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

In assignandis quinque signis divinae voluntatis antiqui magistri conveniunt, non autem eandem viam tenent, ut sufficientiam et congruentiam horum signorum manifestent.  De his opinionibus diffusius agit Alex. Hal., loc. in q. 1. cit; et de ipsis signis ibid. in qq. 37. 38. 39.

In assigning five signs of the Divine Will the ancient masters agree, but they do not hold to the same way, in manifesting the sufficiency and congruence of these signs.  Alexander of Hales deals with these opinions diffusely, in the passage cited in q. 1; and on the signs themselves, ibid., in qq. 37, 38, and 39.

Praeter iam in quaestione 1. citatos:  Scot., I. Sent. d. 47. q. unica.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I.q . 19. a. 12.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 11.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. 3.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 12.

Besides those already cited in Question 1:  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 47, q. sole.  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 19, a. 12.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 11.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2 and 3.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 12.

1  Cfr. infra d. 46. q. 1.  —  In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba connotat effectum, voluntas conditionata.

2  Supple cum Vat. distinguantur.  Mox post ratione modi in plurimis codd. et ed. 1 deest significandi.

3  Supple cum cod. O (Q in marg.) boni, vel cum cod. V respectu boni.

4  Pro et illud quidem opponitur Vat. quam illud quod opponitur, quae et paulo superius cum nonnullis mss. omittit enim, pro qua particula cod. O exhibet est.

5   Sic et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.) dicit, opinionem esse natura sua quid incertum (abebaion).  —  Mox post determinate Vat. perperam addit quia.

1  Cf. below d. 46, q. 1.  —  In the Vatican edition and codex cc there are wanting the words connotes an effect, the established Will [connotat effectum, voluntas conditionata].

2  Supply together with the Vatican edition are distinguished [distinguantur].  Next after by reason of (their) manner [ratione modi] in very many codices and edition 1 there is missing of signifying [significandi].

3  Supply together with codex O (Q in the margin) a good [boni], and/or together with codex V in respect of a good [respectu boni].

4  For and the former, indeed, is opposed [et illud quidem opponitur] the Vatican edition has than that which is opposed [quam illud quod opponitur], which also a little above this, together with not a few manuscripts, omits for [enim], in place of which codex O exhibits it is [est].

5   Thus also Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 26 (ch. 33), says, that an opinion is by its nature something uncertain [abebaion].  —  Next after in a determined manner [determinate] the Vatican edition faultily adds because [quia].

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.